LINCOLN 
LIBRARY 


STATE  CO 
SANTA    B 


LINCOLN    UBHARY 
SANTA   BA«9\»      STATE  COLLEGE 


n 


THE   RISE   AND   GROWTH   OF 
AMERICAN    POLITICS 


A  Sketch  of  Constitutional  Development 


BY 

HENRY  JONES    FORD 


THE    MACMILLAN   COMPANY 

LONDON  :    MACMILLAN  &  CO.,  LTD. 
1898 

All  rights  reserved 


COPYRIGHT,  1898, 
BY  THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY. 


J.  8.  Gushing  &  Co.  -  Berwick  &  Smith 
Norwood,  MM*.  U.S.A. 


SANTA  BARBARA  COLLEGE  L1BBABY 

Li;f>A^Y 


PREFACE 

THE  purpose  of  this  work  is  to  tell  the  story  of 
our  politics  so  as  to  explain  their  nature  and  inter- 
pret their  characteristics.  Consideration  of  ques- 
tions of  public  policy  or  of  party  issues  does  not 
enter  into  the  plan,  and  they  are  referred  to  only 
as  they  have  affected  the  formation  of  political 
structure  ;  but  in  this  respect  their  influence  has 
been  so  continuous  that  the  work  presents  a  view 
of  our  political  history  from  colonial  times  to  the 
present  day.  The  object,  however,  has  been  to 
give  an  explanation  of  causes  rather  than  a  narra- 
tive of  events,  so  that  the  reader  may  understand 
the  actual  system  of  government  under  which 
we  live. 

Our  politics  do  not  become  intelligible  until 
they  are  viewed  as  an  offshoot  from  English  poli- 
tics, and  the  growth  of  the  variety  is  studied  with 
regard  to  the  characteristics  of  the  stock.  This  is 
the  method  pursued  in  the  present  work,  with 
results  which,  I  hope,  will  show  the  operation  of 
principles  of  order  and  progress. 

H.  J.  F. 

PITTSBURGH,  PENN. 


5^ 

4. 


CONTENTS 

PART   I 
ORIGINS  OF  AMERICAN  POLITICS 


CHAPTER 

PAGE 

I.     Colonial  Methods    . 

I 

II.     The  Political  Ideas  of  the  Fathers  . 

•            17 

III.     The  Conservative  Reaction 

•       34 

IV.     The  Restoration      

•       45 

V.     Class  Rule      ...... 

•      59 

POLITICAL   DEVELOPMENT 

VI.  Setting  Up  the  Government    ....  72 

VII.  The  Origin  of  Parties 90 

VIII.  The  Ruling  Class  Divided       ....  106 

IX.  Political  Force         .         .         .         .         .         .121 

X.  Democratic  Tendencies 130 

XI.  Establishing  the  Machine        ....  141 

XII.  The  Nationalizing  Influence  of  Party        .         .  150 

XIII.  Democratic  Reform         .         .         .         .         .162 

XIV.  The  Veto  Power 175 

XV.  The  Presidency  as  a  Representative  Institution  188 

XVI.  The  Convention  System          ....  197 

XVII.  The  Transformation  of  the  Constitution  .  208 


Vlll 


CONTENTS 


PART  III 
THE  ORGANS  OF  GOVERNMENT 

CHAPTER  PACK 

XVIII.  Instruments  of  Rule 217 

XIX.  The  Congress 221 

XX.  The  House  of  Representatives      .         .         .  239 

XXI.  The  Senate 256 

XXII.  The  Presidency 275 

XXIII.  Party  Organization 294 

XXIV.  Party  Subsistence 311 

XXV.  Party  Efficiency 325 

PART   IV 

TENDENCIES  AND  PROSPECTS  OF  AMERICAN 
POLITICS 

XXVI      Political  Ideas  of  Our  Times         .         .         -334 

XXVII.     The  Political  Prospect          .         .         .         .354 

XXVIII.     The  Ultimate  Type      .         .         ...         .365 


APPENDIX 

Direct  Participation  of  the  Heads  of  Executive  Depart- 
ments in  the  Proceedings  of  Congress    .         .         .     383 


INDEX 


397 


THE    RISE    AND    GROWTH    OF 
AMERICAN    POLITICS 


CHAPTER   I 

COLONIAL    METHODS 

ENGLISH  colonies  at  the  present  day  do  not 
afford  a  parallel  to  the  political  conditions  of  the 
American  colonies  at  the  time  of  the  outbreak  of 
the  Revolution.  The  imperial  sovereignty  is  now 
a  protectorate  which  does  not  interfere  with  colo- 
nial independence  in  domestic  affairs,  and  party 
divisions  in  the  colonies  take  place  on  issues  quite 
distinct  from  those  which  agitate  English  constitu- 
encies. But  before  the  Revolution  of  1776,  Eng- 
land exercised  its  jurisdiction  whenever  it  saw  fit, 
action  being  generally  for  the  purpose  of  binding 
American  trade  to  suit  English  interests.  The 
colonies  had  to  keep  agents  at  Westminster  to 


2  ORIGINS   OF  AMERICAN  POLITICS 

look  after  their  interests.  In  such  a  capacity 
Benjamin  Franklin  began  his  illustrious  diplo- 
matic career.  American  politics  were  merged  into 
the  general  movement  of  English  politics.  Colo- 
nists were  Whigs  or  Tories  as  hotly  as  in  England. 
John  Adams  tells  us  :  "  In  every  colony  divisions 
have  always  prevailed.  In  New  York,  Pennsyl- 
vania, Massachusetts,  and  all  the  rest,  a  court  and 
country  party  has  always  contended.  Whig  and 
Tory  disputed  sharply  before  the  Revolution  and  in 
every  step  during  the  Revolution."  1 

There  was,  however,  very  little  community  of 
sentiment  between  the  people  of  the  various 
colonies.  The  facilities  of  travel  and  intercourse 
which  now  give  a  national  fluidity  to  opinion  and 
apply  a  steady  corrective  to  local  prejudice,  were 
then  unknown.  Intense  antipathies  were  cher- 
ished by  people  in  one  locality  against  those  of 
another.  When  the  colonies  assumed  the  powers 
of  states,  these  prejudices  acquired  great  impor- 
tance. They  had  to  be  reckoned  with  at  almost 
every  step  taken  by  the  Continental  Congress. 
With  the  very  beginning  of  federal  government, 
sectional  antipathies  infused  into  national  politics 
a  rancor,  some  of  whose  bitterness  still  remains. 
In  a  letter  written  in  1815,  when  sectional  hatred 
had  reached  a  maddening  pitch,  John  Adams  said  : 
"  It  sprang  from  the  little  intercourse  and  less 
knowledge  which  the  people  of  the  then  British 

1  Adams'  Works,  Vol.  X.,  p.  23. 


COLONIAL  METHODS  3 

provinces  possessed  of  each  other  antecedently  of 
the  American  Revolution,  and  instead  of  being  dis- 
sipated by  an  event  so  honorable  to  them  all,  has 
been  cherished  and  perpetuated  for  political  party 
purposes." 

Colonial  society  was  a  copy  of  English  society 
of  the  same  period,  a  little  caricatured.  The 
caste  spirit  was  rather  more  pronounced,  for  it  had 
more  to  contend  with,  and  hence  was  disposed  to 
emphasize  visible  distinctions.  People  were  ex- 
pected to  dress  according  to  their  rank  and  keep 
their  proper  place.  At  the  inn,  the  parlor  and 
club-room  were  reserved  for  the  gentry ;  the 
tradesman  and  his  wife  went  to  the  tap-room  or 
the  kitchen.  A  man's  seat  in  church  was  expected 
to  correspond  with  his  social  position.  Even  in 
New  England,  whose  levelling  tendencies  were 
one  source  of  the  prejudice  felt  against  that  sec- 
tion in  other  colonies,  it  was  the  practice  to  "  dig- 
nify the  congregation  "  in  the  assignment  of  sittings. 
Common  people  wore  leather  and  homespun ;  gen- 
tlemen put  flounces  of  lace  on  their  linen,  adorned 
their  coats  and  waistcoats  with  gold  and  silver 
braid,  wore  silks  and  satins,  even  in  such  colors 
as  red  and  blue,  and  crowned  the  ornate  edifice  of 
their  attire  by  removing  the  natural  thatch  of  their 
heads  to  give  place  to  the  crisp  volutes  and  frizzed 
convexities  devised  by  the  art  of  the  perruquier. 
When  men  could  dress  in  such  fashion,  imagine  to 
what  monstrosities  of  elegance  the  ladies  were 


4  ORIGINS  OF  AMERICAN  POLITICS 

pushed  to  maintain  the  superiority  of  their  sex! 
Brissot  de  Warville,  a  French  traveller,  who  visited 
this  country  soon  after  the  Revolutionary  War, 
was  astonished  at  the  luxurious  fashions  and 
costly  dress  of  the  ladies,  and  thought  some  gowns 
he  saw  at  a  party  given  by  Cyrus  Griffin,  presi- 
dent of  Congress,  were  scandalously  indecent. 
Simplicity  of  dress  did  not  come  in  until  after  the 
French  Revolution. 

Politics,  the  organic  activity  of  society  in  its 
civic  character,  bore  a  like  aristocratic  stamp.  As 
in  England  at  the  same  period,  the  laws  bore 
hardly  on  the  poor  and  tended  to  perpetuate  dis- 
tinctions between  patricians  and  plebeians.  Poor 
Richard's  saying,  that  the  borrower  is  servant  to 
the  lender,  had  special  point  to  it  in  the  days  of 
imprisonment  for  debt.  The  humane  reforms, 
which  in  every  civilized  country  have  swept  away 
the  ancient  barbarities  of  the  penal  code,  were  yet 
to  be  begun.  The  jails  were  sinks  of  filth  and 
depravity  ;  and  the  whipping-post,  the  stocks,  and 
the  pillory  were  in  active  employment.  The  suf- 
frage was  closely  restricted  by  property  qualifica- 
tions, and  when  it  came  to  holding  office  these 
were  raised  to  a  point  at  which  only  men  of  wealth 
were  eligible.  Drinking  was  the  inevitable  ac- 
companiment of  the  transaction  of  public  busi- 
ness of  almost  every  kind  and  at  election  times 
liquor  flowed  in  abundance.  In  New  England, 
the  town-meeting  system  produced  peculiar  politi- 


COLONIAL  METHODS  5 

cal  methods  which  bore  the  stamp  of  Puritan 
church  procedure,  but  in  most  of  the  colonies 
electioneering  was  carried  on  as  in  England. 
Candidates  announced  themselves  in  flourishing  ad- 
dresses to  electors  and  were  expected  to  maintain 
lavish  hospitality.  Among  the  items  of  a  bill  of 
election  expenses  incurred  by  Washington  in  1757 
are  one  hogshead  and  one  barrel  of  punch,  thirty- 
five  gallons  of  wine,  and  forty-three  gallons  of 
hard  cider. 

Early  in  the  history  of  the  colonies  variations 
from  English  methods  began  which  eventually 
came  to  be  regarded  as  American  characteris- 
tics ;  but  Americanisms  in  politics,  like  American- 
isms in  speech,  are  apt  to  be  Anglicisms  which 
died  out  in  England  but  survived  in  the  new 
world.  The  American  practice  of  requiring  that 
representatives  should  be  inhabitants  of  their  dis- 
tricts, was  an  old  idea  of  English  politics.  An- 
ciently the  king's  writ,  expressly  confirmed  by  a 
statute  of  Parliament,  required  that  none  but  resi- 
dent burgesses  should  be  elected  to  Parliament. 
The  law  was  disregarded  and  became  dead  letter 
in  England ;  transplanted  to  America  it  lived  and 
flourished. 

The  early  introduction  of  the  ballot  in  America 
was  likewise  the  fruition  of  ideas  which  in  Eng- 
land fell  upon  stony  ground,  but  which  found  a 
fair  field  in  the  new  world.  Among  the  reform 
projects  with  which  the  political  theorists  of  the 


6  ORIGINS   OF  AMERICAN  POLITICS 

seventeenth  century  busied  themselves,  the  ballot 
occupied  a  prominent  place.  A  political  tract,  pub- 
lished in  the  time  of  William  and  Mary,  refers  to 
the  use  of  the  ballot  as  being  then  an  old  estab- 
lished custom  in  the  borough  of  Limmington, 
Hampshire ;  but  this  was  an  exception  which 
passed  away,  and  the  ballot  was  not  established  in 
England  until  the  Australian  system  was  adopted 
in  1872.  In  the  colonies,  however,  the  ballot  sys- 
tem took  root  at  an  early  period.  It  is  prominent 
in  the  philosophic  constitutions  prepared  for  the 
proprietary  colonies  of  South  Carolina,  West  Jer- 
sey, and  Pennsylvania.  .-  Theoretic  considerations 
had  probably,  however,  much  less  to  do  with  the 
growth  of  the  ballot  system  than  the  circumstances 
of  colonial  life.  Before  the  formal  introduction 
of  the  ballot  anywhere,  a  practice  had  sprung  up 
in  Virginia,  in  the  New  England  colonies,  and 
perhaps  elsewhere,  of  sending  votes  in  writing  to 
avoid  the  trouble  of  personal  attendance  at  elec- 
tions. This  practice  was  suppressed  in  Virginia 
at  an  early  date,  but  was  methodized  into  a  regular 
system  throughout  New  England,  where  elections 
came  to  be  known  as  "  proxings  "  because  the 
votes  of  the  freemen  were  given  by  proxy  by 
means  of  voting  papers.  At  the  time  of  the 
Revolution,  New  Jersey  and  North  Carolina, 
which  had  at  one  time  used  the  ballot,  had 
adopted  the  English  system  of  viva-voce  voting, 
which  also  prevailed  in  New  York,  New  Jer- 


COLONIAL  METHODS  J 

sey,  Maryland,  Virginia,  and  Georgia.  Voting 
papers  or  ballots  were  in  use  throughout  New 
England  and  in  Pennsylvania,  Delaware,  and 
South  Carolina.1  The  ballot,  in  the  modern  sense 
of  a  party  ticket  put  into  the  hands  of  voters, 
is  a  comparatively  late  development.  In  1794, 
John  Adams  extenuated  "  a  very  unwarranted  and 
indecent  attempt  .  .  .  upon  the  freedom  of  elec- 
tions "  committed  by  his  own  party,  on  the  ground 
that  "  the  opposite  party  .  .  .  practise  arts  nearly 
as  unwarrantable  in  secret,  and  by  sending  agents 
with  printed  votes."  2 

Party  organization,  whose  astonishing  develop- 
ment since  the  adoption  of  the  constitution  causes 
it  to  be  regarded  as  peculiar  to  the  politics  of  the 
republic,  is  a  growth  from  colonial  politics,  and  its 
beginnings  were  common  to  England  and  America. 
In  1769,  during  the  excitement  over  the  famous 
Middlesex  election,  the  holding  of  mass  meetings 
first  became  a  political  practice  in  England,  and 
many  reform  associations  were  organized.  To 
keep  up  communication  with  one  another  they 
appointed  committees  on  correspondence.  The 
American  Whigs  were  in  hearty  sympathy  with 
these  movements.  Before  the  year  was  out 
the  South  Carolina  assembly  had  an  angry 
contention  with  the  provincial  council,  because 
the  latter  refused  to  concur  in  a  grant  of 

1  Bishop's  Colonial  Elections,  Chap.  III. 

2  Adams'  Works,  Vol.  I.,  p.  474. 


8  ORIGINS   OF  AMERICAN  POLITICS 

10,500  pounds  currency  (equal  to  about  1500 
pounds  sterling)  as  a  contribution  to  the  funds 
of  the  English  Constitutional  Society.  In  1771, 
Samuel  Adams  wrote  to  Arthur  Lee,  of  Virginia, 
—  then  in  London  and  active  in  politics  there 
as  a  supporter  of  the  famous  demagogue  John 
Wilkes,  —  proposing  that  committees  should  be 
formed  in  the  colonies  to  correspond  with  "the 
Society  of  the  Supporters  of  the  Bill  of  Rights" 
in  England.1  Towards  the  close  of  the  following 
year,  the  Boston  town  meeting  took  the  lead  in 
banding  together  the  Massachusetts  town  meetings 
by  means  of  such  committees  of  correspondence. 
Soon  after,  intercolonial  committees  of  corre- 
spondence were  organized  under  the  lead  of  the 
Virginia  House  of  Burgesses.  These  committees 
are  the  lineal  predecessors  of  our  state  central 
committees. 

Another  feature  of  modern  political  methods 
which  was  derived  from  colonial  politics  is  the 
caucus.  It  made  its  appearance  in  the  politics 
of  New  England  long  before  the  Revolution.  The 
historian  William  Gordon,  writing  in  1774,  says 
the  system  was  in  operation  fifty  years  before 
that  time.  An  entry  of  February,  1773,  in  John 
Adams'  diary,  presents  a  picture  whose  traits 
are  curiously  modern.  He  writes :  "  This  day  I 
learned  that  the  caucus  club  meets  at  certain 
times  in  the  garret  of  Tom  Dawes,  the  adjutant 

1  Hosmer's  "  Samuel  Adams,"  Johns  Hopkins  University  Studies. 


COLONIAL  METHODS  9 

of  the  Boston  regiment.  He  has  a  large  house, 
and  he  has  a  movable  partition  in  his  garret,  which 
he  takes  down,  and  the  whole  club  meets  in  one 
room.  There  they  smoke  tobacco  till  you  cannot 
see  from  one  end  of  the  room  to  the  other.  There 
they  drink  flip,  I  suppose,  and  there  they  choose 
a  moderator  who  puts  questions  to  the  vote  regu- 
larly ;  and  selectmen,  assessors,  collectors,  fire- 
wards,  and  representatives  are  regularly  chosen 
before  they  are  chosen  in  the  town."  1 

In  the  Middle  and  Southern  colonies,  the  posi- 
tion of  control  held  by  the  New  England  caucus 
was  occupied  by  groups  of  leading  men,  the  nature 
of  whose  association  was  as  much  social  as  politi- 
cal. Their  influence  was  exercised  in  connection 
with  the  proceedings  of  the  provincial  assemblies, 
whose  sessions  brought  on  the  gay  season  in  the 
world  of  society.  More  closely  resembling  in 
their  composition  and  demeanor  the  caucus  club 
described  by  John  Adams,  were  the  committees  of 
safety  which  sprang  up  during  the  Revolution,  but 
for  lack  of  such  an  instrument  to  work  with  as 
the  town  meeting,  they  had  less  direct  political 
influence  and  were  prone  to  mere  rowdyism. 
Some  did  such  work  as  Thomas  Paine  referred  to 
in  the  second  of  his  "  Crisis  "  series  of  pamphlets, 
when  he  spoke  of  the  shame  felt  by  all  sensible 
men  at  the  tarring,  feathering,  and  carting  through 
the  streets,  of  suspected  loyalists. 

1  Adams'  Works,  Vol.  X.,  p.  no. 


IO  ORIGINS   OF  AMERICAN  POLITICS 

During  the  Revolutionary  period,  constitutional 
means  of  popular  participation  in  the  conduct  of 
government  were  so  undeveloped  that  party  as  an 
agency  of  political  control  denoted  little  more  than 
a  connection  of  interest  among  the  gentry.  Even 
in  caucus-ruled  Boston,  John  Adams  says  that 
three  rich  merchants,  Thomas  Hancock,  Charles 
Apthorp,  and  Thomas  Green,  when  united  could 
carry  any  election  almost  unanimously.  He  re- 
marks that  "  half  a  dozen  or  at  most  a  dozen 
families  had  always  controlled  Connecticut." 1 
The  course  of  New  York  politics  was  determined 
by  the  attitude  of  the  great  families  —  the  Living- 
stons, the  Schuylers  and  the  Clintons.  In  the 
South,  political  power  depended  almost  wholly  on 
social  influence  and  family  connection.  Demo- 
cratic activities  gave  the  Revolutionary  movement 
explosive  violence  in  Boston,  and  caused  ferments 
in  other  centres  of  population  which  hastened  the 
progress  of  events  towards  independence ;  but  the 
urban  population  was  small  —  not  one-thirtieth  of 
the  whole.  There  were  but  four  cities  in  the 
country  with  over  10,000  inhabitants.  Boston  had 
a  population  of  about  18,000.  The  chief  city  was 
Philadelphia,  with  42,000  population.  One-fifth  of 
the  total  population  of  the  country  was  embraced 
within  the  bounds  of  Virginia,  a  colony  which  had 
no  large  towns.  The  mass  of  the  people  were 
outside  the  area  of  democratic  influence. 

1  Adams'  Works,  Vol.  VI.,  pp.  506,  530. 


COLONIAL  METHODS  it 

There  are  still  to  be  found  isolated  districts, 
particularly  in  the  South,  which  exhibit  to  a  not- 
able extent  the  prevailing  social  conditions  of  the 
Revolutionary  period.  One  finds  among  the  people 
in  a  locality  of  this  sort  an  abundance  of  political 
prejudice  combined  with  very  little  knowledge. 
When  one  seeks  the  basis  of  an  opinion  it  is  dis- 
covered to  consist  of  popular  confidence  in  the 
local  magnate  from  which  it  was  derived,  and  thus 
being  really  an  article  of  faith  between  man  and 
man  it  is  held  with  peculiar  fervor.  This  relation- 
ship is  finely  illustrated  by  an  anecdote  recorded 
by  the  Marquis  de  Chastellux,  who  visited  Amer- 
ica in  1780-1782.  Governor  Benjamin  Harrison, 
of  Virginia,  said  that  when  he  was  setting  out 
with  Jefferson  and  Lee  to  attend  the  first  session 
of  the  Continental  Congress,  his  anxiety  over  the 
crisis  was  increased  by  the  fact  that  a  number  of 
the  plain  people  of  the  neighborhood  waited  on 
him  and  said,  "You  assert  that  there  is  a  fixed 
intention  to  invade  our  rights  and  privileges  ;  we 
own  that  we  do  not  see  this  clearly,  but  since  you 
assure  us  that  it  is  so,  we  believe  the  fact."  They 
expressed  their  confidence  that  he  would  do  what 
was  right,  and  returned  to  their  homes  to  abide  the 
issue  whatever  it  might  be,  while  he  went  on  his 
way  with  a  heavy  consciousness  of  the  trust  re- 
posed in  him.1 

Such  deference  by  the  people  must  not  be  taken 

1  Chastellux's  Travels,  Vol.  II.,  p.  157. 


12 

to  imply  any  subserviency  of  disposition.  It  was 
a  necessary  consequence  of  the  fact  that  agencies 
for  the  creation  of  an  intelligent  public  opinion 
were  not  in  existence.  There  were  only  thirty- 
seven  newspapers  in  the  entire  country  in  1775, 
and  they  had  no  regular  sources  of  intelligence. 
Leading  men  in  different  localities  kept  one  an- 
other informed  of  political  movements  by  corre- 
spondence. The  political  conditions  were  such 
that  as  a  rule  only  those  in  social  relations  with 
the  governing  class  —  that  is  to  say,  the  gentry  — 
were  in  a  position  to  obtain  the  information,  and 
arrange  the  concert  of  action,  necessary  to  the  ex- 
ecution of  political  designs.  The  men  who  organ- 
ized the  Continental  Congress  and  gave  a  national 
character  to  the  Revolutionary  struggle,  who  bom- 
barded king  and  Parliament  with  constitutional 
arguments,  and  who  finally  declared  their  indepen- 
dence of  the  British  crown,  were  men  of  the  same 
breed  as  those  who  upset  the  throne  of  James  II. 
The  English  revolutionists  of  1688  called  in  Wil- 
liam of  Orange  to  depose  James  II.  The  Ameri- 
can revolutionists  of  1776  called  in  the  French 
power  to  depose  George  III  from  his  colonial 
dominion. 

The  scheme  of  taxing  the  colonies  did  not  origi- 
nate as  a  party  measure.  The  great  increase  of 
imperial  expenditure  on  account  of  the  American 
civil  and  military  establishment,  caused  by  the 
French  and  Indian  War,  was  likely  to  suggest  it 


COLONIAL  METHODS  1 3 

to  any  economical  administration.  The  idea  of 
imposing  taxes  was  broached  as  early  as  1739 
when  the  Whig  leader,  Walpole,  was  at  the  head 
of  affairs,  but  was  rejected  by  that  prudent  states- 
man. The  angry  contention  in  Massachusetts 
over  the  issue  of  general  search  warrants  for  the 
discovery  of  smuggled  goods,  in  which  James  Otis 
distinguished  himself,  and  which  John  Adams  re- 
garded as  the  first  step  towards  revolution,  began 
while  the  elder  Pitt  was  still  prime  minister.  The 
passage  in  1765  of  the  first  stamp  act  met  with 
little  opposition  in  Parliament  and  was  almost  un- 
noticed in  England.  The  violent  outburst  of  re- 
sentment in  America  took  English  statesmen  by 
surprise. 

Although  the  stamp  act  was  repealed  by  the 
short-lived  Whig  ministry  of  1765-1766,  the  right 
of  Parliament  to  tax  the  colonies  was  strongly 
affirmed ;  but  moderation  and  considerateness 
were  such  habitual  characteristics  of  Whig  policy 
that  had  the  Whigs  remained  in  power,  means 
might  have  been  found  to  satisfy  imperial  needs 
without  outraging  colonial  sentiment.  The  real 
issue  was  one  of  home  rule.  The  colonies  had 
become  too  big  to  remain  in  tutelage  to  English 
politicians.  A  profound  change  in  their  relations 
to  the  home  government  would  have  been  required 
in  any  event  to  make  room  for  the  growing  spirit 
of  self-reliance  and  incipient  nationality.  No  class 
of  men  were  less  fitted  to  deal  with  such  a  delicate 


14  ORIGINS   OF  AMERICAN  POLITICS 

matter  than  the  Tories  under  Lord  North,  whom 
George  III  raised  to  power  in  1770  as  the  instru- 
ment of  his  personal  will,  and  for  whom  he  pro- 
vided a  parliamentary  majority  by  the  exercise  of 
every  influence  which  the  crown  could  bring  to 
bear.  Their  sole  idea  of  dealing  with  American 
affairs  was  to  meet  colonial  resistance  with  stub- 
born determination. 

The  burning  interest  with  which  party  leaders 
in  our  own  times  follow  the  fortunes  of  a  decisive 
campaign  in  an  important  state,  affords  as  good 
an  idea  as  different  political  conditions  will  allow, 
of  the  kind  of  feeling  with  which  the  English 
Whig  leaders  regarded  the  struggle  of  the  Ameri- 
can Whigs,  but  can  give  no  idea  of  its  depth  or 
intensity.  They  believed  their  party  existence  — 
nay,  the  very  life  of  the  English  constitution  — 
was  staked  on  the  issue.  At  the  time  the  Ameri- 
can discontents  broke  out  in  open  insurrection,  the 
Whig  party  in  England  was  in  a  dispirited  state. 
The  spirit  of  resistance  to  crown  encroachments 
which  had  flamed  so  audaciously  in  the  letters 
of  Junius  and  in  the  diatribes  of  Wilkes  seemed 
to  have  died  out  altogether.  "  England,"  wrote 
Chatham,  "is  no  more  like  old  England  or  Eng- 
land forty  years  ago  than  the  Monsignori  of  mod- 
ern Rome  are  like  the  Decii,  the  Gracchi,  or  the 
Catos."  Burke  declared  :  "  The  people  have  fallen 
into  a  total  indifference  to  any  matters  of  public 
concern.  I  do  not  suppose  that  there  was  ever 


COLONIAL  METHODS  15 

anything  like  this  torpor  in  any  period  of  our 
history."  Junius  wrote  to  his  publisher  that  it 
would  be  folly  for  him  to  write  anything  more, 
since  the  cause  had  become  hopeless.  The  only 
effective  resistance  to  the  designs  of  the  court  was 
that  which  came  from  the  colonies.  If  that  was 
broken  down,  it  was  the  belief  of  the  Whig  lead- 
ers that  the  ruin  of  English  liberties  would  follow. 
The  Duke  of  Richmond  took  steps  to  provide  him- 
self with  a  suitable  asylum  in  France,  in  case 
American  defeat  should  be  the  signal  of  proscrip- 
tion in  England.1  The  Whig  leaders  compared 
the  Continental  troops  to  the  army  of  deliverance 
led  by  William  of  Orange,  in  1688,  and  with  good 
reason.  The  surrender  of  Cornwallis  gave  the 
death-blow  to  the  system  of  personal  rule  which 
the  king  had  laboriously  erected,  and  ended  a  long 
crisis  by  definitely  setting  the  course  of  English 
constitutional  development  in  the  ways  of  parlia- 
mentary government.  A  still  more  pregnant  con- 
sequence was  the  establishment  of  American 
independence,  leaving  the  American  Whigs  with 
separate  political  interests  to  administer  in  pro- 
foundly altered  circumstances  which  soon  caused 
changes  of  vast  importance  to  human  destiny. 

The  event  was  a  victory  for  the  Whigs  on  both 
sides  of  the  water,  and  was  treated  as  such.  Terms 
of  separation  were  arranged  without  rancor.  Nom- 
inally, the  American  interests  were  in  charge  of 

1  Lecky's  History  of  England,  Vol.  III.,  pp.  590,  591. 


1 6  ORIGINS   OF  AMERICAN  POLITICS 

France  ;  but  the  American  commissioners,  by  direct 
negotiation  with  the  Whig  ministry  then  in  power, 
obtained  greater  concessions  than  France  had  in- 
tended, as  it  was  not  her  policy  to  favor  the  rise  of 
a  great  power  in  America.  Her  intention  was  that 
the  sole  navigation  of  the  Mississippi,  and  dominion 
over  the  unoccupied  Western  country,  should  be 
the  compensation  which  Spain  would  receive  for 
entering  the  alliance  against  England.  On  her 
own  account,  France  was  opposed  to  giving  so 
great  a  share  in  the  Newfoundland  fisheries  as 
was  claimed  by  the  American  commissioners.  Yet, 
by  the  aid  of  their  Whig  friends,  the  American  com- 
missioners were  successful  at  every  point.  The 
young  nation  was  accorded  liberal  fishery  rights, 
and  territorial  claims  were  conceded  which  pro- 
vided a  continental  area  in  which  to  expand.1  It 
was  a  generous  settlement  of  the  family  quarrel. 

1  Lecky's  History  of  England,  Vol.  IV.,  pp.  278-284. 


CHAPTER   II 

THE    POLITICAL    IDEAS    OF    THE    FATHERS 

THE  writings  of  the  statesmen  of  the  Revolu- 
tionary period  show  that  they  regarded  political 
institutions  with  prepossessions  of  another  charac- 
ter than  those  which  now  influence  men's  minds. 
The  world  was  very  different  then,  and  a  different 
set  of  traditions  guided  opinion.  Such  concep- 
tions as  self-government,  the  sovereignty  of  the 
people,  the  rights  of  nationality,  whose  validity 
is  now  generally  regarded  as  obvious,  were  then 
innovating  ideas  which  had  yet  to  make  their  way. 
Rousseau's  "  Social  Contract,"  which  developed 
the  doctrine  of  the  sovereignty  of  the  people  to 
extreme  lengths,  exerted  marked  influence  upon 
French  thought  in  the  last  quarter  of  the  eigh- 
teenth century,  but  it  had  no  visible  effect  upon 
English  or  American  politics.  The  colonists  did 
not  trouble  themselves  about  speculative  concep- 
tions of  popular  rights.  It  took  practical  griev- 
ances to  move  them,  and  in  their  remonstrances 
they  had  recourse  to  the  laws  and  constitution  of 
the  realm.  Only  when  they  came  to  actual  separa- 
tion did  they  fall  back  upon  the  abstract  principles 
of  liberty  which  are  set  forth  in  the  Declaration  of 
c  17 


1 8  ORIGINS   OF  AMERICAN  POLITICS 

Independence.  That  was  a  manifesto  for  a  par- 
ticular occasion,  and  history  shows  that  only  slowly 
and  by  degrees  did  it  come  to  be  regarded  as  an 
embodiment  of  principles  of  government. 

Among  the  things  which  make  Mr.  Bryce's 
great  work  on  "The  Holy  Roman  Empire  "  a  good 
preparation  for  the  study  of  American  history,  is 
the  fact  that  it  brings  vividly  to  the  mind  the 
recent  origin  of  the  cardinal  ideas  of  our  times. 
It  exhibits  to  us  a  period  when  the  ideas  of  nation- 
ality, which  gradually  emerged  in  Europe  after  the 
migrations  of  peoples  had  ceased,  were  opposed 
by  venerable  traditions  of  legality  and  civilization. 
To  the  jurists  and  reformers  of  the  thirteenth  and 
fourteenth  centuries,  the  development  of  nationality 
seemed  to  be  a  baleful  disintegration  of  the  Holy 
Roman  Empire.  The  emperor  was  the  Lord's 
Anointed,  to  whom  kings  and  peoples  owed  their 
obedience.  Dante  did  not  see  how  freedom  could 
be  possible  except  under  the  government  of  an 
universal  monarch,  who,  having  no  rival  to  fear 
and  no  further  ambition  to  gratify,  could  have  no 
motive  save  to  rule  in  wisdom  and  in  equity.  To 
Petrarch,  the  existence  of  an  imperial  jurisdiction, 
coextensive  with  Christendom,  was  as  obvious  a 
necessity  as  that  a  body  should  have  a  head.  In 
language,  which  reads  like  a  bitter  satire  upon  the 
condition  of  Europe  at  the  present  day,  he  re- 
marks what  a  hideous  portent  would  be  a  creature 
of  many  heads,  biting  and  fighting  one  another. 


THE  POLITICAL  IDEAS   OF  THE  FATHERS     19 

The  sublime  ideal  of  universal  peace  and  justice 
under  the  wise  providence  of  a  supreme  magistrate, 
elevated  above  the  reach  of  temptation,  was  never 
held  more  fervently  than  during  the  incessant  war 
and  political  chaos  of  the  Middle  Ages.  It  was 
never  absolutely  renounced,  but  its  hopelessness 
as  a  practicable  design  gradually  removed  it  from 
serious  consideration.  Its  vitality  as  a  political 
principle  was  shown  even  during  the  present  cen- 
tury in  an  astonishing  way,  by  Napoleon  Bona- 
parte's efforts  to  convert  the  kingdoms  of  Europe 
into  dependencies  of  his  empire.  "  There  will  be 
no  repose  in  Europe,"  he  said,  "  until  it  is  under 
one  head,  under  an  emperor  whose  officers  would 
be  kings."  1 

At  the  time  of  the  American  Revolution,  the 
Holy  Roman  Empire  still  preserved  a  nominal 
existence.  In  the  Federalist,  the  term  "  the  Em- 
peror" is  used  as  an  unique,  distinctive  title;  but 
the  old  conception  of  the  Emperor  as  the  supreme 
magistrate  of  Christendom  was  extinct,  and  in  its 
place  the  idea  of  a  balance  of  power  in  Europe 
had  been  developed  as  a  practical  expedient  for 
the  control  of  international  relations,  while  as  a 
basis  of  social  order  royal  authority  was  solidly 
fixed  in  public  confidence.  Political  ideas  take 
their  stamp  from  impressions  received  during  the 
unfolding  of  race  destiny.  During  the  Middle 
Ages,  no  other  political  institution  rendered  such 

1  Taine's  Modern  Regime,  Vol.  I.,  note  to  p.  36. 


2O  ORIGINS   OF  AMERICAN  POLITICS 

service  to  the  public  welfare  as  kingship.  It  was 
the  upholder  of  justice,  the  redresserof  grievances, 
the  guardian  of  the  commonwealth,  the  conservator 
of  the  public  peace ;  it  was  the  shelter  of  the  people 
against  the  arrogance  of  the  nobles.  The  substi- 
tution of  hereditary  succession  for  election  strength- 
ened these  functions  by  placing  the  crown  beyond 
the  reach  of  bargain  and  intrigue.  The  change 
established  a  self-perpetuating  national  magistracy 
of  indefeasible  tenure.  In  the  instinctive  effort  to 
raise  up  an  authority  strong  enough  to  counteract 
the  disintegrating  influences  of  feudalism,  it  was 
for  centuries  the  great  aim  of  European  jurispru- 
dence to  develop  regalian  rights  so  as  to  confer 
upon  royal  authority  the  omnipotence  with  which 
the  Roman  law  vested  the  head  of  the  state. 
Sanctions  of.  divine  right  were  attached  to  kingship 
which  were  originally  attributed  to  imperial  author- 
ity alone.  Monarchy  came  to  be  regarded  as  a 
part  of  the  natural  order  of  things,  the  likeness  in 
human  affairs  of  God's  providence  in  the  universe. 
Popular  dislike  of  individual  kings  weakened  this 
sentiment  no  more  than  dislike  for  a  president  of 
the  United  States  weakens  respect  for  the  constitu- 
tion. Revolts  at  particular  acts  of  royal  authority 
might  take  place,  but  the  principle  of  constitutional 
law  that  royal  authority  should  be  supreme  might 
not  be  questioned.  The  distinction  is  finely  illus- 
trated, with  perfect  fidelity  to  historic  truth,  by 
the  sentiment  which  Dumas  puts  in  the  mouth  of 


one  of  his  famous  musketeers.  Athos  tells  his  son  : 
"  Learn  how  to  distinguish  the  king  from  royalty ; 
the  king  is  but  a  man  ;  royalty  is  the  gift  of  God. 
Whenever  you  hesitate  as  to  whom  you  ought  to 
serve,  abandon  the  exterior,  the  material  appear- 
ance, for  the  invisible  principle ;  for  the  invisible 
principle  is  everything.  Should  the  king  prove  a 
tyrant  —  for  power  begets  tyranny  —  love,  respect 
royalty,  that  divine  right."  J 

Popular  assemblies,  institutions  originally  com- 
mon to  the  barbarian  peoples  who  parcelled  Europe 
among  them,  were  so  much  in  the  way  of  the'  execu- 
tive power  required  by  the  militancy  of  the  times 
that  they  were  gradually  shorn  of  authority  and 
almost  suppressed.  The  historian  Taine  dates  the 
deposit  of  absolute  authority  in  the  French  crown 
from  the  English  invasions  of  the  fifteenth  century, 
when  the  life  of  the  nation  depended  upon  the  re- 
moval of  every  restraint  upon  the  ability  of  the 
king  to  command  at  will  all  its  resources.  Only  in 
a  country  naturally  sheltered  from  invasion,  as  was 
England,  could  parliamentary  bodies  safely  retain 
their  authority.  At  the  time  when  the  disaffec- 
tion of  the  American  colonies  began,  the  various 
Continental  powers  seemed  to  enjoy  conditions  of 
security  and  progress  strictly  in  proportion  to  the 
extent  to  which  hindrances  upon  the  efficiency  of 
executive  power  had  been  removed.  The  Italian 
republics  which  sprang  up  during  the  Middle  Ages 
1  Alex.  Dumas'  Twenty  Years  After,  Chap.  XXII. 


22  ORIGINS  OF  AMERICAN  POLITICS 

had  passed  away,  leaving  odious  memories  of  crime 
and  disorder.  Venice  was  in  a  state  of  hopeless 
decay.  Most  of  the  Swiss  cantons  had  fallen 
under  the  rule  of  narrow  oligarchies.  Poland, 
which  had  preserved  the  principle  of  elective 
kingship  originally  common  among  European  peo- 
ples, was  declining  into  anarchy.  The  principle 
of  vitality  which  upheld  Holland  amid  the  cor- 
ruption and  enfeeblement  of  the  states  general 
seemed  to  be  the  quasi-roya\  position  obtained  by 
the  House  of  Orange  in  1749.  All  the  vigorous 
states  of  the  continent  were  despotic  in  constitution.1 
The  extinction  of  means  of  participation  in  the 
government  must  not  be  regarded  as  implying  a 
sense  of  oppression  among  the  people.  As  a  gen- 
eral thing  they  were  no  more  aggrieved  by  it  than 
the  residents  of  the  District  of  Columbia  were  in 
our  own  time  by  the  abolition  of  their  legislature. 
The  Revolution  of  1772  in  Sweden,  by  which  Gus- 
tavus  III  crushed  the  authority  of  the  Parliament, 
was  hailed  with  joy  by  his  people.  The  abolition 
of  serfdom,  the  removal  of  many  feudal  oppres- 
sions, the  betterment  of  social  conditions,  and  the 
enlargement  of  liberty  of  thought  were  derived 
from  the  exercise  of  royal  power,  while  such  ex- 
traneous organs  of  constituted  authority  as  still 
survived  were  apt  to  be  centres  of  resistance  to 
reform.2  Voltaire,  the  great  apostle  of  liberalism, 

1  Lecky,  Vol.  III.,  pp.  241,  242. 

2  Ibid.,  Vol.  V.,  pp.  315-318. 


THE  POLITICAL  IDEAS   OF  THE  FATHERS    2$ 

wrote  to  D'Alembert  in  1765:  "Who  would  have 
thought  that  the  cause  of  kings  would  be  that  of 
philosophers  ?  But  yet  it  is  evident  that  the  sages 
who  refuse  to  admit  two  powers  are  the  chief  sup- 
port of  royal  authority."  Again  he  said,  "  There 
ought  never  to  be  two  powers  in  the  state."  Lib- 
eral principles  of  government  were  in  fashion 
among  kings  until  the  French  Revolution  caused 
a  violent  reaction. 

England  presented  the  example  of  a  monarchy 
of  limited  prerogative  and  distributed  authority, 
but  for  a  long  period  before  the  French  Revolu- 
tion, the  relative  esteem  in  which  France  and  Eng- 
land were  held  as  regards  stability  of  government 
was  almost  exactly  the  reverse  of  what  it  has  been 
since.  It  was  England  that  was  associated  with 
traits  of  levity  and  changefulness.  Milton,  in  his 
treatise  on  "  A  Free  Commonwealth  "  published  in 
1660,  referred  to  "the  fickleness  which  is  attributed 
to  us  as  we  are  islanders,"  and  remarked  that  "  good 
education  and  acquisite  wisdom  ought  to  correct 
the  fluxible  fault,  if  any  there  be,  of  our  watery 
situation."  In  1649,  Parliament  destroyed  king- 
ship, only  to  lose  its  own  privileges  under  the 
autocratic  rule  of  Cromwell.  In  1660,  the  nation 
restored  royalty  without  conditions.  In  1688,  the 
king  was  driven  from  his  throne.  During  the 
eighteenth  century,  the  turbulence  of  English 
politics  was  proverbial.  The  admixture  of  popular 
representation  with  royal  authority  in  the  English 


24  ORIGINS  OF  AMERICAN  POLITICS 

constitution  seemed  to  be  a  source  of  political  cor- 
ruption and  civic  instability.  Bribery  was  resorted 
to  without  scruple  to  carry  the  public  business 
through  Parliament.  The  control  of  the  secret- 
service  fund  went  by  the  name  of  the  "  manage- 
ment of  the  House  of  Commons."  Wraxall,  in 
his  memoirs  published  in  1781,  remarks  that  it  is 
"  a  branch  of  administration  unfortunately  inter- 
woven with,  and  inseparable  from,  the  genius  of 
the  British  constitution ;  perhaps  of  every  form 
of  government  in  which  democracy  or  popular 
representation  makes  an  essential  part."  The 
philosopher  Hume,  in  an  essay  published  in  1741, 
points  out  the  tendency  to  amass  authority  in  the 
House  of  Commons,  with  its  accompanying  pros- 
pect of  a  tyranny  of  factions,  and  concludes  that 
"  we  shall  at  .last,  after  many  convulsions  and  civil 
wars,  finds  repose  in  absolute  monarchy,  which  it 
would  have  been  happier  for  us  to  have  established 
peaceably  from  the  beginning."  The  efforts  of 
George  III  to  create  a  system  of  personal  rule, 
which  would  put  the  king  of  England  on  a  level 
of  authority  with  his  fellow-monarchs  of  Europe, 
were  given  strength  and  opportunity  by  a  wide- 
spread conviction  that  a  vigorous  exercise  of  pre- 
rogative was  necessary  to  destroy  the  oligarchical 
power  of  party  combinations  and  end  the  reign  of 
corruption.  Goldsmith,  in  his  well-known  poem 
"  The  Traveller,"  expressed  this  sentiment  in  the 
lines :  — 


THE  POLITICAL  IDEAS   OF  THE  FATHERS    2$ 

"  When  I  behold  a  factious  band  agree 
To  call  it  freedom  when  themselves  are  free, 
Each  wanton  judge  new  penal  statutes  draw, 
Laws  grind  the  poor  and  rich  men  rule  the  law, 
The  wealth  of  climes  where  savage  nations  roam, 
Pillaged  from  slaves  to  purchase  slaves  at  home  — 
Fear,  pity,  justice,  indignation,  start, 
Tear  off  reserve  and  bare  my  swelling  heart ; 
Till,  half  a  patriot,  half  a  coward  grown, 
I  fly  from  petty  tyrants  to  the  throne." 

Persons  of  fastidious  culture  turned  for  relief 
from  the  coarseness  of  English  manners  to  the 
contemplation  of  French  order  and  decency. 
Hume's  letters  complain  of  "the  rage  and  vio- 
lence of  parties  "  in  England,  and  he  fondly  cher- 
ished the  hope  of  being  able  to  make  his  home  in 
Paris  where  "  the  taste  for  literature  is  neither  de- 
cayed nor  depraved  as  with  the  barbarians  who 
inhabit  the  banks  of  the  Thames."  The  historian 
Gibbon  deplored  the  fact  that  circumstances  com- 
pelled him  to  live  in  England  instead  of  among  a 
people  "  who  have  established  a  freedom  and  ease 
in  society  unknown  to  antiquity  and  still  unprac- 
tised by  other  nations."  There  is  much  in  the 
Franco-mania  of  that  period  that  reminds  one  of 
the  Anglo-mania  of  the  present  day.  The  aver- 
sion which  many  cultivated  persons  have  for 
American  politics,  and  their  admiration  for  Eng- 
lish models,  curiously  echo  a  tone  of  sentiment  in 
England  towards  France  before  the  Revolution  of 
1793- 


26  ORIGINS    OF  AMERICAN  POLITICS 

The  actual  vigor  of  representative  institutions 
in  England  during  this  period  is  complete  proof 
of  the  existence  there  of  an  order  of  political 
ideas  counteracting  the  tendency  to  exalt  royal 
prerogative,  dominant  elsewhere  in  Europe  ;  but 
those  ideas  owed  nothing  to  democratic  sentiment. 
On  nothing  were  men  better  agreed  than  that 
democracy  meant  licentiousness,  anarchy,  and 
oppression.  The  brief  republican  experiment  be- 
gun in  England  in  1648  was  a  figment  of  mili- 
tary rule,  promoted  by  theocratic  ideas  mixed  with 
millennial  dreams.  Those  ideas  had  no  ancestry 
in  common  with  English  ideas  of  freedom.  Cal- 
vin, whose  theocratic  republic  at  Geneva  was  re- 
garded by  his  adherents  throughout  the  Protestant 
world  as  an  example  of  a  Christian  commonwealth, 
agreed  wi.th  the  mediaeval  jurists  in  holding  both 
church  and  state  of  divine  origin ;  but  instead  of 
regarding  the  Pope  as  Christ's  vicegerent  upon 
earth,  exercising  His  jurisdiction  over  the  souls  of 
men,  and  the  Emperor  as  His  vicegerent  in  secular 
affairs,  Calvin  held  that  Christ  himself  was  the 
true  head  of  church  and  state,  thus  establishing 
their  organic  union,  the  function  of  the  state  being 
to  control  external  conditions  so  as  to  secure  the 
church  in  the  maintenance  of  its  doctrines,  order, 
and  discipline.1  The  operation  of  such  ideas  was 
accompanied  by  a  disposition  to  discard  the  his- 

1  Osgood's  "  Political  Ideas  of  the  Puritans,"  Political  Science 
Quarterly,  March-June,  1891. 


THE  POLITICAL  IDEAS   OF  THE  FATHERS    27 

toric  appliances  of  English  liberty.  Milton's 
"  Ready  and  Easy  Way  to  Establish  a  Free 
Commonwealth  "  was  for  the  people  to  exhaust 
their  rights  of  suffrage  in  one  constituent  act. 
They  should  choose  once  and  for  all  time  their 
ablest  and  wisest  men  to  sit  as  a  grand  council  for 
the  management  of  public  affairs.  He  refers  to 
the  experience  of  ancient  and  mediaeval  republics 
as  proof  that  popular  assemblies  "  either  little 
availed  the  people,  or  else  brought  them  to  such 
a  licentious  and  unbridled  democracy  as  in  fine 
ruined  themselves  with  their  own  excessive 
power."  The  reason  why  kingship  is  esteemed 
"the  more  safe  and  durable"  form  of  government 
is  "  because  the  king,  and  for  the  most  part  his 
council,  is  not  changed  during  life."  This  stability 
may  be  given  to  a  republic  by  adopting  the  same 
principle  of  a  perpetual  tenure  of  authority. 
"  Safest  therefore  to  me,  it  seems,  and  of  less 
hazard  and  interruption  to  affairs,  that  none  of  the 
grand  council  be  moved,  unless  by  death  or  just 
conviction  of  some  crime ;  for  what  can  be  ex- 
pected firm  or  steadfast  from  a  floating  founda- 
tion." Such  a  government,  he  argued,  would 
maintain  the  commonwealth  in  peace  and  pros- 
perity, "  even  to  the  coming  of  our  true  and  right- 
ful, and  only  to  be  expected  king,  only  worthy,  as 
He  is  our  only  Saviour,  the  Messiah,  the  Christ." 

The  Cromwellian  commonwealth  left  behind  it 
memories  of  sanctimonious  despotism  which  made 


28  ORIGINS  OF  AMERICAN  POLITICS 

hatred  of  republics  and  all  their  belongings  one 
of  the  strongest  of  English  prejudices.  A  crisis 
arrived  when  this  prejudice  became  influential  in 
determining  the  course  of  English  constitutional 
development.  When  James  II  became  a  fugitive, 
the  Tories  were  driven,  by  stress  of  their  party 
principle  of  the  indefeasible  tenure  of  royal  author- 
ity, into  proposing  that  the  absence  of  the  king 
should  be  treated  as  if  it  were  a  case  of  physical 
disability,  and  that  the  government  should  be  car- 
ried on  in  the  king's  name  by  a  regent.  The 
Whigs  met  this  by  the  argument  that  since  there 
was  no  prospect  that  James  would  fail  of  heirs, 
the  nation  might  have  to  be  governed  perpetually 
by  regents  or  protectors,  and  would  thus  approach 
much  closer  to  a  republic  than  if  another  king 
were  put  upon  the  throne.  The  settlement  of 
English  kingship  upon  a  parliamentary  title, 
making  it  an  institution  intrinsically  republican, 
was  thus  promoted  by  the  strength  of  anti-repub- 
lican prejudice.1 

The  English  tendency  to  restrict  royal  preroga- 
tive, while  enthusiastically  upholding  it,  was  the 
result  of  a  sort  of  concordat  between  popular  at- 
tachment to  representative  institutions  and  popular 

1  A  Tory  argument  against  the  establishment  of  the  Bank  of  Eng- 
land, in  1694,  affords  a  grotesque  instance  of  the  activity  of  this  prej- 
udice. The  banks  famous  at  that  time  were  those  of  Venice, 
Genoa,  Amsterdam,  and  Hamburg,  and  hence  it  was  argued  that  a 
bank  was  a  republican  institution  which  it  would  be  dangerous  to 
introduce  in  a  monarchy.  Macaulay's  History,  Chap.  XX. 


THE  POLITICAL  IDEAS   OF  THE  FATHERS    29 

reverence  for  kings.  The  circumstances  were  such 
that  neither  principle  of  government  could  exter- 
minate the  other,  so  they  were  brought  into  ac- 
commodation by  means  of  a  doctrine  in  which  each 
found  its  place.  Prerogative  and  popular  rights 
should  be  so  balanced  as  to  protect  the  nation  from 
tyranny  on  the  one  side  and  from  mob  rule  on  the 
other.  The  different  estates  of  the  realm  should 
be  so  represented  in  the  government  that  each 
should  be  able  to  check  excess  upon  the  part  of 
another.  Support  for  this  doctrine  was  found  in 
the  writings  of  Aristotle,  Polybius,  Cicero,  and 
Tacitus.  Montesquieu's  adherence  to  it  in  oppo- 
sition to  the  general  current  of  European  opinion 
made  his  "  Spirit  of  the  Laws  "  more  influential  in 
England  and  America  than  that  great  work  ever 
was  in  the  author's  own  country.  Blackstone  ex- 
hibited this  doctrine  as  the  fundamental  principle 
of  the  British  constitution,  with  such  a  parade  of 
learning  as  to  make  his  conclusions  seem  indispu- 
table, and  with  such  noble  resources  of  style  that 
the  "  Commentaries  "  took  rank  as  a  literary  classic 
as  well  as  a  law  book.  The  same  doctrine  eventu- 
ally received  from  Edmund  Burke  the  most  elo- 
quent expression  ever  given  to  political  ideas.  It 
floats  in  the  music  of  his  grandest  passages  —  as 
when  he  speaks  of  "that  action  and  interaction 
which  in  the  natural  and  in  the  political  world, 
from  the  reciprocal  struggles  of  discordant  powers, 
draws  out  the  harmony  of  the  universe." 


30  ORIGINS   OF  AMERICAN  POLITICS 

Two  currents  of  thought  may  be  discerned  in 
colonial  politics.  One  of  these  had  received  its 
impulse  from  the  Puritan  movement.  A  theocracy 
has  really  no  love  for  democratic  ideas ;  at  a  later 
period  abundant  evidence  of  this  was  furnished  by 
New  England.  But  it  is  always  the  disposition  of 
theocracy,  when  confronted  by  royal  authority,  to 
encourage  the  assertion  of  popular  rights,  and  in 
Massachusetts,  especially,  the  state  of  popular  senti- 
ment showed  an  infusion  of  anti-monarchical  preju- 
dice. The  main  stream  of  colonial  ideas  was, 
however,  that  which  flowed  in  the  channels  of 
English  law,  bearing  with  it  an  inveterate  attach- 
ment to  prerogative  as  an  essential  ingredient  of 
a  free  constitution,  a  necessary  counterpoise  to 
representative  institutions.  Even  so  radical  a 
thinker  as  Thomas  Paine  was  forced  to  defer  to 
this  sentiment.  In  his  celebrated  pamphlet,  "  Com- 
mon Sense,"  issued  in  January,  1776,  after  urging 
the  people  to  look  above  to  a  king,  "who  doth  not 
make  havoc  of  His  people  like  the  royal  brute  of 
England,"  he  adds  :  "  Yet  that  we  may  not  ap- 
pear defective  in  earthly  honors,  let  a  day  be 
solemnly  set  apart  for  proclaiming  the  charter ; 
let  it  be  brought  forth,  placed  on  the  divine  law, 
the  work  of  God ;  let  a  crown  be  placed  thereon, 
by  which  the  world  may  know  that  so  far  as  we 
approve  of  monarchy,  in  America  the  law  is  king." 
Prejudice  against  democracy  is  turned  on  the 
Tories  by  the  argument  that  England  is  too  far 


THE  POLITICAL  IDEAS   OF  THE  FATHERS    31 

away  to  give  adequate  protection,  so  that  if  Amer- 
ica should  neglect  to  provide  herself  with  a  govern- 
ment of  her  own,  "  some  Masaniello  may  hereafter 
arise  who,  laying  hold  of  popular  disquietude,  may 
collect  together  the  desperate  and  discontented, 
and  by  assuming  to  themselves  the  powers  of 
government  finally  sweep  away  the  liberties  of 
the  continent  like  a  deluge."  Paine's  suggestion 
is  prophetic  of  what  happened.  After  the  adoption 
of  the  constitution  the  veneration  became  attached 
to  it  which  was  formerly  felt  for  royalty. 

Failure  to  appreciate  the  intensity  of  public 
attachment  to  the  principle  of  balanced  powers 
of  government  would  leave  concealed  the  true 
cause  of  the  Revolutionary  struggle.  It  was  the 
firm  conviction  of  thinking  men  that  the  only  hope 
of  free  institutions  lay  in  the  adjustments  of  the 
English  constitution.  If  these  seemed  to  place  the 
liberties  of  the  people  in  a  dangerous  strait  between 
the  rock  and  the  whirlpool,  so  much  the  more 
reason  why  any  deviation  from  the  traditional 
course  should  meet  with  resolute  resistance.  It 
was  not  the  extent  of  the  taxation — that  was  triv- 
ial in  comparison  with  that  which  independence 
made  necessary  ;  it  was  not  that  the  doctrine  "  no 
taxation  without  representation  "  was  regarded  as 
an  essential  principle  of  legitimate  government  — 
it  was  not  included  in  the  enumeration  of  rights 
attached  to  the  constitution  and  has  never  been 
formulated  as  a  constitutional  principle ;  —  not  be- 


32  ORIGINS   OF  AMERICAN  POLITICS 

cause  of  these  things  did  the  revolt  of  the  colonies 
take  place.  It  was  because  the  actions  of  the 
British  government  assumed  an  absolute  authority 
which  violated  the  spirit  of  the  English  constitu- 
tion, the  fundamental  compact  controlling  the  rela- 
tions between  the  king  and  his  people.  The 
deepest  political  instincts  of  the  race  were  out- 
raged. 

This  state  of  public  sentiment  explains  those 
diverse  manifestations  which  make  the  American 
uprising  unique  among  revolutions  :  sincere  pro- 
fessions of  loyalty  to  the  British  crown  in  the  very 
thick  of  battle  with  British  armies ;  extreme  hesi- 
tancy in  effecting  an  alliance  with  France  even 
after  George  III  had  set  the  example  of  calling 
in  a  foreign  power  by  the  hire  of  foreign  mercena- 
ries ;  great  aversion  to  issuing  a  declaration  of 
independence  even  after  it  had  become  a  manifest 
necessity  to  enable  the  colonies  to  obtain  help 
from  abroad.  The  declaration  of  the  cause  of 
taking  up  arms,  which  repudiates  any  intention  of 
separating  from  the  British  crown,  was  read  before 
the  troops  on  Prospect  Hill,  in  July,  1775,  amid 
such  shouts  that  the  British  on  Bunker  Hill  put 
themselves  in  array  for  battle.1  It  required  some- 
what violent  methods  to  force  a  declaration  of  in- 
dependence through  Congress.  Evidently  the 
American  leaders  were  revolutionists,  not  from 
choice,  but  from  compulsion.  They  renounced 

1  Bancroft's  History,  Vol.  VIII.,  p.  47. 


THE  POLITICAL  IDEAS   OF  THE  FATHERS    33 

their  allegiance  to  the  English  king  without  break- 
ing their  attachment  to  the  English  constitution. 
The  traditional  ideas  still  controlled  political 
thought,  but  their  expression  in  the  government 
of  the  union  was  hindered  by  obstacles  which  long 
seemed  insurmountable. 


CHAPTER   III 

THE    CONSERVATIVE    REACTION 

THE  ideas  of  government  held  by  the  American 
Whigs  could  find  no  satisfaction  in  the  Confedera- 
tion. That  was  merely  an  agency  of  state  coopera- 
tion for  the  management  of  common  interests.  It 
was  not  thought  of  as  a  regular  government.  The 
Articles  of  Confederation  committed  to  Congress 
the  control  of  the  national  budget,  the  regulation 
of  the  army  and  navy,  the  appointment  of  public 
officers,  and  in  fine  the  entire  management  of  pub- 
lic affairs.  The  concentration  of  authority  was  as 
great  as  in  English  parliamentary  government  in 
our  own  times,  and  was  altogether  incompatible 
with  the  ideas  of  those  times,  but  public  opinion 
was  calmly  indifferent.  In  1781,  Jefferson  wrote, 
"An  elective  despotism  was  not  the  government 
we  fought  for ;  but  one  which  should  not  only  be 
founded  on  free  principles,  but  in  which  the  powers 
of  government  should  be  so  divided  and  balanced 
among  several  bodies  of  magistracy  as  that  no  one 
could  transcend  their  legal  limits  without  being 
effectually  checked  and  restrained  by  the  others." 1 
He  was  thinking,  however,  of  the  changes  in  the 
Virginia  constitution  by  which  the  selection  of 

1  Notes  on  Virginia,  Chap.  XIII. 
34 


THE    CONSERVATIVE  REACTION  35 

the  governor  and  other  officers  formerly  appointed 
by  the  crown  had  been  taken  over  by  the  legislat- 
ure. The  case  of  the  Confederation  was  far  more 
obnoxious  to  the  principle  he  states,  but  it  does  not 
occur  to  him.  In  1787,  John  Adams  wrote,  "If 
there  is  one  certain  truth  to  be  collected  from  the 
history  of  all  ages,  it  is  this  :  that  the  people's  rights 
and  liberties,  and  the  democratic  mixture  in  a  con- 
stitution, can  never  be  preserved  without  a  strong 
executive,  or,  in  other  words  without  separating  the 
executive  power  from  the  legislature."  This  pas- 
sage occurs  in  his  "  Defence  of  the  Constitutions 
of  Government  of  the  United  States  of  America," 
written  in  reply  to  a  criticism  by  Turgot  on  Ameri- 
can institutions.  The  great  French  publicist  ob- 
jected to  them  on  the  ground  that  they  did  not 
collect  all  the  authority  of  government  in  one 
centre  to  represent  the  will  of  the  nation.1  It  did 

1  Writing  to  Dr.  Richard  Price  of  London,  March  22,  1778, 
Turgot  said :  "  I  see  in  the  greatest  number  (of  the  American  state 
constitutions)  an  unreasonable  imitation  of  the  usages  of  England. 
Instead  of  bringing  all  the  authorities  into  one,  that  of  the  nation, 
they  have  established  different  bodies,  —  a  House  of  Representatives, 
a  council,  a  governor,  —  because  England  has  a  House  of  Commons, 
lords,  and  a  king.  They  undertake  to  balance  these  different  au- 
thorities, as  if  the  same  equilibrium  of  powers  which  has  been 
thought  necessary  to  balance  the  enormous  preponderance  of  roy- 
alty could  be  of  any  use  in  republics,  formed  upon  the  equality  of 
all  citizens  ;  and  as  if  every  article  which  constitutes  different  bodies 
was  not  a  source  of  divisions.  By  striving  to  escape  imaginary 
dangers,  they  had  created  real  ones."  The  criticism  of  the  saga- 
cious French  statesman  has  not  lost  its  point. 


36  ORIGINS   OF  AMERICAN  POLITICS 

not  occur  to  Adams  to  refute  the  objection  by 
citing  the  Articles  of  Confederation,  but  he  ran- 
sacked history  from  civilization's  dawn  unto  his 
own  times  to  justify  the  course  of  the  American 
states  in  adopting  governments  of  distributed  pow- 
ers. In  his  voluminous  work  the  sole  reference 
he  makes  to  the  body  whose  ambassador  he  then 
was,  is  this :  "  Congress  is  not  a  legislative  assem- 
bly, nor  a  representative  assembly,  but  only  a  dip- 
lomatic assembly." 1  He  would  not  commit  the 
absurdity  of  classing  a  revolutionary  junto  among 
regularly  constituted  governments. 

People  cared  nothing  about  the  principles  on 
which  the  government  of  the  Confederation  was 
based,  because  they  cared  nothing  for  that  gov- 
ernment. The  Congress  of  the  Confederation, 
although  it  remained  in  existence  fourteen  years, 
never  took  root  in  the  affection  or  respect  of  the 
people.  Its  sittings  were  private,  and  its  pro- 
ceedings made  no  appeal  to  public  opinion.  It 
remained  in  existence  by  sufferance  only.  The 
states  flouted  its  authority  whenever  they  felt 
disposed  to  do  so.  None  of  its  plans  to  reform 
the  government  came  to  anything.  The  consti- 
tution was  the  result  of  an  outside  movement 
which  Congress  obeyed,  but  did  not  direct.  The 

1  Adams'  Works,  Vol.  IV.,  p.  379.  In  the  constitutional  con- 
vention, Edmund  Randolph  spoke  of  Congress  in  the  same  way. 
He  said,  "  Elected  by  the  legislatures  who  retain  even  a  power  of 
recall,  they  are  a  mere  diplomatic  body,  with  no  will  of  their  own." 


THE    CONSERVATIVE   REACTION  37 

period  of  the  Confederation  was  one  in  which  the 
functions  of  general  government  were  in  abeyance. 
Crown  jurisdiction  had  been  thrown  off,  but  no  suc- 
cession to  it  had  been  provided.  The  Confedera- 
tion was  a  makeshift,  "  neither  fit  for  war  or  peace," 
as  Hamilton  remarked. 

During  the  war,  incapacity  of  government  and 
defects  of  administration  were  remedied  to  a  sav- 
ing extent  by  French  subsidies  of  money  and 
troops,  but  now  the  stripling  nation  was  left  to  its 
own  resources.  Although  its  success  and  pros- 
pects had  excited  some  popular  enthusiasm  in 
Europe,  rulers  regarded  it  as  a  troublesome  par- 
venu. It  hardly  retained  the  good  will  of  its  for- 
mer ally,  France.  "We  have  never  pretended," 
wrote  the  Cabinet  of  Versailles  to  its  representa- 
tive in  America,  "  to  make  of  America  an  useful 
ally ;  we  have  had  no  other  object  than  to  deprive 
Great  Britain  of  that  vast  continent.  Therefore 
we  can  regard  with  indifference  both  the  move- 
ments which  agitate  certain  provinces  and  the 
fermentation  which  prevails  in  Congress."  l 

It  was  easy  to  take  advantage  of  a  nation  so 
weak  and  incapable.  England  would  not  allow 
American  goods  to  enter  her  ports  unless  they 
came  on  English  ships.  New  England,  the  world- 
wide enterprise  of  whose  seamen  furnished  Edmund 
Burke  with  an  eloquent  passage  of  his  great  speech 

1  Bancroft's  History  of  the  Constitution,  Vol.  II.,  pp.  415,  424, 
438. 


38  ORIGINS   OF  AMERICAN  POLITICS 

on  American  Conciliation,  now  found  herself  in  a 
sorry  plight.  Spain  would  not  allow  American 
vessels  to  navigate  the  lower  Mississippi,  and  the 
Western  country  was  kept  in  a  state  of  constant 
irritation  by  the  closing  of  the  natural  outlet  of 
its  trade.  Negotiations  for  commercial  privileges 
were  fruitless.  Foreign  nations  would  not  make 
treaties  with  a  nation  which  really  had  no  govern- 
ment and  was  expected  to  go  to  pieces.  Cyrus 
Griffin,  President  of  Congress,  told  a  correspond- 
ent :  "  The  British  courtiers  are  ridiculing  our 
situation  very  much  and  tell  Mr.  Adams,  in  a  sneer- 
ing manner,  when  America  shall  assume  some  kind 
of  government  then  England  will  speak  to  her."  l 
The  development  of  internal  resources  was  no 
less  sorely  oppressed.  Enterprise  could  not  avail 
itself  of  opportunities  because  of  the  lack  of  stable 
government  and  of  security  for  investors.  Cred- 
itors were  kept  out  of  their  own  by  stay  laws  or 
were  defrauded  by  legal  tender  acts.  The  anarchi- 
cal influences  set  in  motion  by  the  Revolution  swept 
so  strongly  over  some  of  the  states  that  the  foun- 
dations of  social  order  seemed  to  be  dissolving. 
The  situation  in  New  England  caused  great 
anxiety.  Puritanism,  being  an  intense  reaction  of 
individualism  against  constituted  authority,  con- 
tains a  political  virus.  The  "generation  of  odd 
names  and  natures,"  which  the  Earl  of  Strafford 
noted  among  the  English  Roundheads,  was  the 
1  Bancroft's  History  of  the  Constitution,  Vol.  II.,  p.  469. 


THE    CONSER  VA  TI VE  RE  A  C  TION  39 

result  of  mental  characteristics;  which,  strongly 
infused  into  American  society  by  Puritan  emigra- 
tion, have  played  a  great  part  in  our  politics.  The 
virus  which  those  characteristics  are  able  to  distil 
has  long  since  spent  its  force  in  the  region  of  its 
original  culture,  but  it  continues  to  produce  typical 
fevers  in  Western  communities  most  deeply  in- 
oculated with  the  New  England  strain.  The 
delirious  politics  which  ensue  may  afford  some 
idea  of  the  situation  in  New  England  during  the 
period  of  social  debility  after  the  Revolutionary 
War.  The  policies  which  commanded  strong  popu- 
lar support  excited  the  astonishment  of  observers, 
and  other  communities  were  then  asking,  What 
is  the  matter  with  New  England  ? 

The  control  of  affairs  had  slipped  away  from  the 
leaders  of  the  Revolution.  Their  correspondence 
is  marked  by  extreme  anxiety,  almost  despondency. 
Although  Washington  had  refused  to  consider  the 
offer  of  some  of  the  army  officers  to  make  him 
king,  the  correspondence  of  prominent  men 
towards  the  close  of  the  Confederation  period 
shows  that  they  were  coming  to  the  belief  that  a 
return  to  kingship  was  the  only  way  out  of  the 
troubles  of  the  times.  A  British  secret  agent 
reported  to  his  government,  "  I  can  assure  you 
that  where  you  had  one  friend  in  the  last  war,  you 
would  find  three  now." 1  The  wretched  state  of  the 
times  is  powerfully  set  forth  in  Number  15  of  the 

1  Bancroft's  History  of  the  Constitution,  Vol.  II.,  p.  424. 


40  ORIGINS  OF  AMERICAN  POLITICS 

Federalist.  In  conclusion  the  article  asks  :  "  What 
indication  is  there  of  national  disorder,  poverty, 
and  insignificance  that  could  befall  a  community 
so  peculiarly  blessed  with  natural  advantages  as 
we  are,  which  does  not  form  a  part  of  the  dark 
catalogue  of  our  public  misfortunes?" 

Meanwhile,  the  forces  of  progress  were  finding 
a  natural  channel  in  conformity  with  the  lay  of 
popular  character.  It  was  generally  admitted  that 
something  ought  to  be  done  about  the  affairs  of 
the  Confederation.  But  something  had  to  be 
done  about  such  matters  as  Virginia's  loss  of  trade 
because  of  the  lower  rates  of  duty  imposed  by 
Maryland,  and  the  menace  to  Maryland's  com- 
merce contained  in  Virginia's  claim  of  the  right  to 
levy  tolls  upon  vessels  passing  between  the  capes 
of  the  Chesapeake.  Complications  of  interest 
troubled  New  York  and  New  Jersey  with  regard 
to  the  commerce  of  New  York  Bay,  and  New  Jer- 
sey and  Pennsylvania  with  regard  to  Delaware 
Bay.  To  adjust  such  matters  joint  action  was 
required,  and  even  during  the  war  commercial  nego- 
tiations took  place  between  colonies. 

In  1785,  commissioners  appointed  by  Maryland 
and  Virginia  to  frame  an  agreement  for  the  regu- 
lation of  Chesapeake  Bay  commerce,  were  to  meet 
in  Alexandria.  Washington  invited  them  to  his 
residence,  Mount  Vernon.  That  meeting  was  the 
starting-point  of  the  movement  for  the  establish- 
ment of  a  more  perfect  union.  The  proceedings 


THE    CONSERVATIVE  REACTION  41 

afforded  an  opportunity  which  the  national  school 
of  politicians  adroitly  seized.  The  ostensible 
object  of  the  series  of  interstate  negotiations 
which  followed  was  to  establish  an  uniform  system 
of  commercial  regulations.  The  purpose  of  the 
national  politicians  was  to  prevent  this  while  using 
the  movement  to  prepare  the  way  for  the  adoption 
of  a  national  constitution.  Their  management 
was  a  masterpiece  of  political  strategy.  The  com- 
mercial convention  which  met  at  Annapolis,  Sep- 
tember n,  1786,  was  completely  under  their 
control.1  An  address  was  issued,  drawn  up  in 
language  whose  tact  and  ingenuity  make  it  the 
illustrious  predecessor  of  the  literary  efforts  of 
succeeding  generations  of  politicians  in  concocting 
manifestoes  for  use  among  the  people.  Anxious 
concern  was  expressed  as  to  the  effect  the  adop- 
tion of  a  scheme  of  commercial  regulation  might 
have  upon  the  operations  of  the  general  govern- 
ment, and  it  was  recommended  that  every  state 
should  send  commissioners  to  a  convention  to  con- 
sider the  subject  in  all  its  bearings. 

After  Madison's  death  there  was  found  in  his 
papers  an  account  of  these  proceedings,  which 
allows  a  glimpse  into  what  would  now  be  called 
the  inside  politics  of  the  movement.  He  relates 

1  Twelve  commissioners  were  present,  representing  five  states. 
Eight  of  those  commissioners  were  chosen  as  delegates  to  the  con- 
stitutional convention.  Among  them  were  :  Alexander  Hamilton, 
James  Madison,  Edmund  Randolph,  and  John  Dickinson. 


42  ORIGINS   OF  AMERICAN  POLITICS 

that  a  number  of  the  commissioners  stayed  away 
from  "a  belief  that  the  time  has  not  yet  arrived 
for  such  a  political  reform  as  might  be  expected 
from  a  further  experience  of  its  necessity."1  We 
have,  however,  a  full  disclosure  of  the  plans  of  the 
national  leaders  in  a  letter  of  October  10,  1786, 
from  Otto,  the  French  minister,  to  his  chief,  Count 
Vergennes.  Otto  tells  him  :  "  Although  there  are 
no  nobles  in  America,  there  is  a  class  of  men 
denominated  'gentlemen,'  who,  by  reason  of  their 
wealth,  their  talents,  their  education,  their  families, 
or  the  offices  they  hold,  aspire  to  a  preeminence 
which  the  people  refuse  to  grant  them  ;  and  al- 
though many  of  these  men  have  betrayed  the 
interests  of  their  order  to  gain  popularity,  there 
reigns  among  them  a  connection  so  much  the  more 
intimate  as  they  almost  all  of  them  dread  the  efforts 
of  the  people  to  despoil  them  of  their  possessions, 
and,  moreover,  they  are  creditors,  and  therefore 
interested  in  strengthening  the  government  and 
watching  over  the  execution  of  the  laws.  .  .  . 
The  attempt,  my  lord,  has  been  vain,  by  pamphlets 
and  other  publications,  to  spread  notions  of  justice 
and  integrity,  and  to  deprive  the  people  of  a  free- 
dom which  they  have  so  misused.  By  proposing 
a  new  organization  of  the  general  government,  all 
minds  would  have  been  revolted ;  circumstances 
ruinous  to  the  commerce  of  America  have  happily 

1  Introduction  to  Madison's  Journal. 


THE    CONSERVATIVE  REACTION  43 

arisen  to  furnish  the  reformers  with  a  pretext  for 
introducing  innovations." 

Otto  describes  the  movement  for  a  commercial 
convention  and  continues  :  "  The  authors  of  this 
proposition  had  no  hope,  nor  even  desire,  to  see 
the  success  of  this  assembly  of  commissioners, 
which  was  only  intended  to  prepare  a  question 
much  more  important  than  that  of  commerce. 
The  measures  were  so  well  taken  that  at  the  end 
of  September  no  more  than  five  states  were  repre- 
sented at  Annapolis,  and  the  commissioners  from 
the  Northern  states  tarried  several  days  at  New 
York  in  order  to  retard  their  arrival.  The  states 
which  assembled,  after  having  waited  nearly  three 
weeks,  separated  under  the  pretext  that  they  were 
not  in  sufficient  numbers  to  enter  on  the  business, 
and,  to  justify  this  dissolution,  they  addressed  to 
the  different  legislatures  and  to  Congress  a  report, 
the  translation  of  which  I  have  the  honor  to  en- 
close you." 

"In  this  paper' the  commissioners  employ  an 
infinity  of  circumlocutions  and  ambiguous  phrases 
to  show  their  constituents  the  impossibility  of 
taking  into  consideration  a  general  plan  of  com- 
merce and  the  powers  pertaining  thereto,  without 
at  the  same  time  touching  upon  other  subjects 
closely  connected  with  the  prosperity  and  national 
importance  of  the  United  States.  Without  enu- 
merating these  objects,  the  commissioners  enlarge 
upon  the  present  crisis  of  public  affairs,  upon  the 


44 

dangers  to  which  the  Confederation  is  exposed, 
upon  the  want  of  credit  of  the  United  States 
abroad,  and  upon  the  necessity  of  uniting,  under  a 
single  point  of  view,  the  interests  of  all  the  states. 
They  close  by  proposing  for  the  month  of  May 
next  a  new  assembly  of  commissioners,  instructed 
to  deliberate,  not  only  upon  a  general  plan  of  com- 
merce, but  upon  other  matters  which  may  concern 
the  harmony  and  welfare  of  the  states,  and  upon 
the  means  of  rendering  the  federal  government 
adequate  to  the  exigencies  of  the  union." 

The  call  for  the  convention,  which  met  at  Phila- 
delphia, May,  1787,  provided  that  it  should  "revise 
the  Articles  of  Confederation."  That  pretext  hav- 
ing served  its  purpose,  no  more  attention  was  paid 
to  it.  As  soon  as  the  delegates  met,  the  real 
design  of  a.  restoration  of  government  was  taken 
in  hand.  The  scheme  of  the  national  politicians 
was  thus  borne  to  its  destination  on  the  back  of  a 
movement  for  commercial  regulations.  It  is  an 
early  specimen  of  "the  rider,"  that  ruse  so  fre- 
quently resorted  to  in  political  strategy  for  the 
control  of  legislation. 


CHAPTER   IV 

THE    RESTORATION 

THE  way  things  had  been  going  on  since  the 
colonies  had  become  independent  states  had  greatly 
excited  among  the  delegates  the  traditional  preju- 
dice against  democracy.  That  which  they  had 
feared  all  along,  which  had  made  them  so  reluctant 
to  carry  their  resistance  to  parliamentary  oppres- 
sion to  the  point  of  declaring  their  independence 
of  the  British  crown  —  the  outbreak  of  democratic 
licentiousness  —  had  come  to  pass,  and  they  were 
aghast  at  the  evil  look  of  the  times.  They  met 
behind  closed  doors,  and  could  talk  freely.  Roger 
Sherman,  a  signer  of  the  Declaration  of  Indepen- 
dence, solemnly  laid  down  the  rule  that  "the  people 
should  have  as  little  to  do  as  may  be  with  the  gov- 
ernment."1 George  Mason  thought  "it  would  be 
as  unnatural  to  refer  the  choice  of  a  proper  char- 
acter for  chief  magistrate  to  the  people,  as  it  would 
be  to  refer  a  trial  of  colors  to  a  blind  man."  Madi- 
son did  not  think  large  bodies  of  men  had  much 
regard  for  honesty.  "  Respect  for  character  is 
always  diminished  in  proportion  to  the  number 

1  All  the  quotations  from  the  convention  debates  are  taken 
from  Madison's  Journal. 

45 


46  ORIGINS   OF  AMERICAN  POLITICS 

among  whom  the  blame  or  praise  is  to  be  divided." 
Elbridge  Gerry  remarked  that  "  he  did  not  deny 
the  position  of  Mr.  Madison,  that  the  majority  will 
generally  violate  justice  when  they  have  an  interest 
in  doing  so."  The  great  argument  in  behalf  of  the 
states'  rights  doctrine,  to  which  the  particular  inter- 
ests of  the  smaller  states  naturally  impelled  them, 
was  that  its  adoption  would  provide  additional  social 
security,  making  the  ship  of  state  a  compartment 
vessel,  as  it  were,  so  that  a  democratic  inundation 
would  be  limited  to  the  vicinity  of  the  breach,  and 
would  not  at  once  overwhelm  the  whole  fabric. 
Said  John  Dickinson,  "  Of  remedies  for  the  dis- 
eases of  republics  which  have  flourished  for  a 
moment  only  and  then  vanished  forever,  one  is  the 
double  branch  of  the  legislature,  and  the  other  the 
accidental  lucky  division  of  this  country  into  dis- 
tinct states." 

Frequent  reference  was  made  to  the  corruption 
and  incapacity  of  state  legislatures.  Madison  com- 
plained that  "the  backwardness  of  the  best  citi- 
zens to  engage  in  the  legislative  service  gave  too 
great  success  to  unfit  characters."  John  Francis 
Mercer  of  Maryland  dwelt  upon  the  need  of  pro- 
tecting the  people  "against  those  speculating  legis- 
latures which  are  now  plundering  them  throughout 
the  United  States."  But  there  was  small  hope 
that  a  national  legislature  would  be  much  better. 
Mason  remarked  that,  "  notwithstanding  the  pre- 
cautions taken  in  the  constitution  of  the  legislature, 


THE  RESTORATION  47 

it  would  still  so  much  resemble  that  of  the  individ- 
ual states  that  it  must  be  expected  frequently  to 
pass  unjust  and  pernicious  laws."  Edmund  Ran- 
dolph argued  that  "  the  Senate  will  be  more  likely 
to  be  corrupt  than  the  House  of  Representatives, 
and  should  therefore  have  less  to  do  with  money 
matters."  Hamilton  remarked  :  "  We  must  take 
man  as  we  find  him,  and  if  we  expect  him  to  serve 
the  public  we  must  interest  his  passions  in  doing 
so."  Gouverneur  Morris  said :  "One  interest  must 
be  opposed  to  another  interest.  Vices,  as  they 
exist,  must  be  turned  against  each  other." 

But  how  was  this  to  be  accomplished  ?  The 
model  of  government  all  had  in  mind  was  the 
English  constitution.  Many  eulogistic  references 
to  it  were  made  in  the  course  of  the  debates.  It 
was,  however,  admitted  that  American  society  did 
not  afford  materials  from  which  such  a  constitution 
could  be  formed.  There  were  no  distinct  orders 
in  the  state  which  could  be  balanced  against  one 
another  like  the  crown,  lords,  and  commons.  The 
best  the  delegates  could  do  was  to  frame  a  govern- 
ment on  the  principles  of  the  English  constitution. 
They  were  agreed  on  this,  but  there  were  sharp 
differences  as  to  the  application  of  those  principles 
under  the  conditions  set  by  the  political  situation. 
In  addition,  they  had  to  consider  above  all  things 
the  practical  question  :  How  were  the  states  to  be 
brought  into  subordination  again  ?  Since  their 
approval  was  necessary  to  give  effect  to  any  plan 


48  ORIGINS   OF  AMERICAN  POLITICS 

of  union,  some  way  had  to  be  found  to  reconcile 
their  conflicting  pretensions.  Under  the  Articles 
of  Confederation  the  states,  large  or  small,  met  as 
equals  in  Congress.  Consent  to  that  had  been 
easy,  since  in  practice  each  state  might  decide  for 
itself  whether  it  would  abide  by  what  was  done. 
The  case  was  very  different  when  it  was  proposed 
to  establish  a  government  of  independent  resources 
and  imperial  authority.  The  smaller  states  had  to 
be  persuaded  to  relinquish  their  complete  equality 
of  representation  with  the  larger  states  ;  the  larger 
states  had  to  be  coaxed  into  making  concessions 
to  the  smaller.  Can  a  more  difficult  problem  of 
practical  politics  be  imagined  ?  It  was  finally  solved, 
not  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  delegates  but  in  a 
tolerable  way,  by  practical  expedients  which  were 
to  acquire  -immense  importance,  and  which  were 
indeed  the  unconscious  development  of  new  facul- 
ties in  the  political  organism  under  the  constraint 
of  hard  necessity. 

At  the  time  of  the  Revolution,  the  provincial 
assemblies  seized  the  powers  reft  from  royal 
authority  and  elected  executive  officials  formerly 
appointed  by  the  crown  or  the  lords  proprietary. 
Just  such  powers  the  Parliament  of  England  had 
exercised  in  1689  when  William  and  Mary  were 
elected  to  fill  the  vacancy  caused  by  the  flight  of 
James  II.  The  first  thought,  in  the  reconstruction 
of  a  general  government  for  America,  was  to  pro- 
ceed in  the  same  way.  The  Virginia  plan,  pre- 


THE  RESTORATION  49 

pared  in  advance  of  the  meeting  of  the  conven- 
tion, provided  that  the  executive  and  the  judiciary 
should  be  chosen  by  the  national  legislature.  The 
national  legislature  should  have  power  to  negative 
all  state  laws  contravening  national  interests.  This 
would  have  put  the  states,  in  their  relations  to  the 
general  government,  in  about  the  same  position  as 
the  charter  colonies  had  been  with  respect  to  the 
British  government,  and  this  was  the  intention. 
Writing  to  Edmund  Randolph,  while  the  Virginia 
plan  was  preparing,  Madison  said,  "  Let  it  have 
a  negative  in  all  cases  whatever,  on  the  legislative 
acts  of  the  states,  as  the  king  of  Great  Britain 
heretofore  had."  Hamilton's  proposition,  that  the 
national  executive  should  appoint  the  governors, 
would  have  put  the  states  in  about  the  same  posi- 
tion as  the  royal  colonies  had  been.  All  were 
agreed  that  a  subordination  of  the  states  to  the 
general  government  was  necessary  to  the  extent 
which  its  proper  functions  required  ;  but  what  the 
relative  situation  of  the  states  would  be,  under 
any  scheme  which  might  be  contrived,  was  a  point 
of  great  difficulty.  Virginia,  on  a  basis  of  repre- 
sentation according  to  population,  would  elect  more 
members  of  the  national  legislature  than  five  of 
the  smaller  states.  Her  vote,  combined  with  that 
of  three  other  large  states,  would  outweigh  the 
representation  of  the  remaining  nine  states.  The 
smaller  states  were  determined  not  to  be  swallowed 
up  in  that  way.  The  hitch  at  this  point  balked 


50  ORIGINS   OF  AMERICAN  POLITICS 

the  business  until  the  idea  was  hit  upon  of  leaving 
state  autonomy  intact  by  delineating  for  the  gen- 
eral government  an  orbit  which  should  include  the 
citizenship  of  the  nation  upon  a  plane  apart  from 
that  in  which  the  state  governments  revolved.1 
The  dual  citizenship  of  Americans,  which  has  had 
such  vast  constitutional  results,  was  thus  wrought 
by  a  casual  stroke. 

The-  issue  as  regards  the  composition  of  the 
national  legislature  was  settled  by  a  compromise 
giving  the  states  equal  representation  in  the 
Senate,  while  in  the  House  representation  was 
according  to  the  population  as  computed  by  a 
special  rule  which  allowed  slaves  to  be  counted  for 
only  three-fifths  of  their  numbers.  The  problem 
as  regards  the  constitution  of  the  executive  proved 
insoluble  until  the  idea  was  conceived  of  making 
the  selection  of  the  executive  the  discretionary  act 
of  an  elite  body  appointed  by  the  states  expressly 
for  that  purpose.  "The  immediate  election  should 
be  made  by  men  most  capable  of  analyzing  the 
qualities  adapted  to  the  station,  and  acting  under 
circumstances  favorable  to  deliberation." 2  In 
order  that  the  courts  should  be  "  the  bulwarks  of 
a  limited  constitution  against  legislative  encroach- 

1  John  Dickinson,  whose  championship  of  state  rights  led  the 
way  in  this  direction,  said,  "  The  proposed  system  is  like  the  solar 
system,  in  which  the  states  are  the  planets,  and  they  ought  to  be 
left  to  move  more  freely  in  their  proper  orbits." 

2  The  Federalist,  No.  68. 


THE  RESTORATION  5 1 

ments,"1  it  was  then  settled  that  the  judiciary 
should  be  constituted  by  executive  appointment, 
independence  of  executive  control  being  secured  by 
establishing  a  life  tenure  of  office.  It  is  the  one 
department  of  the  government  which  has  exactly 
fulfilled  the  original  conception.  It  has  had  an 
enormous  growth  in  power  and  dignity,  but  strictly 
speaking  this  growth  has  not  been  a  development, 
but  rather  an  increasing  exercise  of  functions 
assigned  to  it  from  the  beginning. 

The  influence  moulding  all  the  conceptions,  the 
idea  regulating  all  the  contrivances  of  those 
ardent  politicians  and  able  young  lawyers,  intent 
upon  obtaining  some  practical  result  to  their  labors, 
was  the  Whig  doctrine  of  checks  and  balances  of 
authority  through  distribution  of  the  powers  of 
government.2  In  adapting  the  English  constitu- 
tion to  American  use,  they  endeavored  to  exclude 
influences  which  seemed  to  be  disturbing  the 
balance  of  power  in  the  English  constitution,  and 
they  incorporated  in  the  American  constitution 

1  The  Federalist,  No.  78. 

2  The   work  of  the   convention  was  done  by  the  young  men. 
Washington,  who  was  then  fifty-five,  presided,  but  took  no  part  in 
the  debates.     Dr.  Franklin,  who  was   old  and    near   the   close  of 
his  life,  exerted  himself  to  promote   agreement,  but  he  does  not 
seem  to  have  concerned  himself  much  about  details.     He  thought 
that  sooner  or  later  a  king  would  be  set  up,  but  desired  that  republi- 
can institutions  should  have  a  trial,  and  he  was  willing  to  accede  to 
almost  any  arrangement  to  that  end.     See  Madison's  Journal,  June 
2,  4,  and  July  24. 


52  ORIGINS   OF  AMERICAN  POLITICS 

restraints  suggested  by  English  and  colonial  ex- 
perience. The  united  control  of  legislation  and 
administration,  which  was  obtained  by  the  practice 
of  selecting  the  ministers  of  the  crown  from 
among  the  leaders  of  Parliament,  was  an  aberration 
from  constitutional  theory  against  which  English 
reformers  were  in  the  habit  of  inveighing.  The  act 
of  settlement,  passed  by  a  reforming  House  of 
Commons  in  1700,  contained  an  article  stipulating 
that  "no  person  who  has  an  office  or  place  of 
profit  under  the  king  shall  be  capable  of  serving 
as  a  member  of  the  House  of  Commons."  This 
article,  which  was  defeated  by  crown  influence,  was 
transferred  to  the  constitution  of  the  United 
States  after  suitable  revision  of  its  language.1  An 
accompanying  article  of  the  act  of  settlement 
guarded  against  the  irresponsible  exercise  of  power 
by  providing  for  the  transaction  of  important 
affairs  of  state  in  the  privy  council,  with  the  re- 
quirement that  those  who  should  advise  and  con- 
sent to  what  was  done  should  so  record  themselves. 
These  ideas  are  reflected  in  the  provisions  of  the 
constitution,  adopted  after  repeated  efforts  to  concert 
a  scheme  for  a  privy  council  distinct  from  Congress 
had  failed,  by  which  the  Senate  is  associated  with 
the  President  as  his  advisers  in  the  negotiation  of 
treaties  and  in  the  appointment  of  public  officers.2 

1  Section  6,  Article  I. 

2  Section  2,  Article  II.     A  comparison  between  the  constitution, 
with  the  amendments  immediately  made  to  it,  and  the  bill  of  rights 


THE  RESTORATION  53 

The  bestowal  of  these  important  functions  upon 
the  Senate  made  it  more  powerful  than  the  House 
of  Lords  upon  which  it  was  modelled.  Great 
things  were  expected  of  the  Senate.  Of  course  it 
would  represent  wealth.  The  qualifications  then 
required  for  membership  in  the  state  legislatures 
would  insure  that.  John  Dickinson,  on  whose 
motion  it  was  decided  that  the  senators  should  be 
elected  by  the  state  legislatures,  gave  as  one  of 
his  reasons  that  "  he  wished  the  Senate  to  consist 
of  the  most  distinguished  characters,  distinguished 
for  their  rank  in  life  and  their  weight  of  property, 
and  bearing  as  strong  a  likeness  to  the  British 
House  of  Lords  as  was  possible."  James  Madison 
thought  that  "the  second  branch,  as  a  limited  num- 
ber of  citizens,  respectable  for  wisdom  and  virtue, 
will  be  watched  by  and  will  keep  watch  over  the 
representatives  of  the  people ;  it  will  seasonably 
interpose  between  impetuous  councils,  and  will 
guard  the  minority  who  are  placed  above  indigence 
against  the  agrarian  attempts  of  the  ever-increasing 
class  who  labor  under  the  hardships  of  life,  and 
secretly  strive  for  a  more  equal  distribution  of  its 
blessings."  Gouverneur  Morris  hoped  that  the 
Senate  "  will  show  us  the  might  of  aristocracy." 

But  even  the  creation  of  such  a  body  as  this  was 

of  1689,  will  show  other  points  of  resemblance  indicating  the  source 
of  the  political  ideas  embodied  in  the  constitution.  See  Stevens' 
"  Sources  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  "  for  a  thorough 
discussion  of  this  subject. 


54  ORIGINS   OF  AMERICAN  POLITICS 

not  a  sufficient  safeguard  against  democracy.  The 
great  concern  of  the  delegates  was  to  provide  effect- 
ive restraints  on  the  legislative  branch.  "  It  is 
against  the  enterprising  ambition  of  this  depart- 
ment," said  Madison,  "that  the  people  ought  to 
indulge  all  their  jealousy  and  exhaust  all  their  pre- 
cautions." l  On  the  other  hand,  Hamilton  re- 
marked that  "  energy  in  the  executive  is  a  leading 
character  in  the  definition  of  a  good  government."  2 
Congress  was  given  no  powers  except  such  as  were 
specified.  The  powers  of  the  President  are  plenary 
except  as  specifically  limited.  In  the  one  case  the 
language  of  the  constitution  is:  "All  legislative 
powers  herein  granted  shall  be  vested  in  a  Congress 
of  the  United  States,  which  shall  consist  of  a  Senate 
and  a  House  of  Representatives."  In  the  other 
case  the  grant  is  without  reserve,  "  The  executive 
power  shall  be  vested  in  a  President  of  the  United 
States  of  America."  Language  which  might 
imply  subordination  is  avoided.  The  President's 
oath  of  office  is  :  "I  will  faithfully  execute  the 
office  of  President  of  the  United  States,  and  will, 
to  the  best  of  my  ability,  preserve,  protect,  and  de- 
fend the  constitution  of  the  United  States."  Not 
Congressional  authority  alone  but  executive  pre- 
rogative also  is  a  fountain  of  law.  Madison  de- 
clared, "  All  constitutional  acts  of  power,  whether 
in  the  executive  or  in  the  judicial  department,  have 

1  The  Federalist,  No.  48. 

2  Ibid.,  No.  70. 


THE  RESTORATION  55 

as  much  legal  validity  and  obligation  as  if  they 
proceeded  from  the  legislature."1  The  delegates 
seem  to  have  looked  forward  to  the  possibility  that 
the  President  might  have  to  act  as  a  saviour  of 
society,  on  the  principle  tersely  stated  by  Madison 
that  "the  safety  and  happiness  of  society  are  the 
objects  at  which  all  political  institutions  aim  and  to 
which  all  such  institutions  must  be  sacrificed."  2 
To  obtain  their  full  significance  as  conceived  by 
the  fathers,  the  provisions  of  the  constitution,  re- 
quiring that  the  United  States  shall  guarantee 
to  every  state  a  republican  form  of  government  and 
give  protection  from  domestic  violence,  should  be 
interpreted  in  connection  with  this  embodiment  of 
prerogative.  The  Shays'  Rebellion  in  Massachu- 
setts and  the  disturbances  in  New  Hampshire  and 
Rhode  Island  had  laid  a  great  fear  on  the  dele- 
gates. 

At  the  first  session  of  Congress,  the  Senate, 
under  the  lead  of  John  Adams,  endeavored  to  carry 
out  these  ideas  of  presidential  prerogative  by 
attaching  titles  of  royalty  to  the  office;  but  the 
House  of  Representatives  defeated  all  such  propo- 
sitions. Nevertheless  the  precautions  taken  by  the 
framers  of  the  constitution,  in  behalf  of  the  presi- 
dency, were  so  effectual  that  Congress  was  made 
an  incurably  deficient  and  inferior  organ  of  govern- 
ment. As  the  nation  develops  and  the  people 

1  The  Federalist,  No.  64. 

2  Ibid.,  No.  45. 


56  ORIGINS   OF  AMERICAN  POLITICS 

increase  their  qualifications  for  self-government,  it 
will  be  seen  that  they  will  lay  hold  of  the  presi- 
dency as  the  only  organ  sufficient  for  the  exercise 
of  their  sovereignty. 

In  giving  shape  to  the  determinations  of  the  con- 
vention, the  draughting  committee  seems  to  have 
made  free  use  of  material  afforded  by  state  consti- 
tutions. It  is  a  common  legislative  practice  to 
consult  the  statute  books  for  material  already 
shaped  for  use,  and  in  this  respect  the  behavior  of 
the  convention  of  1787  was  what  that  of  any  con- 
stitutional convention  in  our  own  times  might  be. 
In  plan  and  purpose,  the  constitution  is  a  product 
of  the  political  ideas  of  the  English  race.  It  stands 
in  lineal  succession  to  such  muniments  of  public 
right  as  Magna  Charta,  the  Bill  of  Rights  of  1689, 
and  the  Act  of  Settlement  of  1700.  The  embodi- 
ment of  Whig  doctrine  in  a  written  constitution 
was,  however,  an  unperceived  revolution  in  politi- 
cal conditions,  since  it  converted  what  was  simply 
a  working  theory,  open  to  modification  as  times 
changed,  into  a  rigid  frame  of  government.  The 
anatomy  of  the  English  constitution  was  completed 
by  the  establishment  of  royalty  on  a  parliamentary 
title.  Its  development  since  then  has  been  carried 
on  by  functional  activities.1  The  constitution  ot 
the  United  States  was  a  sort  of  Act  of  Settlement 


1  Lecky  comments   instructively   upon  this  point.      History  of 
England,  Vol.  III.,  p.  10. 


THE  RESTORATION  57 

after  the  American  Whig  revolution  of  17/5-1783  ; 
but  in  adapting  the  traditional  structure  of  govern- 
ment to  new  uses,  the  federal  composition  of  the 
nation  compelled  changes  which,  although  intended 
as  simple  variations,  resulted  in  generic  difference. 
In  endeavoring  to  get  back  to  the  old  type  of  gov- 
ernment, the  fathers  originated  a  new  type  of  more 
complex  organization  and  larger  capacities  of  devel- 
opment. The  old  type,  from  its  superior  complex- 
ity to  the  simple  forms  of  absolute  rule,  could  not 
have  been  developed  save  in  the  shelter  of  Eng- 
land's insular  position.  The  still  more  elaborate 
organization  of  the  new  type  had  a  remote  new 
world  in  which  to  expand.  Although  its  develop- 
ment is  still  incomplete,  its  stability  is  so  well 
established  that  federal  government  is  now  the 
mould  of  empire.  Guizot  says,  "  Of  all  the 
systems  of  government  and  political  guarantee,  it 
may  be  asserted  without  fear  of  contradiction 
that  the  most  difficult  to  establish  and  render 
effectual  is  the  federated  system  :  a  system  which 
consists  in  leaving  in  each  place  or  province,  in 
every  separate  society,  all  that  portion  of  govern- 
ment which  can  abide  there,  and  in  taking  from 
it  only  so  much  of  it  as  is  indispensable  to  a 
general  society,  in  order  to  carry  it  to  the  cen- 
tre of  this  larger  society,  and  there  to  embody 
it  under  the  form  of  a  central  government." l 

1  Guizot's  History  of  Civilization,  Lecture  IV. 


58  ORIGINS    OF  AMERICAN  POLITICS 

This  distribution  of  independent  powers  of  govern- 
ment, according  to  the  respective  needs  of  local  and 
general  administration,  all  comprehended  in  organic 
union,  is  the  contribution  of  America  to  the  advance 
of  political  science,  and  it  has  been  evolved  from 
the  old  Whig  doctrine. 


CHAPTER   V 

CLASS    RULE 

THE  constitutional  history  of  the  United  States 
begins  with  the  establishment  of  the  government 
of  the  masses  by  the  classes.  It  was  expected  as 
a  matter  of  course  that  the  gentry  would  control 
every  branch  of  the  government.  "  The  adminis- 
tration of  government,  in  its  larger  sense,"  re- 
marked Hamilton,  "  comprehends  all  the  operations 
of  the  body  politic,  whether  legislative,  executive, 
or  judiciary." l  This  unity  was  to  be  maintained  by 
the  fact  that  the  conduct  of  public  affairs  would 
be  a  part  of  the  activity  of  good  society,  enmeshed 
in  its  usual  ambitions,  enjoyments,  and  habits  of 
intercourse.  Who,  save  the  gentry,  would  have  the 
means  or  ability  to  attend  to  such  matters  ?  The 
common  people  were  not  regarded  as  having  any 
direct  part  in  the  government  at  all.  It  was  ad- 
mitted that  "  there  are  strong  minds  in  every  walk 
of  life  that  will  rise  superior  to  the  disadvantages 
of  their  situation,  and  will  command  the  tribute 
due  to  their  merit,  not  only  from  the  classes  to 
which  they  particularly  belong,  but  from  the  society 
in  general,"  but  these  "  are  exceptions  to  the  rule." 

JThe  Federalist,  No.  72.     . 
59 


60  ORIGINS   OF  AMERICAN  POLITICS 

"  The  representative  body,  with  too  few  exceptions 
to  have  any  influence  on  the  spirit  of  the  govern- 
ment, will  be  composed  of  landholders,  merchants, 
and  men  of  the  learned  professions."  1 

The  checks  and  balances  of  the  constitution 
were  regarded,  not  as  restraints  upon  the  gov- 
ernment itself,  but  as  restraints  upon  the  classes 
who  would  have  possession  of  the  government,  to 
keep  them  from  abusing  their  trusts  for  individual 
advantage.  By  giving  a  different  constitution  to 
the  various  branches  of  government,  it  was  in- 
tended to  counteract  class  selfishness  by  creating 
antagonistic  interests.  "  Ambition  must  be  made 
to  counteract  ambition,"  said  Madison.  "The 
interests  of  the  man  must  be  connected  with  the 
constitutional  rights  of  the  place."  2  John  Adams 
wrote,  "It  is  the  true  policy  of  the  common  peo- 
ple to  place  the  whole  executive  power  in  one  man, 
to  make  him  a  distinct  order  in  the  state,  from 
whence  arises  an  inevitable  jealousy  between  him 
and  the  rest  of  the  gentlemen  ;  this  forces  him  to 
become  the  father  and  protector  of  the  common 
people,  and  to  endeavor  always  to  humble  every 
proud  aspiring  senator,  or  other  officer  in  the  state, 
who  is  in  danger  of  acquiring  an  influence  too 
great  for  the  law  or  the  spirit  of  the  constitu- 
tion." 3  And  again,  "  If  the  people  are  suffi- 
ciently enlightened  to  see  all  the  dangers  that 

1The  Federalist,  Nos.  35,  36.  *  Ibid.,  No.  51. 

'Adams'  Works,  Vol.  VI.,  p.  186. 


CLASS  RULE  6 1 

surround  them,  they  will  always  be  represented  by 
a  distinct  personage  to  manage  the  whole  executive 
power ;  a  distinct  Senate,  to  be  guardians  of  prop- 
erty against  levellers  for  the  purposes  of  plunder, 
to  be  a  repository  of  the  national  tradition  of 
public  maxims,  customs,  and  manners,  and  to  be 
controllers  in  turn  both  of  kings  and  ministers  on 
one  side,  and  the  representatives  of  the  people  on 
the  other,  when  either  discover  a  disposition  to  do 
wrong ;  and  a  distinct  House  of  Representatives, 
to  be  the  guardian  of  the  public  purse  and  to  pro- 
tect the  people,  in  their  turn,  against  both  kings 
and  nobles."  J 

A  government  constituted  on  these  principles 
was  obviously  not  a  republic,  in  the  sense  in  which 
we  use  the  word,  as  implying  popular  rule.  A  title 
fairly  descriptive  of  its  nature  was  that  applied  to 
it  by  John  Adams,  in  some  correspondence  with 
Roger  Sherman,  at  the  time  of  the  adoption  of 
the  constitution.  He  called  it  "a  monarchical 
republic  "  ;  but  it  must  not  be  supposed  that  there 
is  in  the  term  any  intimation  of  a  hybrid  or  unique 
species  of  government.  In  his  writings  on  gov- 
ernment, Adams  had  classified  England  under  the 
same  title ;  and  in  now  applying  it  to  America  he 
meant  simply  that  it,  too,  was  a  monarchy,  in  that 
the  custody  of  the  executive  power  was  an  individual 
trust,  and  that  it  was  also  republican,  inasmuch 
as  the  constitution  provided  for  the  represen- 

1  Adams'  Works,  Vol.  VI.,  pp.  117, 118. 


62  ORIGINS   OF  AMERICAN  POLITICS 

tation  of  the  people.  It  is  quite  plain  that  this 
was  the  view  taken  by  the  authors  of  the  Feder- 
alist, though  not  so  bluntly  stated.  The  new  gov- 
ernment is  always  referred  to  as  republican ;  but 
Madison  explained  that  by  republic  he  means  "a 
government  in  which  the  scheme  of  representa- 
tion takes  place" — a  definition  which  includes 
England  quite  as  well  as  America.  He  argued 
that  the  new  government  should  by  no  means  be 
classed  with  the  democratic  republics  of  antiquity, 
in  which  the  people  ruled.  "Democracies  have 
ever  been  spectacles  of  turbulence  and  contention, 
have  ever  been  found  incompatible  with  personal 
security  or  the,  rights  of  property,  and  have  in 
general  been  as  short  in  their  lives  as  they  have 
been  violent  in  their  deaths."  Means  must  be 
provided  "to  refine  and  enlarge  the  public  views, 
by  passing  them  through  the  medium  of  a  chosen 
body  of  citizens  whose  wisdom  may  best  discern 
the  true  interests  of  their  country."1  "The  true 
distinction  between  these  (ancient  republics)  and 
the  American  governments  lies  in  the  total  exclu- 

1  The  Federalist,  No.  10.  Adams  in  one  of  his  letters  remarks 
that  in  England  a  republican  was  regarded  as  unamiably  as  a  witch 
or  blasphemer.  According  to  Jefferson's  Anas  something  of  this 
prejudice  against  the  word  lingered  in  Washington's  mind.  Jef- 
ferson relates  that  on  May  23,  1793,  Washington  called  his  atten- 
tion to  the  word  "  republic "  in  the  draft  of  a  state  paper,  with 
the  remark  that  it  was  a  word  "  which  he  had  never  before  seen  in 
any  of  our  public  communications."  On  November  28,  Jefferson 
records  his  satisfaction  that  the  expression  "  our  republic "  had 


CLASS  RULE  63 

sion  of  the  people  in  their  collective  capacity  from 
any  share  in  the  latter."  1 

There  is  nothing  in  the  constitution  requiring 
Congress  to  hold  public  sittings,  although  "each 
House  shall  keep  a  journal  of  its  proceedings,  and 
from  time  to  time  publish  the  same,  except  such 
parts  as  may  in  their  judgment  require  secrecy." 
Members  were  not  to  be  simply  the  delegates  of 
the  people ;  for  the  purposes  of  government  they 
were  the  people  themselves.  To  protect  them  in 
the  complete  exercise  of  this  representative  capac- 
ity, it  was  provided  that  "for  any  speech  or  debate 
in  either  House  they  shall  not  be  questioned  in 
any  other  place."2  That  the  people  may  know 

been  introduced  by  Attorney  General  Randolph  in  his  draught  of  the 
President's  speech  to  Congress,  and  that  Washington  made  no  objec- 
tion to  it.  Jefferson's  Writings  (Ford's  edition),  Vol.  I.,  pp.  231,  271. 

xThe  Federalist,  No.  63. 

2  Article  I,  Section  6,  of  the  constitution.  The  original  source  is 
the  Bill  of  Rights  of  1689.  This  privilege  the  House  of  Commons 
was  in  the  habit  of  asserting  to  the  extent  of  forbidding  any  publi- 
cation of  its  debates  or  comment  on  its  proceedings.  Colonial 
legislatures  had  as  stoutly  maintained  the  same  privilege.  This 
is  one  of  the  features  on  which  Patrick  Henry  based  his  opposition 
to  the  adoption  of  the  constitution.  In  one  of  his  speeches  before 
the  Virginia  convention  he  said :  "  What  security  have  we  in  money 
matters?  Inquiry  is  precluded  by  this  constitution.  .  .  .  How  are 
you  to  keep  inquiry  alive?  How  discover  their  conduct?  We  are 
told  by  that  paper  that  a  regular  statement  and  account  of  the 
receipts  and  expenditures  of  public  money  shall  be  published -from 
time  to  time.  Here  is  a  beautiful  check  !  Here  is  the  utmost  lati- 
tude left.  If  those  who  are  in  Congress  please  to  put  that  con- 
struction upon  it,  the  words  of  the  constitution  will  be  satisfied  by 


64  ORIGINS   OF  AMERICAN  POLITICS 

what  their  trustees  do  with  the  funds  in  their  keep- 
ing, "a  regular  statement  of  the  receipts  and  ex- 
penditures of  public  money  shall  be  published  from 
time  to  time."  Thus  a  certain  degree  of  accounta- 
bility was  established  ;  but  the  desire  was  not  to 
enable  the  people  to  control  the  government,  but 
to  enable  the  government  to  control  the  people. 
"  In  framing  a  government  which  is  to  be  adminis- 
tered by  men  over  men,"  said  Madison,  "  the  great 
difficulty  lies  in  this  :  you  must  first  enable  the  gov- 
ernment to  control  the  governed,  and  in  the  next 
place,  oblige  it  to  control  itself."  l 

So,  then,  the  framers  of  the  constitution  made 
no  intentional  provision  for  the  control  of  the  gov- 
ernment by  public  opinion.  The  idea  could  hardly 
have  occurred  to  them.  Public  opinion  in  the  mod- 
ern sense  of  the  word  is  a  very  recent  thing.  As 
late  as  1820,  Sir  Robert  Peel  spoke  contemptuously 
of  "that  great  compound  of  folly,  weakness,  preju- 
dice, wrong-feeling,  right-feeling,  obstinacy,  and 
newspaper  paragraphs  which  is  called  public  opin- 
ion." If  the  definition  had  been  attempted  in 
1787,  public  opinion  would  have  been  described, 
very  likely,  as  aristocratic  greed,  knavery,  and  in- 
publishing  those  accounts  once  in  a  hundred  years.  They  may 
publish  or  not  as  they  please."  Wm.  Wirt  Henry's  Patrick  Henry, 
Vol.  III.,  pp.49i,  492.  Popular  anxiety  on  the  subject  was  so  great 
that  the  first  amendment  to  the  constitution  prohibited  the  making 
of  any  laws  "  abridging  the  freedom  of  speech  or  of  the  press." 

1  The  Federalist,  No.  51. 


CLASS  RULE  65 

trigue,  compounded  with  popular  stupidity  and  mob 
clamor.  Who  then  could  have  dreamed  of  the  great 
series  of  inventions  which  have  transformed  the 
world  ?  These  elaborate  networks  of  railroads 
and  telegraphs,  the  product  of  a  social  activity 
which  has  meanwhile  been  making  corresponding 
gains  in  public  education  and  popular  intelligence, 
are  nerve  filaments  of  the  body  politic,  giving  it 
an  organization  and  a  sensitiveness  that  constitute 
it  a  new  being,  unknown  before  since  the  begin- 
ning of  the  world.  In  the  eighteenth  century,  the 
possibility  of  such  a  phenomenon  was  unthinkable. 
The  human  animal,  alone  or  in  the  herd,  was  about 
the  same  as  he  always  had  been,  and  such  as  he 
was  always  likely  to  be.  Political  characteristics 
were  much  the  same  as  when  Aristotle  surveyed 
party  struggles  in  the  Grecian  states,  or  when 
Cicero  analyzed  the  faction  strifes  of  Rome.  Mod- 
ern civilization  itself  seemed  to  be  a  barbarian  en- 
campment in  the  ruins  of  the  ancient  world,  the 
memorials  of  whose  grandeur  were  melancholy 
portents.  Gibbon,  whose  great  history  belongs 
to  this  period,  concludes  his  account  of  the  fall 
of  the  Roman  Empire  with  some  speculations  *on 
the  fate  of  the  modern  world,  whose  undertone  of 
gloomy  foreboding  is  not  concealed  by  their  show 
of  philosophic  composure.  In  the  grand  French 
monarchy,  where  the  stability  of  government  seemed 
impregnable,  society  indulged  optimistic  dreams  of 
what  might  be  accomplished  by  the  reign  of  philos- 


66  ORIGINS   OF  AMERICAN  POLITICS 

ophy.  With  light  hearts  and  buoyant  spirits  the 
ancient  regime  pushed  out  into  the  stream  of  vanity 
and  glided  down  towards  the  Niagara  plunge  of 
revolution.  English  institutions  were  still  too  un- 
settled after  the  upheavals  of  the  seventeenth  cen- 
tury to  permit  any  false  sense  of  security  to  arise. 
In  England  and  America,  the  spirit  of  the  age  was 
pessimistic.  There  was  an  away-with-melancholy 
struggle  in  the  coarse  enjoyments  of  society.  Ir- 
religion  was  as  abounding  as  in  France ;  but  it  was 
not  mocking  in  spirit,  for  the  necessity  of  making 
use  of  every  element  of  social  order  caused  states- 
men to  value  even  "the  authority  of  superstition."  l 
There  was  a  cynic  contempt  of  day  dreams  and 
utopist  fancies.2  While  doing  with  Stoic  fortitude 
what  it  lay  in  them  to  do,  the  men  who  took  the 
chief  part  in  founding  the  republic  had  painful 
misgivings  as  to  the  durability  of  their  work.3 

1  The  Federalist,  No.  38,  by  Madison. 

2  In  the   Federalist,  No.  30,  written   by  Hamilton,  there   is  a 
characteristic  allusion   to  the  enthusiasts  "who  expect  to  see  the 
halcyon  scenes  of  the  poetic  or  fabulous  age  realized  in  America." 

3  In  a  letter  written  in  his  old  age,  John  Adams  says  that  Wash- 
ington was  made  unhappy  in   his  retirement,  after  occupying  the 
presidential  chair,  by  fears  for  his  country.    Adams'  Works,  Vol.  X., 
p.  1 6.     Hamilton,  towards  the  close  of  the  great  career  which  was 
brought  to  such  an  untimely  end,  wrote  to  a  friend,  "  Perhaps  no 
man  in  the  United  States  has  sacrificed  or  done  more  for  the  pres- 
ent constitution  than  myself,  and,  contrary  to  all  my  anticipations 
of  its  fate,  as  you  know,  from  the  very  beginning,  I  am  still  labor- 
ing to  prop  up  the  frail  and  worthless  fabric."     Works,  Vol.  VII., 
P-  591- 


CLASS  RULE  6/ 

The  democratic  tendencies  which  they  dreaded 
seemed  uncontrollable.  Despite  all  their  pains  in 
fashioning  the  machine  on  the  old  model,  it  would 
not  work  that  way.  The  trouble  was,  as  Fisher 
Ames  acutely  remarked,  "  Constitutions  are  but 
paper ;  society  is  the  substratum  of  government." 
The  social  conditions  were  such  that  the  constitu- 
tion could  not  escape  conversion  to  democratic  uses. 
Although  the  fathers  imagined  that  they  were 
making  the  government  on  the  old  Whig  model, 
they  were  only  copying  its  external  form.  In 
reality,  the  Whig  theory  of  government  was  a  fic- 
tion masking  the  transfer  of  administrative  author- 
ity from  the  crown  to  parliament.  The  attachment 
of  the  English  people  to  kingship  was  such  that 
politicians  were  bound  to  defer  to  it,  just  as  poli- 
ticians in  our  day  are  bound  to  maintain  that  their 
proposals  are  thoroughly  constitutional  and  realize 
the  true  intent  of  the  fathers.  The  Whigs,  in 
their  way,  were  as  sincere  in  their  loyalty  to  the 
crown  as  the  Tories,  but  after  the  Revolution  of 
1689  England  was  really  ruled  by  the  landed  aris- 
tocracy. The  personal  rule  which  George  III 
exercised  did  not  proceed  so  much  from  the  author- 
ity of  the  crown  as  from  its  influence.  It  was  the 
rule,  not  of  a  king,  but  of  a  political  boss,  depend- 
ent upon  corrupt  inducements  and  transient  com- 
binations.1 The  crown,  lords,  and  commons  were 

1 "  The  power  of  the  crown,  almost  dead  and  rotten  as  prerog- 
ative, has  grown  up  anew,  with  much  more  strength  and  far  less 


68  ORIGINS  OF  AMERICAN  POLITICS 

not  in  fact  distinct  and  independent  depositaries 
of  authority  ;  for  the  landed  gentry  served  as  a  con- 
nective tissue,  enfolding  the  branches  of  govern- 
ment and  establishing  a  centralized  control.  Seats 
in  Parliament  were  almost  personal  property,  and 
were  frequently  sold  as  such.  Elections,  as  a  rule, 
were  a  mere  matter  of  form.  Contests  were  rare. 
In  the  first  general  election  held  in  George  Ill's 
reign  there  were  contests  only  in  two  counties  and 
sixteen  boroughs  of  England,  and  none  at  all  in 
Scotland  or  in  Wales.1  At  the  beginning  of  the 
present  century,  of  658  members  of  Parliament, 
487  were  virtually  nominated  by  peers  or  wealthy 
squires. 

Whatever  unity  or  efficiency  of  administration 
existed  in  the  national  government  when  it  was 
first  established  was  due  to  the  fact  that  the  gen- 
try controlled  the  government  in  all  its  branches. 
Hence  the  machine  did  actually  go.  The  French 
revolutionary  constitution  of  1791,  which  was 
framed  with  the  same  idea  of  separating  the  exec- 
utive and  legislative  powers,  broke  down  at  once 
for  want  of  such  coordinating  social  influences. 
Similar  failures  have  attended  almost  every  attempt 
to  imitate  the  constitution  of  the  United  States. 
The  constitutional  checks  clog  the  machine. 
Deadlocks  are  broken  by  executive  decree,  and  it 

odium,  under  the  name  of  influence."  Burke's  Present  Discon- 
tents, 1770. 

1  Jephson's  The  Platform,  Vol.  I.,  p.  16. 


CLASS  RULE  69 

speedily  becomes  manifest  that  the  true  constitution 
is  a  military  oligarchy.  The  history  of  Central  and 
South  American  republics  affords  numerous  exam- 
ples of  this  process. 

The  class  supremacy  dexterously  reasserted  by 
the  gentry  was,  however,  doomed  to  destruction. 
The  English  gentry  had  to  do  with  a  settled  popu- 
lation, trained  to  habits  of  deference  and  unable 
to  escape  from  landlord  control.  But  the  Amer- 
ican gentry  were  very  differently  situated.  Dur- 
ing the  greater  portion  of  the  colonial  period,  the 
pressure  of  the  French  and  Indians  upon  the  Eng- 
lish settlements  confined  the  field,  so  that  the  pres- 
tige of  the  gentry  could  not  be  seriously  impaired. 
But  with  the  expulsion  of  the  European  powers, 
and  the  driving  back  of  the  Indians,  a  profound 
change  in  social  conditions  ensued.  The  land 
was  practically  illimitable  in  extent,  and  coercive 
social  arrangements  were  impracticable,  as  the 
fathers  soon  discovered.  "  We  need  as  all  nations 
do,"  wrote  Fisher  Ames  to  Rufus  King  in  1802, 
"the  compression  on  the  outside  of  our  circle  of 
a  formidable  neighbor,  whose  presence  shall  at 
all  times  excite  stronger  fears  than  demagogues 
can  inspire  the  people  with  towards  their  govern- 
ment." 1  The  actual  conditions  were  such  as  to 
favor  democratic  concessions.  The  desire  to  obtain 
settlers  caused  inducements,  which  early  took  the 

1  Life  and  Correspondence  of  Rufus  King,  Vol.  IV.,  p.  106. 


7O  ORIGINS  OF  AMERICAN  POLITICS 

shape  of  offers  of  political  franchises.1  The  restric- 
tions upon  the  suffrage  on  which  the  framers  of  the 
Constitution  had  depended,  as  guaranteeing  the 
political  control  of  the  gentry,  soon  began  to  loosen. 
The  breach  between  society  and  politics,  which  was 
sure  to  occur  when  political  influence  ceased  to  be  a 
class  privilege  of  the  gentry,  was  not  long  delayed.2 
Hamilton  lamented  the  growing  indifference  of  the 
better  class  of  people  to  the  exercise  of  their  suf- 
frage much  in  the  style  so  common  nowadays. 
That  breach  was  destined  to  expand  until  the  hon- 
orable title  of  politician  should  carry  with  it  a  social 

1  As  early  as  1681  William  Penn  set  forth  among  the  attractions 
which  his  province  of  Pennsylvania  offered  to  settlers  that  "  they 
will  have  the  right   of  voting,  not  only  for   the  election   of  the 
magistrates  of  the  place  in  which  they  live,  but  also  for  the  mem- 
bers of  the  provincial  council  and  the  general  assembly,  which  two 
bodies,  conjointly  with  the  governor,  formed  the  sovereign  power." 
The  desire  for  settlers  in  the  colonies  was  so  strong  that  one  of  the 
grievances  specified  in  the  Declaration  ot  Independence  was  that 
the  king  put  obstacles  in  the  way  of  emigration.     The  operation 
of  this  desire  has  had  marked  effects  upon  American  institutions. 
Fourteen  states  give  foreigners  the  right  to  vote  on  the  declaration 
of  an  intention  to  be  naturalized. 

2  The  danger  was  foreseen  by  the  framers  of  the  Constitution. 
Dickinson  remarked  that  the  freeholders  were  "  the  best  guardians 
of  liberty,  and  the  restrictions  of  the  right  (of  suffrage)  to  them 
was  a  necessary  defence  against  the  dangerous  influence  of  those 
multitudes  without  property  and  without  principle  with  which  our 
country,  like  all  others,  will  in  time  abound."     The  qualifications  in 
the  different  states  were  so  various  that  it  was  found  impossible  to 
agree  on  any  uniform  rule,  and  the  constitution  therefore  simply 
adopts  in  every  state  the  voting  qualifications  prescribed  in  elec- 
tions for  representatives  in  the  state  legislature. 


CLASS  RULE  ?I 

opprobrium  and  what  is  known  as  good  society 
would  hold  itself  aloof  from  politics  or  merely  invade 
it  at  intervals. 

The  gentry  did  not,  however,  lose  their  control 
until  they  had  founded  the  government  and  estab- 
lished agencies  for  operating  its  machinery  in  lieu 
of  those  which  their  class  interests  had  provided. 
Parties  were  founded  whose  organization  was  gradu- 
ally to  develop  a  strength  and  an  elaboration  equal 
to  the  intricate  tasks  imposed  by  the  complex  nature 
of  the  government.  The  rigid  framework  of  the 
Constitution  forced  political  development  to  find 
its  outlet  in  extra-constitutional  agencies,  bringing 
the  executive  and  legislative  branches  under  a 
common  control,  despite  the  constitutional  theory. 
The  new  control  was  to  be  essentially  as  aristo- 
cratic as  the  old,  for  the  political  class  is  none  the 
less  an  aristocracy,  although  its  muniments  do  not 
consist  of  social  privilege  or  territorial  endowment, 
but  rest  upon  proficiency  in  the  management  of 
party  organization  too  complex  for  any  save  pro- 
fessional experts  to  handle.  The  history  of  Ameri- 
can politics  verifies  Burke's  remark,  that  "an  aris- 
tocracy is  the  most  natural  thing  in  the  world." 


PART   II 

POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT 
CHAPTER   VI 

SETTING    UP   THE   GOVERNMENT 

THE  new  government  patterned  its  behavior  as 
closely  as  possible  after  the  English  style.  Hamil- 
ton drew  up  for  the  President  a  scheme  of  etiquette, 
imitating  royal  exclusiveness.  "  In  Europe,"  he 
said,  "  ambassadors  only  have  direct  access  to  the 
chief  magistrate.  Something  very  near  what  pre- 
vails there  would,  in  my  opinion,  be  right.  ...  I 
have  thought  that  the  members  of  the  Senate 
should  also  have  a  right  of  individual  access  on 
matters  relative  to  the  public  administration.  In 
England  and  France  peers  of  the  realm  have  this 
right."  But  the  Representatives  were  not  entitled 
to  such  a  privilege.1 

The  address  to  Congress,  with  which  Washing- 
ton opened  the  session,  was  couched  in  the  style 
of  the  speech  from  the  throne.  At  the  first  session 
there  was  some  talk  of  setting  up  a  sort  of  throne 

i  Hamilton's  Works,  Vol.  IV.,  p.  3. 
72 


SETTING    UP   THE    GOVERNMENT  f$ 

for  him  in  the  senate  chamber,  but  the  project  did 
not  take  well  and  it  was  dropped.  He  used  the 
Vice-President's  chair  instead,  and  the  Representa- 
tives went  to  the  senate  chamber  to  hear  him,  as 
the  Commons  proceed  to  the  House  of  Lords  on 
similar  occasions.  He  addressed  himself  to  both 
bodies,  or  either,  as  the  nature  of  his  remarks  sug- 
gested. The  tone  was  personal,  such  as  a  king 
might  use.  In  his  speech  opening  Congress  at  its 
first  session,  referring  to  his  constitutional  duty 
of  recommending  to  their  consideration  such  meas- 
ures as  he  should  deem  necessary  and  expedient, 
he  expressed  his  appreciation  of  "  the  talents,  the 
rectitude,  and  patriotism  which  adorn  the  charac- 
ters selected  to  devise  and  adopt  them."  In  open- 
ing the  next  session,  he  told  the  Representatives : 
"  I  saw  with  peculiar  pleasure,  at  the  close  of  the 
last  session,  the  resolution  entered  into  by  you, 
expressive  of  your  opinion  that  an  adequate  pro- 
vision for  the  support  of  the  public  credit  is  a 
matter  of  high  importance  to  the  national  honor 
and  prosperity.  In  this  sentiment  I  entirely  con- 
cur. And,  to  a  perfect  confidence  in  your  best 
endeavors  to  devise  such  a  provision  as  will  be 
truly  consistent  with  the  ends,  I  add  an  equal  reli- 
ance on  the  cheerful  cooperation  of  the  other 
branch  of  the  legislature." 

Congress,  too,  conformed  to  English  precedents 
in  its  procedure.  The  houses  would  vote  a  joint 
address  in  reply,  containing  a  due  amount  of  per- 


74  POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT 

sonal  compliment.  The  members  trooped  to  the 
President's  "audience  chamber,"  and  the  presi- 
dent of  the  Senate  delivered  the  address,  where- 
upon the  President  would  renew  the  assurances 
of  his  distinguished  consideration.1 

It  is  pathetic  to  read  the  accounts  which  have 
reached  us  of  the  embarrassments  of  General 
Washington  in  his  conscientious  discharge  of  these 
irksome  duties.  The  explosion  of  wrath  described 
by  Jefferson  in  his  "Anas,"  when  Washington 
swore  he  would  rather  be  living  on  his  farm  than 
be  emperor  of  the  universe,2  was  doubtless  the 
expression  of  the  dearest  wish  of  his  heart.3  Mac- 
lay  tells  us  that  when  Washington  made  his  first 
address  to  Congress,  he  was  "agitated  and  embar- 
rassed more  than  ever  he  was  by  the  levelled 
cannon  or  the  pointed  musket."  A  similar  spec- 
tacle was  presented  when  Congress  waited  on 
him  to  deliver  their  address  in  response.  Maclay 
says  :  — 

"The  President  took  his  reply  out  of  his  coat 

1  The  joint  rules  adopted  by  the  First  Congress  provided  "  that 
when  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives  shall  judge  it  proper 
to  make  a  joint  address  to  the  President  it  shall  be  presented  to  him 
in  his  audience  chamber,  by  the  President  of  the  Senate,  in  the 
presence  of  the  Speaker  and  both  houses." 

2  Jefferson's  Writings  (Ford's  edition),  Vol.  I.,  p.  254. 

8  When  John  Adams  was  inaugurated  he  was  impressed  by 
Washington's  intense  gratification  on  quitting  office.  Adams  wrote 
to  his  wife  :  "  Methought  I  heard  him  say,  '  Ay !  I  am  fairly  out,  and 
you  fairly  in;  see  which  of  us  will  be  the  happiest.' " 


SETTING    UP    THE    GOVERNMENT  75 

pocket.  He  had  his  spectacles  in  his  jacket  pocket, 
having  his  hat  in  his  left  hand  and  his  paper  in 
his  right.  He  had  too  many  objects  for  his  hands. 
He  shifted  his  hat  between  his  forearm  and  the 
left  side  of  his  breast.  But  taking  his  spectacles 
from  the  case  embarrassed  him.  He  got  rid  of 
this  small  distress  by  laying  the  spectacle  case  on 
the  chimney-piece.  .  .  .  Having  adjusted  his  spec- 
tacles, which  was  not  very  easy  considering  the 
engagements  of  his  hands,  he  read  the  reply  with 
tolerable  exactness  and  without  much  emotion." 

Many  a  time  must  this  honest,  single-minded 
Virginia  gentleman  have  deplored  the  fate  which 
made  such  pretence  his  duty,  when  in  the  ordinary 
course  of  affairs  he  should  have  had  a  right  to 
expect  that  he  would  be  living  in  comfort  on  his 
plantation,  engaged  in  the  country  employments 
and  recreations  of  which  he  was  so  fond.  Mrs. 
Washington  also  had  to  exchange  the  genial  hos- 
pitality and  easy  manners  of  Virginia  for  a  stiff 
etiquette  and  a  social  parade  which  made  her  the 
target  of  disparaging  gossip.1  And  while  Wash- 
ington, with  his  best  endeavor,,  thus  played  his 
part  in  this  caricature  of  kingship,  it  was  quite 
ineffectual.  There  was  no  historical  prestige  at- 
taching to  his  office ;  there  were  no  fixed  social 
gradations  to  buttress  his  dignity ;  he  had  no  rev- 
enue nor  patronage,  save  what  Congress  chose  to 
create  for  him.  His  brand-new  authority  was 

1  Maclay  records  a  characteristic  sample.     Journal,  p.  73. 


76  POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT 

destitute  of  the  sanctions  which  attach  to  royal 
prerogative  and  it  inspired  no  awe.  Within  the 
limit  of  its  constitutional  powers,  Congress  might 
decide  for  itself  how  it  would  treat  the  President. 
The  matter  would  be  determined  wholly  by  its  own 
disposition.  That  disposition  was  not  hostile,  but 
it  was  very  suspicious.  In  addition  to  the  usual 
fear  of  subjects  as  to  what  rulers  might  do  if  given 
the  opportunity,  there  was  a  strong  apprehension 
that  the  Federal  leaders  were  hankering  after  some- 
thing grand  and  splendid  in  the  way  of  government, 
as  close  to  the  monarchical  standard  as  possible. 
We  have  a  vivid  picture  of  this  attitude  of  mind 
in  the  diary  kept  by  William  Maclay,  one  of  the 
senators  from  Pennsylvania,  an  honest,  well-mean- 
ing man,  who  came  to  Congress  without  any 
previous  share  in  the  councils  of  the  Federal  man- 
agers. The  bent  of  his  mind  was  critical  from  the 
first.  The  measures  to  which  the  national  politi- 
cians were  forced  to  resort  in  managing  Congress 
offended  him  and  inspired  personal  dislikes  which 
he  records  with  amusing  simplicity.  Jefferson  has 
"a  rambling  and  vacant  look"  and  "his  discourse 
partook  of  his  personal  demeanor."  "  He  had  been 
long  enough  abroad  to  catch  the  tone  of  Euro- 
pean folly."  Knox  has  "a  bacchanalian  figure." 
"  Hamilton  has  a  very  boyish,  giddy  manner,  and 
Scotch-Irish  people  could  well  call  him  a  'skite." 
John  Adams,  who  had  been  so  much  abroad  that 
he  felt  warranted  in  giving  the  Senate  occasional 


SETTING    UP   THE    GOVERNMENT  // 

instructions  on  the  way  things  were  done  in  Europe, 
the  diarist  cannot  mention  without  an  expression 
of  disgust.  He  "has  a  very  silly  kind  of  laugh." 
There  "sat  Bonny  John  Adams  ever  and  anon 
mantling  his  visage  with  the  most  unmeaning  sim- 
per that  ever  dimpled  the  face  of  folly."  Madison 
is  "His  Littleness."  "There  is  an  obstinacy,  a 
perverse  peevishness,  a  selfishness,  which  shuts 
him  up  from  free  communication."  General 
Washington  himself,  as  the  associate  of  such  men, 
becomes  an  object  of  increasing  suspicion.  At 
last  the  diarist  declares :  "  If  there  is  treason  in 
the  wish,  I  retract  it,  but  would  to  God  this  same 
General  Washington  were  in  Heaven  !  We  would 
not  then  have  him  brought  forward  as  the  constant 
cover  to  every  un-constitutional  and  ir-republican 
act." 

With  such  a  temper  in  Congress,  attempts  to 
establish  usages  requiring  a  habit  of  deference  on 
its  part,  were  doomed  to  failure.  The  design  of 
using  the  Senate  as  a  privy  council  was  baffled 
as  soon  as  tried.  Maclay  gives  a  lively  account 
of  the  affair.  Washington  entered  the  Senate 
chamber  and  took  the  Vice-President's  chair.  He 
informed  the  Senate  that  he  had  called  for  their 
advice  and  consent  to  some  propositions  respect- 
ing the  treaty  with  the  southern  Indians  and  had 
brought  the  Secretary  of  War  along  to  explain  the 
business.  General  Knox  produced  some  papers, 
which  were  read.  Washington's  presence  em- 


78  POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT 

barrassed  the  Senate.  Finally  a  motion  was  made 
to  refer  the  papers  to  a  committee,  and  there  was 
some  debate  for  and  against.  Maclay  spoke  in 
favor  of  doing  business  by  committee.  The  dia- 
rist continues  :  "  As  I  sat  down,  the  President  of 
the  United  States  started  up  in  a  violent  fret. 
'  This  defeats  every  purpose  of  my  coming  here,' 
were  the  first  words  that  he  said.  He  then  went 
on  that  he  had  brought  his  Secretary  of  War  with 
him  to  give  every  necessary  information  ;  that  the 
Secretary  knew  all  about  the  business,  and  yet  he 
was  delayed  and  could  not  go  on  with  the  matter." 
Finally,  the  President  said  that  he  would  have  no 
objection  to  postponing  further  consideration  until 
the  ensuing  Monday,  but  he  did  not  understand 
the  matter  of  commitment.  There  were  awkward 
pauses.  ".We  waited  for  him  to  withdraw,"  says 
the  diarist.  "  He  did  so  with  a  discontented  air." 

It  did  not  take  much  of  such  business  to  deter 
Washington  from  treating  the  Senate  as  his  privy 
council.  He  finally  had  to  do  what  every  Presi- 
dent has  done  since — make  his  treaties  first,  and 
submit  them  to  the  Senate  afterwards,  for  ratifica- 
tion. The  comfortable  seclusion  of  this  practice, 
once  enjoyed,  would  not  willingly  be  given  up. 
In  1813  the  Senate  invited  the  attendance  of  the 
President  to  consult  on  foreign  affairs,  but  Madison 
declined  the  invitation. 

The  breakdown  of  the  privy  council  functions 
of  the  Senate  had  an  important  result  in  clearing 


SETTING    UP    THE    GOVERNMENT  79 

the  way  for  the  development  of  the  Cabinet.  It 
was  generally  supposed  at  the  time  of  the  adop- 
tion of  the  Constitution  that  the  administration 
would  practically  consist  of  the  President  and  the 
Senate  acting  in  conjunction.1  If  the  President 
had  found  in  the  Senate  a  congenial  body  of 
advisers,  so  that  treaties  and  appointments  to 
office  would  have  been  made  in  conference  with 
it,  so  much  of  the  policy  of  the  administration 
would  thus  have  been  brought  within  the  habitual 
purview  of  the  Senate  that  the  natural  tendency 
would  have  been  to  draw  in  the  rest  likewise.  The 
language  of  the  Constitution  would  favor  that  ten- 
dency, while  on  the  other  hand  the  Constitution 
is  altogether  ignorant  of  the  President's  Cabinet, 
which  actually  became  his  privy  council.  The  idea 
that  the  heads  of  the  executive  departments  are 
the  personal  appointees  of  each  President,  the 
chiefs  of  party  administration,  did  not  at  first 
exist.2  It  was  assumed  that  their  position  was 

1  Mason,  of  Virginia,  refused  to  sign  the  report  of  the  constitu- 
tional convention  because  it  provided  for  the  rule  of  an  aristocracy. 
He  objected  to  "  the  substitution  of  the  Senate  in  place  of  an  exec- 
utive council  and  to  the  powers  vested  in  that  body."     Madison's 
Works,  Congressional  edition,  Vol.  I.,  p.  355.     In  the  South  Caro- 
lina convention  James  Lincoln  said :    "  Pray  who  are  the  United 
States?     A  president  and  four  or  five  senators." 

2  This  explains  why  neither  Jefferson  nor  his  opponents  thought 
there  was  anything  dishonorable  in  his  retention  of  office  while 
stirring  up  opposition  to  the  policy  of  the  administration.    Jefferson 
continued  in  office  from  a  sense  of  public  duty  for  some  time  after 
he  wanted  to  retire.     The  idea  that  by  so  doing  he  precluded  him- 


80  POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT 

non-partisan  and  that  their  tenure  of  office  would 
be  the  same  as  that  of  other  officials,  which  was 
then  regarded  as  one  of  permanency  during  good 
behavior.  Hence  the  Constitution  conferred  upon 
the  President  as  a  special  privilege,  authority  to 
"require  the  opinion,  in  writing,  of  the  principal 
officer  in  each  of  the  executive  departments,  upon 
any  subject  relating  to  the  duties  of  their  respec- 
tive offices."  The  incongruous  superfluity  of  that 
provision,  since  constitutional  usage  has  made  the 
selection  of  Cabinet  officers  the  President's  indi- 
vidual prerogative,  and  has  made  their  tenure  of 
office  subject  to  his  pleasure,  shows  that  the  actual 
course  taken  in  the  development  of  the  govern- 
ment was  not  altogether  anticipated,  although  the 
intentional  flexibility  of  the  Constitution,  as  regards 
executive  power,  gave  it  an  easy  permission. 

All  the  members  of  Washington's  Cabinet  except 
Hamilton  were  of  the  opinion  that  Congress  could 
not  communicate  with  the  heads  of  departments 

self  from  carrying  on  an  agitation  in  support  of  his  views  of  public 
policy  did  not  occur  to  him  or  his  friends,  even  the  most  high- 
minded  of  them.  .The  theory  was  that  the  president,  like  the  king, 
was  above  party,  so  that  the  idea  of  treachery  towards  him  or 
breach  of  obligation  in  party  behavior  had  no  place.  It  was  the 
same  way  in  England  at  the  same  period.  Ministers  in  the  same 
Cabinet  might  represent  opposing  party  interests  and  endeavor  to 
undermine  one  another.  But  conduct  like  Jefferson's  in  a  states- 
man of  our  own  times  would  be  thought  basely  dishonorable.  The 
same  observations  apply  to  Hamilton's  conduct  in  maintaining  a 
secret  control  over  Adams'  administration  by  his  influence  with  the 
Cabinet  officials. 


SETTING    UP   THE    GOVERNMENT  8 1 

except  through  the  President.  Hamilton,  who 
uniformly  acted  on  his  maxim  of  practical  politics 
that  "the  public  business  must  in  some  way  or 
other,  go  forward,"  J  paid  no  attention  to  the  scru- 
ples of  theorists,  but  entered  at  once  into  direct 
relations  with  Congress.  From  the  first,  he  as- 
sumed the  functions  of  a  crown  minister  to  the 
fullest  extent  which  circumstances  would  allow, 
and  his  example  was  soon  followed  by  all  the 
other  members  of  the  Cabinet.2  He  organized  his 
department  with  the  view  of  making  it  the  organ 
of  Congress  in  the  preparation  of  financial  meas- 
ures.3 The  great  series  of  measures  by  which  he 
established  the  finances  of  the  nation  were  ad- 
dressed by  him  directly  to  the  House  of  Represen- 
tatives. All  his  acts  consist  with  the  assumption 
that  relations  between  the  heads  of  the  depart- 
ments and  Congress  should  be  practically  the 

1  The  Federalist,  No.  22. 

2  Maclay  describes  a  visit  by  Jefferson  to  the  Senate  chamber  to 
advise  the  Senate  to  make  a  lump  appropriation  for  the  diplomatic 
service  to  be  apportioned  according  to  the  discretion  of  the  Presi- 
dent.    Maclay's  Journal,  p.  272. 

8  The  act  establishing  the  Treasury  department  became  law, 
September  2,  1789.  The  nomination  of  Hamilton  as  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury  was  not  sent  to  the  Senate  until  September  n.  But  for 
months  previous  he  had  been  active  in  organizing  the  government, 
and  the  act  was  drawn  in  accordance  with  his  ideas.  The  Federal- 
ist, No.  36,  written  by  Hamilton,  forecasts  the  relations  of  the 
department  to  Congress  proposed  by  the  act  and  also  indicates  that 
the  plan  of  assuming  the  debts  of  the  states  had  already  been  con- 
ceived by  him. 


82  POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT 

same  as  between  the  king's  ministers  and  Parlia- 
ment. He  became  the  premier  of  the  ministry, 
the  channel  of  communication  between  the  execu- 
tive and  the  legislature.1  This  adherence  to  Eng- 
lish precedents  appears  not  only  in  the  manner, 
but  in  the  character  of  his  work.  His  scheme  for 
funding  the  public  debt,  his  plan  for  a  sinking  fund, 
and  his  proposals  for  the  charter  of  a  national  bank, 
all  show  recourse  to  English  methods.2  The  power- 
ful influence  which  the  Bank  of  England  had  exer- 
cised in  upholding  the  Whig  government  after  the 
English  Revolution  of  1689,  made  a  suggestion 
that  could  not  be  ignored  in  devising  means  to 

1  There  was  some  practical  recognition  of  his  position  as  such. 
For  instance,  Jefferson,  who  was  himself  Secretary  of  State,  wrote 
to  Hamilton  to  ask  what  the  Senate  would  do  in  regard  to  certain 
proposals  for  a  treaty  with  Algiers.     Hamilton's  Works,  Vol.  IV., 
p.  215.     Not  the   Secretary  of  War,  but  Hamilton,  wrote  to  the 
House  "  that  it  is  the  opinion  of  the  secretary  for  the  department 
of  war,  that  it  is  expedient  and  necessary  that  the  United  States 
should  retain  and  occupy  West  Point."     Works,  Vol.  II.,  p.  82. 
It  was   Hamilton's   practice   to    revise   and   alter   important   state 
papers  prepared  by  the  other  Cabinet  officers.    In  a  communication 
to  the  Attorney  General  he  advised  various  changes  in  a  paper 
draughted  by  him,  and  even  told  him  that  "  there  appears  to  me 
too  much  tartness  in  various  parts."    Works,  Vol.  IV.,  p.  544.    The 
extent  to  which  Hamilton's   activity  pervaded   and  controlled    all 
the    executive   departments  is  extraordinary  and  it  is   not  to   be 
wondered  at  that  Jefferson  should  have  been  chagrined  and  that 
Madison  should  have  complained  of  Hamilton's  "  mentorship  to  the 
commander-in-chief." 

2  For  the  evidence  see  Dunbar  on  "  Some  Precedents  Followed 
by  Alexander    Hamilton,"    Quarterly  Journal  of  Economics,  Oc- 
tober, 1888. 


SETTING    UP    THE    GOVERNMENT  83 

brace  and  stay  the  new  government.  The  national 
bank  was  founded  as  much  as  a  political  engine  as 
a  financial  instrumentality.  The  assumption  by 
the  nation  of  the  state  debts  contracted  during 
the  Revolutionary  War,  had  the  twofold  purpose 
of  diminishing  state  taxation,  so  as  to  clear  the 
field  for  the  operation  of  the  revenue  laws  of  the 
nation,  and  of  creating  a  national  debt  which  would 
be  "a  cement  to  the  union."  With  a 'large  body 
of  national  creditors  in  existence,  distributed 
throughout  the  Union,  it  was  certain  that  there 
would  be  an  extensive  class  of  citizens,  who  would 
have  a  direct  interest  in  seeing  that  a  ship  of  state 
carrying  such  valuable  freight  should  be  well  found 
and  safely  handled. 

Hamilton's  active  initiative  would  not,  however, 
have  carried  matters  far,  had  it  not  been  supple- 
mented by  direct  personal  management.  The 
public  business  does  not  manage  itself  any  more 
than  any  other  business,  and  pure  reason  figures 
in  it  as  little  as  in  human  affairs  generally.  Poli- 
ticians have  to  deal  with  human  nature  not  as  it 
ought  to  be,  but  as  it  is.  The  ordinary  motives 
and  propensities  are  more  apt  to  be  mean  than 
heroic,  so  that  any  man  engaged  in  business  must 
at  times  admit  expedients  which  have  no  moral 
dignity  to  commend  them.  In  the  ordinary  affairs 
of  life  allowance  is  made  for  stress  of  circum- 
stances, and  the  fact  is  recognized  that  a  man  of 
honor  may  be  compelled  to  make  what  is  called  a 


84  POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT 

choice  of  evils,  although  it  is  in  truth  the  selection 
of  a  right  course  in  a  complicated  moral  situation. 
But  owing  to  the  curious  way  in  which  the  public 
business  is  idealized  by  public  sentiment,  no  allow- 
ance is  made  to  politicians,  and  their  acts  are 
measured  by  contemporary  opinion  according  to 
the  abstract  ethics  which  everybody  is  able  to 
apply  to  other  people.  However,  in  the  politics  of 
the  English  race,  ethical  theory  does  not  control 
practice  in  public  affairs  any  more  than  in  ordinary 
business.  Their  institutions  have  not  been  made 
by  rule,  but  have  grown,  having  their  roots  in  race 
motives  and  taking  their  characteristic  shape  from 
circumstances  of  development.  In  the  fulness  of 
time  it  appears  that  this  growth  has  had  a  moral 
order  of  its  own,  but  the  discovery  comes  from 
the  appreciation  of  posterity,  and  furious  censure  is 
apt  to  be  the  lot  of  those  whose  activities  sustained 
the  process  of  that  growth  which  a  later  age  ad- 
mires. For  all  that,  there  never  have  been  lacking 
statesmen  of  the  stuff  to  endure  whatever  obloquy 
the  discharge  of  the  practical  duties  of  their  office 
may  incur.  The  case  of  Hamilton  is  one  of  the 
most  remarkable  examples  of  this  political  virtue 
which  history  affords.  True,  such  Stoic  intre- 
pidity is  not  rare  in  politicians  of  the  Erfglish 
breed.  Among  the  statesmen  of  the  Georgian 
era,  there  were  those  who  equalled  Hamilton  in 
this  respect,  but  they  had  compensations  which 
he  did  not  have.  In  England,  the  government  was 


SETTING    UP   THE    GOVERNMENT  85 

rich  and  the  management  of  it  lucrative.  Men 
could  not  only  make  fortunes  for  themselves,  but 
could  provide  well  for  their  relatives  and  friends. 
The  peculiarity  of  Hamilton's  case  is  that  while 
he  was  organizing  the  government,  establishing  its 
finances,  and  performing  prodigies  of  intellectual 
effort  in  the  service  of  the  public,  to  be  repaid  by 
calumny  and  abuse,  he  was  at  the  same  time  sac- 
rificing his  legal  practice  and  professional  advance- 
ment for  an  office  paying  him  $3000  a  year,  in 
an  age  of  lavish  personal  expenditure  and  social 
ostentation. 

The  scale  of  Hamilton's  operations  seemed  co- 
lossal in  his  day,  and  to  men  who  did  not  share 
his  penetration  in  discerning  the  extent  of  national 
resources,  his  measures  for  funding  the  public  debt 
seemed  like  fastening  a  millstone  to  the  neck  of 
the  infant  nation.  The  vastness  of  his  plans  gave 
a  correspondingly  wide  scope  to  the  operations  of 
speculators,  the  advance  in  the  value  of  public 
securities  opening  a  rich  field  of  gain.  Of  course 
the  cry  was  raised  that  these  speculative  opportu- 
nities, inevitably  incident  to  any  restoration  of 
public  credit,  were  the  object  of  Hamilton's  policy. 
He  was  accused  of  setting  up  an  engine  of  cor- 
ruption to  control  the  legislature  and  destroy  the 
purity  and  simplicity  of  republican  institutions. 
The  political  literature  of  the  time  is  full  of  refer- 
ences to  Hamilton's  "corrupt  squadron"  in 
Congress,  his  "  gladiators "  who  by  their  venal 


86  POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT 

cooperation  beat  down  the  opposition  of  the  honest 
and  independent  members.  Such  accusations  are 
the  lot  of  every  statesman  who  has  to  devise 
great  financial  measures.  In  our  own  times  Sec- 
retary Sherman  had  to  move  through  a  storm  of 
abuse  in  accomplishing  the  resumption  of  specie 
payments,  and  a  like  tempest  raged  around  Secre- 
tary Carlisle  in  maintaining  the  integrity  of  treas- 
ury obligations.  But  no  statesman  has  ever  had 
to  contend  against  so  virulent  an  opposition  with 
such  slender  resources  as  Alexander  Hamilton. 

Maclay  gives  an  acrid  account  of  Hamilton's 
negotiation  with  members  of  Congress  for  support 
to  his  measures.  Various  combinations  of  inter- 
est were  tried  and  at  last  the  greedy  squabble 
over  the  site  of  the  national  capital  afforded  him 
the  necessary  leverage.  There  was  really  more 
active  concern  in  Congress  about  that  matter  than 
about  the  national  finances.  Even  the  austere 
Maclay  remarks,  that  with  Dr.  Rush  he  had 
"puffed  John  Adams  in  the  papers  and  brought 
him  forward  for  Vice-President,"  because  "  we 
knew  his  vanity  and  hoped  by  laying  hold  of  it  to 
render  him  useful  among  the  New  England  men 
in  our  scheme  of  bringing  Congress  to  Pennsyl- 
vania." Maclay  relates  that  Madison  made  a 
motion  reducing  General  St.  Clair's  salary  as  gov- 
ernor of  the  Western  territory  the  very  day  the 
general  had  disparaged  the  claims  of  the  Potomac 
site,  although  previously  Madison  had  favored  a 


SETTING    UP   THE   GOVERNMENT  8/ 

larger  amount.1  The  bill  for  assuming  state 
debts  was  finally  carried  by  means  of  a  bargain 
arranged  between  Hamilton  and  Jefferson,  the 
votes  of  a  sufficient  number  of  Southern  members 
being  obtained  in  return  for  Northern  votes  for 
the  Potomac  site.  The  foundations  of  the  national 
government  were  laid  by  "log-rolling." 

Although  Hamilton's  assumption  of  leadership 
was  made  good  for  a  time,  from  the  start  it  met 
with  an  opposition  which  showed  that  it  could  not 
be  permanent.  The  bill  establishing  the  treasury 
department  made  it  the  duty  of  the  Secretary  "  to 
digest  and  report  plans  for  the  improvement  and 
management  of  the  revenue,  and  for  the  support 
of  the  public  credit."  Page,  of  Virginia,  immedi- 
ately moved  to  strike  out  that  clause  on  the  ground 
that  "a  precedent  would  be  established  which 
might  be  extended  until  ministers  of  the  govern- 
ment should  be  admitted  on  that  floor  to  explain 
and  support  the  plans  they  had  digested  and  re- 
ported, thereby  laying  the  foundation  for  an  aris- 
tocracy or  a  detestable  monarchy."  Madison 
defended  the  proposed  grant  of  power  on  the 
ground  that  it  would  promote  good  administration, 
which  was  the  chief  end  of  government.  Page's 
motion  was  defeated,  but  the  word  "  prepare  "  was 
substituted  for  "  report,"  and  it  was  made  evident 
that  the  open  connection  between  administration 
and  legislation  would  continue  only  so  long  as  the 

1  Maclay's  Journal,  p.  150. 


88  POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT 

House  should  choose  to  permit  it.  The  temporary 
splice  between  the  executive  and  legislative 
branches  was  too  weak  to  stand  party  violence, 
and  at  this  point  the  first  attack  was  made  when 
an  opposition  was  organized  and  the  formation  of 
national  parties  began.  Originally  the  only  stand- 
ing committee  of  the  House  had  been  one  on 
elections.  Any  matter  on  which  the  House  de- 
sired information,  whether  a  claim,  petition,  or 
memorial,  was  generally  referred  directly  to  the 
head  of  the  proper  department.  When  the  House 
took  up  an  attitude  of  hostility  towards  the  Sec- 
retary of  the  Treasury,  the  system  of  standing 
committees,  which  has  had  such  a  monstrous 
development,  was  begun.  In  January,  1795,  Ham- 
ilton quitted  an  office  which  had  lost  the  functions 
that  made  it  useful  for  his  purposes.  The  effect 
of  the  changed  relations  upon  the  conduct  of  the 
public  business  was  described  with  prophetic  in- 
sight by  Fisher  Ames  in  a  letter  to  Hamilton,  two 
years  after  the  latter's  retirement  from  office  :  — 

"  The  heads  of  departments  are  chief  clerks. 
Instead  of  being  the  ministry,  the  organs  of  the 
executive  power,  and  imparting  a  kind  of  momen- 
tum to  the  operation  of  the  laws,  they  are  pre- 
cluded even  from  communicating  with  the  House 
by  reports.  In  other  countries  they  may  speak  as 
well  as  act.  We  allow  them  to  do  neither.  We 
forbid  them  even  the  use  of  a  speaking-trumpet ; 
or  more  properly,  as  the  Constitution  has  ordained 


SETTING   UP  THE   GOVERNMENT  89 

that  they  shall  be  dumb,  we  forbid  them  to  explain 
themselves  by  signs.  Two  evils,  obvious  to  you, 
result  from  all  this.  The  efficiency  of  government 
is  reduced  to  a  minimum  —  the  proneness  of  a 
popular  body  to  usurpation  is  already  advancing  to 
its  maximum  ;  committees  already  are  the  minis- 
ters ;  and  while  the  House  indulges  a  jealousy  of 
encroachment  in  its  functions,  which  are  properly 
deliberative,  it  does  not  perceive  that  these  are 
impaired  and  nullified  by  the  monopoly  as  well  as 
the  perversion  of  information  by  these  committees. 
The  silly  reliance  of  our  haughty  House  and  Con- 
gress prattlers  on  a  responsibility  of  members  to 
the  people,  &c.,  is  disgraced  by  every  page  in  the 
history  of  popular  bodies."  J 

The  attempt  to  maintain  the  unity  of  adminis- 
tration by  means  of  ministerial  leadership  had 
failed.  The  political  organism  was  constrained  to 
develop  new  faculties  for  that  purpose.  The 
necessary  control  was  resumed  through  the  agency 
of  party. 

1  Hamilton's  Works,  Vol.  VI.,  p.  201. 


CHAPTER  VII 

THE   ORIGIN    OF   PARTIES 

THE  bane  of  the  Whig  ideal  of  government  was 
party  spirit.  It  introduced  principles  of  association 
inconsistent  with  the  constitutional  scheme.  Be- 
cause of  party  spirit  gentlemen  betrayed  the 
interests  of  their  order  and  menaced  the  peace  of 
society  by  demagogic  appeals  to  the  common 
people.  Instead  of  the  concert  of  action  which 
should  exist  between  the  departments  of  govern- 
ment as  the  result  of  a  patriotic  purpose  common 
to  all,  devotion  to  party  was  substituted,  and  the 
constitutional  depositaries  of  power  were  converted 
into  the  fortifications  of  party  interest. 

Throughout  the  eighteenth  century,  party  was 
regarded  as  a  gangrene,  a  cancer,  which  patriotic 
statesmen  should  combine  to  eradicate.  This 
chord  of  sentiment  was  skilfully  touched  by  Boling- 
broke  in  his  influential  treatise,  "The  Patriot 
King,"  in  which  he  eloquently  portrayed  the  char- 
acter of  the  just  ruler  who  should  break  down 
party  control  and  command  for  the  state  the 
service  of  all  good  men.  The  policy  of  George  III. 
was  formed  upon  this  ideal,  and  it  influenced  the 
conduct  of  the  greatest  statesmen  of  the  age.  The 

90 


THE    ORIGIN  OF  PARTIES  91 

elder  Pitt  prevented  the  Rockingham  Whigs  from 
establishing  a  stable  government  by  holding  aloof 
on  the  ground  that  he  thought  "  any  change  insuffi- 
cient which  did  not  comprehend  or  annihilate  every 
party  in  the  kingdom." 1  He  finally  upset  the 
Whig  government  by  consenting  to  take  office  at 
the  head  of  a  non-partisan  administration.  This 
administration  —  whose  power  was  so  compacted 
by  crown  influence  that  when  Pitt  himself  turned 
against  it  his  tremendous  attacks  were  ineffectual 
—  brought  on  the  American  war  and  lost  to  the 
British  crown  thirteen  colonies  and  eight  islands. 

Edmund  Burke  splendidly  defended  the  consti- 
tutional function  of  party  organization,  but  it  was 
the  fashion  to  regard  him  as  a  clever  Irish  advent- 
urer in  Lord  Rockingham's  service,  repaying  his 
patron  by  advocating  views  which  suited  the 
designs  of  a  nobleman  who  wanted  to  restore  the 
principles  of  political  monopoly  and  exclusion  on 
which  Walpole  had  acted.  Burke  defined  party 
as  "  a  body  of  men  united,  for  promoting  by  their 
joint  endeavors  the  national  interest,  upon  some 
particular  principle  on  which  they  are  all  agreed."2 
This  is  the  modern  English  doctrine,  but  in  1770, 
when  Burke  propounded  it,  the  attempt  to  put  such 
a  gloss  on  the  machinations  of  cabal  and  faction 
was  treated  with  scorn.  The  idea  of  basing  gov- 
ernment on  party  seemed  like  selecting  poison  as 

1  Lecky's  History  of  England,  Vol.  IV.,  pp.  256,  297. 

2  The  Present  Discontents. 


92  POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT 

a  diet.  A  section  of  the  Whig  party,  in  whose 
ranks  were  conspicuous  some  statesmen  distin- 
guished in  a  corrupt  age  for  their  rigid  personal 
integrity,  fought  party  government  to  the  last. 
The  Whig  ministry,  which  in  1783  succeeded  to 
power  after  the  British  defeats  in  America  had 
temporarily  destroyed  Tory  ascendency,  was  shat- 
tered by  a  conflict  on  this  point.  Shelburne,  who 
stubbornly  resisted  the  efforts  of  the  Rockingham 
Whigs  to  organize  the  Cabinet  as  a  party  interest, 
told  the  House  of  Commons  that  he  had  imbibed 
the  principles  of  "  his  master  in  politics,  the  Earl  of 
Chatham,  who  had  always  declared  that  this  coun- 
try ought  not  to  be  governed  by  any  party  or 
faction,  and  that  if  it  were  to  be  so  governed  the 
constitution  must  necessarily  expire."  1 

In  fact,  the  principle  of  party  government  was 
never  recognized  in  England  until  it  was  firmly 
established  in  practice,  and  it  had  become  manifest 
that,  despite  all  theory  to  the  contrary,  any  other 
mode  of  government  was  quite  impracticable.  The 
acceptance  of  the  party  system  involved  a  profound 
alteration  in  the  constitutional  theory.  The  old 
Whig  doctrine  of  checks  and  balances  of  power 
became  obsolete.  It  was  found  by  experience  that 
more  efficient  checks  and  balances  were  inherent 
in  the  constitution  of  party  itself,  since  it  is  con- 
stantly obliged  to  consider  all  shades  of  opinion  in 
order  to  maintain  its  strength.  The  amassing  of 
1  Lecky,  Vol.  IV.,  p.  256. 


THE   ORIGIN  OF  PARTIES  93 

the  sovereignty  of  the  nation  in  one  organ  of  gov- 
ernment, which  according  to  the  old  theory  was 
the  very  essence  of  tyranny,  became  the  very 
essence  of  popular  rule.  The  modern  theory  is 
thus  stated  by  Bagehot:  "The  English  consti- 
tution is  founded  on  the  principle  of  choosing 
a  single  sovereign  authority  and  making  it 
good." 

The  old  Whig  abhorrence  of  party  spirit  raged 
in  the  bosoms  of  the  fathers.  It  is  a  topic  to 
which  frequent  reference  is  made  in  their  speeches 
and  correspondence.  The  Federalist  abounds 
with  remarks  on  "the  pestilential  influence  of 
party  animosities."  It  forms  the  chief  topic  of 
Washington's  farewell  address  to  his  countrymen. 
"  There  is  an  opinion,"  he  says,  "  that  parties  in  free 
countries  are  useful  checks  upon  the  administration 
of  the  government,  and  serve  to  keep  alive  the  spirit 
of  liberty.  This  within  certain  limits  is  probably 
true ;  and,  in  governments  of  a  monarchical  class, 
patriotism  may  look  with  indulgence,  if  not  with 
favor,  on  the  spirit  of  party.  But  in  those  of  a 
popular  character,  in  governments  purely  elective, 
it  is  a  spirit  not  to  be  encouraged."  He  re-states 
the  Whig  doctrine  of  "  the  necessity  of  reciprocal 
checks  in  the  exercise  of  political  power,  by  divid- 
ing and  distributing  it  into  different  depositaries, 
and  constituting  each  the  guardian  of  the  public 
weal  against  the  invasions  of  the  others."  He 
describes  in  solemn  language  the  "horrid  enor- 


94  POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT 

mities  "  which  party  spirit  may  perpetrate  against 
these  constitutional  safeguards  of  government. 

Innumerable  echoes  of  that  memorable  appeal 
still  reach  the  ears  of  the  public.  Non-partisan- 
ship is  still  preached  as  a  civic  duty,  but  it  has 
never  been  reduced  to  practice  and  it  never  will 
be.  The  reason  is  very  simple.  No  law  of  human 
nature  is  better  known  than  that  action  is  the 
correlative  of  desire.  The  very  existence  of 
public  opinion  implies  the  seeking  of  means  for 
giving  effect  to  it  in  the  conduct  of  public  affairs, 
and  in  a  free  country  this  produces  party  action. 
But  little  reflection  is  needed  to  show  that  what 
are  called  non-partisan  movements  are  really  new 
party  combinations,  and  the  only  distinction 
marked  by  the  phrase  is  that  the  purpose  is  special 
and  transient. 

As  with  every  organism,  the  natural  tendency 
of  party  is  to  obtain  sustenance  wherever  it  can. 
It  appeals  to  the  follies  and  passions,  as  well  as 
to  the  virtues,  of  human  nature,  so  that  its  activity 
is  as  productive  of  evil  manifestations  as  well  as 
of  good  as  the  capacity  of  human  nature  allows. 
Hence  it  always  presents  aspects  revolting  to 
upright  men.  In  particular,  its  subordination  of 
all  other  considerations  to  the  needs  of  its  own 
organization,  is  accompanied  by  a  disregard  of 
absolute  standards  of  worth,  which  is  peculiarly 
offensive  to  those  who  do  not  feel,  or  sympathize 
with,  its  necessities.  This  defect  in  accommodation 


THE    ORIGIN  OF  PARTIES  95 

of  party  functions  to  ethical  ideals  is  ever  a  source 
of  complaint,  and  it  has  inspired  magnificent  out- 
bursts of  scorn  from  poets  and  moralists.  Neverthe- 
less, there  never  has  been  a  time,  since  the  colonies 
had  a  life  of  their  own,  when  party  spirit  was  not  ac- 
tive in  this  country,  and  never  more  so  than  when 
formal  party  divisions  were  temporarily  effaced.  A 
party  which  grows  so  great  as  to  destroy  regular 
opposition  tends  to  split  and  fall  apart  from  internal 
repulsions,  no  longer  counteracted  by  external 
pressure.  Such  times  are  marked  by  an  abounding 
partisanship,  displaying  itself  in  violent  faction 
strife,  eventually  producing  new  party  combina- 
tions. 

A  period  of  this  kind  was  brought  on  by  the 
success  of  the  Revolution.  The  Tory  party  was 
destroyed,  and  the  Whigs  were  left  undisputed 
masters  of  the  field,  but  the  triumphant  party  was 
rent  by  faction  animosities  excited  during  the 
course  of  the  struggle.  In  order  to  understand 
the  situation  it  is  necessary  to  consider  in  some 
detail  the  political  side  of  the  War  of  Indepen- 
dence.1 

Congress  was  not  instituted  as  a  regular  govern- 
ment and  was  altogether  unfit  to  exercise  the 
functions  which  devolved  upon  it.  It  assumed 

1  The  chief  authority  for  the  statements  which  follow  is  Wharton's 
"  Revolutionary  Diplomatic  Correspondence,"  a  government  publi- 
catioH.  There  is  a  vivid  account  of  the  characteristics  of  the 
Revolutionary  period  in  W.  G.  Sumner's  "  Alexander  Hamilton." 


96  POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT 

the  control  of  the  national  finances,  the  regulation 
of  the  army  and  navy,  the  appointment  of  public 
officials,  and  in  fine  the  entire  administration  of 
public  affairs.  The  only  practicable  way  in  which 
a  body  of  notables,  equal  in  rank  and  importance, 
opinionated  and  contentious,  could  handle  such  a 
fund  of  patronage  was  by  continual  bargain  and 
intrigue.  Congress  sat  in  private,  and  it  was 
seclufled  from  the  control  of  any  public  opinion 
save  that  of  its  own  circle.  The  possession  of 
such  opportunities  in  a  position  of  irresponsible 
control  subjected  character  to  a  dangerous  strain, 
and  there  is  evidence  that  deterioration  did  take 
place.  Expressions  of  the  sharpest  censure  might 
be  collected  from  contemporary  writings.  In 
the  summer  of  1778  a  letter  written  by  Henry 
Laurens,  then  president  of  Congress,  in  which  he 
referred  to  ''  scenes  of  venality,  peculation  and 
fraud,"  was  intercepted  by  the  British  and  pub- 
lished in  the  London  papers.  There  was  always 
profusion  and  waste  at  the  seat  of  government 
however  the  army  might  suffer.  The  festivities 
which  enclosed  the  sittings  of  Congress  were 
never  more  extravagant  than  during  the  darkest 
period  of  the  struggle.  Washington  wrote  that 
"party  disputes  and  personal  quarrels  are  the 
great  business  of  the  day ;  whilst  the  momentous 
concerns  of  an  empire,  a  great  and  accumulating 
debt,  ruined  finances,  depreciated  money  and 
want  of  credit,  which  in  its  consequences  is  the 


THE    ORIGIN  OF  PARTIES  97 

want  of  everything,  are  but  secondary  considera- 
tions and  postponed  from  day  to  day  and  from 
week  to  week,  as  if  our  affairs  wore  the  most 
promising  aspect.  .  .  .  And  yet  an  assembly,  a 
concert,  a  dinner  or  a  supper,  will  not  only  take 
men  off  from  acting  in  this  business,  but  even 
from  thinking  of  it."  The  low  repute  of  Congress 
injured  the  patriot  cause  in  foreign  estimation  and 
repelled  sympathy.  The  mainstay  of  American 
credit  abroad  was  the  great  personal  reputation  of 
Benjamin  Franklin  and  the  marvellous  ability  with 
which  he  managed  the  interests  of  the  infant 
republic.  But  had  it  not  been  for  the  energetic 
remonstrances  of  the  French  court,  by  representa- 
tions made  through  its  minister  at  Philadelphia, 
Congress  might  have  removed  Franklin  from  his 
post  at  a  most  critical  ju.itture.  The  generalship 
of  Washington  was  adn.ired  by  the  ablest  Euro- 
pean critics,  among  them  Frederick  the  Great ; 
but  Washington,  too,  had  to  endure  the  hostility 
of  a  congressional  cabal  which  came  near  remov- 
ing him  from  command. 

Still  it  would  be  a  great  mistake  to  infer  that 
the  inefficiency  of  Congress  was  due  to  any  lack 
of  honesty  or  patriotism.  Its  evil  tendencies  were 
the  result  of  a  defective  organization.  It  was 
impossible  for  a  body  so  constituted  to  act  with 
the  resolution  and  consistency  necessary  for  suc- 
cessful administration,  and  in  every  branch  of  the 
public  service  the  results  were  deplorable.  Taxes 


98  POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT 

being  unpopular,  the  members  eagerly  caught  up 
the  idea  that  they  could  make  -money  out  of 
paper.  Between  June  23,  1775,  and  November  29, 
1779,  bills  to  the  amount  of  $200,000,000  were 
emitted  and  made  a  legal  tender.  Severe  laws 
against  the  advance  of  prices,  and  refusal  to  accept 
this  paper  in  lieu  of  money,  were  enacted.  In  ef- 
fect, such  financiering  was  a  vast  confiscation  of 
property  for  public  use.  Jefferson  remarked,  "It 
was  a  mode  of  taxation,  the  most  oppressive  of  all 
because  the  most  unequal  of  all." 1  The  chief 
sufferers  were,  of  course,  the  producers,  —  the 
laborers,  the  mechanics,  the  farmers.  They  were 
constantly  being  defrauded  of  their  just  dues,  and 
the  natural  consequence  was  the  rapid  spread  of 
disaffection.  Goods  were  secreted,  provisions  hid 
away,  and  supplies  withheld.  In  1777,  while  Gen- 
eral Washington,  with  wretchedly  inferior  forces, 
was  striving  to  keep  the  field  against  General 
Howe  in  Pennsylvania,  he  said  that  he  felt  as  if 
he  were  in  an  enemy's  country.  The  commissary 
department,  which  Congress  insisted  upon  keeping 
under  its  thumb,  seemed  unable  to  do  anything. 
Washington's  troops  were  left  to  starve,  while 
Howe  was  able  to  obtain  fresh  provisions  in  abun- 
dance. The  paper-money  plague  cheated  the 
troops,  as  it  did  all  who  gave  service  at  a  fixed  rate 
of  compensation.  It  became  impossible  to  obtain 
recruits,  and  disaffection  became  prevalent  in  the 

1  Writings,  Vol.  IV.,  p.  165. 


THE    ORIGIN  OF  PARTIES  99 

army.  "  No  day,  nor  scarce  an  hour  passes,"  wrote 
Washington,  "without  the  offer  of  a  resigned 
commission." 1  There  was  desertion  from  the 
American  camp  to  the  British  army. 

Meanwhile  any  reform  in  administration  was 
stubbornly  resisted.  The  chief  solicitude  of  Con- 
gress was  to  keep  the  army*  under  civil  control. 
Dread  of  the  rise  of  a  Cromwell  haunted  their 
minds.  Hence,  above  all  things,  they  resolved  to 
control  military  appointments  and  prevent  the 
organization  of  a  regular  army.  In  1776,  John 
Adams,  referring  to  the  promotion  of  officers  by 
Congress,  said :  "  That  interest,  favor,  private 
friendship,  prejudice,  may  operate  more  or  less 
in  the  present  assembly  is  true.  But  where  will 
you  lodge  this  power  ?.  To  place  it  in  the  general 
would  be  more  dangerous  to  the  public  liberty 
and  not  less  liable  to  abuse."  In  1777,  he  "hoped 
that  Congress  will  elect  annually  all  the  general 
officers."  Wharton  remarks  that  "  the  leaders  of 
the  opposition,  by  holding  the  great  military  ap- 
pointments in  the  hands  of  Congress,  by  refus- 
ing adequate  compensation  to  the  soldiers,  had 
much  to  do  with  protracting  the  war."  The  be- 
havior of  Congress  was  such  as  to  invite  the  very 
evil  they  feared.  In  letters  written  by  confiden- 
tial agents  of  the  British  government  it  was 
said  that  Washington's  only  course  in  order  to 
sustain  himself  would  be  to  follow  the  example  of 

1  Works,  Vol.  V.,  p.  201. 


100  POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT 

Cromwell.  Not  until  the  cause  of  independence 
had  been  brought  to  the  brink  of  ruin  did  Congress 
consent  to  the  creation  of  independent  executive 
departments  for  the  management  of  finances,  war, 
the  marine,  and  foreign  affairs.  The  triumph  of 
the  Revolution  soon  followed.1 

By  an  ordinary  law  of  political  development, 
the  efforts  made  to  strengthen  executive  authority 
and  the  resistance  thereto  made  by  interests  dis- 
turbed by  change,  tended  to  produce  parties  in  the 
government,  and  doubtless  would  have  done  so  had 
the  government  of  the  Confederation  possessed 
a  stable  basis.  As  it  was,  there  were  antagonistic 
factions  —  the  one  administrative,  the  other  parlia- 
mentary, which  served  as  centres  of  party  forma- 


1  Wharton  regards  the  decisive  victory  over  Cornwallis  at  York- 
town  as  the  direct  consequence  of  the  improved  financial  admin- 
istration. A  department  of  finance  was  established,  and  on  March 
13,  1781,  Robert  Morris  was  placed  at  its  head.  "  He  started  with 
the  position  that  on  taxation,  full  and  equal,  must  the  country 
depend  for  its  ordinary  income ;  that  until  it  showed  its  readiness 
to  impose  such  taxation,  it  could  not  either  honorably  or  success- 
fully borrow;  that  the  issue  of  paper  money  must  be  stopped,  and 
that  a  national  bank  should  be  established  to  equalize  exchanges 
and  meet  sudden  governmental  exigencies.  To  the  comparative 
success  of  his  administration,  in  the  face  of  an  opposition  the  most 
bitter,  is  the  final  triumph  of  the  Revolution  to  be  largely  attributed. 
Our  income  from  taxation  was  greatly  increased,  the  bank  was 
prosperous,  and  France,  encouraged  by  this,  continued  to  make 
loans  and  forward  supplies,  without  which  the  campaign  of 
1781-1782  could  not  have  been  effectively  conducted."  Vol.  I., 
p.  289. 


THE   ORIGIN  OF  PARTIES  IOI 

tion.  In  the  one,  the  military  group  was  prominent ; 
the  other  was  wholly  civilian.  On  the  one  side  was 
the  energetic  desire  to  build  up  executive  author- 
ity ;  on  the  other,  an  habitual  dread  of  arbitrary 
power.  The  parliamentary  faction  had  it  all  their 
own  way  until  their  principles  were  discredited 
by  the  wretched  results  of  their  meddlesome 
incapacity,  when  there  was  a  strong  reaction  in 
favor  of  communicating  more  executive  vigor  to 
the  government.  A  class  of  national  politicians, 
to  which  Jefferson  and  Madison  belonged,  intro- 
duced a  more  sensible  tone  of  thought.  It  was 
the  influence  of  this  class  which  eventually  prevailed 
upon  Congress  to  establish  executive  departments. 
It  was  the  alliance  of  this  class  with  the  military 
group  which  secured  the  adoption  of  the  constitu- 
tion, and  its  features  were  chiefly  their  work.  Both 
groups  energetically  cooperated  in  setting  up  and 
starting  the  new  government.  The  successful  es- 
tablishment of  constitutional  government  was  a 
break  or  starting-point,  the  natural  consequence  of 
which  was  a  new  alignment  of  parties. 

The  rise  of  national  parties  is  generally  dated 
from  the  struggle  over  the  adoption  of  the  consti- 
tution ;  but  the  nature  of  that  struggle  was  such  that 
it  could  not  furnish  an  enduring  basis  of  party  ac- 
tion. When  the  constitution  was  adopted  and  put 
into  operation,  Anti-federalism,  having  been  merely 
a  policy  of  negation,  was  destitute  of  any  principle 
of  vitality.  Party  action  had  to  find  its  place  under 


TY  OF  CALIFORNIA 


IO2  POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT 

the  constitution,  and  make  its  issues  on  questions 
of  constitutional  interpretation  and  government 
policy.  At  the  most,  all  that  can  be  said  is  that 
the  struggle  over  the  adoption  of  the  constitution 
engendered  antipathies  which  supplied  material 
for  national  party  purposes ;  but  the  distribution 
thereof  was  determined  by  the  circumstances  of  the 
time  when  national  parties  were  formed.  The 
natural  tendency  of  the  defeated  Anti-federal  state 
factions  was  to  recruit  the  party  of  national  opposi- 
tion ;  but  when  the  Anti-federal  leaders  happened 
to  be  faction  adversaries  of  the  leaders  of  the 
national  opposition,  the  tendency  was  just  the  other 
way.  Hence  the  time  came  when  Patrick  Henry, 
who  had  resisted  the  constitution  with  all  his  might, 
and  who  had  declared  that  he  would  "  seize  the  first 
moment  that  offered  for  shaking  off  the  yoke  in  a 
constitutional  way,"  1  was  seen  on  the  stump  ex- 
cusing the  alien  and  sedition  laws  and  condemn- 
ing the  Virginia  and  Kentucky  resolutions.  Other 
prominent  leaders  of  the  opposition  to  the  adop- 
tion of  the  constitution,  among  them  Richard 
Henry  Lee,  Luther  Martin,  and  Samuel  Chase, 
also  became  high  Federalists.  On  the  other  hand, 
Madison,  Dickinson,  and  others,  who  took  an  active 
part  in  securing  the  adoption  of  the  constitution, 
became  prominent  Republicans.  Jefferson,  their 
party  leader,  had  been  in  sympathy  with  the 

1  Madison's  Works,  Vol.  I.,  p.  402. 


THE   ORIGIN  OF  PARTIES  1 03 

national  movement,  although  out  of  the  country 
at  the  time,  and  on  his  return  had  done  service  of 
essential  value  in  getting  the  new  government 
fairly  started. 

It  is,  therefore,  impossible  to  establish  any  con- 
nection between  Anti-federalism  and  the  Republi- 
can party  organized  by  Jefferson,  which  implies 
party  continuity.  The  truth  is  that  the  formation 
of  national  parties  was  inevitable  from  the  antago- 
nistic views  on  national  policy  held  by  the  politi- 
cal groups  which  cooperated  in  the  adoption  of  the 
constitution.  The  situation  was  similar  to  that  in 
England  after  the  Revolution  of  1688.  Whigs  and 
Tories  cooperated  in  reconstructing  the  govern- 
ment ;  but  after  the  Act  of  Settlement  they 
soon  renewed  their  party  strife  as  furiously  as 
ever.  So  it  was  after  the  adoption  of  the  consti- 
tution of  the  United  States.  As  soon  as  the  gov- 
ernment became  sufficiently  well  established  to 
relax  the  pressure  of  their  common  necessity,  the 
groups  began  to  draw  apart.  The  purpose  of  the 
military  group,  and  of  those  associated  with  them 
in  interest  and  sympathy,  was  to  make  the  national 
government  strong  and  effective.  This  considera- 
tion presided  over  their  calculations  of  the  effect 
of  measures.  Their  experience  had  been  such  as 
to  concentrate  their  attention  on  the  apparatus  of 
government.  On  the  contrary,  the  object  of  the 
other  group  of  national  politicians  had  been  to  set 
up  an  orderly  government,  but  not  a  weighty  one, 


104  POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT 

which  might  rest  heavily  upon  the  people.1  Their 
ideal  was  an  agricultural  community,  settled  in  its 
habits  and  steady  in  its  ways,  requiring  no  more 
apparatus  of  government  than  would  suffice  to  sub- 
ject the  common  people  to  the  magisterial  super- 
vision of  their  natural  protectors  —  the  landed 
gentry.  In  his  "Notes  on  Virginia,"  Jefferson 
said :  "  While  we  have  land  to  labor,  let  us  never 
wish  to  see  our  citizens  occupied  at  a  workshop  or 
twirling  a  distaff.  .  .  .  Let  our  workshops  remain 
in  Europe.  It  is  better  to  carry  provisions  and 
materials  to  workmen  there  than  to  bring  them  to 
the  provisions  and  materials,  and  with  them  their 
manners  and  principles.  .  .  .  The  mobs  of  great 
cities  add  just  so  much  to  the  support  of  pure 
government  as  sores  do  to  the  strength  of  the 
human  body."  He  brought  up  this  point  again 
when  writing  to  Madison  about  the  new  constitu- 
tion. He  said :  "  I  think  our  governments  will 
remain  virtuous  for  many  centuries,  as  long  as 
they  are  chiefly  agricultural ;  and  this  they  will  be 
as  long  as  there  shall  be  vacant  lands  in  any  part 
of  America.  When  they  get  piled  up  upon  one 
another  in  large  cities,  as  in  Europe,  they  will 
become  corrupt  as  in  Europe."2 

The  manifest  tendency  of  Hamilton's  measures 
to  develop  banking,  commercial,  and  manufacturing 

1  This  explanation  of  the  origin  of  parties  adopts  that  given  by 
Chief- Justice  Marshall,  who  spoke  from  his  own  knowledge  of  the 
men  and  the  times.     See  his  Life  of  Washington,  Vol.  V.,  Chap.  V. 

2  Jefferson's  Writings,  Vol.  IV.,  p.  480. 


THE    ORIGIN  OF  PARTIES  1 05 

interests  seemed  therefore  to  be  a  policy  whose 
purpose  was  to  corrupt  and  alter  the  character  of 
the  government.  There  was  no  lack  of  circum- 
stances to  feed  suspicion.  Obstacles,  which  igno- 
rance and  perversity  put  in  the  way  of  plans  for  the 
benefit  of  the  government,  were  the  occasion  of 
expressions  of  disgust  in  administration  circles. 
Private  talk  among  party  managers  is  apt  to  be 
cynic  in  tone  as  regards  the  public.  The  courtiers 
of  King  Demos,  like  courtiers  in  general,  revenge 
themselves  for  the  servility  which  they  have  to 
assume  in  public,  by  private  sneers  at  his  majesty. 
It  is  doubtless  quite  true,  as  Jefferson  reports  in 
his  "Anas,"  that  talk  at  the  executive  mansion 
was  disparaging  of  popular  government  as  com- 
pared with  the  order  and  decency  of  royal  gov- 
ernment ;  but  it  does  not  follow  that  there  was 
any  idea  of  establishing  royalty.  Long  after, 
when  Hamilton  had  been  for  many  years  in  his 
untimely  grave,  and  the  passions  of  party  contro- 
versy had  cooled,  Jefferson  acquitted  Hamilton  of 
any  idea  of  subverting  republican  institutions  ;  but 
that  was  the  accusation  at  the  time.  By  a  natural 
antithesis,  Jefferson's  party  styled  itself  the  Re- 
publicans. The  supporters  of  the  administration 
retained  as  their  party  name  the  title  of  Federalists, 
originally  designating  the  advocates  of  the  adop- 
tion of  the  constitution,  but  now  used  as  implying 
that  it  was  they  who  were  defending  and  upholding 
the  federal  government  against  its  enemies. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

THE   RULING   CLASS   DIVIDED 

JEFFERSON  and  his  colleagues  believed  them- 
selves to  be  the  genuine  conservatives.  "  The  Re- 
publican party  wish  to  preserve  the  government 
in  its  present  form,"  wrote  Jefferson  to  Washing- 
ton in  justification  of  their  course.  What  they  did 
do  was  to  give  a  powerful  impetus  to  democratic  ten- 
dencies which  were  destined  to  transform  the  gov- 
ernment. Men  who  in  the  constitutional  convention 
had  descanted  upon  the  evils  of  democracy,  and 
had  tried  to  leave  as  little  room  as  possible  for 
popular  control  over  the  government,  cast  aside 
their  scruples  when  the  only  practicable  way  of 
maintaining  their  influence  was  to  stir  up  the  peo- 
ple against  the  government.  Politicians  employ 
their  logic  to  defend  the  positions  they  feel  im- 
pelled to  take ;  their  action  is  the  result  of  cir- 
cumstances operating  upon  their  endowment  of 
character  and  habits  of  thought.  Their  personal 
relation  to  the  events  of  their  times  has  much  more 
to  do  with  shaping  their  policy  than  any  abstract 
theory  of  government  which  they  may  profess. 
English  history  notes  that  some  of  the  greatest 
changes  in  government,  some  of  the  most  radical 

106 


THE  RULING   CLASS  DIVIDED  1 07 

principles  of  reform,  have  been  introduced  by  con- 
servative parties  acting  from  new  considerations 
of  interest  on  special  occasions.  Political  structure 
grows  like  coral  rock,  the  product  of  multitudinous 
activities  incited  by  individual  needs. 

The  Republican  leaders  were  very  much  in  the 
position  of  the  Rockingham  Whigs  in  1763,  when, 
unable  to  make  an  effective  resistance  in  Parlia- 
ment, they  subsidized  the  demagogue  John  Wilkes 
and  abetted  a  pamphlet  and  newspaper  war  on  the 
administration.  It  was  not  possible  for  Jefferson 
to  emulate  the  example  of  the  wealthy  nobles 
who  gave  Wilkes  an  annuity  of  p^iooo,  but  he 
assisted  Callender  by  presents  of  money,  and  he 
gave  Freneau  an  office  in  the  state  department, 
keeping  him  there  despite  Washington's  complaint 
that  the  publications  in  Freneau's  paper  were 
"outrages  on  common  decency."  When  men  like 
Hamilton  or  Madison  took  a  hand  in  the  fray, 
they  addressed  themselves  to  people  of  their  own 
class.  On  setting  about  a  reply  to  Hamilton's 
defence  of  the  foreign  policy  of  the  administration, 
Madison  wrote  to  Jefferson :  "  None  but  intelligent 
readers  will  enter  into  such  a  controversy,  and  to 
their  minds  it  ought  principally  to  be  accom- 
modated." The  ephemeral  journalism  of  the  day, 
however,  addressed  a  different  public.  Its  object 
was  to  excite  the  passions.  Lampoon  and  invec- 
tive were  preferred  to  serious  argument.  Current 
events  afforded  plenty  of  material.  The  whole 


IO8  POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT 

world  was  convulsed  by  the  throes  of  the  French 
Revolution,  and  in  America  the  shocks  produced 
waves  of  democratic  excitement.  The  position  of 
the  administration  was  one  of  great  perplexity, 
requiring  caution  and  reserve,  so  that  misrepre- 
sentation of  its  acts  and  purposes  was  easy. 

The  distinct  assumption  of  political  functions 
by  the  newspaper  press  took  place  during  the 
eighteenth  century.  Originally,  newspapers  were 
simply  handy  mediums  of  announcement.  They 
were  an  improvement  on  the  town  crier.  For 
them  to  engage  in  political  discussion  was  out  of 
harmony  with  traditional  ideas  of  government. 
The  criticism  of  politics,  which  now  addresses 
itself  to  journalism,  formerly  found  its  outlet  in 
pamphleteering.  In  England,  every  political  tem- 
pest brought  .a  shower  of  ballads,  tracts,  and  pam- 
phlets, falling  as  thickly  as  autumn  leaves.  The 
artillery  of  the  law  was  as  ineffectual  against  such 
fugitive  writings  as  it  would  be  against  a  swarm 
of  mosquitoes.  The  ministers  of  the  crown  found 
that  the  most  practical  course  was  to  have  their  own 
corps  of  pamphleteers  to  wage  war  for  them.  The 
great  mass  of  such  publications  was  ephemeral 
rubbish,  soon  swept  away ;  but  English  literature 
reckons  among  its  classics  writings  which  origi- 
nally had  a  party  purpose.  Addison's  famous 
poem  "  Blenheim  "  was  written  to  order  for  the 
Whig  ministry  of  the  day,  who  wanted  some  verses 
on  Marlborough's  victory  for  popular  circulation. 


THE  RULING    CLASS  DIVIDED  109 

Most  of  Swift's  writings  are  Tory  pamphlets.  His 
"  Gulliver's  Travels "  continues  to  be  a  popular 
story-book,  although  the  political  satire,  which  origi- 
nally gave  it  piquancy,  is  no  longer  noticed.  Some 
of  the  best  works  of  Edmund  Burke,  which  for  all 
time  will  never  cease  to  be  profitable  to  men  who 
give  serious  thought  to  problems  of  government, 
we  owe  to  his  activity  as  a  Whig  pamphleteer. 

It  was  inevitable  that  this  species  of  writing 
would  seek  so  convenient  a  medium  of  publication 
as  the  newspaper  press  as  soon  as  possible;  but 
the  combination  of  newsgathering  and  political 
criticism  had  to  encounter  a  formidable  prejudice. 
Reports  of  the  debates  of  Parliament,  or  comment 
on  its  proceedings,  assailed  a  historic  guarantee  of 
public  liberty.  The  character  of  institutions  is 
really  an  attribute  from  the  service  which  they 
render ;  but  the  disposition  to  regard  that  character 
as  inherent,  causes  them  to  be  valued  for  their 
own  sake  when  they  have  lost  the  use  which  made 
them  valuable.  Thoroughly  honest  and  patriotic 
statesmen  insisted  upon  the  secrecy  of  parliament- 
ary proceedings  long  after  it  had  ceased  to  be  neces- 
sary as  a  protection  of  freedom  of  debate,  and  had 
become  the  shield  of  corruption.  The  intrusion  of 
journalism  into  the  field  of  politics  was  attended 
by  violent  struggles,  but  the  public  demand  was 
so  imperious  that  Parliament  was  literally  beaten 
into  submission. 

In  the  American  colonies  the  censorship  of  the 


110  POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT 

press  had  been  very  strict.  Benjamin  Franklin, 
in  his  autobiography,  gives  some  amusing  instances 
of  his  collisions  with  the  authorities  because  of  his 
audacity  in  venturing  an  occasional  remark  on  pub- 
lic affairs.  The  Revolutionary  movement  freed  the 
press.  The  practical  convenience  of  such  a  medium 
for  the  expression  of  colonial  opinion  outweighed 
any  theoretical  objections.  A  stream  of  articles 
poured  into  the  columns  of  the  newspapers  of  the 
day.  The  celebrated  "  Farmer's  Letters  "  of  John 
Dickinson  appeared  in  the  Pennsylvania  Chronicle. 
The  pens  of  other  leaders  of  the  Revolution  were 
busily  employed  in  like  manner.  The  practice  con- 
tinued after  the  Revolution,  and  to  a  series  of  news- 
paper articles  over  the  signature  "  Publius,"  written 
by  Hamilton,  Madison,  and  Jay,  to  influence  the 
action  of  the  New  York  convention,  we  owe  that 
great  commentary  on  the  constitution,  commonly 
known  as  "The  Federalist."  Communications  on 
public  affairs  from  Cato,  Camillus,  Decius,  Senex, 
Agricola,  and  such  like,  frequently  appeared  in  the 
newspapers,  until  gradually  political  comment  was 
recognized  as  an  ordinary  function  of  the  newspaper 
press,  and  the  editorial  article  became  an  estab- 
lished institution.  In  our  own  time,  the  transfor- 
mation of  public  sentiment  has  become  so  complete 
that  there  is  a  disposition  to  regard  the  press  as 
being  in  some  way  responsible  for  the  conduct  of 
public  affairs,  and  blame  for  defects  of  government 
is  laid  at  its  door. 


Ill 


Federalism  being  essentially  a  movement  for  the 
restoration  of  the  old  order,  the  traditional  ideas 
as  to  the  place  and  duties  of  the  press  in  a  well- 
regulated  government  were  revived.  In  one  of 
his  essays  on  government,  Fisher  Ames  said :  "  The 
press  is  a  new  and  certainly  a  powerful  agent  in 
human  affairs.  It  will  change  societies ;  but  it  is 
difficult  to  conceive  how,  by  rendering  men  in- 
docile and  presumptuous,  it  can  change  them  for 
the  better.  ...  It  has  inspired  ignorance  with 
presumption,  so  that  those  who  cannot  be  gov- 
erned by  reason  are  no  longer  awed  by  authority." 
These  forebodings  soon  seemed  to  be  in  course  of 
rapid  fulfilment.  The  highest  privileges  of  Con- 
gress were  violated  with  impunity.  The  constitu- 
tional right  of  members,  that  "  for  any  speech  or 
debate  in  either  House  they  shall  not  be  ques- 
tioned in  any  other  place,"  was  virtually  annulled. 
The  license  of  speech  assumed  by  the  papers  was 
abominable  to  the  supporters  of  the  government. 
When  the  Republican  journals  began  to  charge  that 
Washington  was  drawing  more  from  the  treasury 
than  the  law  allowed,  and  were  circulating  forged 
letters  to  show  that  during  the  Revolutionary  War 
he  desired  to  submit  to  the  king,  whatever  con- 
tempt might  be  felt  for  such  attacks,  the  effect 
upon  public  opinion  could  not  be  ignored.  The 
provocation  was  increased  by  the  fact  that  the 
leading  Republican  journalists  were  men  of  alien 
birth :  "  a  group  of  foreign  liars,"  John  Adams 


112  POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT 

termed  them.  The  growth  of  party  spirit,  which 
was  regarded  as  destructive  to  constitutional  gov- 
ernment, seemed  to  be  a  direct  consequence  of  the 
tolerance  shown  to  a  seditious  press.  "  The  very 
idea  of  the  power  and  the  right  of  the  people  to 
establish  government,"  said  Washington  in  his 
farewell  address,  "  presupposes  the  duty  of  every 
individual  to  obey  the  established  government.  All 
obstructions  to  the  execution  of  the  laws,  all  com- 
binations and  associations  under  whatever  plausible 
character,  with  the  real  design  to  direct,  control, 
counteract,  or  awe  the  regular  deliberations  of  the 
constituted  authorities,  are  destructive  of  this  fun- 
damental principle  and  of  fatal  tendency." 

It  is  necessary  to  understand  this  attitude  of 
thought  in  order  to  comprehend  the  remarkable 
features  which  the  politics  of  the  times  eventually 
presented.  The  behavior  of  the  Federalist  judges 
during  Adams'  administration  would  seem  to  be 
an  amazing  exhibition  of  headlong  and  reckless 
partisanship,  if  not  viewed  in  the  light  of  their 
ideas  of  constitutional  privilege  and  duty.  They 
were  trying  to  uphold  the  traditional  ideal  of  gov- 
ernment. They  let  no  fair  opportunity  pass  of 
instructing  the  people  how  monstrous  and  horrid 
a  thing  it  was  for  them  to  rebel  against  magisterial 
control  and  disturb  the  constitutional  balance  of 
power  among  the  departments  of  government  by 
seditious  attempts  to  interfere  in  the  administra- 
tion of  public  affairs.  The  charge  to  a  grand  jury 


THE  RULING    CLASS  DIVIDED  113 

at  times  became  a  political  harangue.  In  western 
Pennsylvania,  Judge  Addison,  of  the  state  judi- 
ciary, delivered  a  series  of  charges  on  Jealousy  of 
the  Administration  and  Government,  the  Horrors 
of  Revolution,  etc.,  pointing  out  to  the  people  what 
terrible  things  were  likely  to  happen  if  they  were 
not  dutiful  in  their  behavior  towards  constituted 
authority.  General  Washington,  then  in  private 
life,  was  so  pleased  by  Judge  Addison's  perform- 
ance that  he  sent  a  copy  of  the  charge  to  friends 
for  circulation.  Chief  Justice  Ellsworth,  in  a  charge 
to  a  Massachusetts  grand  jury,  denounced  "  the 
French  system-mongers,  from  the  quintumvirate  at 
Paris  to  the  vice-president  (Jefferson)  and  minor- 
ity in  Congress  as  apostles  of  atheism  and  anarchy, 
bloodshed  and  plunder." 

The  wave  of  popular  indignation  which  swept 
the  country  when  Talleyrand's  attempt  to  black- 
mail the  American  envoys  was  made  known  to 
the  public,  temporarily  prostrated  the  Republican 
party  and  gave  the  Federalists  control  of  both 
Houses  of  Congress.  The  Federalist  leaders  seized 
the  opportunity  of  suppressing  that  "fatal  ten- 
dency "  to  which  Washington  had  referred,  by 
passing  the  alien  and  sedition  laws.  The  President 
could  now  send  out  of  the  country  such  aliens  as 
he  might  deem  dangerous  to  the  peace  and  safety 
of  the  United  States.  It  was  a  crime,  punishable 
by  fine  and  imprisonment,  to  publish  any  false, 
scandalous,  or  malicious  writings  against  the  gov- 


114  POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT 

ernment  of  the  United  States,  or  either  House  of 
Congress,  or  the  President,  with  the  intent  to  defame 
them  or  bring  them  into  contempt  or  disrepute. 
Such  legislation  was  quite  in  accord  with  the  tradi- 
tional theory  of  government.  Washington,  in  his 
correspondence,  referred  to  it  approvingly;  and 
while  Hamilton  regarded  it  as  impolitic,  he  did  not 
question  its  constitutionality.  The  laws  were  vigor- 
ously enforced,  despite  popular  clamor.  To  wag  a 
loose  tongue  ran  the  risk  of  severe  punishment.  A 
Jersey  man  named  Baldwin  was  fined  $100  for 
expressing  a  wish  that  the  wad  of  a  cannon  dis- 
charged as  a  salute  to  President  Adams  had  hit 
the  broadest  part  of  the  President's  breeches. 
Matthew  Lyon,  of  Vermont,  while  canvassing  for 
reelection  to  Congress,  charged  the  President  with 
"unbounded  thirst  for  ridiculous  pomp,  foolish 
adulation,  and  a  selfish  avarice."  That  cost  him 
four  months  in  jail  and  a  fine  of  $1000.  For  a 
time  it  seemed  as  if  the  conservative  reaction  had 
consummated  its  purpose,  and  that  the  federal 
monarchy  was  perfected,  affording  an  example  of 
authority  which  George  III  himself  might  have 
admired. 

The  enraged  Republicans,  unable  to  make  head 
in  Congress,  now  developed  fresh  resources  of 
opposition  by  invoking  state  authority.  Then 
began  the  conflict  of  state  and  federal  powers  of 
government  which  constitutes  such  an  important 
episode  of  our  constitutional  history.  It  is  gener- 


THE  RULING    CLASS  DIVIDED  115 

ally  regarded  as  peculiar  to  American  politics,  so 
that  it  has  been  treated  as  comprising  the  sub- 
stance of  American  constitutional  history,  but  it 
is  really  a  very  old  feature  of  politics.  Wherever 
independent  powers  of  government  have  existed 
side  by  side,  they  have  served  as  antagonistic 
centres  of  opposition.  That  was  the  bane  of  the 
feudal  system,  and  led  to  its  overthrow  by  an  exal- 
tation of  royal  authority  sustained  by  necessities 
of  social  order.  In  England,  the  consolidation  of 
authority  was  so  complete  that  when  the  Rocking- 
ham  Whigs  were  helpless  in  Parliament,  during 
the  memorable  struggle  over  the  Wilkes'  case,  the 
most  effective  form  of  opposition  they  could  think 
of  was  to  get  up  reproachful  petitions  to  the  king 
from  every  locality  which  their  influence  could 
sway.  From  the  strength  of  the  passions  which 
were  aroused  during  the  struggle,  there  can  be  no 
doubt  that,  had  the  territorial  strongholds  of  the 
Whig  aristocracy  possessed  independent  powers 
of  government,  those  powers  would  have  been 
brought  to  bear  against  the  administration.  In  this 
respect  the  Jefferson  faction  among  the  American 
gentry  had  a  peculiar  advantage,  for  the  state 
governments  did  possess  independent  political 
powers  which  furnished  weapons  to  the  opposition 
for  attacks  on  the  government.  The  famous  Vir- 
ginia and  Kentucky  resolutions  made  their  appear- 
ance. Madison,  who  had  labored  hard  in  the 
constitutional  convention  to  give  the  government 


Il6  POLITICAL   DEVELOPMENT 

discretionary  authority  to  veto  any  state  legisla- 
tion, and  who  had  declared  that  the  people  "  will 
never  be  satisfied  till  some  remedy  be  applied  to 
the  vicissitudes  and  uncertainties  which  char- 
acterized the  state  administrations," *  draughted 
the  Virginia  resolutions.  They  declare  the  consti- 
tution to  be  "a  compact  to  which  the  states  are 
parties,"  so  that  they  have  a  right  to  interpose 
their  authority  when  the  federal  government  at- 
tempts "a  deliberate,  palpable,  and  dangerous 
exercise  of  other  powers  not  granted  in  that  com- 
pact." In  1786,  when  the  states  were  united  only 
by  the  loose  ties  of  the  Confederation,  Jefferson 
laid  down  the  doctrine  that  "when  any  one  state  in 
the  American  union  refuses  obedience  to  the  Con- 
federation, by  which  they  have  bound  themselves, 
the  rest  have  a  natural  right  to  compel  them  to 
obedience.'.'2  The  time  had  now  arrived  when  he 
draughted  the  Kentucky  resolutions,  asserting  the 
right  of  any  one  state  "  to  nullify  of  its  own  au- 
thority all  assumptions  of  power  by  others,  within 
its  limits."  Thus  was  developed  a  resource  of 
opposition  which  was  long  in  habitual  use  as  a 
menace  to  federal  policy.  During  Madison's  ad- 
ministration, the  New  England  Federalists  carried 
state  opposition  almost  to  the  stage  of  secession. 
At  various  times,  Pennsylvania,  Ohio,  New  York, 
North  Carolina,  South  Carolina,  Massachusetts, 

1  The  Federalist,  No.  37. 

1  Jefferson's  Writings,  Vol.  IV.,  p.  147. 


THE  RULING   CLASS  DIVIDED  II? 

Alabama,  Georgia,  Mississippi,  and  Maine  have 
each  imitated  the  example  of  Virginia  and  Ken- 
tucky and  made  threats  of  nullification.  All 
parties  in  turn  have  made  use  of  such  means  of 
opposition,  until  it  was  suppressed  forever  by  the 
Civil  War.  The  tendency  has  not  ceased  alto- 
gether, but  it  is  now  reduced  to  such  absurd  shifts 
as  were  displayed  during  the  agitation,  over  the 
Force  Bill  in  aid  of  federal  election  laws,  when 
the  most  that  state  opposition  could  do  was  to 
threaten  to  withhold  appropriations  for  state  repre- 
sentation at  the  Chicago  World's  Fair. 

The  alien  and  sedition  laws  doomed  the  Federal- 
ist party.  The  people  rebelled  against  the  yoke, 
and  the  Federalists  went  down  in  irretrievable  ruin. 
It  may  seem  strange  that  a  party  of  which  Wash- 
ington had  been  the  head,  and  which  founded  the 
government,  was  so  deficient  in  vitality  that  it 
could  never  recover  from  the  shock  of  defeat,  but 
its  position  was  weak  and  precarious  from  the 
first.  The  combination  of  interests  which  pro- 
duced it  never  attained  true  party  union.  The 
deep  antagonism,  originating  in  the  events  of  the 
Revolutionary  War,  divided  it  in  a  way  that  made 
it  incapable  of  united  action  after  Washington's 
control  and  influence  had  been  removed.  John 
Adams  had  belonged  to  the  old  congressional 
group.  Although  thrown  by  circumstances  into 
party  antagonism,  Jefferson  and  Adams  had  a 
strong  personal  esteem  for  each  other.  When 


Il8  POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT 

Adams  was  elected,  Jefferson  wrote  to  Madison, 
asking  if  "  it  would  not  be  worthy  of  consideration 
whether  it  would  not  be  for  the  public  good  to 
come  to  a  good  understanding  with  him."  On 
the  other  hand,  the  military  group  profoundly 
distrusted  Adams.  Washington's  relations  with 
Adams  were  marked  by  formality  and  reserve, 
and  Adams  wrote  that  he  detested  "that  con- 
tracted principle  of  monopoly  and  exclusion  which 
had  prevailed  through  Washington's  administra- 
tion." Hamilton,  in  his  famous  denunciation  of 
Adams,  made  it  a  count  of  his  indictment  that 
Adams,  as  a  member  of  the  Continental  Congress, 
had  supported  the  system  of  annual  enlistments 
which  had  been  so  injurious  to  the  discipline  and 
efficiency  of  the  army.  Hamilton  would  have  pre- 
vented Adams'  election  could  he  have  done  so, 
and  Adams  was  so  distrusted  by  his  party  that  his 
cabinet  officials  looked  to  Hamilton  for  instruction 
and  advice  on  important  points  of  public  policy. 
For  a  considerable  period  Adams'  administration 
was  subject  to  a  secret  control  and  was  but  nom- 
inally under  his  direction.  This  false  situation 
ended  in  an  open  breach  between  Hamilton  and 
Adams,  which  shattered  the  Federal  party. 

But  even  had  it  escaped  these  intestine  disor- 
ders, the  original  Federal  party  was  doomed  to 
extinction.  Old-fashioned  Federalism  was  the 
product  of  an  order  of  ideas  transmitted  from 
the  colonial  period,  and  fast  becoming  obsolete. 


THE  RULING    CLASS  DIVIDED  1 19 

Under  the  new  conditions  of  thought  and  feeling, 
created  by  the  progress  of  the  nation,  it  was  in- 
evitable either  that  it  should  perish  or  else  be 
completely  transformed.  Burr's  pistol  blew  the 
brains  out  of  the  Federal  party;  for  Hamilton's 
death  removed  the  only  leader  who  might  have 
risen  to  the  occasion  and  made  a  new  departure. 
Before  it  died,  Federalism  had  degenerated  into 
a  senile  Toryism,  as  much  out  of  touch  with  the 
age,  and  as  incapable  of  political  activity,  as 
Jacobitism  in  England. 

The  extraordinary  scenes  which  disgraced  the 
close  of  Adams'  administration  were  the  natural 
product  of  Federalist  ideas  of  government.  The 
constitution  seemed  to  have  gone  to  wreck,  and 
the  duty  of  the  hour  was  to  make  as  great  a 
salvage  as  possible.  "In  the  future  administra- 
tion of  our  country,"  wrote  Adams  to  Jay,  in  offer- 
ing him  the  chief  justiceship,  "the  firmest  secu- 
rity we  can  have  against  the  effects  of  visionary 
schemes  or  fluctuating  theories  will  be  in  a  solid 
judiciary ;  and  nothing  will  cheer  the  hopes  of 
the  best  men  so  much  as  your  acceptance  of  this 
appointment."  Jay  declined  the  office.  "I  left 
the  bench,"  he  said,  "perfectly  convinced  that 
under  a  system  so  defective  it  would  not  obtain 
the  energy,  weight,  and  dignity  which  were  essen- 
tial to  its  affording  due  support  to  the  national 
government,  nor  acquire  the  public  confidence  and 
respect  which,  as  the  last  resort  of  the  justice  of 


120  POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT 

the  nation,  it  should  possess."  Had  Jay  resolved 
to  brave  the  perils  he  feared,  John  Marshall  might 
have  passed  obscurely  into  history  as  a  service- 
able partisan,  instead  of  as  the  great  chief  justice. 
Even  after  his  appointment  to  the  bench,  Marshall 
continued  at  Adams'  urgent  request  to  hold  the 
office  of  Secretary  of  State.  He  was  kept  busy 
issuing  federal  commissions,  as  Federalists  were 
appointed  to  every  office  in  the  reach  of  the  ad- 
ministration. A  bill  was  hurried  through  Con- 
gress, establishing  circuit  courts  and  providing  for 
thirty-six  new  judgeships,  which  were  promptly 
filled.  The  work  of  appointing  Federalists  to 
office  went  on  to  the  very  last  hour  of  Adams' 
term  of  office. 

Jefferson's  installation  in  office  was  an  event 
that  was  regarded  with  gloomy  foreboding  by  the 
old  school  of  statesmen.  It  seemed  that  the  time 
had  arrived  of  which  Fisher  Ames  wrote :  "  The 
Democrats  really  wish  to  see  an  impossible  experi- 
ment fairly  tried,  and  to  govern  without  govern- 
ment. There  is  universally  a  presumption  in 
Democracy  that  promises  everything ;  and  at  the 
same  time  an  imbecility  that  can  accomplish  noth- 
ing, nor  even  preserve  itself." 

But  although  it  seemed  that  party  spirit  had 
trampled  over  constitutional  government,  there 
was  at  work,  quite  unsuspected,  a  principle  of 
conservatism  that  seems  to  be  peculiar  to  party 
of  the  English  and  American  type. 


CHAPTER   IX 

POLITICAL    FORCE 

THE  aptitude  of  politics  to  form  a  party  of 
administration  and  a  party  of  opposition,  which  is 
generally  regarded  as  a  normal  characteristic,  is 
really  a  tendency  which  has  to  be  acquired.  The 
natural  tendency  is  towards  a  multiplication  of 
parties  to  correspond  with  varieties  of  opinion 
and  groupings  of  interests,  so  that  instead  of  op- 
posing parties  contending  for  the  management  of 
public  affairs,  there  would  be  shifting  parliamentary 
groups,  such  as  make  French  and  German  politics 
so  perplexing  to  outsiders.  The  strong  tendency 
of  English  politics  to  party  division,  rather  than 
faction  partition,  is  evidently  not  a  race  charac- 
teristic. A  sectarian  disposition  is  a  conspicuous 
trait  of  religious  opinion  among  Englishmen  and 
Americans,  and  in  politics  also  a  sectarian  dispo- 
sition is  exhibited  by  the  frequent  attempts  to 
organize  new  parties.  In  politics,  however,  such 
movements  are  counteracted  by  other  forces  which 
tend  to  gather  all  varieties  of  political  sentiment 
into  two  opposing  party  organizations. 

The  explanation  of  this  curious  phenomenon  is 
probably  to  be  found  in  the  circumstances  of  Eng- 


122  POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT 

lish  political  development.  Royal  authority  in 
England  was  not  built  up  gradually,  as  in  France 
and  Germany,  by  centuries  of  struggle  against 
feudal  privilege,  but  was  attained  at  once  by  con- 
quest. The  prerogative  of  William  the  Conqueror, 
in  the  eleventh  century,  was  as  robust  as  that  of 
Louis  XIV  in  the  seventeenth.  The  king  of  Eng- 
land had  complete  control  of  the  national  authority 
at  a  time  when  a  French  or  a  German  king  was 
merely  the  primate  of  a  swarm  of  sovereigns.  The 
royal  prerogative  was  so  powerful  in  England  that 
it  did  not  fear  parliamentary  institutions  as  a  rival 
source  of  power,  and  instead  of  aiming  to  suppress 
them,  as  in  Continental  Europe,  the  disposition  was 
to  preserve  them,  as  an  useful  means  of  communica- 
tion with  the  people.  Milton's  reason  for  desiring  to 
abolish  the  use  of  the  word  "parliament"  to  denote 
the  English  legislature  was  that  it  originally  sig- 
nified "  the  parley  of  our  lords  and  commons  with 
the  Norman  kings  when  he  pleased  to  call  them." 
The  uniformity  of  jurisprudence,  effected  by  the 
plenitude  of  royal  authority,  was  a  powerful  na- 
tionalizing influence,  small  opportunity  being  af- 
forded for  the  growth  of  the  provincial  rights  and 
privileges  which  played  such  a  great  part  in  the 
politics  of  Continental  Europe.  The  immense 
weight  of  royal  prerogative  rested  upon  the  nation 
as  a  whole,  compacting  its  elements.  To  make 
any  stand  against  royal  oppression,  the  nobles 
had  to  act  together  and  have  the  support  of  the 


POLITICAL  FORCE  123 

people.  When  bounds  were  set  to  royal  preroga- 
tive, they  were  established,  not  as  a  class  privilege, 
but  as  a  general  right,  of  which  Parliament  was 
the  natural  guardian.  The  influences  of  constitu- 
tional progress  tended  to  fuse  the  various  elements 
of  the  population,  originally  as  diverse  and  antago- 
nistic as  anywhere  else  in  Europe,  into  national 
unity.  The  process  consumed  centuries,  but  its 
heat  and  pressure  formed  English  politics  into  a 
substance  so  homogeneous  that,  when  public  opinion 
became  a  factor  in  administration,  the  force  gen- 
erated by  it  exhibited  the  marked  polarity  which 
has  been  its  characteristic,  —  a  positive  phase  and 
a  negative  phase,  the  government  and  the  oppo- 
sition. 

After  the  overthrow  of  the  Stuarts  had  prac- 
tically transferred  the  executive  authority  from 
the  crown  to  Parliament,  the  conditions  which  had 
brought  about  this  unique  phenomenon  were  con- 
tinued by  the  rule  of  the  nobility.  The  Whig 
oligarchy,  which  had  successfully  carried  through 
the  Revolution  of  1689,  resumed  in  its  class  control 
the  authority  of  which  royalty  had  been  dispos- 
sessed. Without  such  restraints,  the  establish- 
ment of  the  authority  of  Parliament  would  have 
allowed  such  free  play  to  divergent  interests  that 
politics  would  probably  have  become  a  chaos  of 
turbulent  opinion.  Such  had  been  the  result  of 
the  victory  of  Parliament  over  Charles  I.  Par- 
liamentary government  became  impossible  with 


124  POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT 

the  usual  result  —  the  establishment  of  a  military 
dictatorship.  The  nation  was  glad  to  escape  by 
returning  to  the  ancient  constitution.  The  Revolu- 
tion of  1689  was  aristocratic  in  its  inception  and 
guidance,  and  did  not  disturb  the  forms  of  the 
constitution  while  radically  transforming  its  char- 
acter. Unity  of  administration  was  no  longer 
secured  by  the  king's  prerogative,  but  by  aristo- 
cratic control.  The  body  of  the  aristocracy,  united 
by  their  class  interests,  were  at  the  same  time 
divided  into  contending  factions  by  rivalry  for  the 
possession  of  office  and  power.  Their  struggles 
developed  party  organization  and  discipline,  and 
set  party  action  in  the  grooves  along  which  it  has 
since  moved.  They  were  like  a  board  of  directors, 
who  might  quarrel  among  themselves  and  split 
into  factions,  each  aiming  to  secure  control  of  the 
affairs  of  the  corporation ;  but  to  whose  strife  their 
common  interests  set  bounds  which  they  instinc- 
tively respected,  so  that  their  disputes  were  neces- 
sarily subject  to  some  regulation,  gradually  finding 
expression  in  rules  of  procedure.  In  like  manner, 
parliamentary  usages  have  been  established  which 
give  to  the  English  government  its  true  character. 
The  cabinet  system  has  no  other  foundation  than 
a  general  agreement  that  the  political  junto  which 
can  secure  a  majority  in  the  House  of  Commons  is 
entitled  to  the  administration.1 

1  Boutmy's  English  Constitution,  Part  III.,  Chap.  IV.,  gives  a 
lucid  account  of  the  process  of  English  party  development. 


POLITICAL  FORCE  12$ 

Something  like  the  same  conditions  of  control 
and  guidance  were  established  in  the  United  States 
by  the  rule  of  the  gentry.  This  rule  was,  how- 
ever, so  artificial  and  factitious  that  it  was  always 
in  a  condition  of  extreme  delicacy.  Had  it  ful- 
filled the  desire  with  which  it  was  instituted,  of 
setting  a  rigid  barrier  to  democratic  tendencies,  it 
would  have  been  crushed.  The  tutelage  to  which 
it  was  intended  to  subject  the  nation  would  not 
have  been  endured.  Notwithstanding  Washing- 
ton's military  renown  and  the  popular  veneration 
for  his  character,  the  spirit  of  insubordination  was 
so  strong  that  the  government  was  a  weak,  shaky 
affair.  John  Adams  says  that,  in  the  exciting 
times  of  1794,  "ten  thousand  people  in  the  streets 
of  Philadelphia,  day  after  day,  threatened  to  drag 
Washington  out  of  his  house  and  effect  a  revolu- 
tion in  the  government,  or  compel  it  to  declare 
war  in  favor  of  the  French  Revolution  and  against 
England."  1  In  Adams'  opinion,  the  yellow  fever, 
more  than  any  strength  in  the  government,  pre- 
vented a  revolution.  The  attempt  made  during 
Adams'  administration  to  suppress  popular  agita- 
tion by  means  of  the  sedition  laws  might  have 
caused  an  explosion  of  democratic  force  which 
would  have  blown  up  the  government,  had  it  not 
been  for  an  event  which  at  the  time  was  regarded 
by  the  supporters  of  the  government  as  a  dire  mis- 
fortune—  the  formation  among  the  gentry  them- 

1  Adams'  Works,  Vol.  X.,  pp.  47,  48. 


126  POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT 

selves  of  an  opposition  party.  It  was  the  great 
unconscious  achievement  of  Thomas  Jefferson  to 
open  constitutional  channels  of  political  agitation, 
to  start  the  processes  by  which  the  development  of 
our  constitution  is  carried  on. 

It  is  remarkable  how  promptly  the  varied  dis- 
contents, which  might  have  converted  politics  into 
a  strife  of  revolutionary  groups,  rushed  into  the 
outlet  provided  for  them.  Everywhere  the  state 
factions  were  gathered  into  relations  with  the 
Federal  or  Republican  parties,  and  placed  them- 
selves under  the  guidance  of  their  party  chiefs. 
This  was  the  salvation  of  the  government.  Change 
became  possible  without  destruction.  Anti-feder- 
alism lost  its  sullen  temper,  and  entertained  hopes 
of  the  government  if  only  Jefferson  and  the  Re- 
publicans should  obtain  control.  The  whiskey 
insurrectionists  saw  a  way  open  by  which  they 
could  attack  the  hated  excise  without  rebellion, 
and  their  ablest  spokesman,  Gallatin,  became  a 
Republican  party  leader.  The  clubs  of  social 
revolutionists  which  had  sprung  up  in  the  cities, 
blazing  with  incendiary  ideas  caught  from  the 
French  Revolution,  were  converted  into  party 
workers,  and  their  behavior  was  moderated  by 
considerations  of  party  interest.  When  the  more 
violent  factions  among  the  Republicans  showed  a 
disposition  to  follow  up  their  victory  in  the  elec- 
tion of  Jefferson  by  an  assault  upon  the  judiciary, 
their  own  party  leaders  held  them  in  check.  In 


POLITICAL  FORCE  I2/ 

Pennsylvania,  Governor  McKean,  whose  election 
was  one  of  the  first  triumphs  of  the  Republican 
party,  vetoed  a  bill  reforming  the  judiciary  system. 
Eminent  Republicans,  such  as  Alexander  Dallas, 
Jared  Ingersoll,  and  Hugh  H.  Brackenridge 
opposed  the  impeachment  of  three  judges  of  the 
state  supreme  court,  and  the  state  senate  gave  a 
majority  for  acquittal.  Even  Jefferson's  own  in- 
fluence could  not  procure  the  united  support  of 
his  party  in  the  U.  S.  Senate  for  the  impeachment 
of  Judge  Chase.  The  reform  of  government  which 
the  Republican  leaders  had  really  sought  was  a 
change  in  the  custody  of  the  powers  of  govern- 
ment, and  they  would  not  support  movements 
aimed  directly  at  the  authority  of  government. 
As  their  support  was  essential  to  party  success, 
faction  animosity  had  to  defer  to  their  ideas. 

The  distinction  between  party  and  faction  seems 
to  be  this :  party  aims  at  administrative  control, 
while  faction  is  the  propaganda  of  a  particular 
interest.  Party,  therefore,  contains  a  principle  of 
conservatism,  inasmuch  as  it  must  always  seek  to 
keep  faction  within  such  bounds  as  will  prevent 
it  from  jeoparding  party  interests.  An  important 
consequence  of  this  party  instinct  of  comprehen- 
sion is  the  tendency  of  opposing  party  organiza- 
tions to  equalize  each  other  in  strength.  The 
practical  purpose  of  their  formation  causes  each 
to  compete  for  popular  favor  in  ways  that  tend 
towards  an  approximately  equal  division  of  pop- 


128  POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT 

ular  support.  Even  in  the  greatest  victories  at 
the  polls,  the  preponderance  of  the  triumphant 
party  is  but  a  small  percentage  of  the  total  vote. 
If  a  party  becomes  so  hopelessly  discredited  that 
it  has  no  chance  of  success,  it  disappears  like  the 
Federalists  or  the  old  National  Republican  party, 
and  a  new  party  takes  its  place  based  on  contem- 
poraneous divisions  of  public  sentiment. 

The  conservative  function  of  party  is  not  duly 
appreciated,  because  its  operation  is  negative. 
What  is  done  is  known,  but  how  far  the  impulse 
which  produced  the  act  has  been  moderated  can- 
not be  known.  It  must,  however,  be  apparent  on 
reflection,  that  even  in  times  of  the  most  conta- 
gious excitement  there  must  be  some  modification 
of  individual  opinions  to  secure  an  agreement  of 
purpose  among  large  bodies  of  citizens.  It  is 
reasonable  to  infer  that  the  habitual  calculation  of 
consequences,  essential  to  the  training  of  every 
political  leader,  must  affect  his  deference  to  the 
behests  of  his  supporters.  It  may  be  stated  as  a 
fact,  which  acquaintance  with  the  interior  work- 
ings of  politics  will  verify,  that  the  influence  of 
party  leaders  is  chiefly  exerted  in  soothing  the 
prejudices  and  moderating  the  demands  of  their 
followers.  If  party  action  were  an  accurate  re- 
flection of  the  passions,  animosities,  and  beliefs  of 
the  mass  of  individuals  composing  the  party  mem- 
bership, politics  would  be  as  tremendous  in  their 
instability  as  ocean  waves ;  but  party  action  being 


POLITICAL  FORCE  129 

a  social  product  is  in  organic  connection  with  all 
the  processes  of  thought  and  feeling  which  pertain 
to  human  nature,  and  is  subject  to  the  play  of  their 
influence.  A  typical  result  is  that  curious  accum- 
ulation of  traditions  and  tenets  which  give  to  party 
communion  almost  the  sanctions  of  religious  faith. 
On  this  point,  with  great  sagacity,  Macaulay  has 
said :  "  Every  political  sect  has  its  esoteric  and  its 
exoteric  school,  its  abstract  doctrines  for  the  initi- 
ated, its  visible  symbols,  its  imposing  forms,  its 
mythological  fables  for  the  vulgar.  It  assists  the 
devotion  of  those  who  are  unable  to  raise  them- 
selves to  the  contemplation  of  pure  truth  by  all 
the  devices  of  ...  superstition.  It  has  its  altars 
and  its  deified  heroes,  its  relics  and  its  pilgrimages, 
its  canonized  martyrs  and  confessors,  and  its  legen- 
dary miracles." 

American  party  history  conspicuously  attests 
the  truth  of  these  observations.  The  mythic 
tendency  has  converted  the  choleric  politicians  of 
the  early  period  of  the  republic  into  sages,  philoso- 
phers, and  even  saints !  Hf  it  were  not  so  difficult 
to  notice  that  which  is  familiar,^it  would  be  easy  to 
see  that  this  process  of  canonization  is  going  on 
in  our  own  time,  idealizing  and  transfiguring  men 
whose  real  personality  is  still  well  within  the 
recollection  of  the  living. 


CHAPTER   X 

DEMOCRATIC    TENDENCIES 

THE  overthrow  of  the  Federalists  was  marked 
by  an  immediate  change  in  the  deportment  of  the 
administration.  Jefferson  substituted  a  written 
message  for  the  speech  to  Congress  at  the  opening 
of  the  session,  giving  as  his  reason  that  he  thus 
avoided  the  contention  that  would  have  taken  place 
in  Congress  over  the  character  of  the  address  in 
reply  to  the  President.  He  also  tried  to  introduce 
an  easy  and  informal  style  of  manners  at  the  exec- 
utive mansion.  It  is  usually  the  case  that  those 
who  set  themselves  against  established  forms  have 
to  give  more  attention  to  the  subject  than  those 
who  observe  them,  and  in  introducing  what  he 
called  "  the  principle  of  pele  mele,"  Jefferson 
troubled  himself  a  great  deal  more  about  questions 
of  etiquette  than  his  predecessors  had  done. 

The  agencies  of  government  devised  by  the 
Federalists  were  mostly  left  intact.  The  alien  and 
sedition  laws  were  by  their  terms  only  temporary 
measures,  and  they  expired  by  limitation.  The 
legislation  by  which  the  Federalists  had  packed 
the  bench  was  rescinded,  and  thus  "  the  midnight 
judges"  were  gotten  rid  of  by  extinguishing  their 

130 


DEMOCRATIC    TENDENCIES  131 

office.  The  internal  revenue  laws  were  repealed ; 
but  Jefferson  became  so  far  reconciled  to  the 
United  States  Bank  as  to  suggest  "a  judicious 
distribution  of  favors "  to  that  and  other  banks 
"to  engage  the  individuals  who  belonged  to  them 
in  support"  of  his  administration.  A  bill  enabling 
the  United  States  Bank  to  establish  branches  in 
the  territories  was  approved  by  him. 

In  general,  it  may  be  said  that  the  Jeffersonian 
triumph  restored  the  supremacy  of  the  civilian 
group.  They  proceeded  to  put  down  the  army  and 
navy,  and  rid  themselves  as  rapidly  as  possible  of 
the  burden  of  national  defence ;  but  there  was  no 
reluctance  about  making  a  large  use  of  the  powers 
of  government  which  had  come  into  their  hands. 
The  Louisiana  purchase  was  effected  by  an  as- 
sumption of  authority  quite  in  Hamilton's  style. 
Jefferson  himself  salved  his  wounded  sense  of 
consistency  by  recommending  the  adoption  of  a 
constitutional  amendment  expressly  legalizing  his 
act ;  but  even  his  own  Cabinet  would  not  pay 
any  attention  to  his  scruples.  The  embargo  upon 
American  commerce,  which  he  ingeniously  con- 
ceived as  a  dignified  retaliation  for  the  insults  and 
injuries  which  his  policy  encouraged  England  and 
France  to  inflict,  carried  national  authority  to  logi- 
cal extremities  to  which  the  Federalists  would  not 
have  dared  to  go.  The  enforcement  act  passed 
to  sustain  the  embargo  was  a  greater  interference 
with  the  ordinary  privileges  of  citizens  than  would 


132  POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT 

have  been  necessary  in  the  exercise  of  war  powers. 
The  executive  behavior  of  Jefferson  and  Madison 
shows  that  they  were  willing  to  go  to  any  length 
in  the  development  of  authority,  so  long  as  it  was 
in  its  nature  such  as  would  remain  in  civilian 
hands.1 

All  this  was  a  great  stumbling-block  to  the 
state  sovereignty  theorizers,  who  at  a  later  day 
declared  that  they  were  simply  holding  out  for 
the  ideas  of  Jefferson.  Calhoun,  with  his  habitual 
intellectual  honesty,  frankly  admitted  that  Jeffer- 
son did  not  live  up  to  the  principles  which  he  had 
enunciated.  Calhoun  said :  "  He  did  nothing  to 
arrest  many  great  and  radical  evils ;  nothing  tow- 
ards elevating  the  judicial  departments  of  the 
governments  of  the  several  states,  from  a  state 
of  subordination  to  the  judicial  department  of  the 
United  States,  to  their  rightful  constitutional  posi- 
tion as  coordinates ;  nothing  towards  maintaining 
the  rights  of  the  states,  as  parties  to  the  constitu- 
tional compact,  to  judge  in  the  last  resort  as  to 
the  extent  of  their  delegated  powers  ;  nothing 
towards  restoring  to  Congress  the  exclusive  right 
to  adopt  measures  necessary  and  proper  to  carry 
into  operation  its  own  as  well  as  other  powers 
vested  in  the  government,  or  in  any  of  its  depart- 
ments ;  nothing  towards  reversing  the  order  of 
General  Hamilton  which  united  the  government 

1  Henry  Adams'  History  of  the  United  States,  Vol.  IV.,  pp. 
398-400. 


DEMOCRATIC   TENDENCIES  133 

with  the  banks ;  and  nothing  effectual  towards  re- 
stricting the  money  power  to  objects  specifically 
enumerated  and  delegated  by  the  constitution."  1 

In  its  character  the  government  was  as  aristo- 
cratic as  before.  Manhood  suffrage  had  been 
established  in  Kentucky  and  in  Vermont,  and  a 
general  movement  towards  the  removal  of  restric- 
tions on  the  suffrage  had  begun ;  but  in  most  of 
the  states  the  voters  were  still  a  limited  class  of 
the  adult  male  population.  In  only  six  of  the 
sixteen  states  which  voted  in  1800  were  electors 
chosen  by  popular  vote.  Political  leaders  set  up 
candidates  and  made  nominations  in  their  party 
interest  in  pretty  much  the  same  style  in  which 
such  matters  were  done  in  England.  In  1808, 
Jefferson  wrote  to  William  Wirt :  "The  object  of 
this  letter  is  to  propose  to  you  to  come  into  Con- 
gress. That  is  the  great  commanding  theatre  of 
this  nation  and  the  threshold  to  whatever  depart- 
ment of  office  a  man  is  qualified  to  enter.  With 
your  reputation,  talents,  and  correct  views,  used 
with  the  necessary  prudence,  you  will  at  once  be 
placed  at  the  head  of  the  House  of  Representa- 
tives ;  and  after  obtaining  the  standing  which  a 
little  time  will  assure  you,  you  may  look,  at  your 
own  will,  into  the  military,  the  judiciary,  diplo- 
matic, or  other  civil  departments,  with  a  certainty 
of  being  in  either  whatever  you  please ;  and  in  the 
present  state  of  what  may  be  called  the  eminent 

1  Calhoun's  Works,  Vol.  I.,  p.  360. 


134  POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT 

talents  of  our  country  you  may  be  assured  of 
being  engaged  through  life  in  the  most  honorable 
employments." 

No  party  leader  in  our  time  would  dare  to  give 
so  broad  a  guarantee.  Of  the  early  period  of  our 
politics,  Professor  Alexander  Johnston  remarks : 
"  In  both  parties  the  abler  leaders  assumed  the 
direct  initiative  in  party  management  to  an  extent 
which  would  be  intolerable,  if  openly  asserted  at 
the  present  time."  l  Nevertheless,  the  democratic 
tendencies  of  the  times  were  very  marked,  and  the 
circumstances  were  such  that  the  natural  care  of 
the  administration  for  its  own  interests,  in  dis- 
pensing the  patronage  of  the  government,  tended 
to  foster  those  tendencies.  It  may  seem  strange 
that  the  democratic  movement,  which  eventually 
overthrew  the  old  regime,  should  have  been  pro- 
moted by  such  a  close  oligarchy  as  the  Virginia 
dynasty  of  presidents.  But  it  is  a  thing  of  common 
occurrence  in  politics  to  find  that  special  exigen- 
cies impel  politicians  in  directions  opposed  to  their 
traditional  tendencies. 

In  using  the  patronage  for  party  ends,  Jeffer- 
son and  his  successors  adopted  no  new  principle  of 
conduct.  Such  use  of  the  patronage  was  an  in- 
veterate practice  of  English  politics.  It  dates 
from  the  time  when  the  crown,  no  longer  able  to 
overawe  Parliament  by  power,  had  to  resort  to  in- 
fluence —  that  is  to  say,  it  dates  from  the  Revolu- 

1  Cyclopaedia  of  Political  Science,  Vol.  I.,  p.  769. 


DEMOCRATIC    TENDENCIES  135 

tion  of  1689.  The  rage  for  office  was  quite  as 
great  in  the  colonies  as  in  England.  During  colo- 
nial times,  quarrels  over  questions  of  patronage 
were  the  cause  of  many  conflicts  between  provin- 
cial assemblies  and  the  governors.  The  state  of 
antagonism,  which  generally  existed  between  the 
governor  and  the  assembly,  strengthened  and  per- 
petuated the  original  English  conception  of  the 
speakership  as  the  office  of  a  party  leader,  a  char- 
acter which  has  never  left  it  in  this  country.  Most 
of  the  time  of  the  Continental  Congress  seems  to 
have  been  consumed  in  disputes  about  the  offices. 
John  Adams  says  :  "  Congress  was  torn  to  pieces 
by  these  disputes,  and  days  and  months  were 
wasted  in  such  controversies,  to  the  inexpressible 
injury  of  the  service."1  The  restoration  of  the 
general  government  made  no  change  of  disposition 
in  this  respect.  So  far  as  the  influence  of  patron- 
age could  extend,  it  was  used  to  secure  political 
support  for  the  administration.  Maclay  notes  in 
his  diary  that  Washington  had  begun  to  consult 
with  representatives  as  to  his  appointments,  and 
took  this  as  a  sign  of  "  a  courtship  of  and  atten- 
tion to  the  House  of  Representatives,  that  by 
their  weight  he  may  depress  the  Senate  and  exalt 
his  prerogative  on  the  ruins."2  Although  the  ad- 
ministration was  non-partisan  in  theory,  yet  it  was 
careful  in  making  appointments  to  select  such  as 

1  Adams'  Works,  Vol.  VI.,  pp.  538,  539. 
a  Maclay 's  Diary,  p.  122. 


136  POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT 

were  zealous  in  support  of  the  government,  and 
would  exert  their  influence  to  make  it  a  success. 
When  the  break-up  of  the  Cabinet  occurred,  and 
an  anti-administration  party  was  organized,  only 
staunch  Federalists  received  office.  In  a  letter 
to  Colonel  Timothy  Pickering,  Secretary  of  War, 
Washington  said :  "  I  shall  not,  while  I  have  the 
honor  of  administering  the  government,  bring  a 
man  into  any  office  of  consequence  knowingly 
whose  political  tenets  are  adverse  to  the  measures 
the  general  government  are  pursuing ;  for  this,  in 
my  opinion,  would  be  a  sort  of  political  suicide." 

During  Adams'  administration  the  utterances  of 
Federal  leaders  in  the  Senate  were  very  emphatic 
on  this  point.  Senator  Bayard  announced  "that 
the  politics  of  the  office-seeker  would  be  the  great 
object  of  the  President's  attention,  and  an  invinci- 
ble objection  if  different  from  his  own."1  Senator 
Otis  said  that  "the  pecuniary  claims  of  Henry 
Miller  for  extra  clerk  hire,"  occasioned  by  his 
inability  to  keep  up  with  his  office  work  while  elec- 
tioneering for  Adams,  was  "  a  paltry  consideration 
infinitely  outweighed  by  the  service  he  was  ren- 
dering to  his  country."2 

The  direct  influence  of  patronage  was  more 
potent  then  than  it  is  now  ;  for  the  conduct  of  poli- 
tics was  further  removed  from  the  people,  and  was 
more  largely  an  affair  of  personal  management  and 

1  Annals  of  Congress,  1797-1798,  p.  1232. 

2  National  Intelligencer,  August  14,  1801. 


DEMOCRATIC   TENDENCIES  137 

individual  negotiation,  which  could  be  greatly  pro- 
moted by  executive  favors.  "This  is  the  great 
spring  of  all  in  the  minds  of  senators  and  repre- 
sentatives," wrote  John  Adams,  "  to  obtain  favors 
for  favorites  among  their  constituents,  in  order  to 
attach  them  by  gratitude,  and  establish  their  own 
influence  at  home  and  abroad."  1  Adams  attrib- 
uted his  defeat  for  reelection  to  the  presidency  to 
a  matter  of  this  sort.  Washington,  when  in  com- 
mand of  the  little  army  put  on  foot  during  the 
French  war  scare  in  1798,  refused  to  give  Peter 
Muhlenberg  an  officer's  commission.  "  And  what 
was  the  consequence  ?  "  said  Adams.  "  These  two 
Muhlenbergs  (Peter  and  Frederick)  addressed  the 
public  with  their  names  both  in  English  and  in 
German,  with  invectives  against  the  administra- 
tion and  warm  recommendations  of  Mr.  Jefferson. 
.  .  .  The  Muhlenbergs  turned  the  whole  body  of 
the  Germans,  great  numbers  of  the  Irish,  and 
many  of  the  English,  and  in  this  manner  intro- 
duced the  total  change  which  followed  in  both 
houses  of  the  legislature  and  in  all  the  executive 
departments  of  the  national  government."2 

Removals  from  office  were  for  a  long  time  hin- 
dered by  the  feeling  that  they  were  in  the  nature 
of  an  attack  on  property  rights.  In  England,  the 
disposition  to  regard  public  trusts  in  private  hands 
as  a  species  of  property  was  so  strong  that  so 

1  Adams'  Works,  Vol.  IX.,  pp.  633,  634. 

2  Ibid.,  Vol.  X.,  p.  122. 


138  POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT 

bitter  an  assailant  of  political  corruption  as  Junius 
conceded  that  the  nomination  boroughs  were  en- 
titled by  usage  and  prescription  to  rank  as  prop- 
erty. It  is  true  that  removals  from  office  on  party 
grounds  were  practised  under  George  III,  but  the 
national  instinct  of  justice  was  deeply  violated.  In 
1762-1763,  Henry  Fox  broke  the  power  of  the  elder 
Pitt  and  secured  a  parliamentary  majority  for  the 
Bute  ministry  by  sweeping  removals  of  Pitt's  sup- 
porters and  by  the  ruthless  use  of  all  the  patronage 
of  the  government ;  but  he  made  himself  execrated 
by  public  opinion,  and  the  literature  of  the  day 
contains  expressions  of  the  deepest  abhorrence. 
George  III  personally  pursued  the  same  tactics, 
with  ruinous  results,  and  in  the  end  he  had  to 
abandon  the  system  and  rest  the  administration 
of  affairs  on  the  talents  and  popularity  of  the 
younger  Pitt.  A  great  purification  of  politics  fol- 
lowed. Having  under  the  cabinet  system  of  gov- 
ernment the  power  of  shaping  issues  by  exercising 
a  direct  initiative  in  legislation,  an  administration 
supported  by  a  popular  mandate  was  to  a  large 
extent  relieved  of  the  necessity  of  using  bribery 
or  trafficking  in  offices  to  facilitate  the  trans- 
action of  the  public  business ;  for  the  admin- 
istration was  in  a  position  to  invoke  the  power 
of  public  opinion  to  overawe  intriguers  and 
mutineers. 

When  Jefferson  became  President  he  found  the 
offices  in  the  possession  of  the  Federalists.      In 


DEMOCRATIC   TENDENCIES  139 

trying  to  bring  in  his  party  friends,  he  was 
hampered  by  this  sentiment  that  a  man  had  a 
property  right  to  the  retention  of  his  office.  When 
he  removed  Elizur  Goodrich  from  the  collectorship 
of  New  Haven,  he  was  disturbed  by  the  energy  of 
public  remonstrance.  Writing  in  reply,  he  said : 
"  Declarations  by  myself,  in  favor  of  political  toler- 
ance, exhortations  to  harmony  and  affection  in 
social  intercourse,  and  respect  for  the  equal  rights 
of  the  minority,  have  on  certain  occasions  been 
quoted  and  misconstrued  into  assurances  that  the 
tenure  of  office  was  not  to  be  disturbed.  But 
could  candor  apply  such  a  construction  ?  When 
it  is  considered  that  under  the  late  administration 
those  who  were  not  of  a  particular  cast  of  politics 
were  excluded  from  all  office ;  when,  by  a  steady 
pursuit  of  this  measure,  nearly  the  whole  offices  of 
the  United  States  were  monopolized  by  that  sect ; 
when  the  public  sentiment  at  length  declared 
itself  and  burst  open  the  doors  of  honor  and  con- 
fidence to  those  whose  opinions  they  approved, 
was  it  to  be  expected  that  this  monopoly  of  office 
was  to  be  continued  in  the  hands  of  the  minority  ? 
Does  it  violate  their  equal  rights  to  assert  some 
rights  in  the  majority  also.  Is  it  political  intoler- 
ance to  claim  a  proportionate  share  in  the  direction 
of  public  affairs  ?  If  a  due  participation  of  office 
is  a  matter  of  right,  how  are  vacancies  to  be 
obtained  ?  Those  by  death  are  few,  by  resignation 
none.  Can  any  other  mode  than  that  of  removal 


140  POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT 

be  proposed  ?    This  is  a  painful  office ;  but  it  is 
made  my  duty  and  I  meet  it  as  such." 

Nevertheless,  the  force  of  hostile  sentiment 
was  so  strong  that  he  made  few  removals.  So 
long  as  the  gentry  retained  their  class  control  of 
the  government,  the  tenure  of  office  was  rarely 
disturbed  on  avowed  party  grounds. 


CHAPTER   XI 

ESTABLISHING   THE    MACHINE 

THE  forces  which  broke  down  the  traditional  re- 
straint were  developed  in  state  politics,  where  they 
began  to  operate  with  marked  effect  as .  soon  as 
the  national  government  was  established.  An  in- 
termixture of  national  with  state  politics  was  pro- 
vided by  the  constitution,  for  the  states  were  made 
parties  to  the  administration  of  the  government. 
The  management  of  state  politics  was  hence  an 
essential  part  of  national  politics.  As  soon  as  the 
constitution  was  framed,  the  struggle  to  control 
state  politics  on  national  issues  was  begun,  and  it 
has  gone  on  ever  since. 

The  South  preserved  longer  than  any  other 
section  the  characteristics  of  colonial  politics ; 
the  conditions  there  were  such  that  the  class  inter- 
ests and  social  connections  of  the  gentry  provided 
an  organization  that  was  sufficient  for  political 
purposes.  Being  thus  shielded  from  the  neces- 
sities which  at  an  early  date  forced  the  Northern 
politicians  into  a  commerce  in  offices,  the  original 
prejudice  against  assailing  a  man's  property  in  his 
office  remained  acute  in  the  South  long  after  it 
had  been  dulled  or  extinguished  in  the  North. 

141 


142  POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT 

The  political  activity  of  the  Southern  gentry  was 
a  function  of  their  social  position.  What  they 
chiefly  sought  from  politics  was  honor  and  power. 
Their  instinct  was  to  regard  office  as  the  due  of 
social  eminence  or  individual  ability.  The  concep- 
tion of  office  as  payment  for  partisan  servility  was 
revolting  to  their  ideas.  The  greed  and  violence 
of  the  mob  politics  of  Northern  cities  filled  them 
with  disgust.  In  Virginia  changes  of  the  state 
administration  were  not  accompanied  by  changes 
in  the  offices  until  after  I834-1  Daniel  Webster, 
in  a  speech  at  Richmond  in  1840,  declared  that 
"  Virginia  more  than  any  other  state  in  the  Union 
had  disavowed  and  condemned  the  doctrine  of  re- 
movals from  office  for  opinion's  sake."  As  late  as 
1849  Calhoun  boasted  °f  South  Carolina:  "Party 
organization,  party  discipline,  party  proscription, 
and  their  offspring,  the  spoils  system,  have  been 
unknown  to  the  state.  Nothing  of  the  kind  is 
necessary  to  produce  concentration."  z 

In  the  North,  party  divisions  in  the  states,  caused 
by  the  introduction  of  national  issues,  did  not  sim- 
ply produce  rival  factions  among  the  gentry  as  in 
the  South,  but  from  the  first  appealed  to  and  drew 
into  the  field  of  political  activity  an  electorate,  in 
whose  opinions  the  offices  were  good  things  which 
ought  to  go  around.  The  rise  of  this  sentiment 
was,  however,  gradual,  and  even  in  New  York, 

1  Tyler's  Letters  and  Times  of  the  Tylers,  Vol.  I.,  p.  524. 

2  Calhoun's  Works,  Vol.  I.,  p.  405. 


ESTABLISHING    THE  MACHINE  143 

where  favoring  influences  were  strongest,  it  made 
its  way  with  difficulty.  When  Hamilton  began 
the  work  of  building  up  the  Federal  party  in  New 
York,  state  politics  had  for  many  years  been  con- 
trolled by  family  influences,  with  no  more  disturb- 
ance than  was  caused  by  rivalries  among  the  Clin- 
tons, Livingstons,  and  Schuylers.  Although 
party  contests  were  full  of  personal  rancor,  yet 
effective  public  opinion  was  still  the  class  opinion 
of  the  gentry.  The  electorate  was  limited,  only 
freeholders  with  an  estate  of  ^100  above  all 
liens  having  the  franchise.  In  the  state  election 
of  1789,  out  of  a  population  of  324,270,  only  12,300 
votes  were  polled.  Hamilton's  success  was  due  to 
the  fact  that  on  the  issue  he  presented  he  was  able 
to  combine  the  Livingstons  and  the  Schuylers 
against  the  Clintons.  The  use  the  Federalists 
made  of  their  victory  showed  the  restraining 
influence  of  polite  opinion.  Actual  removals  from 
office  were  few.  The  Federalists  got  their  party 
friends  into  office  by  seizing  vacancies  caused  by 
the  expiration  of  terms  of  office,  although  reap- 
pointment  had  been  the  usage.  New  offices 
were  created  by  increasing  the  number  of  such 
public  officers  as  judges  and  justices  of  the  peace. 
In  this  way  enough  Federalists  were  introduced 
into  the  county  courts  to  outvote  their  opponents. 
In  counties  where  the  numbers  of  such  officers 
had  been  about  twenty,  there  were  now  forty  or 
fifty. 


144  POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT 

Politics  could  still  be  managed  by  conference 
and  agreement  among  gentlemen,  and  the  conduct 
of  politics  had  to  defer  to  their  class  opinion.  But 
the  spread  of  democratic  influence  was  rapid.  The 
growth  of  city  population  developed  an  electorate, 
which  soon  dispossessed  itself  of  habits  of  defer- 
ence to  social  superiors,  so  that  it  had  to  be  wrought 
upon  by  other  influences.  There  were  none  so 
available  as  those  connected  with  the  use  of  pat- 
ronage, and  this  use  had  to  conform  to  the  changing 
conditions  of  politics.  The  change  in  the  political 
situation  was  made  sharply  manifest  by  Aaron 
Burr,  whose  political  ambition  was  so  steadily 
thwarted  by  Hamilton's  ascendency,  and  who  was 
so  jealously  excluded  from  influence,  that  it  was 
necessary  for  him  to  develop  a  new  source  of 
power,  or  be  crushed  altogether  as  a  factor  in  poli- 
tics. His  instrument  was  the  Columbian  order, 
now  better  known  as  Tammany  Hall.  Founded 
during  the  second  week  of  Washington's  adminis- 
tration, it  was  originally  a  social  rather  than  a 
political  organization.  It  seemed  to  have  become 
a  centre  of  political  activity,  largely  owing  to  the 
fact  that  it  was  a  place  of  meeting  for  the  common 
people,  filling  the  place  occupied  among  the  gen- 
try by  their  clubs  and  assemblies.  By  a  natural 
antagonism  of  classes  it  gradually  became  a  polit- 
ical power.  While  the  gentry  arranged  their 
political  deals  with  their  feet  under  the  mahogany 
and  the  punch-bowl  on  the  board,  there  was  now 


ESTABLISHING    THE  MACHINE  145 

in  existence  a  competitive  mixture  of  politics  and 
hospitality  to  which  the  common  people  could 
resort.  A  stanza  by  Fitz-Greene  Halleck  has  em- 
balmed the  tradition  of  those  early  days  :  — 

"  There's  a  barrel  of  porter  in  Tammany  Hall, 
And  the  Bucktails  are  swigging  it  all  the  night  long. 
In  the  time  of  my  childhood  'twas  pleasant  to  call 
For  a  seat  and  cigar  'mid  the  jovial  throng." 

By  the  aid  of  Tammany  Hall,  in  1800,  Aaron 
Burr  wrested  from  Hamilton  the  political  control 
of  New  York  City.  The  election  presented  the 
modern  features.  Voters  were  sought  out  and 
brought  to  the  polls,  carriages  were  sent  for  the 
sick,  infirm,  or  lazy,  and  Tammany  Hall  kept  open 
house  all  day.  Hamilton,  whose  power  in  New 
York  City  had  rested  upon  the  support  of  the 
local  moneyed  aristocracy,  was  much  impressed  by 
the  effectiveness  of  the  new  political  methods. 
He  came  to  the  conclusion  that  the  Federalists 
"erred  in  relying  so  much  on  the  rectitude  and 
utility  of  their  measures  as  to  have  neglected  the 
cultivation  of  popular  favor  by  fair  and  justifiable 
expedients."  He  drew  up  a  scheme  of  "  the  Chris- 
tian Constitutional  Society,"  whose  objects  were 
to  be  the  support  of  the  Christian  religion  and  of 
the  constitution  of  the  United  States.1  Senator 
Bayard,  of  Delaware,  to  whom  he  submitted  the 
project,  did  not  think  favorably  of  it,  and  it  was 
dropped. 

1  Hamilton's  Works,  Vol.  VI.,  pp.  541-543. 
L 


146  POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT 

From  such  cares  as  these  the  Southern  leaders 
were  quite  free.  Politics  were  so  completely 
under  the  control  of  the  gentry  that  scarcely  any 
appeal  could  be  made  in  any  quarter  against  their 
class  sentiment.  The  Virginia  dynasty  was  the 
political  expression  of  the  natural  hegemony  of 
the  great  state  of  Virginia  in  a  compact  confedera- 
tion of  social  interests  which  ruled  the  South,  and 
by  means  of  an  united  South  ruled  the  Union. 
The  security  in  which  Jefferson  and  his  close  suc- 
cessors abided  as  regards  their  own  section  gave 
them  a  free  hand  in  the  turbulent  politics  of  the 
North.  If  a  Northern  politician  became  dangerous, 
the  federal  patronage  could  be  used  against  him 
with  effect.  Aaron  Burr  was  the  first  to  experi- 
ence this.  Up  to  the  time  of  the  struggle  which 
ensued  when  the  presidential  election  of  1800  de- 
volved on  the  House  of  Representatives,  Burr  was 
recognized  as  the  head  of  the  Republican  interest 
in  New  York.  But  under  Jefferson's  adminis- 
tration De  Witt  Clinton  became  the  party  leader 
in  that  state.  Clinton  resigned  his  seat  in  the 
United  States  Senate  to  become  mayor  of  New 
York  City,  the  power  and  influence  of  which  office 
gave  him  the  best  opportunity  of  undermining 
Burr's  local  interest.  Burr,  weighed  down  by  the 
odium  of  his  fatal  duel  with  Hamilton,  was  unable 
to  maintain  himself  as  a  party  leader ;  but  before 
submitting  to  political  extinction  he  made  an  in- 
structive test  of  the  fitness  of  the  stage  of  public 


ESTABLISHING    THE  MACHINE  147 

affairs  for  a  role  which  at  one  time  or  another  has 
been  successfully  enacted  in  every  other  country, 
and  which  still  affords  an  opening  to  political 
talent  in  Central  and  South  American  states.  He 
turned  conspirator.  The  result  showed  conclu- 
sively that  American  politics  do  not  afford  a  field 
for  such  adventure.  The  political  habits  and  in- 
stinctive prejudices  of  the  American  people  are  so 
firmly  attached  to  constitutional  government  that 
not  in  any  mood  will  they  hearken  to  proposals 
which  do  not  claim  its  sanction.  However  fierce  an 
outburst  of  public  sentiment  may  be,  even  though 
it  reach  to  the  stage  of  insurrection  or  civil  war, 
it  must  keep  under  the  cover  of  a  constitutional 
theory. 

A  Southern  politician,  who  might  become  re- 
calcitrant, could  not  be  disposed  of  as  easily  as  was 
Burr.  When  John  Randolph  of  Roanoke  turned 
against  the  administration,  Jefferson  had  to  endure 
his  galling  attacks,  for  he  could  not  cut  the  ground 
from  under  Randolph's  feet  in  his  own  constitu- 
ency. But  when  De  Witt  Clinton,  in  his  turn, 
assumed  an  attitude  of  opposition  to  the  national 
administration,  during  Madison's  term,  he  could  be 
dealt  with  as  Burr  had  been.  The  federal  patron- 
age was  turned  against  him,  contributing  to  the 
defeat  which  Clinton  then  sustained  in  the  struggle 
for  the  control  of  state  politics. 

Similar  interferences  of  federal  influence  in  the 
contests  of  state  factions,  in  furtherance  of  the 


148  POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT 

party  interests  of  the  national  administration, 
were  of  frequent  occurrence,  and  in  this  way  the 
federal  patronage  acted  as  a  stimulus  to  democratic 
tendencies.  The  road  to  political  consideration 
being  thus  plainly  pointed  out,  travel  naturally 
turned  that  way.  The  organization  of  political 
clubs  and  societies  antagonized  the  family  politics 
of  the  old  state  factions  and  gradually  broke  down 
the  old  methods.  Democratic  gains  increased 
democratic  pressure  upon  the  restraints  put  against 
popular  activity  in  politics,  and  set  in  motion  pro- 
cesses of  change  which  profoundly  altered  political 
conditions.  A  race  of  politicians  grew  up  who  were 
not  the  men  to  entertain  scruples  about  disturbing 
gentlemen  in  their  snug  berths.  The  longer  the 
office-holders  had  been  in  the  more  reason  why 
they  should  get  out,  so  as  to  make  room  for  others 
and  give  every  one  a  chance  at  the  public  crib. 
The  survival  of  the  old  prejudice  may,  however,  be 
traced  in  the  behavior  of  Clinton,  who,  in  the  vio- 
lent faction  struggles  of  New  York,  was  several 
times  in  power,  wielding  the  state  patronage  in 
behalf  of  his  party,  and  was  several  times  over- 
thrown, to  become  the  victim  of  a  fierce  proscrip- 
tion aimed  at  him  and  his  adherents.  At  one  time 
he  advocated  the  removal  of  heads  of  departments 
only.  Then  he  took  up  Jefferson's  line  of  argu- 
ment and  proposed  a  fair  division  of  minor  offices 
between  the  two  parties.  In  1817  he  won  a  great 
victory  by  appealing  to  the  rural  counties  with  his 


ESTABLISHING    THE  MACHINE  149 

scheme  for  the  construction  of  the  Erie  canal. 
Believing  himself  then  independent  of  New  York 
City  politics,  he  declared  his  opposition  to  partisan 
proscription  and,  beyond  turning  out  a  few  Tam- 
many office-holders,  made  no  removals  on  party 
grounds.  This  was  the  last  stand  made  in  New 
York  against  the  use  of  the  offices  for  party  pur- 
poses. Clinton  was  antagonized  by  a  combination 
of  factions,  and  during  Monroe's  administration  the 
federal  patronage  was  so  actively  employed  against 
him  that  he  made  it  a  subject  of  formal  complaint 
in  a  message  to  the  legislature.  Clinton  was 
driven  back  to  his  former  methods,  which  became 
the  settled  practice  of  all  administrations. 

Not  alone  in  New  York,  but  in  Pennsylvania 
and  in  other  Northern  states,  the  development  of 
the  new  method  of  affecting  party  concentration 
for  administrative  purposes  made  rapid  progress. 
The  transfer  of  those  methods  to  the  sphere  of 
national  government  was  simply  a  matter  of  time, 
but  it  was  not  accomplished  until  the  new  influences 
at  work  in  American  society  swelled  in  volume 
until  they  inundated  the  whole  field  of  national 
politics. 


CHAPTER   XII 


THE  growth  of  national  parties  tended  to  develop 
in  the  people  of  every  state  a  conception  of  equita- 
ble rights  in  the  political  arrangements  of  all  the 
states.  If  the  party  did  not  receive  fair  play  any- 
where, it  suffered  everywhere.  The  popular  sense 
of  injury  in  this  respect,  once  excited,  was  very 
alert  and  suspicious,  and  there  was  incessant  com- 
plaint against  the  unfair  discriminations  which 
existed. 

The  inability  of  the  framers  of  the  constitution 
to  get  much- beyond  general  principles  in  reaching 
an  agreement,  had  left  a  latitude  to  state  action 
in  national  politics  which  resulted  in  gross  ine- 
quality of  political  circumstances.  The  state  legis- 
latures elected  United  States  Senators  as  they 
pleased,  appointed  presidential  electors  as  they 
pleased,  and  provided  for  the  election  of  state 
quotas  in  the  House  of  Representatives  as  they 
pleased.  The  variety  and  uncertainty  of  the  con- 
ditions to  which  national  party  action  was  sub- 
jected were  especially  exasperating  with  respect 
to  the  presidential  election.  The  system  was  not 
made  for  democratic  use,  and  its  unsuitability  soon 

150 


NATIONALIZING  INFLUENCE    OF  PARTY       \^\ 

became  a  sore  grievance.  When  the  people  sought 
to  say  for  themselves  who  should  be  President, 
they  were  outraged  by  the  facility  with  which  the 
electoral  machinery  could  be  used  to  thwart  their 
desires. 

In  1800  the  election  of  Jefferson  was  put  in 
jeopardy  by  Federalist  manoeuvres  in  Pennsyl- 
vania. In  that  state  it  had  been  the  practice  from 
the  first  to  choose  presidential  electors  by  popular 
vote.  Every  four  years  the  legislature  would  dis- 
charge its  constitutional  duty  of  providing  for  the 
appointment  of  presidential  electors  by  passing  a 
special  act  for  an  election  by  the  people.  In  1796 
fourteen  Jefferson  electors  had  been  chosen  and 
only  one  Adams  man.  When  the  election  of  1800 
came  on,  the  state  Senate  was  Federalist  by  thir- 
teen to  eleven  ;  the  House  was  strongly  Republi- 
can. No  law  was  passed  for  a  popular  election, 
and  the  Senate  held  out  against  any  action  by  the 
legislature  until  the  House  agreed  that  the  fifteen 
electors  should  be  chosen  out  of  a  list  of  sixteen  — 
eight  to  be  nominated  by  the  Senate  and  as  many 
by  the  House.  In  this  way  seven  electoral  votes 
were  obtained  for  Adams,  although  the  sentiment 
of  the  people  was  strongly  in  favor  of  Jefferson. 
In  New  York,  during  the  same  campaign,  it  be- 
came evident  that  the  incoming  legislature  would 
appoint  Republican  electors.  Hamilton  wrote  to 
Governor  Jay,  proposing  that  the  expiring  legislat- 
ure should  be  convoked  in  special  session  to  pass 


152  POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT 

a  law  providing  for  district  elections  of  presiden- 
tial electors,  so  as  to  enable  the  Federalists  to 
secure  a  number.  The  letter  was  endorsed  by 
Jay,  "  Proposing  a  measure  for  party  purposes 
which  I  think  it  would  not  become  me  to  adopt." 
In  Massachusetts,  where  it  had  been  the  practice 
for  the  legislature  to  appoint  the  electors,  two  at 
large,  on  its  own  motion,  and  the  remainder  from 
lists  of  candidates  sent  up  from  the  congressional 
districts,  the  system  was  suddenly  changed,  in  1804, 
for  fear  that  some  Republicans  might  slip  in,  and 
a  law  was  passed  providing  for  an  election  by  popu- 
lar vote  on  a  general  state  ticket.  In  New  Jersey, 
in  1812,  calculations  of  Federalist  party  advantage 
caused  just  the  reverse  of  the  policy  of  the  Massachu- 
setts Federalists  to  be  adopted.  The  practice  had 
been  to  choose  the  presidential  electors  by  popular 
election.  The  state  elections  showed  a  popular 
majority  for  the  Republicans,  but  owing  to  pecul- 
iarities of  apportionment  the  legislature  was  con- 
trolled by  the  Federalists.  Less  than  a  week 
before  the  time  when  the  election  by  the  people 
should  have  taken  place,  the  legislature  repealed 
the  law,  and  itself  appointed  the  electors,  all  Fed- 
eralists.1 

Fortunately,  none  of  these  manoeuvres  changed 
the  result  of  the  presidential  election,  or  else  a 
revolutionary  violence  might  have  been  engen- 

1  Stanwood's  History  of  Presidential  Elections. 


NATIONALIZING  INFLUENCE    OF  PARTY       153 

dered  in  politics,  fatal  to  constitutional  develop- 
ment. In  the  Massachusetts  case  cited,  the  actual 
effect  was  helpful  to  the  Republican  party,  for  it 
carried  the  state,  and  hence  obtained  the  solid 
electoral  vote.  The  cumbrous  machinery  of  the 
electoral  college  yielded  sufficiently  to  popular  con- 
trol to  secure  toleration,  but  its  operation  revealed 
one  defect  which  compelled  prompt  amendment. 
Under  the  system,  as  originally  established,  each 
elector  voted  for  two  persons,  without  designating 
the  office,  and  the  person  who  received  the  great- 
est number  of  electoral  votes  became  President. 
Therefore,  as  soon  as  the  electors  voted  as  party 
agents  and  cast  their  votes  solidly  for  both  party 
candidates,  there  was  a  tie  vote.  Such  was  the 
outcome  of  the  election  of  1800,  and  although  it 
had  been  perfectly  well  understood  that  Jefferson 
was  to  have  been  President  and  Burr  Vice-Presi- 
dent,  yet,  when  the  case  went  to  the  House  of 
Representatives,  they  stood  legally  on  precisely 
the  same  footing.  The  ensuing  struggle  shook 
the  government  so  alarmingly  that  there  was  a 
prompt  and  irresistible  demand  that  this  defect 
should  be  cured.  Even  at  this  early  date  there  was 
some  popular  agitation  in  favor  of  the  establish- 
ment of  an  uniform  system  of  electing  the  Presi- 
dent ;  but  conservative  influences  were  too  strong 
for  it  to  be  effective.  The  system  was  amended 
so  as  to  provide  that  electors  should  designate 
their  choice  for  President  and  for  Vice-President ; 


154  POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT 

but  the  original  latitude  of  action  given  to  the 
states  was  not  restricted. 

There  were  great  diversities  of  practice  in  the 
various  states.  In  some,  the  electors  were  ap- 
pointed by  the  legislature ;  in  others,  they  were 
elected  by  districts;  in  others,  they  were  elected 
on  a  general  ticket.  This  lack  of  uniformity  was 
inimical  to  democratic  influence,  for  it  varied 
the  conditions  so  as  to  make  precarious  any 
concert  of  action  which  might  be  arranged,  and 
placed  the  people  at  the  mercy  of  the  faction 
temporarily  in  control  of  the  electoral  machinery. 
Imagine  the  resentment  of  Tammany  Hall  after 
achieving  a  victory  for  the  Republican  ticket  in 
New  York  in  1800,  when  news  came  of  the  Fed- 
eralist strategy  by  which  the  party  lost  seven 
electoral  votes  in  Pennsylvania ! 

In  view  of  the  fact  that  the  practical  results  of 
the  working  of  the  electoral  machinery  were  for  a 
long  period  after  1800  quite  in  accord  with  pre- 
vailing popular  sentiment,  it  is  a  striking  proof  of 
the  strength  of  the  dissatisfaction  with  the  system 
that  such  persistent  efforts  were  made  to  obtain 
the  passage  of  a  constitutional  amendment.  Dur- 
ing Monroe's  administration  the  agitation  of  the 
subject  was  carried  on  with  great  earnestness. 
Congress  was  urged  to  submit  to  the  states  a  con- 
stitutional amendment,  providing  that  all  the  elect- 
ors should  be  chosen  by  popular  vote  in  districts. 
This  proposition  was  before  Congress  from  1813 


NATIONALIZING  INFLUENCE    OF  PARTY       155 

to  1822.  It  passed  the  Senate  by  the  requisite 
two-thirds  majority  in  1818,  in  1819,  and  again  in 
1822,  but  failed  to  pass  the  House.  In  1819,  it 
was  passed  to  a  third  reading  in  the  House  by  a 
vote  of  103  to  59,  but  on  the  question  of  the  pas- 
sage of  the  bill,  received  only  92  votes  in  favor  to 
54  against  — less  than  the  necessary  two-thirds. 

The  truth  was  that  political  control  had  been 
gotten  into  a  shape  that  was  satisfactory  to  the 
dominant  group  of  Southern  politicians.  Chief- 
Justice  Marshall  noticed  early  in  Jefferson's  ad- 
ministration that  it  was  his  policy  to  "embody 
himself  with  the  House."  This  policy  was  so  suc- 
cessful that  it  was  the  usage  to  make  up  the  com- 
mittees with  regard  to  the  President's  wishes,  and 
to  reserve  important  chairmanships  for  members 
who  enjoyed  his  confidence.  The  original  functions 
of  the  electoral  college  were  quietly  taken  over  by 
the  administration,  and  the  presidential  succession 
was  arranged  through  the  agency  of  the  Congres- 
sional Caucus. 

The  American  people  are  a  singularly  accommo- 
dating democracy,  but  only  on  condition  that  they 
are  humored.  There  was  no  objection  whatever 
when  the  Republican  members  of  Congress  met  in 
1804,  and  cut  out  the  work  of  the  electoral  college 
by  nominating  Jefferson  and  Clinton.  But  in 
1808,  when  the  Caucus  chairman,  Senator  Bradley 
of  Vermont,  convoked  it  "in  pursuance  of  the 
powers  vested  in  me  as  president  of  the  late  con- 


156  POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT 

vention  of  the  Republican  members  of  both  Houses 
of  Congress,"  the  newspapers  at  once  began  to 
harp  upon  his  authoritative  language,  and  to  ask 
upon  what  meat  this  Caesar  fed.  This  system  of 
nomination  aggravated  the  inequality  of  the  electo- 
ral system  by  complicating  with  it  the  inequality 
that  existed  in  the  system  of  congressional  elec- 
tions. While  in  some  states  the  district  system 
prevailed,  in  others  the  representatives  were 
elected  on  a  general  ticket,  constituting  a  solid 
party  phalanx.  The  violation  of  democratic  in- 
stincts, perpetrated  by  this  diversity  of  political 
circumstances,  caused  a  simultaneous  demand  for 
reform  here,  as  well  as  in  the  electoral  system,  and 
the  two  propositions  were  generally  coupled.  In 
1818,  Senator  Sanford  of  New  York,  by  instruction 
of  his  state  legislature,  introduced  an  amendment 
providing  for  an  uniform  district  system  in  the 
election  both  of  members  of  the  House  and  of 
presidential  electors,  the  appointment  of  the  two 
electors,  allotted  to  each  state  in  addition  to  those 
corresponding  to  the  number  of  its  representatives, 
to  be  made  by  the  legislature.  This  was  the  one 
of  the  various  propositions  submitted  from  time  to 
time  which  came  the  nearest  to  passing  Congress. 
The  combination  of  interests  which  established 
the  Virginia  dynasty  was  too  strong  to  be  seriously 
disturbed.  The  presidency  was  handed  along  from 
Jefferson  to  Madison,  and  from  Madison  to  Mon- 
roe with  some  perturbation,  but  with  no  great  dif- 


NATIONALIZING  INFLUENCE    OF  PARTY       157 

ficulty.  Pennsylvania,  the  heterogeneous  character 
of  whose  population  prevented  the  establishment 
of  a  family  political  control,  like  that  of  the  Clintons 
in  New  York,  was  always  attentively  cared  for  by 
the  Virginia  dynasty,  and  her  adhesion  made  it 
impossible  to  form  a  sectional  combination  against 
Southern  ascendency.  New  York  went  into  re- 
volt against  the  Congressional  caucus,  and  set  up 
De  Witt  Clinton  against  Madison  when  he  was  a 
candidate  for  the  second  time ;  but,  although  the 
remains  of  the  Federalist  party  rallied  to  Clin- 
ton, he  was  crushingly  defeated,  and  then  the 
federal  patronage  was  used  to  overthrow  his  con- 
trol of  New  York  politics.  The  state  was  brought 
back  to  its  former  subordinate  relation,  and  again 
received  the  vice-presidency  as  its  reward. 

The  time  was  not  ripe  for  a  successful  revolt 
against  the  rule  of  the  Congressional  Caucus  until 
the  older  generation  of  statesmen  should  cease  to 
furnish  a  presidential  candidate  upheld  by  their 
collective  prestige.  That  period  arrived  when 
Monroe  had  received  the  usual  renomination. 
Every  one  of  the  four  candidates  for  the  presiden- 
tial succession  were  men  of  the  post-revolutionary 
age,  and  among  them  was  a  typical  representa- 
tive of  democratic  aspirations.  General  Jackson's 
career  had  marked  him  as  the  natural  leader  of  the 
democratic  movement.  His  success  as  a  military 
man  had  been  in  brilliant  contrast  with  the  pom- 
pous impotence  of  generals  set  up  by  the  Wash- 


158  POLITICAL   DEVELOPMENT 

ington  gentry.  His  victory  at  New  Orleans  over 
the  flower  of  the  British  army  uplifted  the  national 
pride  which  had  been  humiliated  by  the  incapacity 
of  the  government.  As  a  politician  he  represented 
the  new  states,  the  chief  source  of  the  democratic 
leaven  which  was  stirring  the  whole  mass  of 
American  society.  In  the  splendid  force  of  his 
indomitable  manhood,  he  realized  a  popular  ideal 
which  his  frontier  training  and  his  educational 
deficiencies  made  only  the  more  genial  and  inspir- 
ing. 

Having  found  such  a  leader,  the  triumph  of  de- 
mocracy was  inevitable.  Although  in  six  states, 
among  them  the  great  state  of  New  York,  there 
was  no  election  by  the  people,  yet  such  was  the 
strength  of  the  Jackson  movement  that  he  received 
the  greatest  number  of  electoral  votes.  Crawford, 
the  nominee  of  the  rump,  which  in  1824  was  all 
that  was  left  of  the  Congressional  Caucus,  stood 
third  in  the  poll.  John  Quincy  Adams,  who  stood 
second,  was  elected  to  the  presidency  by  the 
House  of  Representatives,  but  he  was  the  last 
President  of  the  old  order.  The  Jackson  move- 
ment went  on  without  intermission.  Before 
Adams  had  sent  his  first  message  to  Congress,  the 
Tennessee  legislature  had  nominated  Jackson  to 
the  succession  and  he  had  formally  accepted  the 
nomination.  The  force  of  public  sentiment  com- 
pelled Vermont,  New  York,  Georgia,  and  Louisi- 
ana to  accept  the  popular  system  of  choosing 


NATIONALIZING  INFLUENCE    OF  PARTY       159 

electors,  leaving  only  Delaware  and  South  Caro- 
lina to  continue  the  system  of  appointment  by  the 
legislature.  Jackson  was  triumphantly  elected, 
and  the  subserviency  of  the  electoral  machinery 
to  popular  control  was  forever  established.  Before 
the  next  presidential  election,  South  Carolina, 
which  had  taken  up  an  independent  role  and  was 
outside  of  the  communion  of  national  party  organ- 
ization, was  the  only  state  which  retained  the  old 
system  of  appointment  by  the  legislature. 

During  Jackson's  administration,  efforts  were 
made  to  obtain  the  passage  of  a  constitutional 
amendment  providing  for  a  direct  election  by  the 
people,  but  they  were  unavailing.  The  President 
repeatedly  urged  it  on  the  attention  of  Congress, 
and  the  agitation  of  the  subject  continued  for  a 
number  of  years;  but  the  conditions  required  for 
the  amendment  of  the  constitution  are  so  many 
and  so  rigorous  that  in  the  ordinary  course  of  poli- 
tics it  is  impossible  to  satisfy  them.  The  end 
sought  was,  however,  step  by  step  attained  through 
party  activity.  With  the  establishment  of  the 
system  of  nominating  conventions,  which  took 
place  at  this  period,  the  superior  weight  in  party 
councils  of  a  state  which  cast  a  solid  electoral 
vote,  over  a  state  whose  vote  was  apt  to  be  divided 
by  the  district  system,  caused  a  general  abandon- 
ment of  the  latter  method.  In  1832,  the  method 
of  choosing  electors  was  uniform  throughout  the 
country,  with  the  exception  of  Maryland  and  South 


160  POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT 

Carolina.  Before  the  next  presidential  election, 
Maryland  abandoned  the  district  system  for  the 
general  ticket ;  but  South  Carolina  clung  to  the 
system  of  appointment  by  the  legislature  until 
after  1860.  Since  the  Civil  War  the  general 
ticket  has  been  everywhere  used,  except  in  Michi- 
gan in  1892.  The  Democrats,  having  secured  the 
legislature  at  the  election  of  1890,  revived  the 
party  trickery  of  the  Federalist  period,  and  passed 
a  law  establishing  the  district  system ;  but  the 
next  legislature  repealed  it. 

Lack  of  uniformity  as  regards  the  method  of  con- 
gressional elections  ceased  to  disturb  the  Demo- 
cratic party  after  its  triumph,  as  it  speedily  found 
a  party  advantage  in  the  complete  suppression  of 
minorities  in  some  of  the  states.  The  correction 
of  this  injustice  was  a  fruit  of  the  Whig  victory  of 
1840.  In  May,  1842,  an  act  was  passed  requiring 
the  election  of  members  of  the  House  by  districts. 
At  that  time  the  members  from  New  Jersey, 
Georgia,  Mississippi,  Missouri,  and  Louisiana  were 
elected  on  a  general  ticket.  The  national  regula- 
tion of  senatorial  elections  did  not  take  place  un- 
til the  present  Republican  party1  rose  to  national 
dominion.  The  law  for  this  purpose  was  enacted 

1  There  have  been  three  Republican  parties  in  United  States 
history,  viz. :  The  Republican  party  of  Jefferson,  of  which  the 
Democratic  party  claims  to  be  the  lineal  successor;  the  National 
Republican  party  established  by  the  Adams  and  Clay  men,  which 
was  soon  merged  into  the  Whig  party;  and  the  Republican  party 
still  existing,  organized  in  1856. 


NATIONALIZING  INFLUENCE    OF  PARTY    l6l 

July  25,  1866.  Thus  step  by  step  the  states  have 
been  brought  into  a  uniformity  of  system  in  national 
politics,  and  this  again  has  reacted  in  various  ways 
upon  state  politics,  so  as  to  produce  a  general  con- 
formity in  political  methods. 

A  fact  of  the  highest  importance,  which  has  been 
made  manifest  by  this  process,  is  the  plastic  nature 
of  constitutional  arrangements,  however  rigid  their 
formal  character.  The  electoral  college  has  been 
entirely  divested  of  its  original  functions,  without 
a  change  of  a  letter  of  the  law.  Instead  of  pos- 
sessing discretionary  powers,  it  has  become  as 
mechanical  in  its  operation  as  a  typewriter.  The 
case  is  conclusive  evidence  of  the  ability  of  public 
opinion  to  modify  the  actual  constitution  to  any 
extent  required.  It  has  also  revealed  wherein  the 
true  strength  of  a  constitution  resides.  There  is 
not  a  syllable  in  the  organic  or  in  the  statute  law 
to  safeguard  the  present  constitutional  function  of 
the  electors,  and  yet  such  is  the  force  of  public 
sentiment  that  there  is  practically  no  danger  that 
any  elector  will  ever  violate  his  party  obligations, 
although  it  cannot  be  doubted  that  those  obliga- 
tions have  been  established  in  opposition  to  the 
expectation  of  the  constitution. 


CHAPTER   XIII 

DEMOCRATIC    REFORM 

AT  the  time  Jackson  was  elected  to  the  presi- 
dential office,  Congress  had  acquired  great  weight 
in  the  government,  and  had  practically  become  the 
seat  of  administrative  control.  The  idyllic  con- 
ceptions of  government  proclaimed  by  Jefferson 
had  not  fared  well  in  this  rough  and  bustling 
world.  A  strong  reaction  in  favor  of  more  vig- 
orous and  efficient  government  set  in  and  made 
itself  felt  in  Congress.  In  a  speech  delivered  in 
the  House,  January  31,  1816,  Calhoun  remarked  : 
"  In  the  policy  of  nations  there  are  two  extremes  : 
one  extreme,  in  which  justice  and  moderation 
may  sink  in  feebleness ;  another,  in  which  the 
lofty  spirit  which  ought  to  animate  all  nations, 
particularly  free  ones,  may  mount  up  to  military 
violence.  These  extremes  ought  to  be  equally 
avoided ;  but  of  the  two,  I  consider  the  first  far 
the  most  dangerous."  Such  language  indicated  a 
change  of  heart  in  the  Republican  party.  It 
began  to  lean  to  a  policy  which  could  be  distin- 
guished from  the  old  Federalist  policy  only  by 
nice  discrimination.  Internal  improvements  were 
begun  under  Jefferson's  administration,  and  before 

162 


DEMOCRATIC  REFORM  163 

Madison  left  office  another  national  bank  had  been 
chartered  with  the  same  general  powers  as  the 
one  of  Hamilton's  creation  against  which  Jeffer- 
son had  fulminated.  Such  changes  provoked  the 
taunt  that  the  Republicans  were  turning  Feder- 
alists, but  in  reply  it  was  argued  that  with  Repub- 
licans at  the  head  of  affairs  things  could  be  allowed 
that  might  justly  have  been  regarded  as  dangerous 
while  Federalists  were  in  control.  This  ingenious 
view  of  the  case  was  Madison's  own,  produced 
during  his  philosophic  retirement  at  Montpellier 
after  the  close  of  his  public  career.  Writing 
under  date  of  May  22,  1823,  he  said,  "It  is  true 
that,  under  a  great  change  of  foreign  circumstances, 
and  with  a  doubled  population  and  more  than 
doubled  resources,  the  Republican  party  has 
been  reconciled  to  certain  measures  and  arrange- 
ments, which  may  be  as  proper  now  as  they  were 
premature  and  suspicious  when  urged  by  the  cham- 
pions of  Federalism." 

Notwithstanding  such  soothing  lotions,  the 
sense  of  consistency  in  the  old  Republican  lead- 
ers smarted  under  the  necessity  of  having  to 
reconcile  themselves  to  theories  and  measures 
which  they  had  formerly  denounced,  and  an  easy 
way  of  avoiding  it  was  to  throw  the  responsibility 
on  Congress.  As  for  themselves,  they  admitted 
the  desirability  of  enlarged  powers  of  government, 
if  only  the  constitutional  authority  could  be  found. 
So  Jefferson,  Madison,  and  Monroe  each  recom- 


1 64  POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT 

mended  that  the  constitution  should  be  amended 
for  this  purpose.  Congress  hearkened  respect- 
fully, and  then  assumed  the  necessary  authority. 
In  1806  the  government  began  the  construction 
of  the  Cumberland  road.  In  1808  Secretary  Gal- 
latin  submitted  an  elaborate  plan  of  internal  im- 
provements, including  the  construction  of  both 
roads  and  canals,  which  was  received  with  enthu- 
siasm. The  financial  embarrassments  caused  by 
the  embargo  put  an  end  to  that  scheme,  but  in 
1816  a  scheme  of  the  same  nature  was  brought 
forward  in  the  House  by  Calhoun.  The  bill  passed 
Congress,  but  was  vetoed  by  Madison  in  the  last 
hours  of  his  administration.  His  message  was  in 
effect  a  plea  to  Congress  to  amend  the  constitution 
so  as  to  obtain  the  undoubted  right  to  enact  such 
very  desirable  legislation.  Nevertheless,  the  pol- 
icy of  internal  improvement  continued  to  take 
shape  in  Congress.  Monroe  was  so  hard  pressed 
that,  in  his  turn,  he  was  compelled  to  vindicate 
the  consistency  of  his  principles  by  sending  in  an 
elaborate  veto  message,  which  in  a  stately  and 
dignified  way  performed  the  dialectic  feat  vulgarly 
known  as  beating  the  devil  around  the  stump. 
After  arguing  at  great  length  that  he  could  not 
really  be  expected  to  sanction  internal  improve- 
ments unless  authorized  by  an  amendment  to  the 
constitution,  he  contrived  this  loophole  for  Con- 
gress :  "  My  idea  is  that  Congress  have  an  unlim- 
ited power  to  raise  money,  and  that  in  its  appro- 


DEMOCRATIC  REFORM  165 

priation  they  have  a  discretionary  power,  restricted 
only  by  the  duty  to  appropriate  it  to  purposes 
of  common  defence  and  of  general,  not  local,  na- 
tional, and  state  benefit."  Congress  promptly 
acted  upon  this  hint  and  exercised  its  discretion- 
ary power.  Items  on  account  of  internal  improve- 
'ments  became  a  regular  feature  of  the  ordinary 
appropriation  bills. 

Such  an  attitude  of  the  executive  department 
connived  at  the  concentration  of  power  and  respon- 
sibility in  Congress,  and  promoted  the  establish- 
ment of  a  parliamentary  regime.  The  party  ar- 
rangement by  which  the  Congressional  Caucus 
named  the  President,  gave  a  parliamentary  origin 
to  the  administration,  and  the  government  began 
to  take  its  tone  and  character  from  Congress. 
The  presidency  seemed  on  the  way  to  becoming 
the  headship  of  a  permanent  bureaucracy,  at  the 
top  of  which  stood  the  Cabinet.  After  the  tradi- 
tional two  terms  had  expired,  the  incumbent  retired 
to  private  life,  to  be  revered  as  a  sage,  and  the  Sec- 
retary of  State  was  promoted  to  fill  the  vacancy. 
For  more  than  a  quarter  of  a  century  after  the 
accession  of  Jefferson,  the  Cabinet  resembled  the 
Senate  in  being  a  continuous  body,  each  president 
as  he  stepped  into  the  office  from  the  Cabinet 
retaining  his  old  associates.  Such  was  the  per- 
manency of  tenure  that  a  sense  of  individual  right 
in  the  retention  of  Cabinet  office  grew  up.  The 
force  of  this  sentiment  is  displayed  in  some  cor- 


1 66  POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT 

respondence  which  took  place  between  William 
Wirt  and  ex-President  Monroe  after  the  election 
of  Jackson.  Wirt  had  been  attorney-general  dur- 
ing the  administration  of  Monroe  and  John  Quincy 
Adams.  He  consulted  Monroe  whether  he  should 
be  expected  to  offer  his  resignation  to  Jackson. 
Monroe  expressed  the  opinion  that  from  some' 
points  of  view  Cabinet  officers  "  may  be  considered 
as  holding  an  independent  ground  —  that  is,  de- 
pending on  their  good  conduct  in  office  and  not 
on  the  change  of  the  incumbent."  If  the  Cabinet 
were  subject  to  change,  "the  danger  is,  by  con- 
necting the  members  with  the  fortune  of  the 
incumbent,  of  making  them  the  mere  appendages 
and  creatures  of  the  individual."  He  concluded, 
however,  that  "as  the  heads  of  departments  are 
counsellors  and  wield  important  branches  of  the 
government,  I  do  not  see  how  they  can  remain  in 
office  without  the  President's  sanction."1 

The  people  naturally  got  into  the  habit  of  look- 
ing altogether  to  Congress  for  decisions  on  ques- 
tions of  national  policy.  Furious  contests  took 
place  in  Congress  in  regard  to  the  tariff,  internal 
improvements,  and  slavery,  without  entering  into 
the  presidential  election.  All  such  issues  were 
confined  to  the  parliamentary  arena.  The  struggle 
over  the  admission  of  Missouri,  which  from  1818 
to  1820  kept  the  country  in  boiling  excitement, 
and  caused  the  Representatives  from  the  free  states 

1  Kennedy's  Memoirs  of  William  Wirt,  Vol.  II.,  pp.  221,  222. 


DEMOCRATIC  REFORM  l6/ 

to  present  a  more  solid  front  against  slavery  than 
at  any  time  previous  to  the  election  of  Lincoln, 
did  not  have  any  effect  upon  the  presidential  elec- 
tion. Monroe  was  reflected  almost  unanimously. 

Congress  was  strong,  not  only  in  the  ascend- 
ency it  had  acquired  in  the  management  of  public 
affairs,  but  also  in  the  dignity  and  influence  of  its 
membership.  Lustre  was  given  to  its  proceedings 
by  the  presence  of  a  singularly  able  group  of 
statesmen,  strong  in  personal  force  and  parlia- 
mentary experience.  It  was  the  age  of  Clay, 
Webster,  and  Calhoun. 

The  democratic  upheaval  which  lifted  Jackson 
to  the  presidency  was  a  consequence  of  the  great 
extension  of  the  suffrage  which  had  been  going  on 
since  the  beginning  of  the  century.  Ohio,  Indiana, 
Illinois,  Mississippi,  Alabama,  Maine,  and  Missouri 
had  entered  the  Union  with  manhood  suffrage 
either  specifically  provided  by  law,  or  virtually 
established  in  practice.  Their  example  had  re- 
acted on  the  older  states,  so  that  a  demand  for 
like  privileges  to  their  citizens  could  not  be  denied 
by  the  politicians.  Maryland  in  1810,  Connecticut 
in  1818,  New  York  in  1821,  and  Massachusetts  in 
1822  abolished  their  property  qualifications.1  The 
last  stand  of  the  statesmen  of  the  old  school  was 
made  against  the  spread  of  this  movement,  the 
survivors  among  the  original  leaders  of  the  Fed- 
eralists and  the  Republicans  joining  hands  in 

1  Cyclopaedia  of  Political  Science,  Vol.  I.,  p.  774. 


1 68  POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT 

defence  of  their  order.  John  Adams,  in  Massa- 
chusetts, stood  on  common  ground  with  Madison, 
Monroe,  and  Marshall  in  Virginia  in  resisting  the 
breaking-down  of  property  qualifications  to  the 
franchise.  In  1830  there  were  80,000  white  male 
inhabitants  of  Virginia  who  were  disfranchised. 
They  were  the  mechanics  and  artisans  of  the  com- 
monwealth, and  their  exclusion  from  the  franchise 
was  a  perpetual  inducement  to  this  valuable  class 
of  citizens  to  emigrate  to  the  West.  But  Madison 
made  his  last  fight  in  opposition  to  their  demand 
for  the  franchise,  and,  aided  by  the  vigorous  sup- 
port of  Monroe  and  Marshall,  carried  the  constitu- 
tional convention  of  his  state  in  favor  of  his  views, 
so  that  the  freehold  qualification  was  continued  in 
Virginia  for  twenty  years  more.1 

In  most  of  the  states,  however,  property  qualifi- 
cations had  become  either  nominal  in  amount  or 
in  enforcement.  At  the  same  time  population 
had  increased  with  amazing  rapidity.  The  census 
of  1830  showed  that  the  4,000,000  of  1790  had 
grown  into  13,000,000.  Jackson's  triumph  was 
the  result  of  political  forces  generated  by  this 
great  increase  of  the  electorate.  It  was  an  earth- 
quake extending  over  the  entire  area  of  politics. 
The  old  Republican  party  was  shattered  to  frag- 
ments. The  old  relations  between  Congress  and 
the  presidency  were  destroyed.  The  whole  struct- 

1  Thorpe's  "  A  Century's  Struggle  for  the  Franchise,"  Harper's 
Magazine,  January,  1897. 


DEMOCRATIC  REFORM  169 

ure  of  administration  was  shaken  and  displaced.  A 
period  of  reconstruction  necessarily  followed.  The 
force  which  regulated  the  process  was  supplied  by 
the  establishment  in  national  politics  of  the  prin- 
ciple of  rotation  in  office,  already  reduced  to  prac- 
tice in  the  politics  of  New  York,  and  to  a  large 
extent  adopted  in  all  the  states  outside  the  area  of 
Southern  plantation  politics. 

Although  its  definite  assertion  in  national  poli- 
tics was  somewhat  of  an  innovation,  the  doctrine 
was  not  a  new  one.  It  had  been  advocated  for 
centuries  as  a  sovereign  remedy  for  political  cor- 
ruption. A  great  deal  was  made  -of  it  in  the 
political  writings  of  the  Commonwealth  period  in 
England.  Harrington  in  his  "  Oceana,"  proposed 
that  every  officer,  magistrate,  or  representative 
should  be  excluded  from  his  place  of  power  and 
trust  for  a  term  equal  to  that  of  his  employment. 
Burgh,  whose  "Political  Disquisitions"  was  the 
text-book  of  reform  in  the  last  quarter  of  the 
eighteenth  century,  elaborately  set  forth  the  bene- 
fits to  be  derived  from  the  application  of  this 
principle.  John  Adams,  in  some  thoughts  on 
government  published  in  1776,  favored  the  prin- 
ciple "if  the  society  has  a  sufficient  number  of 
suitable  characters  to  supply  the  great  number  of 
vacancies."  Jefferson  favored  rotation  in  office, 
to  prevent  the  creation  of  a  bureaucracy.  Some 
enunciation  of  the  principle  was  a  staple  article  of 
the  bill  of  rights  which  it  was  the  fashion  to  affix 


I7O  POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT 

to  the  state  constitutions  adopted  by  the  colonies 
after  the  Declaration  of  Independence.  During 
Monroe's  administration,  this  principle  obtained 
practical  recognition  in  the  federal  service  by  the 
passage  of  the  act  of  1820,  limiting  the  commis- 
sions of  district  attorneys,  collectors,  naval  officers, 
navy  agents,  surveyors  of  customs,  paymasters, 
and  some  other  classes  of  officers,  to  a  term  of 
four  years.  The  ground  on  which  this  law  had 
been  enacted  was  the  protection  it  would  afford  to 
the  public  revenues  by  compelling  the  settlement 
of  accounts  at  regular  intervals  ;  but  what  was  that, 
it  was  now  asked,  but  an  admission  of  the  efficacy 
of  the  principle  of  rotation  in  office  ? 

What  with  Jefferson  had  been  abstract  philos- 
ophy, Jackson  was  willing  and  able  to  put  into 
practice.  The  circumstances  of  administration  in 
Jefferson's  time  had  restrained  such  tendencies, 
but  now  the  circumstances  were  such  as  to  make 
them  peculiarly  energetic.  Reform  was  the  watch- 
word of  the  new  administration,  and  heedless  of 
the  shrieks  of  remonstrance,  the  reform  of  the 
civil  service  was  carried  on  unflinchingly.  The 
number  of  removals  during  the  first  year  of  Jack- 
son's administration  is  variously  computed  at  from 
690  to  734  —  less  than  the  number  of  changes  which 
now  soon  follow  the  installation  of  a  reform  ad- 
ministration ;  but  the  contrast  with  the  behavior 
of  previous  administrations  in  this  respect  was  so 
startling  that  the  event  has  become  the  mark  of  a 


DEMOCRATIC  REFORM  I /I 

new  era  in  politics.  The  changes  that  took  place 
were  far  from  being  a  clean  sweep.  Benton  avers 
that,  with  all  his  removals,  Jackson  still  left  a 
majority  in  office  against  him,  even  in  the  execu- 
tive departments  at  Washington.  Nevertheless, 
the  practice  of  making  changes  in  office  on  party 
grounds  had  been  established  as  a  national  system. 
The  effect  of  the  distinct  conversion  of  the  gov- 
ernment patronage  into  a  party  fund  was  obviously 
pernicious  in  its  adulteration  of  the  standard  of 
official  worth.  Scandalous  exhibitions  of  the  con- 
sequences in  this  respect  were  not  long  delayed. 
At  the  same  time  it  is  incontestable  that  in  this 
way  the  means  were  obtained  of  readjusting  the 
political  system  in  conformity  with  the  changed 
conditions.  The  energy  of  the  force  is  exhibited 
by  the  results  of  its  operation.  The  wrangling 
factions  were  rapidly  aligned  in  party  ranks. 
There  was  no  opening  for  an  independent  r61e. 
Factions  had  to  choose  one  side  or  the  other, 
or  be  cut  off  from  present  enjoyment  or  future 
possibility  of  office.  Appropriate  party  issues 
were  shaped  by  executive  policy.  The  adminis- 
tration of  the  patronage  on  party  grounds  carries 
with  it  the  power  of  defining  party  issues,  for  it 
implies  on  the  part  of  the  appointing  power  a 
conception  of  what  constitutes  party  membership. 
Whatever  else  may  be  said  of  it,  the  test  has  the 
advantage  of  being  practical  and  efficient.  -  Dis- 
senters may  contend  that  they  represent  the  true 


POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT 

party  tradition,  but  that  does  not  help  their  case 
any.  They  must  submit  or  go  into  opposition  ; 
and  unless  they  are  able  to  wrest  control  of  the 
party  organization  from  the  President,  they  must 
organize  a  party  organization  of  their  own. 

Some  appearance  of  continuity  with  the  party 
of  Jefferson  had  been  preserved  by  the  very 
magnitude  of  Jackson's  triumph.  Such  was  the 
strength  of  the  movement  that  it  had,  in  the 
modern  phrase,  "captured  the  organization,"  tak- 
ing over  its  name  so  as  to  enable  the  new  party 
to  set  up  the  claim  of  being  the  direct  lineal  suc- 
cessor of  the  Republican  party  of  Jefferson.  For 
a  time  the  title  of  Republican  was  retained  in  use 
as  part,  at  least,  of  the  party  name,  and  is  still  so 
retained  officially,  but  the  organization  soon  be- 
came known  simply  as  the  Democratic  party. 
The  opposition  to  Jackson  claimed  to  be  the  true 
Jeffersonian  Republican  party,  and  it  was  at  first 
known  as  the  National  Republican  party ;  but  in 
broadening  out  so  as  to  include  all  the  elements 
of  opposition,  it  finally  abandoned  that  title  for 
the  good  old  revolutionary  party  name  of  Whig. 
The  Whig  party  was  a  coalition  of  the  National 
Republicans,  or  Adams  and  Clay  men,  with  the 
Anti-Masons,  Conservatives,  and  Nullifiers.  The 
Whigs,  however,  always  contended  that  they  rep- 
resented the  true  Jeffersonian  principle  —  the 
maintenance  of  the  -constitutional  checks  and  bal- 
ances of  power.  Both  Whigs  and  Democrats 


DEMOCRATIC  REFORM  173 

were  really  new  parties,  but  the  Democrats  ob- 
tained possession  of  the  Jeffersonian  tradition. 

It  was  soon  made  evident  that  the  basis  of 
administrative  control  had  been  shifted  from  Con- 
gress to  the  presidency.  The  reluctance  of  Con- 
gress to  make  a  party  issue  of  the  rechartering  of 
the  Bank  of  the  United  States  was  strongly  ex- 
hibited. The  President  forced  that  issue  upon  it. 
To  the  will  of  Congress,  the  President  opposed  his 
will,  and  his  will  prevailed.  When  Congress  re- 
fused to  authorize  the  removal  of  the  government 
deposits,  the  President  himself  assumed  that  au- 
thority. The  Senate  placed  upon  its  records  a 
censure  of  his  acts.  Inside  of  three  years  it  had 
to  reverse  its  judgment  and  expunge  the  censure 
from  its  records.  Thus  at  a  time  when  its  pres- 
tige was  at  the  highest,  and  it  had  been  accus- 
tomed to  exercising  a  controlling  influence  in 
the  government,  Congress  was  overborne  by  the 
weight  of  presidential  authority.  There  was  no 
uncertainty  as  to  the  nature  of  the  instrument  by 
which  the  power  of  the  presidential  office  was 
made  effectual.  During  the  debate  of  January, 
1837,  on  tne  final  passage  of  the  expunging  reso- 
lution, Henry  Clay  said  :  — 

"The  Senate  has  no  army,  no  navy,  no  patron- 
age, no  lucrative  offices,  nor  glittering  honors  to 
bestow.  Around  us  there  is  no  swarm  of  greedy 
expectants  rendering  us  homage,  anticipating  our 
wishes,  and  ready  to  execute  our  commands.  How 


1/4  POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT 

is  it  with  the  President  ?  Is  he  powerless  ?  He 
is  felt  from  one  extremity  to  the  other  of  this 
republic.  By  means  of  principles  which  he  has 
introduced,  and  innovations  which  he  has  made 
in  our  institutions,  alas !  but  too  much  counte- 
nanced by  Congress  and  a  confiding  people,  he 
exercises  uncontrolled  the  power  of  the  state.  In 
one  hand  he  holds  the  purse  and  in  the  other 
brandishes  the  sword  of  the  country !  Myriads 
of  dependents  and  partisans  scattered  over  the 
land  are  ever  ready  to  sing  hosannahs  to  him 
and  to  laud  to  the  skies  whatever  he  does.  He 
has  swept  over  the  government  like  a  tropical 
tornado." 


CHAPTER   XIV 

THE    VETO    POWER 

THE  state  of  mind  in  which  the  framers  of  the 
constitution  addressed  themselves  to  the  task  of 
forming  a  national  government  was  such  as  to 
cause  them  to  attach  great  importance  to  the  veto 
power,  to  make  it  strong,  searching,  and  effective. 
They  had  been  familiar  with  its  exercise  in  colo- 
nial relations  with  the  British  government,  and 
the  character  of  legislation  since  such  control  had 
been  removed  was  regarded  as  demonstrating  the 
necessity  of  reestablishing  it.  The  original  propo- 
sition of  the  Virginia  plan  was  that  the  national 
legislature  should  have  a  right  to  negative  all  state 
laws  contravening  national  functions  ;  then  in  their 
turn  the  acts  of  the  national  legislature,  including 
such  as  negatived  state  laws,  should  be  subject  to 
the  approval  of  a  Council  of  Revision,  to  be  com- 
posed of  "the  Executive  and  a  convenient  number 
of  the  national  judiciary."  The  opposition  of  the 
delegates  from  the  smaller  states  was  so  stubborn 
that  the  scheme  of  direct  national  control  over 
state  legislation  was  gradually  reduced  until  only 
two  marks  of  it  were  left  in  the  constitution  as  it 
was  finally  adopted.  One  of  these  is  the  clause 


1/6  POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT 

giving  Congress  power  to  make  or  alter  regulations 
prescribed  by  state  authority  for  elections  of  Sena- 
tors and  Representatives ;  the  other  is  a  clause 
relative  to  state  imposts  on  imports  or  exports, 
providing  that  "all  such  laws  shall  be  subject  to 
the  revision  and  control  of  Congress." 

The  veto  power,  as  attached  to  the  presidential 
office,  had  a  different  experience  in  passing  through 
the  constitutional  convention.  Although  the  de- 
bates were  carried  on  by  taking  up  in  their  order 
the  propositions  of  the  Virginia  plan,  the  com- 
mittee of  detail  seems  to  have  used  the  draught  of 
a  constitution  submitted  by  Charles  Pinckney  of 
South  Carolina  as  a  skeleton  which  was  gradually 
filled  out  according  to  the  resolves  of  the  conven- 
tion. Pinckney's  original  draught  gave  the  Presi- 
dent power  to  veto  bills  substantially  as  was 
eventually  provided  in  Article  I,  Section  7,  of  the 
constitution,  the  only  new  matter  added  by  the 
convention  being  the  clauses  requiring  the  vote 
to  be  taken  by  ayes  and  nays,  and  entered  upon 
the  journals  of  the  two  Houses.  The  veto  power, 
in  the  shape  it  finally  assumed  as  regards  bills, 
closely  resembles  the  corresponding  section  in  the 
constitution  of  Massachusetts,  adopted  in  1780. 
In  "The  Federalist,"  Hamilton  remarks  that  this 
power  is  "precisely  the  same  with  that  of  the 
governor  of  Massachusetts  whose  constitution, 
as  to  this  article,  seems  to  have  been  the  original 
from  which  the  convention  has  copied."  The 


THE    VETO  POWER  1 77 

clause  of  the  constitution  of  the  United  States, 
conferring  also  a  veto  power  over  "every  order, 
resolution,  or  vote  to  which  the  concurrence  of 
the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives  may  be 
necessary,"  however,  stands  alone.  In  the  Massa- 
chusetts constitution,  "  bills  "  and  "  resolves  "  are 
coupled  as  subjects  of  the  veto  power.  The  added 
provision  in  the  constitution  of  the  United  States 
has  peculiar  force.  It  was  put  in  towards  the 
latter  part  of  the  proceedings,  when  the  conven- 
tion was  reviewing  its  work  to  see  where  any 
weak  points  were  to  be  found.  Among  a  number 
of  resolutions  adopted  for  the  guidance  of  the 
committee  of  detail  was  the  following:  "  Resolved, 
that  the  national  executive  shall  have  a  right  to 
negative  any  legislative  act ;  which  shall  not  be 
afterwards  passed,  unless  by  two-third  parts  of 
each  branch  of  the  national  legislature."  In  satis- 
faction of  this  resolution,  the  committee  draughted 
the  constitutional  provisions  as  they  now  stand, 
making  the  President  a  party  to  every  legislative 
proceeding  requiring  the  concurrence  of  the  two 
Houses.  This  was  perfectly  well  understood  at 
the  time.  When  the  phraseology  of  the  enacting 
clause  of  the  laws  was  under  consideration,  at  the 
first  session  of  the  Senate,  Ellsworth  of  Connecti- 
cut, who  had  been  a  member  of  the  convention, 
argued  that  the  President  should  be  named  as  a 
party  to  the  enactment,  because  of  "  the  conspic- 
uous part  he  would  act  in  the  field  of  legislation, 


POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT 

as  all  laws  must  pass  in  review  before  him,  and 
were  subject  to  his  revision  and  correction."  1 

In  thus  reviving  royal  prerogative  as  an  attri- 
bute of  the  presidential  office,  there  was  consider- 
able uneasiness  among  the  founders  of  the  national 
government  as  to  the  success  of  the  attempt.  In 
"  The  Federalist,"  great  pains  were  taken  to  recon- 
cile public  sentiment  to  so  autocratic  an  authority. 
Hamilton  explained  that  such  a  power  is  necessary 
to  protect  the  executive  from  encroachments  by 
the  other  departments  of  government.  The  fear 
that  it  might  enable  the  executive  to  encroach 
upon  congressional  authority  was  treated  as  chi- 
merical. He  said :  — 

"  The  superior  weight  and  influence  of  the  leg- 
islative body  in  a  free  government,  and  the  hazard 
to  the  executive  in  a  trial  of  strength  with  that 
body,  afford  a  satisfactory  security  that  the  nega- 
tive would  generally  be  employed  with  great  cau- 
tion ;  and  that,  in  its  exercise,  there  would  oftener 
be  room  for  a  charge  of  timidity  than  of  rashness. 
A  king  of  Great  Britain,  with  all  his  train  of 
sovereign  attributes,  and  with  all  the  influence 
he  draws  from  a  thousand  sources,  would  at  this 
clay  hesitate  to  put  a  negative  upon  the  joint  reso- 
lutions of  the  two  houses  of  Parliament.  ...  If 
a  magistrate,  so  powerful  and  well  fortified  as 
a  British  monarch,  would  have  scrupled  about  the 
exercise  of  the  power  under  consideration,  how 

1  Maclay's  Diary,  p.  19. 


THE    VETO  POWER 

much  greater  caution  may  be  reasonably  expected 
in  a  President  of  the  United  States,  clothed  for  a 
short  period  of  four  years  with  the  executive  author- 
ity of  a  government  wholly  and  purely  republican." l 
It  was  a  fortunate  circumstance  that  the  first 
veto,  which  was  exercised  upon  an  apportionment 
bill,  fell  in  with  the  interests  of  the  South  and 
received  the  support  of  Mr.  Jefferson  and  his 
political  connection,  so  that  in  this  case  there  was 
an  overpowering  concentration  of  political  influence 
in  support  of  the  President.  Jefferson  remarks  in 
his  "  Anas  "  that  "  a  few  of  the  hottest  friends  of 
the  bill  expressed  passion,  but  the  majority  were 
satisfied,  and  both  in  and  out  of  doors  it  gave 
pleasure  to  have  at  length  an  instance  of  the  neg- 
ative being  exercised."  Up  to  Jackson's  time  it 
was  exercised  sparingly  and  cautiously,  rather  in 
the  way  of  counsel  than  of  opposition.  Neither 
Jefferson  nor  the  Adamses  used  the  veto  power  at 
all.  Madison  and  Monroe  used  it  to  express  their 
dissent  from  the  broad  doctrines  which,  under 
the  lead  of  Clay  and  Calhoun  in  his  liberal  early 
period,  Congress  was  adopting  in  regard  to  internal 
improvements  ;  but  there  was  no  settled  resistance 
to  the  deliberate  purposes  of  Congress.  There 
were  in  all  nine  instances  only  of  the  exercise 
of  the  veto  power  up  to  the  time  Jackson  became 
President.  In  his  hands  it  ceased  to  be  a  mere 
advisory  function,  as  with  Madison  and  Monroe. 

1  The  Federalist,  No.  73. 


180  POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT 

It  developed  a  terrible  power.  His  twelve  vetoes 
descended  upon  Congress  like  the  blows  of  an  iron 
flail. 

The  parliamentary  leaders  raged  against  a  power 
which  could  be  put  to  such  use.  Henry  Clay 
pointed  out  that  "  it  is  a  feature  of  our  government 
borrowed  from  a  prerogative  of  the  British  king." 
He  declared :  "  The  veto  is  hardly  reconcilable 
with  the  genius  of  representative  government.  It 
is  totally  irreconcilable  with  it  if  it  is  to  be  em- 
ployed in  respect  to  the  expediency  of  measures, 
as  well  as  their  constitutionality."  If  such  be- 
havior should  be  tolerated,  "the  government  will 
have  been  transformed  into  an  elective  monarchy." 
Webster  devoted  some  of  his  strongest  speeches 
to  an  exhibition  of  the  dangers  to  the  constitution 
from  executive  encroachments.  "The  President 
carries  on  the  government ;  all  the  rest  are  sub- 
contractors. ...  A  Briareus  sits  in  the  centre  of 
our  system,  and  with  his  hundred  hands  touches 
everything,  moves  everything,  controls  everything." 
Calhoun  denounced  the  arrogance  of  the  President's 
attitude.  "He  claims  to  be  not  only  the  repre- 
sentative, but  the  immediate  representative,  of  the 
American  people  !  What  effrontery  !  What  bold- 
ness of  assertion  !  The  immediate  representative  ? 
Why,  he  never  received  a  vote  from  the  American 
people.  He  was  elected  by  electors — the  colleges." 

Outside  of  Congress,  the  agitation  against  the 
President's  vetoes  was  carried  on  with  vehemence. 


THE    VETO  POWER  l8l 

The  newspapers  teemed  with  denunciations  of  the 
bank  vetoes.  "  No  king  of  England,"  said  an  edito- 
rial article  in  Nile's  Register,  "has  dared  a  practical 
use  of  the  veto  for  about  two  hundred  years,  or 
more,  and  Louis  Philippe  would  hardly  retain  his 
throne  three  days,  were  he  to  veto  a  deliberate 
act  of  the  two  French  chambers,  though  supported 
by  an  army  of  one  hundred  thousand  men."  Under 
the  head  of  "Effects  of  the  Veto,"  many  news- 
papers established  a  regular  department  of  reports 
of  business  depression  and  industrial  distress.  The 
veto  message  and  the  speeches  of  Webster,  Clay, 
Clayton,  and  Ewing  upon  it  were  used  as  campaign 
documents.  The  supporters  of  Jackson  did  not 
evade  the  issue.  They  also  used  the  veto  message 
as  a  campaign  document,  and  as  a  result  of  this 
combination  of  effort  no  public  document  ever  had 
a  more  thorough  distribution.  The  people  sus- 
tained their  President.  Jackson's  triumph  was 
even  more  decisive  than  before.  He  received  219 
electoral  votes  out  of  286.  Of  the  states  which 
had  been  opposed  to  him  before,  he  carried  Maine 
and  New  Hampshire.  Of  the  states  which  he 
carried  before,  he  lost  South  Carolina,  where  there 
was  no  election  by  the  people,  and  Kentucky, 
which  in  the  new  division  of  parties  stood  by  her 
great  leader,  Henry  Clay. 

Support  of  the  veto  power  became  a  Democratic 
principle.  The  Whig  party  was  timid  of  confronting 
that  issue  ;  the  Democratic  party  was  always  ready 


1 82  POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT 

to  present  it.  After  their  great  victory  in  1840, 
the  plans  of  the  Whig  leaders  were  paralyzed  by 
the  veto  power  in  Tyler's  hands.  In  January, 
1842,  Clay  proposed  constitutional  amendments, 
empowering  Congress  to  pass  a  bill  over  the  presi- 
dential veto  by  a  majority  vote.  He  supported 
his  proposals  in  a  carefully  prepared  speech.  His 
argument,  setting  forth  the  colossal  proportions 
which  the  presidential  authority  had  obtained  by 
virtue  of  the  veto  power,  was  a  strong  one.  In 
legislative  strength  it  made  the  President  the  equal 
of  anything  short  of  a  two-thirds  majority  of  both 
Houses.  He  contended  with  great  force  that 
"really  and  in  practice  this  veto  power  drew  after 
it  the  power  of  initiating  laws,  and  in  its  effects 
must  ultimately  amount  to  conferring  on  the  exec- 
utive the  entire  legislative  power  of  the  govern- 
ment. With -the  power  to  initiate  and  the  power 
to  consummate  legislation,  to  give  vitality  and 
vigor  to  every  law,  or  to  strike  it  dead  at  his 
pleasure,  the  President  must  ultimately  become 
the  ruler  of  the  nation." 

Notwithstanding  this  weighty  exposition  of  the 
importance  of  the  issue,  the  sole  reference  to  it, 
ventured  in  the  Whig  platform  of  1844,  was  tne 
mention  of  "  a  reform  of  executive  usurpations  " 
as  one  of  the  principles  of  the  party.  The  Demo- 
cratic convention,  which  met  soon  after,  was 
bluntly  outspoken.  One  of  the  resolutions  adopted 
declared  that  "  we  are  decidedly  opposed  to  taking 


THE    VETO  POWER  183 

from  the  President  the  qualified  veto  power,  by 
which  he  is  enabled,  under  restrictions  and  respon- 
sibilities amply  sufficient  to  guard  the  public  inter- 
est, to  suspend  the  passage  of  a  bill,  whose  merits 
cannot  secure  the  approval  of  two-thirds  of  the 
Senate  and  House  of  Representatives,  until  the 
judgment  of  the  people  can  be  obtained  thereon." 
This  resolution  was  specifically  reaffirmed  in  1848, 
1852,  and  1856.  The  Whig  deliverance  of  1844 
was,  however,  the  last  intimation  of  an  appeal  to 
the  people  in  opposition  to  the  veto  power. 

The  use  of  the  veto  power  has  increased  until 
its  exercise  has  become  an  ordinary  executive 
function.  In  our  own  time  there  is  no  power  of 
government  which  displays  more  vigor.  At  the 
time  the  constitution  was  adopted,  only  two  states 
conferred  the  veto  power  upon  executive  authority, 
—  New  York  and  Massachusetts.  At  the  time 
Clay  proposed  his  constitutional  amendment,  only 
nine  of  the  twenty-six  states  then  in  the  Union 
gave  to  the  governor  such  a  veto  power  over  bills 
as  the  President  possessed.  At  present  the  gov- 
ernor still  has  no  veto  power  in  Rhode  Island, 
North  Carolina,  and  Ohio.  The  veto  is  annulled 
by  a  majority  vote  of  the  legislature  in  nine  states, 
—  Alabama,  Arkansas,  Connecticut,  Indiana,  Ken- 
tucky, New  Jersey,  Tennessee,  West  Virginia,  and 
Vermont.  In  Delaware,  Maryland,  and  Nebraska 
it  takes  three-fifths  of  the  members  of  both  Houses 
to  pass  a  bill  over  the  veto,  and  in  the  remaining 


184  POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT 

thirty  states  it  requires  two-thirds  of  the  votes  of 
each  House  to  overrule  the  veto.  Not  only  is  it 
the  tendency  of  American  constitutional  law  to 
favor  the  deposit  of  such  an  authority  in  the  exec- 
utive department,  but  there  is  a  growing  disposi- 
tion to  stimulate  its  exercise.  In  thirteen  states 
the  governor  is  specifically  authorized  to  veto 
items  of  appropriation  bills.  In  some  states,  nota- 
bly New  York  and  Pennsylvania,  it  may  be  exer- 
cised upon  bills  after  the  legislature  has  adjourned, 
thus  leaving  it  quite  uncontrolled  and  absolute  in 
its  operation  as  regards  the  legislature,  and  in  the 
states  named  the  veto  power  is  now  chiefly  exer- 
cised in  this  field.  Of  the  acts  passed  during  one 
session  of  the  New  York  assembly,  335  were  vetoed 
by  Governor  Hill  after  its  adjournment.  In  the 
official  publication  of  the  vetoes  by  Governor 
Hastings  of'  Pennsylvania  in  1897,  fifty-four  pages 
are  occupied  by  veto  messages  sent  to  the  legislat- 
ure, while  the  curt  vetoes  filed  after  adjournment 
occupy  238  pages.  The  revisionary  nature  of  the 
veto  power  is  strikingly  displayed  in  this  field  of 
its  exercise,  by  the  fact  that  it  is  at  times  used 
to  reduce  particular  items  of  appropriation  bills. 
Thus  in  a  number  of  cases,  Governor  Hastings 
refused  to  pass  certain  items  until  the  beneficiaries 
agreed  to  execute  and  file  their  acquiescence  in  an 
abatement  of  the  appropriation. 

The  veto  power  vested  in  the  President  of  the 
United  States  has  not  as  yet  been  exercised  ex- 


THE    VETO  POWER  185 

cept  as  regards  bills  and  joint  resolutions  ;  but 
every  vote  of  the  two  Houses  is  subject  to  it,  and 
unless  it  can  be  successfully  contended  that  the 
items  of  appropriation  bills  obtain  place  and  en- 
actment without  the  vote  of  the  two  Houses,  they 
are  fit  subjects  for  the  exercise  of  the  veto  power. 
Action,  which  in  effect  occupies  this  position,  was 
taken  by  President  Grant.  On  August  14,  1876, 
he  sent  a  message  to  the  House,  relative  to  the 
River  and  Harbor  bill,  in  which  he  expressly  stated 
that  if  he  regarded  it  as  obligatory  upon  the  exec- 
utive to  expend  all  the  money  therein  appropri- 
ated, he  should  have  returned  the  bill  without  his 
approval.  Referring  to  the  fact  that  "  many  ap- 
propriations are  made  for  works  of  purely  private  or 
local  interests,  in  no  sense  national,"  he  remarked  ; 
"  I  cannot  give  my  sanction  to  these,  and  will  take 
care  that  during  my  term  of  office  no  public  money 
shall  be  expended  upon  them." 

This  doctrine,  that  appropriations  are  discretion- 
ary and  not  mandatory,  has  found  expression  in 
Congress,  as  it  is  a  convenient  apology  for  extrava- 
gance, and  passes  the  responsibility  on  from  Con- 
gress to  the  executive.  In  the  course  of  a  debate 
on  the  River  and  Harbor  bill,  June  3,  1896,  Senator 
Sherman  remarked  :  — 

"  I  cannot  conceive  a  case  where  one  of  the  ordi- 
nary regular  appropriation  bills  should  be  vetoed 
by  the  President ;  for,  after  all,  it  is  a  mere  permis- 
sion granted  by  Congress  to  the  executive  officers 


1 86  POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT 

to  do  certain  things.  It  does  not  require  them  to 
do  it,  but  only  permits  them  to  do  it,  and  author- 
izes the  money  to  be  paid  out  of  the  common 
treasury  of  the  United  States  for  that  purpose. 
But  if  the. officers  who  are  allowed  discretion  in 
the  matter  say,  '  There  is  no  money  in  the  treas- 
ury for  that  purpose ;  it  is  otherwise  appropriated,' 
or  if  the  President  of  the  United  States  should  see 
proper  to  say,  'That  object  of  appropriation  is  not 
a  wise  one  ;  I  do  not  concur  that  the  money  ought 
to  be  expended,'  that  is  the  end  of  it." 

While  the  veto  power  has  had  an  astonishing 
development  in  this  country,  the  kingly  preroga- 
tive upon  which  it  was  modelled  has  disappeared. 
Neither  George  III  nor  any  of  his  successors 
ever  used  it.  There  is  no  instance  of  a  veto  from 
the  crown  upon  a  law  of  Parliament  since  Queen 
Anne's  reign.  In  the  hands  of  the  President,  who, 
in  the  estimate  of  "The  Federalist,"  would  have  to 
be  even  more  cautious  in  exercising  this  power  than 
the  British  king,  it  is  in  robust  operation.  Either 
monarchical  prerogative  has  found  a  more  congen- 
ial soil  in  the  republic  than  in  the  kingdom  whose 
sovereignty  was  thrown  off,  or  else  a  remarkable 
transformation  has  taken  place  in  the  constitution 
of  the  presidency,  and  instead  of  an  embodiment 
of  prerogative,  it  has  become  a  representative  insti- 
tution. The  history  of  the  phases  of  the  develop- 
ment of  the  veto  power  shows  that  the  latter  view 
of  the  case  is  certainly  the  true  one.  Jackson's 


THE    VETO  POWER  l8/ 

democratic  instinct  correctly  informed  him  of  the 
source  of  his  power  when  he  told  the  Senate  that 
it  was  "  a  body  not  directly  amenable  to  the  peo- 
ple," while  the  President  "  is  the  direct  representa- 
tive of  the  people,  elected  by  the  people,  and 
responsible  to  them." 

All  the  circumstances  go  to  show  that  the  veto 
power  is  sustained,  not  by  strength  of  prerogative, 
but  by  the  representative  character  of  the  presi- 
dential office.  The  development  of  executive 
authority  has  been  sustained  by  public  sentiment 
because  it  has  forged  an  instrument  of  popular 
control.  Congress  represents  locality  ;  the  Presi- 
dent represents  the  nation.  Congressional  author- 
ity is  founded  on  a  combination  of  interests  which 
the  people  instinctively  feel  to  be  beyond  their 
control.  The  people,  parcelled  into  districts,  elect 
their  delegates,  but  they  have  nothing  to  do  with 
the  places  those  delegates  may  obtain  in  the  shuf- 
fle. When  the  units  are  supplied,  the  politicians 
work  out  the  sum  to  suit  themselves.  Presiden- 
tial authority  is  founded  on  the  direct  mandate  of 
the  people.  This  is  the  secret  of  the  strength  of  " 
the  veto  power.  Levi  Woodbury,  who  was  a 
cabinet  officer  under  Jackson  and  Van  Buren,  and 
became  a  justice  of  the  supreme  court,  in  a  speech 
at  Faneuil  Hall  October  19,  1841,  described  the 
constitutional  function  exactly  when  he  said, 
"  The  veto  power  is  the  people's  tribunative  pre- 
rogative speaking  again  through  their  executive." 


CHAPTER   XV 

THE     PRESIDENCY    AS    A    REPRESENTATIVE    INSTITU- 
TION 

THE  new  character  impressed  upon  the  presiden- 
tial office  by  the  democratic  movement  at  once 
made  it  the  basis  of  political  control.  Every 
national  party  which  has  come  into  existence  since 
Jackson's  time,  no  matter  how  purely  legislative 
its  programme,  has  felt  impelled  to  nominate  a 
presidential  ticket.  Unless  it  is  able  to  control 
the  presidential  office,  no  party  can  accomplish  its 
purposes.  The  Whig  party,  which  was  animated 
by  the  old  spirit  of  parliamentary  control,  was  the 
first  party  to  find  this  out  by  experience.  In  elect- 
ing Harrison  in  1840,  it  secured  a  President  who 
fully  assented  to  the  parliamentary  principle  of 
government.  In  his  inaugural  address  he  con- 
tended that  by  no  fair  construction  could  anything 
"  be  found  to  constitute  the  President  a  part  of  the 
legislative  power."  His  duty  to  recommend  legis- 
lation was  simply  "  a  privilege  which  he  holds  in 
common  with  every  other  citizen."  He  regarded 
it  as  "preposterous  to  suppose  that  a  thought 
could  for  a  moment  have  been  entertained  that 
the  President,  placed  at  the  capital,  in  the  centre 

1 88 


THE  PEOPLE'S  REPRESENTATIVE  189 

of  the  country,  could  better  understand  the  wants 
and  wishes  of  the  people  than  their  own  immediate 
representatives"  ;  so,  therefore,  "to  assist  or  con- 
trol Congress  in  its  ordinary  legislation  could  not 
have  been  the  motive  for  conferring  the  veto 
power  on  the  President."  In  particular  he  held 
that  the  President  "  should  never  be  looked  to  for 
schemes  of  finance." 

This  was  very  satisfactory  doctrine  to  the  Whig 
party  leaders  in  Congress,  but  there  was  no  way  by 
which  it  could  be  made  obligatory.  When  Har- 
rison died,  his  doctrine  died  with  him.  Tyler, 
although  elected  on  the  same  ticket  with  Harrison, 
did  not  scruple  to  use  the  veto  power  to  defeat  the 
Whig  schemes  of  finance  adopted  by  Congress. 
Polk,  the  next  President,  had  occasion  to  review  the 
whole  subject  of  the  relations  between  the  Presi- 
dent and  the  Congress,  and  in  his  message  of 
December  5,  1848,  he  laid  down  the  constitutional 
principles  governing  the  case  as  follows  :  — 

"The  people,  by  the  constitution,  have  com- 
manded the  President,  as  much  as  they  have  com- 
manded the  legislative  branch  of  the  government,  to 
execute  their  will.  They  have  said  to  him  in  the 
constitution,  which  they  require  he  shall -take  a 
solemn  oath  to  support,  that  if  Congress  pass  any  bill 
which  he  cannot  approve, '  he  shall  return  it  to  the 
House  in  which  it  originated,  with  his  objections.' 
If  it  be  said  that  the  representatives  in  the  popu- 
lar branch  of  Congress  are  chosen  directly  by  the 


POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT 

people,  it  is  answered,  the  people  elect  the  Presi- 
dent. If  both  Houses  represent  the  states  and 
the  people,  so  does  the  President.  The  President 
represents  in  the  executive  department  the  whole 
people  of  the  United  States,  as  each  member  of 
the  legislative  department  represents  portions  of 
them." 

The  course  of  our  political  history  since  Jack- 
son's time  has  conformed  to  the  constitutional 
principle  that  the  President  is  the  direct  repre- 
sentative of  the  people  as  a  whole.  The  establish- 
ment of  this  principle  was  accompanied  by  a  marked 
change  of  popular  habit  in  the  exercise  of  the  suf- 
frage. Originally,  the  House  of  Representatives 
was  not  only  the  designated  medium  for  the  ex- 
pression of  public  sentiment,  but  in  most  of  the 
states  there- was  no  means  of  popular  participation 
in  the  government  of  the  United  States,  save  in 
the  election  of  members  of  the  House.  And  even 
in  states  where  presidential  electors  were  chosen 
by  the  vote  of  the  people,  the  interest  in  such  elec- 
tions was  small  as  compared  with  that  taken  in 
congressional  elections.  Niles  Register  of  No- 
vember 1 8,  1820,  reports  that  very  few  votes  had 
been  polled  for  presidential  electors  in  Maryland 
and  Virginia.  In  the  whole  city  of  Richmond 
only  seventeen  votes  were  cast.  Yet  this  was  the 
period  when  the  country  was  convulsed  over  the 
admission  of  Missouri  with  a  slavery  constitu- 
tion, and  congressional  elections  were  attended  by 


THE  PEOPLE'S  REPRESENTATIVE  19 1 

great  excitement.  Even  during  the  presidential 
election  of  1824,  with  four  candidates  in  the  field, 
each  with  enthusiastic  partisans,  the  total  vote  cast 
in  Virginia  was  less  than  15,000;  and  Massachu- 
setts, which  had  cast  more  than  66,000  votes  for 
governor  in  1823,  cast  only  37,000  votes  at  the 
presidential  election.  Ohio  polled  50,024  votes  ; 
but  the  election  for  governor  two  years  before  had 
drawn  out  10,000  more  votes,  and  in  the  same  year 
as  the  presidential  election  the  vote  for  governor 
aggregated  76,634.  The  Jacksonian  era  marks  the 
beginning  of  a  concentration  of  popular  interest 
on  the  presidential  election.  After  1824,  the  pop- 
ular vote  shows  a  rapid  increase.  The  aggregate 
in  1824  was  356,038.  The  aggregate  vote  cast  by 
the  same  states  in  1828  was  817,409.  The  in- 
crease in  some  of  the  states  was  amazing.  In 
New  Hampshire,  the  vote  rose  from  4750  to 
45>O56;  in  Connecticut,  from  9565  to  18,286;  in 
Pennsylvania,  from  47,255  to  152,500;  in  Ohio, 
from  50,024  to  130,993.  The  popular  tendency 
thus  suddenly  developed  has  been  constant.  It  is 
now  a  commonplace  of  politics  that  the  presiden- 
tial vote  is  the  largest  cast  at  any  election.  In 
the  presidential  election  of  1896  there  were  cast 
for  President  218,658  votes  more  than  were  cast 
for  Congressmen.  When  it  is  considered  that  the 
practice  of  putting  presidential  and  congressional 
candidates  on  the  same  ballot  is  almost  general, 
this  popular  disposition  is  certainly  very  remarkable. 


POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT 

This  change  in  the  attitude  of  the  people  towards 
the  President  took  away  much  of  the  importance 
of  Congress,  and  had  effects  upon  its  character 
which  soon  became  very  manifest.  The  framers  of 
the  constitution  anticipated  for  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives a  brilliant  career,  something  like  that  of 
the  House  of  Commons.  The  natural  ascendency 
which  the  House  would  possess  as  the  immediate 
representative  of  the  people,  is  the  stock  argu- 
ment of  "The  Federalist"  in  justification  of  the 
exclusive  privileges  conferred  upon  the  President 
and  the  Senate.  It  was  held  that  no  danger  to 
the  constitution  could  result  from  an  excess  of 
power  in  them,  since  "the  House  of  Representa- 
tives with  the  people  on  their  side  will  at  all  times 
be  able  to  bring  back  the  constitution  to  its  primi- 
tive form  and  principles"  ;  while,  on  the  other  hand, 
the  coordinate  branches  of  the  government  could 
not  withstand  the  encroachments  of  the  House 
without  special  safeguards.1  The  result,  on  the 
whole,  during  the  early  period  of  the  republic, 
verified  this  calculation.  Although  never  develop- 
ing such  an  authority  as  that  of  the  House  of 
Commons,  the  House  of  Representatives  was  the 
most  important  branch  of  the  government.  The 
Senate  was  composed  of  provincial  notables  who 
sat  as  a  privy  council,  transacting  business  behind 
closed  doors.  The  floor  of  the  House  was  the 

1  The  Federalist,  No.  63. 


THE  PEOPLE'S  REPRESENTATIVE  193 

field  where  political  talent  might  obtain  distinc- 
tion. The  Senate  became  tired  of  its  dull  seclu- 
sion from  popular  interest,  and  in  1799  admitted 
the  public  to  its  debates ;  but  the  superior  prestige 
of  the  House  was  maintained  until  the  Jacksonian 
era.  Calhoun  remarks  that  the  House  was  origi- 
nally "a  much  more  influential  body  than  the 
Senate." l  Benton  says,  "  For  the  first  thirty 
years  it  was  the  controlling  branch  of  the  govern- 
ment, and  the  one  on  whose  action  the  public 
eye  was  fixed."  2  The  democratic  revolution  over- 
threw the  pillars  of  its  greatness.  It  ceased  to 
make  presidents  ;  it  ceased  to  control  them.  In- 
stead of  being  the  seat  of  party  authority,  —  the 
motive  force  of  the  administration,  —  it  became  in 
this  respect  merely  a  party  agency.  National 
party  purposes,  having  to  seek  their  fulfilment 
through  the  presidential  office,  had  nothing  to 
ask  of  the  House  but  obedience  to  party  demands, 
and  at  once  began  the  task  of  devising  machinery 
to  enforce  submission. 

Burke  long  ago  had  foretold,  "  If  we  do  not  per- 
mit our  members  to  act  upon  a  very  enlarged  view 
of  things,  we  shall  at  length  infallibly  degrade  our 
national  representation  into  a  confused  and  scuffling 
bustle  of  local  agency."  Precisely  such  a  change 
rapidly  took  place  in  the  House  of  Representatives. 

1  Calhoun's  Works,  Vol.  I.,  p.  341. 

2  Thirty  Years'  View,  Vol.  I.,  p.  208. 
o 


194  POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT       „ 

Its  decadence  was  rapid  and  soon  became  noto- 
rious.1 

From  this  period  dates  the  disposition  of  the 
people  to  make  use  of  the  House  to  reflect  their 
passing  moods  rather  than  their  settled  habits  of 
thinking.  The  early  contests  between  the  Fed- 
eralists and  the  Republicans  were  faction  struggles 
that  did  not  establish  strict  party  lines  in  the  House. 
Although  in  the  Fourth  Congress  the  opponents  of 
the  administration  were  strong  enough  to  vote  down 
a  resolution  of  confidence  in  the  President,  a  Fed- 
eralist was  chosen  speaker.  Under  the  Virginia 
dynasty  the  political  complexion  of  the  House  was 
constant,  and  its  membership  exhibited  a  stability 
of  composition  approximating  that  of  the  House 
of  Commons  at  the  same  period.  Henry  Clay  was 
elected  speaker  five  times  in  succession,  and  might 
have  continued  to  hold  the  position  had  he  so  de- 
sired. But  after  the  Jackson  upheaval  the  House 
became  the  shuttlecock  of  politics.  A  graphic 
delineation  of  changes  of  party  strength  appears 
like  storm  waves  in  ascent  and  reflux.  In  the 
Twenty-first  Congress  the  party  division  in  the 
House  was  152  to  39;  in  the  Twenty-second  Con- 
gress, 98  to  97.  In  the  Twenty-fifth  Congress  the 
majority  in  the  House  was  Democratic ;  in  the 
Twenty-sixth,  it  was  Whig.  In  the  Twenty-seventh 

1  Benton  makes  some  doleful  comments  on  this  fact,  which  he 
greatly  deplores  and  tries  to  extenuate.  Thirty  Years'  View,  Vol.  I., 
Chap.  LVII, 


THE  PEOPLE'S  REPRESENTATIVE          195 

Congress,  it  was  Whig ;  in  the  Twenty-eighth,  it 
was  Democratic.  In  the  Twenty-ninth  Congress,  it 
was  Democratic ;  in  the  Thirtieth,  it  was  Whig. 
During  the  Civil  War  the  waves  were  flattened 
down,  so  to  speak  ;  but  the  fluctuation  was  still 
remarkable.1  Since  the  reconstruction  period  the 
vicissitudes  of  party  strength  in  Congress  are  so 
enormous  that  they  simply  daze  and  confound  the 
politicians.  They  come  in  exultingly  at  one  elec- 
tion, on  a  wave  of  victory  that  seems  to  have  swept 
away  the  opposition,  and  a  few  years  later  they  find 
themselves  swept  from  power  in  a  condition  of 
utter  rout  and  demoralization,  wondering  what  on 
earth  has  befallen  them. 

So  periodic  is  the  fluctuation  of  public  sentiment 
that  it  is  expected  as  a  matter  of  course  that  "  the 
off-year"  —  the  congressional  election  intervening 
between  presidential  elections  —  will  show  a  gain 
in  the  strength  of  the  opposition.  Nothing  being 
at  stake  but  the  composition  of  the  House,  the 
particular  interests  of  localities  are  not  so  heavily 
weighed  upon  by  the  necessities  of  national  party 
interest,  so  that  faction  aims  and  individual  pre- 
dilections have  more  to  do  with  shaping  results. 
The  popular  vote  is  smaller,  opposition  is  active 
and  ardent,  while  support  is  languid,  so  that  it  is 
a  common  thing  to  hear  of  candidates  defeated  by 
"the  stay-at-home  vote."  The  popular  mandate  is 

1  Johnston's  American  Politics  gives  the  congressional  strength 
of  parties  down  to  1889. 


196  POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT 

delivered  at  the  presidential  election.  Many  peo- 
ple do  not  vote  at  any  other  time.  Other  elections, 
so  far  as  they  bear  upon  national  affairs,  are  used 
for  correction,  warning,  or  reproof. 

Alexander  Hamilton  once  remarked  to  a  friend 
that  the  time  will  "assuredly  come  when  every 
vital  question  of  the  state  will  be  merged  in  the 
question,  'Who  shall  be  the  next  President?'"1 
That  time  arrived  when  the  President  became  the 
elect  of  the  people,  and  the  presidential  office  be- 
came the  organ  of  the  will  of  the  nation. 

1  History,  by  John  C.  Hamilton,  Vol.  III.,  pp.  335,  346. 


CHAPTER   XVI 

THE    CONVENTION    SYSTEM 

AN  immediate  effect  of  the  conversion  of  the 
presidency  into  a  representative  institution  was 
the  establishment  of  the  convention  system.  It  is 
a  typical  development  of  American  politics,  and  its 
origin  and  growth  as  the  result  of  the  operation  of 
democratic  forces  may  be  distinctly  traced. 

The  idea  was  an  old  one,  but  was  long  ineffectual, 
owing  to  popular  jealousy  of  any  mediation  in 
the  election  of  public  officials.  In  Pennsylvania 
in  1792,  as  the  time  for  the  election  of  represent- 
atives and  of  presidential  electors  approached,  it 
was  proposed  that  a  convention  should  be  held 
"  of  conferees  from  all  parts  of  the  state  to  meet 
at  Lancaster  and  fix  on  suitable  candidates  to  be 
recommended  to  the  choice  of  the  citizens."  The 
object  was  to  secure  "  such  an  unanimity  of 
suffrage  among  the  electors  as  would  return  to 
the  House  of  Representatives  of  the  United 
States  —  men  whose  attachment  to  the  federal 
constitution,  whose  concern  in  the  national 
prosperity,  and  whose  knowledge  of  its  best  in- 
terests, should  qualify  them  to  administer  that 

197 


198  POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT 

government." 1  The  Republican  papers  at  once 
opened  fire  on  this  proposition.  "  A  Mechanic  " 
sarcastically  commends  the  plan  because  it  re- 
lieves the  common  people  of  any  concern  in  poli- 
tics, by  providing  them  with  a  ticket  ready  made 
to  their  hands.  "  Sidney  "  tells  the  people  :  "  A 
congregation  of  men  to  frame  a  ticket,  sanctioned 
by  you,  is  in  fact  a  body  of  electors,  clothed 
with  your  authority.  Are  you  incapable  of  judg- 
ing for  yourselves,  that  you  must  hazard  a  transfer 
of  your  most  important  rights?"  Hugh  H.  Brack- 
enridge,  the  distinguished  Republican  leader  of 
western  Pennsylvania,  dissected  the  proposal  with 
arguments  that  are  as  keen  to-day  as  when  first 
penned.  After  presenting  considerations,  showing 
the  improbability  that  the  conferees  would  be  so 
chosen  as  fairly  to  represent  the  people  of  their 
districts,  he  adds  that  even  if  they  were,  the 
system  would  not  work  fairly,  "  because  the  persons 
that  go  forward  will  have  attachments  and  resent- 
ments, interests  and  partialities,  hopes  and  fears, 
which  those  at  home  know  nothing  of,  but  which 
will  be  fully  exercised  when  they  come  to  form  a 
ticket."  "Leave  it,"  he  concluded,  "to  every 
man  to  frame  his  ticket,  or  be  immediately  in- 
structed by  others  how  to  do  it ;  but  let  it  be  his 
own  act,  and  there  is  no  deception  or  injustice." 

These  comments  fairly  set  forth  popular  senti- 
ment,   but    practical    experience   was    constantly 

1  The  American  Museum,  Philadelphia,  for  August,  1792. 


THE   CONVENTION  SYSTEM  199 

showing  that  to  compass  party  ends  means  were 
necessary  for  the  concentration  of  votes  in  the 
party  interest,  or  else  people  of  like  minds  on 
political  issues  might  defeat  their  desire  by  dis- 
agreement in  the  selection  of  representatives. 
Hence  caucuses  and  mass-meetings  were  held,  and 
committees  of  correspondence  became  busy  when- 
ever an  election  was  on  hand,  in  order  to  set  forth 
the  claims  of  candidates  and  afford  guidance  to 
voters.  In  matters  requiring  a  concert  of  action, 
extending  over  a  state,  it  became  the  practice  for 
the  members  of  the  legislature  to  caucus  for  the 
purpose  of  recommending  candidates.  Travel  was 
slow  and  costly,  the  members  were  from  all  parts 
of  the  state  and  were  already  convened,  so  that 
the  ease  and  convenience  of  the  arrangement 
commended  it.  Men  of  political  prominence,  who 
were  not  members,  could  attend  and  participate  in 
the  proceedings  if  they  cared  to  take  the  trouble 
to  do  so.  A  practical  defect  of  the  system, 
revealed  at  an  early  date,  was  that  in  a  party 
caucus  of  members  of  the  legislature,  districts  from 
which  members  of  another  party  had  been  elected 
would  not  be  represented.  This  could  be  remedied 
by  the  election  from  those  districts  of  delegates  to 
represent  them  in  the  caucus,  thus  giving  it  the 
character  of  a  party  convention.  The  New  York 
legislative  caucus,  which  nominated  De  Witt  Clin- 
ton for  governor  in  1817,  was  completed  in  this 
way. 


200  POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT 

These  methods  came  into  existence,  not  by 
theoretic  design,  but  as  practical  expedients.  In 
just  the  same  way,  the  nomination  of  candidates 
for  President  devolved  upon  the  Congressional 
Caucus.  Anything  like  express  authority  for  such 
action  was  disavowed.  In  1808  the  Republican 
Congressional  Caucus,  in  announcing  its  candi- 
dates, declared  "  that  in  making  the  foregoing  rec- 
ommendation the  members  of  this  meeting  have 
acted  only  in  their  individual  characters  as  citi- 
zens ;  they  have  been  induced  to  adopt  this  meas- 
ure from  the  necessity  of  the  case ;  from  a  deep 
conviction  of  the  importance  of  union  to  the  Re- 
publicans throughout  all  parts  of  the  United  States 
in  the  present  crisis  of  both  our  external  and 
internal  affairs  ;  and  as  being  the  most  practicable 
mode  of  consulting  and  respecting  the  interests 
and  wishes  of  all  upon  a  subject  so  truly  interest- 
ing to  the  whole  people  of  the  United  States." 
Some  such  explanation  was  regularly  appended  to 
the  announcements  of  the  action  of  the  Caucus  so 
long  as  it  undertook  to  make  presidential  nomina- 
tions. 

While  this  method  might  serve  an  established 
party  already  in  possession  of  legislative  control, 
it  would  not  do  for  a  party  whose  legislative  repre- 
sentation was  too  weak  for  it  to  presume  to  speak 
for  the  whole.  Consequently,  the  Federalists  had 
to  make  use  of  other  means  of  pooling  their  votes. 
Generally,  the  old-fashioned  method  of  correspond- 


THE    CONVENTION  SYSTEM  2OI 

ence  between  party  leaders,  in  the  states  where 
they  still  had  some  strength,  was  sufficient  for 
their  needs.  In  1812,  when  the  Clinton  revolt  in 
New  York  against  the  Virginia  dynasty  inspired 
the  Federalists  with  some  hope,  they  held  a  con- 
vention in  New  York,  at  which  eleven  states  were 
represented,  and  endorsed  the  Clinton  presidential 
ticket,  already  nominated  by  the  legislative  caucus 
at  Albany.  This  convention,  although  more  like  a 
ratification  mass-meeting  than  a  nominating  con- 
vention in  the  modern  sense,  led  to  an  attempt 
to  establish  a  regular  convention  system  in  New 
York.  The  Clinton  bolt,  although  it  controlled 
the  Republican  Caucus  at  Albany,  did  not  carry 
with  it  the  entire  party  organization  in  New 
York.  Tammany  Hall,  with  the  support  of 
Madison's  administration,  began  a  vigorous  war 
on  De  Witt  Clinton,  and  in  1813  formally  proposed 
that  a  state  convention  should  be  called  for  the 
purpose  of  nominating  the  governor.  The  move- 
ment failed,  but  the  tendency  of  political  oppo- 
sition to  resort  to  the  convention  system  became 
strongly  marked.  This  was  particularly  the  case 
with  new  political  movements,  whose  power  had 
yet  to  be  developed  in  the  composition  of  the 
legislature.  Their  interests  naturally  antagonized 
the  legislative  caucus,  in  which  established  political 
interests  were  intrenched.  Hence  the  Anti-Masonic 
party,  which  sprang  up  in  1826,  was  driven  to  the 
expedient  of  holding  conventions  of  its  own.  Its 


202  POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT 

propaganda  was  actively  carried  on  during  the 
period  in  which  the  new  conception  of  the  presi- 
dential office  was  formed,  and  obedient  to  that  im- 
pulse a  national  convention  of  the  party  was  held 
in  Philadelphia  in  1831.  This  may  be  regarded  as 
the  first  regularly  constituted  national  party  con- 
vention, congressional  representation  being  taken 
as  the  rule  of  party  representation. 

The  popular  dislike  of  party  machinery  was, 
however,  deeply  rooted.  The  Jackson  movement 
had  derived  a  great  deal  of  strength  from  this 
sentiment,  and  in  overthrowing  the  Congressional 
Caucus  there  was  no  intention  to  substitute  for  it 
the  still  more  elaborate  and  cumbrous  conven- 
tion system.  The  desire  was  to  procure  a  con- 
stitutional amendment,  enabling  the  people  to  vote 
directly  for  President.  In  the  ordinary  course  of 
politics,  however,  the  constitution  is  unamendable. 
A  two-thirds  majority  of  both  Houses  of  Congress, 
and  the  sanction  of  three-fourths  of  the  states,  can 
be  commanded  only  at  rare  and  tremendous  junct- 
ures. As  the  close  of  Jackson's  first  term  ap- 
proached, the  newly  formed  Democratic  party 
found  itself  exposed  to  dangerous  hazards  of  dis- 
sension from  the  lack  of  any  method  of  securing 
party  agreement  as  to  the  ticket  to  be  supported 
by  the  presidential  electors  who  might  be  chosen 
in  the  party  interest.  While  it  was  settled  that 
Jackson  should  be  renominated,  the  vice-presidency 
was  an  open  question,  to  decide  which  some  mode 


THE    CONVENTION  SYSTEM  2O3 

of  party  action  was  necessary.  There  was  some 
inclination  to  restore  the  Congressional  Caucus. 
This  was  the  preference  of  Van  Buren  and  the 
Albany  agency.  Of  course  candidates  apprehen- 
sive of  the  influences  controlling  Congress  were 
opposed  to  this,  and  moreover  public  sentiment 
had  been  too  deeply  incensed  against  the  Caucus 
to  be  won  over.  Meanwhile,  the  convention  sys- 
tem had  been  adopted  by  the  opposition.  After 
the  Anti-Masonic  party  had  held  its  national  con- 
vention, the  National  Republicans  held  theirs. 
William  Wirt  was  the  presidential  candidate  of 
the  Anti-Masons.  Henry  Clay  was  the  candidate 
of  the  National  Republicans.  The  hope  of  the 
opposition  to  Jackson  was  that  the  electoral  vote 
would  be  split  up  so  as  to  throw  the  election  into 
the  House  of  Representatives,  where  the  states 
would  vote  as  equals.  The  necessity  of  concen- 
trating the  Democratic  vote  became  manifest,  and 
the  convention  system  appeared  to  be  the  only 
practicable  method.  The  New  Hampshire  legis- 
lature led  the  way  by  issuing  a  call  for  a  national 
convention,  and  Jackson  gave  his  approval  to  the 
movement.  Every  state  responded  except  Mis- 
souri. The  system  of  national  conventions  was 
thus  adopted  by  all  parties. 

The  position  of  the  national  convention,  as  the 
supreme  authority  in  party  organization,  was  not 
established  without  opposition.  The  Pennsylvania 
Democracy  bolted  the  nomination  of  Van  Buren 


2O4  POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT 

for  Vice-Presiclent  in  1832,  and  the  electoral  votes 
of  the  state  were  cast  for  William  Wilkins  for  that 
office.  In  1832  and  1836  South  Carolina  cast  her 
electoral  vote  for  candidates  of  her  own,  who 
received  no  votes  from  any  other  state.  In  1836 
the  Democratic  party  was  the  only  party  which 
held  a  national  convention.  The  plan  of  the 
opposition  was  to  take  the  greatest  possible  ad- 
vantage of  local  elements  of  hostility  to  the 
national  administration  by  running  a  number  of 
tickets,  and  thus  endeavor  to  throw  the  election 
into  the  House  of  Representatives.  The  Demo- 
cratic party  organization  in  Virginia  bolted  the 
national  convention  nomination  for  Vice-President, 
and  the  electoral  votes  of  the  state  were  cast  for 
an  independent  candidate.  Van  Buren,  the  con- 
vention candidate  for  President,  was  elected,  but 
no  one  had  a  majority  of  votes  for  Vice-President. 
The  election  devolved  on  the  Senate,  which  chose 
the  convention  nominee  —  Richard  M.  Johnson  of 
Kentucky.  In  1840  the  Democratic-Republican 
national  convention  did  not  venture  to  nominate 
a  candidate  for  Vice-President,  but  adopted  a  reso- 
lution, leaving  "the  decision  to  their  Republican 
fellow-citizens  in  the  several  states,  trusting  that 
before  the  election  shall  take  place  their  opinions 
shall  become  so  concentrated  as  to  secure  the 
choice  of  a  Vice-President  by  the  electoral  col- 
leges." The  Democratic  party  did  not  obtain 
many  electoral  votes  in  that  election.  While  all 


THE    CONVENTION  SYSTEM  20$ 

were  given  to  Van  Buren  for  President,  they  were 
divided  among  three  candidates  for  Vice-President. 
Declarations  of  party  principles  naturally  accom- 
panied the  nomination  of  party  candidates,  and  so 
the  party  platform  had  its  origin.  As  in  the  case 
of  the  convention  system  the  germ  of  the  platform 
may  be  traced  a  long  way  back.  In  1800  the 
Congressional  Caucus  of  the  Republican  party 
adopted  resolutions,  setting  forth  the  principles 
represented  by  Jeff erson's  candidacy.  In  1812  the 
New  York  legislative  caucus,  which  nominated 
Clinton  to  the  presidency,  set  forth  the  grounds  of 
opposition  to  Madison  in  a  series  of  resolutions. 
During  the  Jackson  movement  the  adoption  of 
resolutions  at  meetings  and  conventions  became  a 
regular  practice.  When  national  party  conven- 
tions regularly  assumed  the  function  of  selecting 
candidates,  they  could  not  well  avoid  making 
statements  of  party  principles.  Public  opinion 
demanded  such  explanations,  and  the  politicians 
had  to  comply.  In  1840,  the  first  formal  national 
platform  of  the  Democratic  party  was  adopted. 
The  Whigs,  a  party  of  political  odds  and  ends, 
did  not  formally  present  a  platform  either  in  1840 
or  in  1848.  The  prepossessions  in  favor  of  parlia- 
mentary control  which  clung  to  the  Whig  party 
made  the  laying  down  of  platforms  in  connection 
with  presidential  nominations  a  disagreeable  duty. 
Its  real  feeling  on  the  subject  was  probably  that 
which  it  declared  when,  reduced  to  a  mere  rump 


206  POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT 

under  the  name  of  the  Constitutional  Union  Party, 
it  met  at  Baltimore  in  1860  and  nominated  Bell 
and  Everett.  It  then  adopted  resolutions  setting 
forth  that  "experience  has  demonstrated  that  plat- 
forms adopted  by  the  partisan  conventions  of  the 
country  have  had  the  effect  to  mislead  and  deceive 
the  people,  and  at  the  same  time  widen  the  politi- 
cal divisions  of  the  country  by  the  creation  and 
encouragement  of  geographical  and  sectional  par- 
tisan parties." 

That  party  never  held  another  convention,  and 
never  since  then  has  any  party  failed  to  submit  to 
the  people  some  statement  of  its  purpose. 

But  while  the  adoption  of  a  platform  is  now  an 
accepted  party  obligation,  the  duty  is  not  dis- 
charged with  complete  sincerity.  Platform  utter- 
ances have  become  so  vague  and  ambiguous  that 
the  tendency  of  public  sentiment  is  to  attach  much 
less  importance  to  them  than  to  the  declarations 
of  the  presidential  candidates.  Mr.  Blaine,  in  a 
review  article,  thus  described  the  change  which 
has  taken  place  :  — 

"  The  resolutions  of  a  convention  have  come  to 
signify  little  in  determining  the  position  of  President 
or  party.  Formerly  the  platform  was  of  first  impor- 
tance. Diligent  attention  was  given,  not  only  to 
every  position  advanced,  but  to  the  phrase  in  which 
it  was  expressed.  The  presidential  candidate  was 
held  closely  to  the  text,  and  he  made  no  excur- 
sions beyond  it.  Now,  the  position  of  the  candi- 


THE    CONVENTION  SYSTEM  2O/ 

date,  as  defined  by  himself,  is  of  far  more  weight 
with  the  voters,  and  the  letter  of  acceptance  has 
come  to  be  the  legitimate  creed  of  the  party." 

The  establishment  of  national  control  over  party 
organization,  against  the  obstructions  raised  by 
popular  prejudice  and  state  pride,  could  not  have 
been  effected  without  the  influence  of  the  federal 
patronage.  The  resistance  to  the  system  in  the 
Democratic  party  was  strong  and  stubborn,  and 
some  marks  of  it  still  appear  in  convention  pro- 
cedure. The  rule  requiring  a  two-thirds  majority 
to  nominate,  which  is  peculiar  to  the  Democratic 
party,  was  a  precaution  taken  by  state  party  or- 
ganizations against  submergence  of  their  interests. 
The  subsequent  adoption  of  the  unit  rule,  by  which 
a  majority  of  each  delegation  was  allowed  to  cast 
its  full  vote,  recognized  a  practice  begun  in  the  Van 
Buren  interest,  the  inequitable  character  of  which 
was  mitigated  by  making  it  uniform.1  It  required 
the  full  pressure  of  Jackson's  authority  to  make 
the  party  organizations  in  a  number  of  states  sub- 
mit to  the  convention  system  at  all.  The  great 
edifice  of  national  party  organization  has  the  presi- 
dential patronage  for  its  corner-stone. 

1  These  famous  rules  are  usually  ascribed  to  the  influence  of 
state  sovereignty  ideas,  but  the  facts  of  the  case  do  not  sustain 
this  theory.  Calhoun,  who  was  the  great  champion  of  state  sover- 
eignty, always  contended  that  the  people  should  elect  convention 
delegates  by  districts.  He  also  contended  that  if  delegations  voted 
as  states,  they  should  have  an  equal  vote,  as  in  an  election  of  the 
President  by  the  House  of  Representatives. 


CHAPTER   XVII 

THE   TRANSFORMATION    OF    THE    CONSTITUTION 

AN  effect  of  the  convention  system,  which  was 
at  once  noted,  was  the  complete  effacement  of  the 
constitutional  design  for  the  election  of  President. 
Senator  Benton,  a  leader  of  the  Jackson  movement 
which  was  the  great  agent  of  change,  was  startled 
by  the  consequences  of  the  new  system.  He  said, 
"  The  election  of  the  President  and  the  Vice-Presi- 
dent  of  the  United  States  has  passed,  —  not  only 
from  the  college  of  electors  to  which  the  constitu- 
tion confided.it,  and  from  the  people  to  which  the 
practice  under  the  constitution  gave  it,  and  from 
the  House  of  Representatives  which  the  constitu- 
tion provided  as  ultimate  arbiter,  —  but  has  gone  to 
an  anomalous,  irresponsible  body,  unknown  to  law 
or  constitution,  unknown  to  the  early  ages  of  our 
government.  .  .  ."1  Benton's  remedy  was  "the  ap- 
plication of  the  democratic  principle  —  the  people 
to  vote  direct  for  President  and  Vice-President." 
This  was  the  original  demand  of  the  Jackson  party. 
Benton  drew  a  fancy  picture  of  American  citizens 
going  to  the  polls,  each  declaring  who,  in  his  indi- 
vidual opinion,  was  the  fittest  man  for  President. 

1  Thirty  Years'  View,  Vol.  I.,  p.  49. 
208 


TRANSFORMATION  OF  THE    CONSTITUTION    209 

He  likened  it  to  "the  sublime  spectacle"  that  was 
seen  in  the  city  states  of  antiquity,  "  when  the 
Roman  citizen  advanced  to  the  polls  and  pro- 
claimed:  'I  vote  for  Cato  to  be  Consul';  the 
Athenian,  '  I  vote  for  Aristides  to  be  Archon ' ; 
the  Theban,  '  I  vote  for  Pelopidas  to  be  Boeotrach ' ; 
the  Lacedaemonian,  '  I  vote  for  Leonidas  to  be  first 
of  the  Ephori. ' '  That  there  would  be  any  diffi- 
culty in  exercising  a  real  choice  does  not  seem  to 
have  occurred  to  Benton,  but  the  point  was  clearly 
discerned  by  Calhoun's  penetrating  intellect.  He 
argued  that  the  natural  incompetency  of  the  peo- 
ple to  judge  in  such  a  case  would  inevitably  trans- 
fer the  real  selection  to  a  few  managers.  Like 
Benton,  he  held  that  "the  complex  and  refined 
machinery  provided  by  the  constitution  for  the 
election  of  the  President  and  Vice-President  is  vir- 
tually superseded ";  and  that  "the  nomination  of 
the  successful  party,  by  irresponsible  individuals, 
makes,  in  reality,  the  choice."  1  But  so  far  from 
holding  popular  election  to  be  the  cure,  he  found 
it  to  be  the  cause  of  the  evil,  so  that  the  extension 
of  the  principle  would  only  aggravate  the  malady. 
In  his  own  state  of  South  Carolina  he  successfully 
opposed  the  choice  of  presidential  electors  by 
popular  election,  on  the  ground  that  "  so  far  from 
giving  power  to  the  people  it  would  be  the  most 
effectual  way  that  could  be  devised  of  divesting 
them  of  it  and  transferring  it  to  party  managers 

1  Calhoun's  Works,  Vol.  I.,  p.  224. 
P 


210  POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT 

and  cliques."  In  his  "Disquisition  of  Government  " 
he  sets  forth  with  impregnable  logic  the  sequence 
of  cause  and  effect.  He  points  out  that  parties 
will  rule  because  associated  effort  is  more  power- 
ful than  individual  action. 

"The  conflict  between  the  two  parties  in  the 
government  of  the  numerical  majority,  tends  neces- 
sarily to  settle  down  into  a  struggle  for  the  honors 
and  emoluments  of  the  government ;  and  each,  in 
order  to  obtain  an  object  so  ardently  desired,  will, 
in  the  process  of  the  struggle,  resort  to  whatever 
measure  may  seem  best  calculated  to  effect  this 
purpose.  The  adoption  by  the  one,  of  any  meas- 
ure, however  objectionable,  which  might  give  it  an 
advantage,  would  compel  the  other  to  follow  its 
example.  In  such  a  case,  it  would  be  indispensa- 
ble to  success,  to  avoid  division  and  keep  united ; 
—  and  hence,  from  a  necessity  inherent  in  the 
nature  of  such  governments,  each  party  must  be 
alternately  forced,  in  order  to  insure  victory,  to 
resort  to  measures  to  concentrate  the  control  over 
its  movements  in  fewer  and  fewer  hands,  as  the 
struggle  became  more  and  more  violent.  This  in 
process  of  time  must  lead  to  party  organization 
and  party  caucuses  and  discipline  ;  and  these  to 
the  conversion  of  the  honors  and  emoluments  of 
the  government  into  means  of  rewarding  partisan 
services,  in  order  to  secure  the  fidelity  and  increase 
the  zeal  of  the  members  of  the  party."  1 

1Calhoun's  Works,  Vol.  I.,  pp.  40,  41 


TRANSFORMATION  OF  THE    CONSTITUTION    211 

Calhoun's  writings  exhibit  a  mental  attitude  in 
which  the  nullification  doctrine  and  attachment 
to  the  Union  meet  in  harmony.  Taking  for  his 
starting-point  the  fact  that  the  intention  of  the 
constitution  was  to  establish,  not  a  government  by 
popular  majority,  but  one  of  checks  and  balances, 
he  showed  how  the  constitutional  checks  and 
balances  had  been  destroyed  by  party  spirit. 
While  the  form  of  the  constitution  had  remained, 
its  restraint  had  been  avoided  by  transferring  the 
selection  of  Presidents  and  the  initiative  of  admin- 
istration to  an  extra-constitutional  body,  free  from 
all  restriction,  save  such  as  public  opinion  might 
impose.  Members  of  Congress  and  office-holders 
are  constitutionally  disqualified  from  serving  as 
electors,  but  nevertheless  they  swarm  in  national 
conventions  and  in  practice  act  as  electors.  Cal- 
hdun's  point  was  that,  since  the  original  checks 
had  been  overthrown,  new  ones  were  necessary  if 
the  constitution  was  to  be  preserved.  The  fittest 
check  was  one  which  he  held  to  be  inherent  in  the 
nature  of  the  union  —  the  exercise  of  state  sover- 
eignty. 

"  The  practical  effect  is  to  give  to  each  inter- 
est or  portion  of  the  community  a  negative  on  the 
others.  It  is  this  mutual  negative  among  its 
various  conflicting  interests,  which  invests  each 
with  the  power  of  protecting  itself ;  and  places 
the  rights  and  safety  of  each,  where  only  they  can 
be  securely  placed,  under  its  own  guardianship. 


212  POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT 

Without  this  there  can  be  no  systematic,  peaceful, 
or  effective  resistance  to  the  natural  tendency  of 
each  to  come  into  conflict  with  the  others  ;  and 
without  this  there  can  be  no  constitution.  It  is 
this  negative  power  —  the  power  of  preventing  or 
arresting  the  action  of  the  government  —  be  it 
called  by  what  term  it  may  —  veto,  interposition, 
nullification,  check,  or  balance  of  power  —  which 
in  fact  forms  the  constitution."  1 

It  is  easy  to  see  how  this  line  of  reasoning 
eventually  led  to  Calhoun's  proposal  of  a  dual  ex- 
ecutive, the  final  expedient  suggested  by  his  pa- 
triotism as  a  means  of  reconciling  to  his  ideas  of 
constitutional  liberty  the  Union  which  he  loved. 
The  secession  movement  naturally  emerged  from 
this  state  of  thought.  It  was  as  constitutional  in 
its  temper  as  the  Revolution  of  1776.  There  is 
no  more  pathetic  reading  in  all  political  literature 
than  Calhoun's  writings  on  government.  They 
are  a  noble  monument  over  the  grave  of  the  Whig 
theory  of  government,  slain  in  its  constitutional 
intrenchments  by  victorious  Democracy. 

The  profound  change  which  Jackson's  adminis- 
tration effected  in  the  character  of  the  govern- 
ment, makes  it  a  landmark  of  the  divergence 
between  the  English  and  American  constitutional 
systems.  To  subject  the  administration  of  public 
affairs  to  the  superintendence  of  public  opinion, 
has  been  the  tendency  of  constitutional  develop- 

1  Calhoun's  Works,  Vol.  I.,  p.  35. 


•TRANSFORMATION  OF  THE    CONSTITUTION    213 

ment  in  both  countries.  In  England,  the  dem- 
ocratic movement  made  executive  prerogative 
subservient  to  the  national  will,  through  the 
agency  of  Parliament ;  in  America,  it  seized  pre- 
rogative by  the  immediate  act  of  the  people. 
There  was  no  conscious  selection  of  means. 
The  choice  was  determined  by  necessity.  There 
are  instances  of  popular  appeals  to  George  III  to 
exercise  the  royal  veto  upon  acts  of  Parliament. 
The  nature  of  the  tenure  of  royal  authority,  how- 
ever, puts  it  out  of  the  reach  of  direct  popular  con- 
trol. The  people  have  no  choice  who  shall  be 
king.  In  England,  the  only  organ  of  government 
on  which  democratic  forces  could  act  directly  was 
Parliament.  When  George  III  was  compelled 
by  circumstances  to  rest  his  administration  upon 
the  popularity  of  the  younger  Pitt,  the  form  which 
democratic  development  would  take  was  settled. 
Thenceforth  the  basis  of  governmental  authority 
was  not  the  king's  will,  but  public  opinion,  as 
reflected  in  the  composition  of  Parliament  and 
embodied  in  its  leadership.  To  make  the  com- 
position of  Parliament  a  fair  expression  of  public 
opinion  was  the  object  sought  by  the  English 
reform  movement  which  was  contemporaneous 
with  the  democratic  uprising  in  America.  The 
parliamentary  reform  bill,  which  marks  the  estab- 
lishment of  popular  control  in  England,  was  passed 
in  1832,  during  Jackson's  first  administration. 
In  this  country  democratic  progress  found  in 


214  POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT 

the  President  its  most  convenient  instrument. 
Public  opinion  suppressed  the  constitutional  dis- 
cretion of  the  electoral  college,  and  made  it  a  reg- 
ister of  the  result  of  the  popular  vote  as  taken  by 
states.  The  President  became  the  elect  of  the 
people,  the  organ  of  the  will  of  the  nation.  Hence 
the  power  of  the  presidential  office  exhibits  an 
enormous  growth,  while  royal  prerogative  has 
withered.  The  right  to  choose  the  ministers  of 
the  crown  has  long  since  been  resigned  by  Eng- 
lish royalty.  The  President  selects  the  members 
of  his  cabinet  to  suit  himself.  The  constitutional 
participation  of  the  Senate  has  become  a  mere 
matter  of  form.  The  veto  power  of  the  crown  is 
extinct.  Writing  in  1828,  Macaulay  described  it 
as  "a  prerogative  which  has  not  been  exercised 
for  a  hundred  and  thirty  years,  which  probably 
will  never  be  exercised  again,  and  which  can 
scarcely  in  any  conceivable  case  be  exercised  for 
a  salutary  purpose."  That  is  just  the  time  when 
the  veto  power  of  the  President  began  to  dis- 
play an  exuberant  vitality.  English  royalty  has 
dwindled  away  into  a  ceremonial  function.  The 
power  of  the  presidential  office  has  increased  and 
is  increasing. 

In  England  the  formation  of  the  parliamentary 
type  of  government  was  completed  when  it  be- 
came a  settled  principle  that  party  control  of  the 
House  of  Commons  carried  with  it  the  custody  of 
crown  authority.  The  presidential  type  of  gov- 


TRANSFORMATION  OF  THE    CONSTITUTION    21$ 

ernment  which  democratic  progress  is  shaping  in 
America  is  still  imperfect.  While  the  presiden- 
tial office  has  been  transformed  into  a  representa- 
tive institution,  it  lacks  proper  organs  for  the 
exercise  of  that  function.  The  nomination  of  a 
presidential  candidate  is  accompanied  by  a  decla- 
ration of  party  principles  which  he  is  pledged  to 
enforce  in  the  conduct  of  the  administration  ;  but 
no  constitutional  means  are  provided  whereby  he 
may  carry  out  his  pledges,  and  it  is  due  solely  to 
the  extra-constitutional  means  supplied  by  party 
organization  that  the  presidential  office  is  able  to 
perform  the  function  imposed  upon  it  of  executing 
the  will  of  the  nation.  Party  organization  acts  as 
a  connective  tissue,  enfolding  the  separate  organs 
of  government,  and  tending  to  establish  a  unity 
of  control  which  shall  adapt  the  government  to  the 
uses  of  popular  sovereignty.  The  adaptation  is 
still  so  incomplete  that  the  administrative  func- 
tion is  imperfectly  carried  on  and  the  body-politic 
suffers  acutely  from  its  irregularity. 

American  politics  are  in  a  transition  state. 
Throes  of  change  rack  the  state  with  pain  in  every 
limb  and  evoke  continual  groans.  A  cry  for  relief 
is  the  burden  of  public  utterance.  A  ready  ear  is 
given  to  quackery,  and  many  political  nostrums 
are  recommended  with  pathetic  credulity  by  large 
bodies  of  respectable  people.  Fortunately  for  the 
safety  of  the  state  and  the  development  of  the 
constitution,  the  character  and  circumstances  of 


2l6  POLITICAL  DEVELOPMENT 

the  mass  of  the  people  are  such  that  efforts  to 
physic  American  politics  are  futile.  The  agencies 
which  have  carried  on  the  process  of  change  will 
continue  to  do  so,  in  spite  of  all  outcry  and  remon- 
strance, until  the  democratic  type  of  government 
is  perfected. 


PART   III 

THE    ORGANS   OF  GOVERNMENT 

CHAPTER   XVIII 

INSTRUMENTS    OF    RULE 

THE  preceding  chapters  sketch  the  development 
of  American  politics  down  to  our  own  times.  The 
stage  of  growth,  whose  beginning  is  marked  by 
the  Jacksonian  era,  still  continues,  and  the  actual 
constitution  of  the  government,  in  its  typical  char- 
acteristics, still  remains  as  it  was  then  moulded. 
The  conclusions  which  have  been  reached  may  be 
summarized  as  follows  :  — 

The  government  began  as  a  magisterial  control, 
the  product  of  a  conservative  reaction  against  im- 
pending anarchy.  This  control  was  founded  accord- 
ing to  the  principles  of  the  English  constitution, 
as  then  understood,  by  distributing  the  authority 
and  balancing  the  powers  of  government  so  as  to 
give  representation  to  different  social  orders  and 
interests,  and  enable  each  to  protect  itself.  The 
organs  of  government  were  constituted  upon  the 
English  pattern,  monarchical  prerogative  being 

217 


2l8  THE    ORGANS  OF  GOVERNMENT 

represented  by  the  presidential  office,  the  House 
of  Lords  by  the  Senate,  and  the  House  of  Com- 
mons by  the  House  of  Representatives.  In  fram- 
ing the  government  care  was  taken  to  exclude  what 
were  regarded  as  corruptions  impairing  the  consti- 
tutional model,  —  in  particular,  the  formation  of  a 
cabinet  of  ministers  from  among  the  members  of 
the  legislature,  — and  extra  precautions  were  taken 
to  confine  the  democratical  element  in  the  consti- 
tution by  restricting  the  powers  of  the  House  of 
Representatives  to  limits  narrower  than  those  of 
the  House  of  Commons. 

The  government  was  put  up  and  set  going  by  a 
concert  of  action  among  leading  men  in  the  various 
states,  who  possessed  an  aristocratic  ascendency 
strong  enough,  when  dexterously  and  energetically 
exercised,  to  impose  their  determinations  upon  the 
mass  of  the  people.  These  national  politicians 
comprised  two  groups  formed  during  the  Revolu- 
tionary struggle :  the  one,  from  the  associations 
of  the  Continental  Congress ;  the  other,  from  ex- 
perience of  administrative  necessities  ;  the  one, 
wholly  civilian ;  the  other,  largely  military ;  the 
one,  intent  upon  parliamentary  checks  upon  au- 
thority ;  the  other,  intent  upon  executive  efficiency. 
As  soon  as  the  government  was  fairly  established, 
and  the  stress  of  circumstances  which  brought 
them  together  was  relaxed,  these  groups  with 
their  adherents  drew  apart  and  formed  rival 
parties,  each  seeking  to  control  the  administration. 


INSTRUMENTS   OF  RULE  219 

Party  competition  for  popular  favor  and  support 
stimulated  democratic  tendencies,  at  the  same  time 
supplying  a  leadership  which  moderated  their  force 
and  confined  them  to  constitutional  methods.  As 
the  suffrage  was  extended  and  political  power  was 
diffused  among  the  masses,  the  supremacy  of  the 
classes  which  had  possession  of  the  government 
was  undermined.  Their  control  of  the  electoral 
college  —  which,  although  constituted  as  a  delib- 
erative body,  had  always  acted  in  a  ministerial 
capacity — -became  precarious,  and  in  the  election 
of  Jackson  was  overthrown.  The  electoral  college 
was  finally  divested  of  any  semblance  of  its  origi- 
nal constitutional  discretion  and  became  distinctly 
a  party  agency.  The  presidential  office  was  thus 
placed  within  reach  for  use  as  an  instrument  of 
popular  control  over  the  administration  of  public 
affairs.  The  office  experienced  a  democratic  trans- 
formation, making  it  a  representative  institution 
—  the  organ  of  the  will  of  the  nation.  All  its 
powers  were  invigorated. 

This  profound  change  in  the  nature  of  the  con- 
stitution was  accomplished  without  any  change  in 
its  formal  provisions,  and  the  separation  of  the 
legislative  and  executive  branches  of  administra- 
tion, so  carefully  ordained  by  the  framers  of  the 
constitution,  remained  intact ;  while  the  coordi- 
nating influences  upon  which  they  had  relied  were 
extinguished.  The  establishment  of  a  new  joint 
control  became  the  instinctive  object  of  party 


22O  THE   ORGANS  OF  GOVERNMENT 

effort.  To  supply  the  place  of  the  class  interests 
and  social  connections  which  originally  provided 
the  necessary  unity  of  control,  the  convention 
system  was  developed,  and  gradually  its  jurisdic- 
tion was  confirmed  until  local,  state,  and  national 
politics  were  bound  together  in  national  party  or- 
ganization and  all  their  activities  were  subordi- 
nated to  national  interests.  The  magnitude  and 
extent  of  the  functions  assumed  have  been  sus- 
tained by  an  appropriate  elaboration  of  structure, 
giving  to  party  organization  in  America  a  massive- 
ness  and  a  complexity  unknown  in  governments 
whose  constitution  leaves  to  party  only  its  ordi- 
nary office  of  propagating  opinion  and  inciting  the 
political  activity  of  citizenship.  In  England  party 
elicits  the  expression  of  the  will  of  the  nation ;  in 
this  country  it  must  also  provide  for  its  execution, 
so  that  it  is  virtually  a  part  of  the  apparatus  of  gov- 
ernment itself,  connecting  the  executive  and  legis- 
lative departments,  and  occupying  the  place  which 
in  the  parliamentary  type  of  government  is  filled 
by  the  ministry.  An  account  of  the  organs  of 
government  would  therefore  be  incomplete  unless, 
to  the  House  of  Representatives,  the  Senate,  and 
the  Presidency,  there  is  added  Party  Organization. 


CHAPTER   XIX 

THE   CONGRESS 

LIKE  the  Continental  Congress  which  preceded 
it,  the  Congress  of  the  United  States  is  essentially 
a  diplomatic  body  —  a  convention  of  the  envoys  of 
locality.  This  fact  determines  its  essential  char- 
acter, and  refers  one  to  the  ordinary  methods  of  a 
diplomatic  congress  rather  than  to  those  of  a  par- 
liament for  an  explanation  of  its  usages.  The 
essential  characteristic  of  a  genuine  parliament 
is  that  it  embodies  national  control.  The  govern- 
ment appears  before  it,  like  the  general  manager 
of  a  company  meeting  the  board  of  directors. 
The  measures  he  submits  for  their  consideration 
have  been  prepared  in  advance.  He  explains 
them,  replies  to  criticism,  and  when  sufficient  op- 
portunity has  been  allowed  for  discussion,  he  de- 
mands the  decision  of  the  board.  It  is  part  of 
his  ordinary  duties  to  be  prepared  to  give  informa- 
tion as  to  the  condition  of  the  company's  affairs, 
and  at  all  times  he  must  be  able  to  sustain  the 
responsibilities  of  his  trusteeship.  Under  such 
circumstances  discussion  cannot  but  be  direct  and 
practical.  When  people  are  talking  business,  they 
are  intolerant  of  futile  palaver.  Hence  parliamen- 


222  THE   ORGANS   OF  GOVERNMENT 

tary  bodies  are  notoriously  rude  to  bores.  Among 
the  traditions  of  the  House  of  Commons  is  the 
story  of  a  member,  caught  pulling  out  a  written 
speech  in  the  course  of  an  exciting  debate,  who 
was  handled  in  a  manner  that  drove  him  out  of  the 
House  and  extinguished  his  parliamentary  ambi- 
tion.1 It  is  a  well-known  incident  of  Disraeli's 
career  that  the  first  time  he  attempted  to  make  a 
speech,  his  affected  manner  provoked  such  a  tumult 
of  derision  that  he  could  not  make  himself  heard, 
and  he  sat  down  in  disgust. 

Nothing  of  this  kind  could  happen  in  Congress, 
for  the  underlying  principle  of  its  procedure  is 
that  its  members,  like  the  delegates  to  a  diplomatic 
congress,  meet  as  peers,  each  one  having  in  theory 
all  the  rights  and  privileges  that  any  one  has.2 
In  the  Senate  this  principle  is  in  no  way  circum- 
scribed. Nothing  can  be  done  so  long  as  any  one 
desires  to  talk  and  is  able  to  do  so.  Even  in  the 
House,  where  under  compulsion  of  necessity  limi- 
tations have  been  put  upon  debate,  a  member 
cannot  be  so  dull  and  incapable  but  what  he  may 
not  at  least  have  his  opportunity  at  an  evening  set 

1  Trevelyan's  Early  Years  of  Fox,  p.  169. 

2  January  18,  1814,  Representative  King  of  Massachusetts  con- 
tended that  the  rules  should  be  amended  so  as  to  prohibit  the  House 
from  refusing  to  consider  any  resolutions  offered  by  a   representa- 
tive.    In  his  speech  he  said,  "  I  never  can  for  a  moment  concede 
that  it  depends  upon  the  will  and  pleasure  of  this  or  any  other  ma- 
jority of  this  House,  whether  the  people  of  the  United  States,  by 
their  representatives,  shall,  or  shall  not,  be  heard  upon  this  floor." 


THE    CONGRESS  22$ 

apart  for  speechmaking  only ;  or,  if  he  like  it  bet- 
ter, be  permitted  to  print  a  speech  in  the  Record 
as  having  been  delivered,  with  the  privilege  of 
free  use  of  the  mails  to  send  it  to  his  constitu- 
ents. 

The  truth  is  that  in  Congress  the  role  of  orators 
is  the  subordinate  one  of  advocating  and  support- 
ing policies  imposed  by  party,  and  they  may  figure 
brilliantly  in  this  capacity  without  thereby  obtain- 
ing much  authority.  A  man  may  have  genuine, 
forensic  ability,  which  attracts  the  attention  of 
the  House  and  of  the  country,  and  yet  his  politi- 
cal career  may  be  suddenly  ended  by  the  displeas- 
ure of  party  managers  whom  he  has  somehow  of- 
fended or  whose  plans  it  suits  to  bring  some  one 
else  forward.  On  the  other  hand,  men  who  would 
be  utterly  lost  in  a  parliamentary  debate,  and  would 
simply  make  a  show  of  themselves  if  they  should 
make  an  attempt  at  oratory,  may  exercise  great 
influence  in  Congress  by  their  prominence  in  party 
councils. 1  The  ablest  orators  cannot  compare  with 
them  in  real  power,  for  they  represent  an  authority 
superior  to  Congress  —  the  authority  of  party  or- 
ganization. 2 

1  The  career  of  Senator  J.  Donald  Cameron  is  a  case  in  point. 
He  was  indisputably  an  influential  member  of  Congress,  although 
his  incapacity  as  an  orator  was  a  perpetual  subject  of  newspaper 
ridicule. 

2  In  the  Republican  caucus  at  Harrisburg,  which  nominated  Mr. 
Cameron  for  reelection  to  the  Senate,  Mr.  Toweler  of  Forest  County 
said  :  "  Ingalls  and  Evarts  are  orators,  and  I  would  like  to  know 


224  THE   ORGANS   OF  GOVERNMENT 

Business  is  shaped  and  arranged  for  considera- 
tion, as  in  a  diplomatic  gathering,  by  the  action  of 
the  Congress  itself.  It  supplies  itself  with  the  nec- 
essary organs  by  subdivision  into  as  many  commit- 
tees as  it  sees  fit.  The  Pan-American  Conference 
which  met  at  Washington  1890-1891  exhibited  in 
its  proceedings  the  ground  plan  of  the  methods  by 
which  Congress  does  its  work.  That  conference 
had  so  many  subjects  to  consider  that  it  appointed 
sixteen  standing  committees.  Their  reports  to  the 
conference  presented  those  subjects  in  shape  for 
action.  Congress  works  in  precisely  the  same  way. 
It  breaks  itself  up  into  numerous  segments,  each  a 
little  congress  in  its  way,  with  both  the  dominant 
party  and  the  opposition  represented  in  its  mem- 
bership. The  formative  stage  of  legislation  is 
carried  on  in  diplomatic  privacy,  while  the  public 
feeds  on  gossip  about  what  is  going  on  behind  the 
closed  doors.  Hidden  influences  are  at  work  de- 
termining results.  The  conduct  of  business  is  a 
negotiation  between  diverse  interests,  and  it  is 
only  after  the  conclusions  reached  are  reported  that 
Congress  gets  a  chance  to  act.  And  yet  the  com- 
mittees assume  no  responsibility,  for  the  theory 
is  that  they  are  simply  agents  of  Congress,  ap- 
pointed for  its  convenience.  Jefferson's  "  Manual 
of  Parliamentary  Practice,"  which  forms  a  part  of 

what  they  ever  got  or  ever  did,  except  blow  off  their  mouths. 
Pennsylvania  gets  everything  she  wants  through  her  senators." 
Philadelphia  Inquirer,  January  8,  1891. 


THE    CONGRESS  225 

the  rules  of  the  House,  holds  that  the  proceedings 
of  a  committee  are  not  to  be  published,  as  they 
are  of  no  force  until  confirmed  by  the  House. 

Congress  originally  pursued  parliamentary  meth- 
ods, and  did  not  begin  to  develop  its  peculiar 
characteristics  until  it  had  rejected  the  offices 
of  the  chiefs  of  administration  on  which  it  had 
originally  depended,  and  threw  itself  upon  its 
own  resources.  The  rules  of  order  adopted  by 
the  House  when  it  first  organized  did  not  provide 
for  the  appointment  of  any  standing  committees, 
although  before  the  first  session  was  over  the 
rules  were  amended  so  as  to  provide  for  a  standing 
Committee  on  Elections.  The  recommendations  of 
the  President  and  reports  of  heads  of  departments 
supplied  the  subjects  of  legislation,  which  were 
considered  in  Committee  of  the  Whole.  The 
sense  of  the  House  being  thus  ascertained,  a  select 
committee  would  be  appointed  to  prepare  the  bill.1 
There  was  close  contact  between  Congress  and 
the  heads  of  administration.  Until  the  govern- 
ment was  settled  in  Washington,  all  its  branches 
were  so  bunched  together  in  their  quarters  that 
communication  was  easy,  and  so  long  as  Congress 

1  An  entry  of  January  10,  1794,  says:  "The  House  went  into 
Committee  of  the  Whole  on  the  statements  and  estimates  of  appro- 
priations for  the  current  year.  Resolved,  on  certain  appropriations, 
and  moved  that  a  committee  should  be  appointed  to  prepare  and 
bring  in  a  bill  for  that  purpose."  Annals  of  Congress,  1793-1795, 
p.  169. 

Q 


226  THE    ORGANS   OF  GOVERNMENT 

was  willing,  the  executive  departments  were  almost 
as  closely  in  touch  with  legislation  as  they  would 
have  been  if  the  Cabinet  officers  had  been  actually 
present  on  the  floor  of  the  House.  Indeed,  it  was 
not  unusual  for  them  to  come  personally  into 
Congress  with  the  business  they  had  to  pro- 
pose.1 

The  Third  Congress,  which  adopted  the  plan  of 
internal  taxation,  the  preparation  of  which  was 
Hamilton's  last  important  official  act  before  leav- 
ing the  Cabinet,  had  only  two  standing  committees, 
—  Elections  and  Claims.  The  Fourth  Congress, 
which  met  December,  1795,  added  two  more, — 
Commerce  and  Manufactures,  and  Revisal  and 
Unfinished  Business.  On  December  16,  1796,  the 
party  breach  between  the  House  and  the  adminis- 
tration being  then  complete,  it  was  resolved  on 
motion  of  Mr.  Gallatin  that  a  standing  Committee 
of  Ways  and  Means  should  be  appointed  to  watch 
over  the  national  finances.  Thereafter,  motions  to 
increase  the  number  of  standing  committees  were 
made  at  every  session.  Under  the  Virginia 
dynasty,  when  the  House  was  the  seat  of  admin- 
istration, the  list  of  standing  committees  was 
extended  so  as  to  cover  by  name  every  executive 
department  and  all  the  business  of  the  adminis- 
tration —  such  as  Indian  Affairs,  Foreign  Affairs, 


1  Senate  Document,  837  ;    Forty-sixth  Congress,  third  session, 
gives  a  number  of  instances.     See  Appendix. 


THE   CONGRESS  22/ 

Military  Affairs,  Naval  Affairs,  etc.  This  com- 
pleted the  committee  system,  but  it  still  continued 
to  expand,  and  from  time  to  time  the  list  of  com- 
mittees has  been  extended. 

The  Senate  was  slow  to  follow  the  example  of 
the  House.  In  its  executive  functions  it  acted  as 
a  council  of  state  considering  business  submitted 
by  the  President.  Its  legislative  functions  were 
exercised  upon  business  already  put  in  shape  for 
action  by  the  House.  The  Senate,  being  a  small, 
permanent  body,  always  able  to  consult  its  own 
wishes,  could  get  along  conveniently  by  the 
appointment  of  select  committees  as  occasion 
arose.  For  the  same  reason,  it  did  not  experi- 
ence the  embarrassment,  in  choosing  its  own 
committees,  which  at  an  early  date  caused  the 
House  to  turn  that  business  over  to  the  Speaker.1 
The  Senate  has  always  adhered  to  the  practice  of 
choosing  its  own  committees.  It  was  not  until 
the  second  session  of  the  Fourteenth  Congress,  in 
1816,  that  it  established  standing  committees,  but 
the  process  once  started  moved  on  rapidly.  In 
the  Fifty-fifth  Congress  the  House  had  fifty-four 

1  The  rules  of  the  House  at  first  provided  that  the  Speaker 
should  appoint  all  committees  unless  over  three  in  number  of  mem- 
bers, when  they  should  be  balloted  for  by  the  House.  The  rules 
adopted  at  the  first  session  of  the  Third  Congress,  November,  1 794, 
provided  that  the  Speaker  should  appoint  all  committees  unless 
otherwise  specially  directed  by  the  House.  The  House  found  it  so 
troublesome  to  undertake  this  duty  that  appointment  by  the  Speaker 
became  the  settled  practice. 


228  THE    ORGANS   OF  GOVERNMENT 

standing  committees ;  the  Senate  had  forty-nine 
standing  committees  and  ten  select ;  and  there 
were  three  joint  committees. 

All  this  vast  development  of  organization  is  due 
to  the  separation  which  took  place  between  execu- 
tive management  and  legislative  control.  The 
English  Parliament,  with  much  more  authority  to 
exercise,  continues  to  do  its  work  with  an  organiza- 
tion as  simple  as  sufficed  Congress  a  hundred  years 
ago.  The  House  of  Commons  has  only  four  stand- 
ing committees,  and  but  two  of  these  consider  bills.1 
The  House  of  Commons  still  resolves  itself  into 
Committee  on  Supply  to  consider  appropriations, 
or  into  Committee  on  Ways  and  Means  to  consider 
revenue  measures,  just  as  the  House  of  Represent- 
atives did  at  first.  In  other  words,  the  directors, 
having  the  management  of  the  concern  before 
them  all  the  time,  subject  to  their  supervision  and 
control,  do  not  need  to  keep  up  a  staff  of  standing 
committees  to  gather  information  and  prepare  busi- 
ness for  their  consideration.  Neither  do  they  have 
to  bother  about  getting  their  resolves  into  legal 
shape,  and  so  moil  over  questions  of  phraseology, 
as  Congress  is  continually  doing.  A  salaried  staff 
of  legal  experts  are  there  to  serve  them  in  this 

1  For  the  consideration  of  private  bills  there  is  a  system  of  com- 
mittees, but  these  are  really  courts  at  whose  bar  eminent  counsel 
practice.  For  an  interesting  account  of  how  Parliament  does  its 
work  see  the  chapter  under  that  title  in  Porritt's  The  Englishman 
at  Home. 


THE    CONGRESS  22Q 

respect,  giving  exact  and  uniform  expression  to  the 
legislative  intent. 

On  the  contrary,  it  is  in  just  such  work  as  this 
that  Congress  consumes  its  powers,  so  that  its 
proper  functions  of  deliberation  and  criticism  are 
impoverished  just  as  Fisher  Ames  said  they  would 
be.1  The  committees  are  very  industrious,  and  at 
every  session  they  turn  out  an  enormous  amount 
of  business.  That  is  the  main  occupation  of  Con- 
gress. The  popular  characterization  of  it  as  "  the 
legislative  mill  "  hits  it  off  exactly.  Congress  does 
the  best  it  can  do  in  the  circumstances,  for  it  is 
really  the  most  diligent  legislative  body  in  the 
world,  but  the  harder  it  works  the  more  it  flounders 
in  the  mass  of  legislation  thrust  upon  it.  Only 
a  small  proportion  of  the  bills  on  the  calendar  can 
ever  be  reached.  Contending  interests  struggle 
for  attention  and  pull  this  way  and  that.  An 
interest  that  gets  on  top  in  the  scramble  plunges 
violently  towards  its  goal,  anxious  above  all  things 
to  attain  its  object  while  the  opportunity  serves. 
Of  course  there  is  a  great  deal  of  haphazard  work. 
Imagine  the  plight  of  a  large  board  of  directors, 
who,  instead  of  dealing  directly  with  the  general 
officers  of  the  company,  have  to  deal  with  numer- 
ous busy  committees  of  their  own,  possessed  by  all 
sorts  of  ideas,  and  abounding  with  schemes  con- 
ceived in  behalf  of  all  sorts  of  interests  !  What 
opportunity  would  there  be  for  the  establishment 

i  See  Chap.  VI.,  p.  88. 


230  THE    ORGANS   OF  GOVERNMENT 

of  a  steady  and  consistent  policy  and  for  the  exer- 
cise of  judgment  and  deliberation  in  the  dispatch 
of  business  ? 

The  Senate  is  less  the  victim  of  circumstances 
in  this  respect  than  the  House,  for  it  is  so  small 
a  body  and  has  such  settled  habits  that  it  is  easy 
for  it  to  understand  itself  and  know  what  it  wants, 
so  that  it  can  act  promptly  and  easily  whenever 
it  so  desires.1  Much  of  its  business  is  matured 
before  reaching  it.  The  revenue  and  appropriation 
bills,  which  take  up  the  greater  part  of  the  time 
of  every  Congress,  are  put  in  shape  by  the  House, 
and  the  Senate  is  familiar  with  their  provisions 
before  it  has  to  pass  upon  them. 

In  the  House,  however,  where  all  have  so  much 
to  do  and  are  so  eager  to  do  it,  the  push  of  legis- 
lation is  so  violent  that  special  precautions  have 
to  be  taken  for  the  orderly  guidance  of  business. 
A  complicated  system  of  rules  has  grown  up,  a 
curious  feature  of  which  is  the  manoeuvring  by 
which  business  of  special  importance  may  be  carried 
around  the  blockade  of  measures  on  the  regular 
calendar.  Certain  committees  have  leave  to  report 
at  any  time.  Bills  for  raising  revenue,  general 
appropriations,  and  bills  for  the  improvement  of 
rivers  and  harbors  always  have  precedence  over 
other  bills  on  the  calendar.  There  are  times  when 
the  rules  may  be  suspended  altogether,  to  permit 

1  On  January  23,  1897,  tne  Senate  passed  104  bills  in  ninety- 
five  minutes.  They  were  bills  granting  pensions. 


THE    CONGRESS 


any  desired  measure  to  be  taken  up  and  put  upon 
its  passage,  but  it  takes  a  two-thirds  vote  to  do 
this,  and  in  such  a  case  debate  is  limited  to  forty 
minutes.  The  regular  channels  of  legislation  are 
always  so  hopelessly  clogged  that  the  last  six  days 
of  the  session  are  devoted  to  legislation  under 
suspension  of  the  rules,  and  then  a  legislative 
crevasse  takes  place.1 

Instead  of  securing  deliberation,  the  practical 
effect  of  the  committee  system,  with  its  numerous 
.entanglements,  is  to  incline  Congress  towards 
hasty  and  violent  methods  of  despatching  business. 
It  is  difficult  to  know  what  is  being  done  in  the 
hurly-burly.  The  mass  of  members  record  their 
votes  for  measures  about  which  they  know  little 
or  nothing,  counting  in  return  on  a  similar  indul- 
gence towards  the  measures  in  which  they  are 
interested.2  The  inevitable  consequence  is  that 
legislation  is  frequently  crude,  obscure,  and  un- 
certain. The  courts  are  kept  busy  construing  and 

1  Of  the  433  pages  of  general  legislation  enacted  at   the  last 
session  of  the  Fifty-first  Congress,  284  pages  are  covered  by  the 
enactments  of  the  last  day. 

2  Here    is   a  typical  instance   culled   from   the    Congressional 
Record  :  — 

Mr.  Broderick.  —  Do  you  see  any  objection  to  the  bill  with  that 
feature  in  it  ? 

Mr.  Brosius.  —  I  do  not  care  anything  about  the  bill.  I  think 
I  will  support  the  bill  because  you  say  it  is  all  right  ;  but  I  have 
given  it  no  attention  at  all.  I  only  rose  to  reply  to  some  statements 
of  my  friend  from  Ohio.  .  .  .  Congressional  Record,  February  23, 
1897,  P-  2254- 


232  THE   ORGANS   OF  GOVERNMENT 

interpreting  the  laws.  The  litigation  that  ensues 
after  every  tariff  act,  before  its  exact  meaning  is 
settled,  involves  millions  of  dollars,  and  affects 
business  interests  to  an  incalculable  extent. 

Where,  in  this  struggle  of  interests,  this  jostle  of 
legislation,  does  the  government  come  in  ?  Writ- 
ing home  about  the  manner  in  which  he  negotiated 
the  reciprocity  treaty  of  1854,  Lord  Elgin  said: 
"There  was  no  government  to  deal  with.  ...  It 
was  all  a  matter  of  canvassing  this  member  of 
Congress  or  the  other."1  By  "government"  Lord 
Elgin  meant  a  responsible  management,  defining 
national  policy  and  shaping  legislative  proposals. 
Foi  such  a  government,  our  present  constitutional 
system  makes  no  provision.  Government  is  sup- 
posed to  be  a  by-product  of  the  normal  activities 
of  Congress.  The  theory  is  that  Congress  re- 
flects with  tolerable  fairness,  subject  to  correc- 
tion when  it  fails  to  do  so,  the  interests,  opinions, 
and  desires  of  the  people.  This  theory  blinks 
such  an  awkward  circumstance  as  the  oligarchic 
constitution  of  the  Senate,  and  it  quite  ignores 
the  fact  that  public  opinion  is  for  the  most  part 
a  static  force,  while  force  in  action  is  the  only 
kind  which  Congress  notices.  It  may  seem  like 
a  sarcasm  to  say  that  Congress  represents  every 

1  Letters  and  Journals  of  Lord  Elgin,  p.  121.  Laurence  Oli- 
phant,  who  was  Lord  Elgin's  secretary  on  this  diplomatic  mission, 
gives  a  very  racy  account  of  this  transaction  in  his  Episodes  of 
a  Life  of  Adventure,  pp.  43,  44. 


THE   CONGRESS  233 

interest  except  the  public  interest,1  but  just  that 
is  implied  by  the  attitude  which  Congress  takes 
with  regard  to  public  demands.  It  disclaims  the 
position  of  a  trustee,  and  seeks  to  confine  its  re- 
sponsibility to  the  faithful  discharge  of  ministerial 
functions.  It  insists  that,  before  anything  can  be 
done,  the  public  shall  reach  definite  conclusions 
and  create  specific  political  interests  such  as  Con- 
gress is  able  to  take  cognizance  of.  That  is  what 
Speaker  Reed  told  the  delegation  which  waited 
on  him,  March  26,  1897,  to  urge  financial  legis- 
lation. The  Associated  Press  despatches  report 
him  as  saying :  "  Congress  rarely  moves  faster 
than  the  people  in  matters  of  legislation,  and  when 
public  sentiment  became  crystallized  in  favor  of 
any  particular  form  of  financial  legislation,  Con- 
gress would  be  apt  to  respond  with  little  delay. 
If  the  people  demanded  changes  in  the  banking 
system,  and  brought  pressure  to  bear  upon  Con- 
gress, they  would  secure  the  changes." 

In  thus  avoiding  the  responsibility  of  determin- 
ing legislative  policy,  Congress  really  abandons 
itself  to  the  control  of  special  interests  but  re- 

1  In  the  course  of  a  debate  in  the  Senate,  Mr.  Allen  remarked : 
"  In  the  imposition  of  tariff  taxes  the  interests  of  all  persons  con- 
cerned must  be  considered.  The  senator  from  Kentucky  (Mr. 
Lindsay)  says  to  me,  '  except  the  consumers.'  The  consumers 
seem  largely  to  get  the  worst  of  it  in  the  framing  of  a  tariff  bill. 
That  is  true  largely,  possibly,  because  they  have  nobody  here  look- 
ing after  their  interests  particularly.  They  are  not  organized." 
Congressional  Record,  June  29,  1897. 


234  THE   ORGANS  OF  GOVERNMENT 

motely  concerned  about  the  general  welfare.  The 
mass  of  the  people  simply  desire  good  government, 
and  leave  questions  of  ways  and  means  to  the 
administration.  The  particular  interests  which 
bombard  Congress  may  misrepresent  the  real  state 
of  public  opinion  altogether.  In  a  general  way 
the  politicians  are  aware  of  this,  and  endeavor  to 
take  the  fact  into  account,  but  sometimes  they 
make  woful  miscalculations,  and  the  result  is  a 
great  revulsion  of  popular  sentiment,  producing 
what  is  called  "a  tidal  wave"  or  a  "landslide." 

Whatever  may  be  the  theory,  however,  a  practi- 
cal consideration  which  is  quite  well  understood 
is  that  the  make-up  of  the  committees  moulds  the 
character  of  legislation.  In  the  House  of  Com- 
mons the  Speaker  is  simply  a  moderator.  His 
party  connection  is  a  matter  of  no  importance. 
But  in  the  House  of  Representatives  everything 
turns  upon  the  election  of  the  Speaker,  for  his 
action  in  constituting  the  committees  determines 
the  character  of  legislation.1  Thus  the  effect  of 

1  A  striking  illustration  of  this  is  furnished  by  the  tariff  policy  of 
the  Democratic  party.  When  Mr.  Randall,  the  head  of  the  pro- 
tectionist wing  of  the  Democratic  party,  was  elected  Speaker,  he 
thwarted  the  plans  of  the  tariff  reformers  by  refusing  to  reappoint 
Mr.  Morrison  to  the  chairmanship  of  the  Ways  and  Means  Commit- 
tee. The  make-up  of  this  committee  was  the  issue  in  the  election 
of  the  Speaker  at  the  opening  of  the  Forty-eighth  Congress,  when 
Randall  was  defeated  by  Carlisle.  Mr.  Randall  was  then  appointed 
chairman  of  the  Committee  on  Appropriations.  His  influence  was 
still  so  great  that  at  the  first  session  of  the  Forty-ninth  Congress  he 


THE   CONGRESS  235 

the  rules  is  really  to  narrow  the  control  of  busi- 
ness to  a  group  of  party  leaders,  to  whose  exercise 
of  authority  no  direct  and  open  responsibility  is 
attached. 

The  final  stage  of  legislation  exhibits  a  still 
more  remarkable  development  of  irresponsible 
control.  The  rules  of  the  House  provide  that 
"all  motions  or  propositions  involving  a  tax  or 
charge  upon  the  people ;  all  proceedings  touching 
appropriations  of  money,  .  .  .  shall  be  first  consid- 
ered in  a  Committee  of  the  Whole."  But  reports 
from  conference  committees  are  excepted  from  the 
operation  of  this  rule.  A  committee  of  conference 
may  introduce  matter  into  a  bill  which  has  not 
been  considered  in  either  House,  or  it  may  change 
items  concerning  which  there  has  been  no  dis- 
agreement between  the  two  Houses.  This  is  not 
merely  theoretically  possible,  but  has  often  been 
done.1  The  report  of  a  conference  committee 

was  able,  with  Republican  assistance,  to  defeat  the  tariff  bill  re- 
ported from  the  Ways  and  Means  Committee.  The  rules  of  the 
House  were  changed  at  the  next  Congress,  so  that  much  of  the 
work  of  the  Appropriations  Committee  was  distributed  among  other 
committees.  Having  thus  broken  Mr.  Randall's  influence,  the 
Democratic  party  leaders  were  at  last  able  to  get  their  tariff  bill 
through  the  House. 

1  In  one  case,  when  the  House  had  fixed  a  duty  of  $20  on  bar 
iron,  and  the  Senate  had  made  the  rate  $20.16,  the  conference  com- 
mittee fixed  the  rate  at  $22.40.  Once,  when  both  Senate  and 
House  had  fixed  the  duty  on  iron  ore  at  50  cents  a  ton,  the  con- 
ference committee  made  the  rate  75  cents.  Taussig's  Tariff  His- 
tory, p.  233.  New  items,  which  have  not  been  discussed  in  either 


236         THE  'ORGANS  OF  GOVERNMENT 

may  not  be  amended  or  divided  or  laid  on  the 
table,  as  other  reports,  but  must  be  adopted  or 
rejected  in  its  entirety.  Under  such  duress,  in 
order  to  secure  the  passage  of  important  bills, 
Congress  has  time  and  again  passed  measures 
which  but  few  wanted  and  to  which  the  great 
majority  were  opposed. 

Thus  the  system  of  committee  supervision  over 
details  of  legislation  accomplishes  its  own  suicide. 
In  its  practical  operation  it  delivers  the  House, 
bound  and  helpless,  into  the  hands  of  the  Senate. 
Senators  take  care  to  load  bills  with  matter  for 
use  in  making  mock  concessions,  while  they  extort 
from  the  House  everything  they  really  want.  This 
arbitrary  control  of  senators  over  legislation  was 
the  issue  really  involved  in  the  conflict  between 
the  two  Houses  over  the  tariff  bill  of  1894.  Fear, 
lest  the  bill  might  be  defeated  altogether,  caused 
the  House  suddenly  to  pass  the  bill  just  as  it  came 
back  from  the  Senate.  This  unprecedented  action 
made  a  chance  exposure  of  the  way  in  which  leg- 
islation is  really  shaped.  Some  senators  found 
themselves  badly  caught  at  their  own  tricks,  pro- 
visions which  they  had  introduced  with  a  jockey- 
House,  are  sometimes  introduced.  A  notorious  case  was  the 
clause  in  the  tariff  bill  of  1897,  imposing  an  additional  duty  of 
10  per  cent  on  all  goods  brought  into  this  country  from  Canada, 
which  was  inserted  in  the  bill  by  the  Senate  conferees  for  a  pur- 
pose which  was  not  disclosed  until  after  the  passage  of  the  bill, 
and  of  which  a  number  of  the  conferees  themselves,  according  to 
their  statements,  were  quite  ignorant. 


THE    CONGRESS 


ing  purpose  being  converted  into  law.  Senator 
Sherman  complained  that  "  there  are  many  cases 
in  the  bill  where  the  enactment  was  not  intended 
by  the  Senate.  For  instance,  innumerable  amend- 
ments were  put  on  by  senators  on  both  sides  of 
the  chamber  ...  to  give  the  Committee  of  Con- 
ference a  chance  to  think  of  the  matter,  and  they 
are  all  adopted,  whatever  may  be  their  language  or 
the  incongruity  with  other  parts  of  the  bill."  1 

Altogether,  the  legislative  methods  of  Congress 
afford  a  striking  verification  of  Madison's  observa- 
tion that  "  in  all  legislative  assemblies  the  greater 
the  number  composing  them,  the  fewer  will  be  the 
men  who  in  fact  direct  the  proceedings."  2  This 
holds  true  alike  of  a  parliament  or  of  a  congress, 
the  difference  being  that  in  a  parliament  the  men 
who  direct  the  proceedings  assume  a  definite  re- 
sponsibility under  public  scrutiny,  whereas  in  Con- 
gress they  are  behind  the  scenes,  and  it  is  only  a 
matter  of  conjecture  who  really  produce  the  re- 
sults which  the  public  experience. 

The  abandoned  character  of  Congress  is  exem- 
plified by  the  Congressional  Record.  The  Record 
is  not  a  report  of  actual  proceedings,  but  is  a 
repository  of  all  such  matter  as  members  of  Con- 
gress desire  to  put  in  print.  Speeches  are  pub- 
lished that  were  never  delivered,  and  speeches  that 
were  delivered  are  changed  at  pleasure.  The  law 

1  Congressional  Record,  August  19,  1894,  p.  10,109. 

2  The  Federalist,  No.  58. 


238  THE   ORGANS  OF  GOVERNMENT 

allows  members  of  Congress  to  send  the  Record 
free  through  the  mails,  so  that  it  is  extensively 
used  for  the  purpose  of  circulating  campaign  litera- 
ture. Compilations  of  statistics,  pamphlets,  songs, 
and  even  entire  books  are  introduced  as  part  of 
the  record  of  congressional  proceedings.  This 
abuse  has  increased  enormously  of  late  years, 
swelling  the  Record  to  absurdly  vast  dimen- 
sions. The  proceedings  of  Congress  during  the 
entire  period  of  the  Civil  War  occupy  less  space 
by  thousands  of  pages  than  the  proceedings  of 
any  one  Congress  in  the  past  decade. 


CHAPTER   XX 

THE    HOUSE   OF   REPRESENTATIVES 

THE  House  of  Representatives  takes  its  char- 
acter from  the  fact  that  it  represents,  not  the 
nation,  but  the  districts  into  which  the  nation  is 
divided.  It  is  powerfully  acted  upon  by  external 
agencies  of  party  rule,  but  there  is  in  its  constitu- 
tion no  embodiment  of  national  control  to  which 
particular  demands  and  impulses  must  be  subor- 
dinated. Hence  it  lacks  the  faculty  of  self-govern- 
ment which,  whether  in  the  state  or  in  the  individ- 
ual, implies  the  supremacy  of  reason  over  desire. 
The  consequence  is  that,  when  the  House  is  not 
acting  under  a  party  mandate,  it  is  a  scuffle  of 
local  interests  in  which  every  member  must  take 
his  part  under  penalty  of  losing  his  seat.  "  What 
has  he  done  for  his  district  ? "  is  a  question  which 
applies  the  test  by  which  ordinarily  the  value  of  a 
representative  is  gauged.  While  eminent  party 
service  will  add  to  his  reputation,  it  does  not 
lessen  his  dependence  upon  his  local  constituency. 
The  dominant  idea  is  that  it  is  the  proper  business 
of  a  member  to  represent  his  district,  and  most 

239 


240  THE  ORGANS   OF  GOVERNMENT 

people  would  be  surprised  to  hear  that  any  other 
idea  could  be  entertained.1 

This  idea  of  particular  representation  works  in 
the  district  itself.  The  county  in  which  the  rep- 
resentative may  happen  to  reside  "has  had  the 
nomination,"  and  that  is  a  reason  why  another 
county  or  part  of  the  district  should  have  the 
nomination  next  time.  Men  of  distinguished  abil- 
ity or  powerful  influence  may  override  such  con- 
siderations, but  the  tendency  towards  change  is  apt 
to  prevail  in  the  end.  Joshua  Giddings  represented 
his  district  for  over  twenty  years,  but  lost  the  nomi- 
nation when  he  was  at  the  height  of  his  national 
renown,  and  when  the  party  in  whose  cause  he  had 
fought  so  long  and  valiantly  was  on  the  verge  of 
success.  National  leaders  such  as  Seward  and 
Sumner  deplored  the  loss  to  the  party,  and  this 
feeling  was  generally  expressed  by  the  party  press, 
but  as  the  New  York  Evening  Post  at  the  time 
remarked,  "  The  people  of  a  congressional  district 


aNo  other  idea  than  that  of  local  representation  penetrates  con- 
gressional thoughts.  For  instance,  Senator  Hawley  said :  "  I  re- 
member that  when  John  Morrissey,  the  pugilist,  was  elected  to  the 
House  of  Representatives  from  a  district  of  New  York  City,  it  was 
freely  said  by  some  that  he  was  the  best  man  in  the  district,  the 
fairest  representative  that  could  be  selected.  He  would  not  lie  and 
he  was  not  afraid,  and  those  are  two  great  virtues.  In  addition  to 
that,  he  stood  by  his  friends,  and  he  knew  what  his  district  wanted. 
He  was  their  champion  in  Congress  as  well  as  in  the  fistic  arena." 
Congressional  Record,  Fifty-fourth  Congress,  second  session,  page 
2957- 


THE  PI O USE    OF  REPRESENTATIVES        241 

of  course  have  the  right  to  manage  their  own 
affairs  in  their  own  way." 

The  gerrymandering  schemes  by  which  the 
state  legislatures  keep  reconstructing  congressional 
districts  also  contribute  to  the  process  of  change. 
In  any  parliamentary  system  the  absence  of  Mr. 
McKinley  from  the  national  legislature  at  the 
time  when  the  measure  which  bore  his  name  was 
a  party  issue,  would  be  regarded  as  a  grave  aber- 
ration from  the  regular  working  of  party  govern- 
ment, and  his  party  would  see  to  it  that  he  should 
be  provided  with  a  seat.  No  such  idea  is  extant  in 
this  country.  His  party  denounced  the  action  of 
the  Ohio  legislature  in  putting  the  bulk  of  his  con- 
stituency into  another  district ;  but  to  ask  that  other 
district  to  give  him  a  seat  would  have  been  regarded 
as  equivalent  to  asking  it  to  forego  its  right  to  direct 
representation.  The  farthest  that  party  esteem  of 
his  services  could  go  was  to  advance  the  suggestion 
that  he  should  move  into  the  other  district. 

As  a  result  of  these  various  influences,  a  con- 
tinual change  goes  on  in  the  composition  of  the 
House  irrespective  of  vicissitudes  of  party  strength. 
At  every  Congress  there  are  a  large  number  of 
new  members,  and  by  the  time  they  have  gained 
useful  experience  they  give  place  to  other  new 
members.1  Men  strong  enough  to  keep  their  foot- 

1  Each  succeeding  House  in  the  ten  Congresses  (1861-1881),  with 
a  single  exception,  contained  a  majority  of  new  members.  Elaine's 
Twenty  Years  in  Congress,  Vol.  II.,  p.  675. 


242  THE   ORGANS   OF  GOVERNMENT 

ing  feel  the  strain  of  the  continual  watchfulness 
and  effort  that  are  required,  and  would  greatly 
prefer  a  seat  in  the  Senate,  where  the  term  of 
office  is  longer. 

Service  to  local  interests  being  the  test  of  capa- 
city, members  must  admit  any  method  of  rendering 
such  service,  or  else  relinquish  their  seats  to  others 
not  so  scrupulous.  Hence  the  long-established 
practice  of  "log-rolling,"  by  which  many  minority 
interests  are  united  to  form  an  overwhelming 
majority.  This  is  the  way  in  which  extravagant 
River  and  Harbor  and  Public  Buildings  appropria- 
tion bills  are  passed.  The  many  absurdities  of  the 
River  and  Harbor  bills  are  often  pointed  out  in 
debate,1  but  they  are  passed  just  the  same,  and 
against  such  raids  the  presidential  veto  is  not  an 
effective  barrier,  as  members  will  unite  regardless 
of  party  lines  to  pass  the  bill  over  the  veto. 

Another  manifestation  which  excites  the  sur- 
prise of  those  who  do  not  understand  the  devotion 
of  the  House  to  particular  interests,  is  the  flood 

1  In  the  course  of  debate,  March  13, 1897,  Mr.  Hepburn,  of  Iowa, 
called  attention  to  the  fact  that  there  were  appropriations  for  the 
improvement  of  the  Chickasay  River,  the  commerce  of  which  in  1895 
consisted  of  30  tons  of  cotton,  100  tons  of  rosin  and  turpentine, 
and  3  tons  of  miscellaneous  produce ;  also  of  the  Leef  River,  on 
which  one  small  stern-wheel  steamboat  makes  occasional  trips,  the 
total  commerce  borne  by  this  stream  in  1895  being  50  tons.  The 
speaker  justly  remarked  that  the  government  might  as  well  spend 
money  on  county  roads  as  on  such  streams.  Congressional  Record, 
Fifty-fourth  Congress,  second  session,  p.  2970. 


THE  HOUSE    OF  REPRESENTATIVES        243 

of  bills  of  a  freakish  character  which  pour  into  it 
at  every  session.  A  part  of  the  service  required 
of  a  member  is  that  he  shall  introduce  bills  of  any 
nature  desired  by  local  interests,  and  his  industry 
in  this  respect  is  one  of  the  ways  in  which  he  may 
show  his  ability  as  a  representative  of  his  district. 
All  that  is  really  desired  in  most  cases  is  that  the 
bills  shall  be  printed  at  the  expense  of  the  govern- 
ment, and  copies  furnished  for  distribution. 

A  body  of  such  character  could  hardly  be  ex- 
pected to  form  or  maintain  traditions  of  conduct 
which  imply  an  active  sense  of  corporate  honor 
and  responsibility.  The  House  is  neither  proud 
nor  sensitive  in  regard  to  its  prerogatives.  At 
the  time  the  constitution  was  formed,  the  House 
of  Commons  had  established  the  right  of  originat- 
ing all  money  bills.  Even  if  an  amendment  pro- 
posed by  the  Lords  should  be  acceptable,  the  House 
would  maintain  its  dignity  by  throwing  out  the 
bill  and  then  passing  another  bill  embodying  the 
amendment.  In  pursuance  of  the  design  of  limit- 
ing as  much  as  possible  the  powers  of  the  House 
of  Representatives,  the  framers  of  the  constitution 
provided  that  "all  bills  for  raising  revenue  shall 
originate  in  the  House  of  Representatives,  but  the 
Senate  may  propose  or  concur  with  amendments 
as  on  other  bills."1  With  the  exception  of  the 

1  The  rules  of  the  House  originally  provided  that  "  no  bill 
amended  by  the  Senate  shall  be  committed,"  but  this  rule  was 
stricken  out,  January  12,  1791. 


244  THE    ORGANS   OF  GOVERNMENT 

right  of  impeachment  and  the  power  to  elect  a 
President  in  default  of  a  choice  by  the  electors, 
the  clause  quoted  sets  forth  the  only  exclusive 
privilege  allowed  the  House  by  the  constitution  ; 
but  the  House  has  been  so  careless  about  it  that 
the  Senate  may,  if  it  pleases,  extend  its  right  of 
amendment  to  the  origination  of  an  entirely  new 
measure.  The  tariff  act  of  1883  really  originated 
in  the  Senate,  where  it  was  added  to  a  small  in- 
ternal revenue  reduction  bill  which  came  over 
from  the  House,  and  the  new  bill  with  some 
changes  was  accepted  by  the  House.  When  the 
Mills  bill  passed  the  House  in  1888,  the  Senate 
under  the  form  of  an  amendment  proposed  a  sub- 
stitute measure.  In  the  discussion  which  followed 
on  the  comparative  merits  of  the  two  bills,  the 
point  of  constitutional  authority  made  no  figure  at 
all.  The  House  bill  was  the  Democratic  party 
measure,  and  the  Senate  bill  was  the  Republican 
party  measure,  and  so  the  matter  rested.  The 
manner  in  which  the  enactment  of  the  tariff  bill 
of  1894  was  taken  from  the  House  by  the  Senate 
is  still  fresh  in  the  public  mind.  The  House  then 
did  make  some  show  of  standing  up  for  its  privi- 
leges, but  soon  made  a  hasty  retreat,  passing  the 
bill  just  as  it  came  from  the  Senate.  As  regards 
special  appropriation  bills  the  Senate  may,  with- 
out question,  originate  and  pass  all  it  pleases.  Its 
right  to  do  so  has  been  admitted  by  the  House.1 

1  House  Reports,  No.  147,  Forty-sixth  Congress,  third  session. 


THE  HOUSE   OF  REPRESENTATIVES        24$ 

In  order  to  reach  the  susceptibilities  of  the 
House  it  is  necessary  to  touch  it  upon  points 
relating  to  its  service  to  local  and  personal  in- 
terests. The  greater  ability  of  the  Senate  in 
providing  for  itself  in  the  way  of  patronage  and 
perquisites,  and  the  address  with  which  it  carries 
its  point  in  the  frequent  squabbles  over  such  mat- 
ters, causes  much  sore  feeling  in  the  House ;  but 
it  is  moved  rather  by  envy  than  indignation.  The 
House  is  also  irritable  in  regard  to  the  treaty- 
making  power  when  it  is  applied  to  commercial 
subjects,  which  may  affect  district  interests.  The 
constitution  confides  this  power  to  the  President 
and  the  Senate.  In  Washington's  time  the  House 
attempted  to  take  jurisdiction  of  treaties,  and  made 
a  formal  demand  for  all  the  documents  relating  to 
the  Jay  treaty  of  1794  with  Great  Britain.  This 
demand  was  firmly  resisted  by  the  President,  and 
the  House  has  never  been  able  to  extend  its  power 
in  that  direction.  The  ratification  of  a  treaty  by 
the  Senate  makes  it  the  law  of  the  land  ;  on  the 
other  hand,  the  regulation  of  commerce  is  vested 
in  Congress,  so  that,  as  regards  commercial  treaties, 
there  is  ground  on  which  the  House  might  inter- 
vene. The  matter  has  been  the  occasion  of  angry 
contention  between  the  two  Houses,  but  the  House 
of  Representatives  has  never  failed  to  enact  legis- 
lation required  to  carry  out  the  provisions  of  a 
treaty.1  The  truth  of  the  matter  is  —  and  this  is 

1  The  action  of  the  House  on  the  Mexican  reciprocity  treaty  of 
1883  is  really  no  exception  to  this  rule.  Out  of  consideration  for 


246  THE    ORGANS  OF  GOVERNMENT 

the  secret  of  its  behavior  —  that  the  time  of  mem- 
bers is  so  taken  up  with  the  affairs  of  their  districts 1 
that  the  natural  disposition  of  the  House  is  to  pay 
no  attention  to  other  matters,  save  as  party  obli- 
gation requires,  and  party  has  no  regard  for  any- 
thing save  its  own  convenience,  using  indifferently 
either  the  House,  the  Senate,  or  the  executive 
branch,  to  the  extent  of  its  power,  just  as  may 
suit  its  ends  for  the  time  being. 

For  these  reasons,  the  abiding  fear  of  the  framers 
of  the  constitution,  lest,  notwithstanding  all  their 
checks  and  limitations,  the  House  would  engross 
power  at  the  expense  of  the  other  branches  of  gov- 
ernment, has  not  been  justified  by  events.  The 
House  is  not  so  strong  and  influential  now  as  when 
Congress  first  met.  Its  highest  prerogative,  which 

ex-President  Grant,  who  had  taken  a  personal  interest  in  the  nego- 
tiation, the  Senate  did  not  reject  the  treaty,  but  a  stipulation  was 
inserted  that  it  should  not  take  effect  until  Congress  should  pass 
laws  to  put  it  into  operation.  This  was  an  indirect  mode  of  de- 
feating it.  In  1886  Mr.  Hewitt  introduced  in  the  House  a  bill  to 
give  effect  to  the  treaty,  but  it  was  adversely  reported  on  by  the  Ways 
and  Means  Committee,  and  the  House  refused  to  consider  the  bill 
by  a  vote  of  162  to  51.  This  ended  the  matter. 

1  The  Washington  Star,  which  has  Congress  within  its  local 
field,  says:  "  In  actual  experience  the  new  Congressman  learns  this, 
after  he  has  been  in  Washington  for  awhile  :  that  he  is  an  attorney, 
a  claim  agent,  an  office  broker,  a  bureau  of  general  information,  and 
an  errand  boy,  with  occasionally  the  addition  of  public  entertainer 
and  Capitol  guide.  Even  the  Speaker  of  the  House,  Mr.  Reed, 
'  the  Czar,"  may  be  seen  at  times  pointing  out  things  of  interest  to 
visitors,  or  calling  up  the  echoes  in  statuary  hall  for  their  entertain- 
ment." 


THE  HOUSE    OF  REPRESENTATIVES 

the  framers  of  the  constitution  regarded  as  the 
foundation  of  its  authority,  —  control  of  supplies,  — 
has  been  relinquished.  Madison  remarked  :  "  The 
House  of  Representatives  cannot  only  refuse,  but 
they  alone  can  propose  the  supplies  requisite  for  the 
support  of  the  government.  They,  in  a  word,  hold 
the  purse :  that  powerful  instrument  by  which  we 
behold  in  the  history  of  the  British  constitution  an 
infant  and  humble  representation  of  the  people, 
gradually  enlarging  the  sphere  of  its  .activity  and 
importance,  and  finally  reducing,  as  far  as  it  seems 
to  have  wished,  all  the  overgrown  prerogatives  of 
the  other  branches  of  the  government."  l  In  our 
times  the  spokesmen  of  the  House  plead  its  impo- 
tence as  its  excuse.  At  the  close  of  the  second 
session  of  the  Fifty-fourth  Congress,  the  chairman 
of  the  Appropriations  Committee,  reviewing  the 
work  of  the  session,  declared  that  "the  General 
Deficiency  bill,  in  recent  sessions,  as  it  leaves  the 
House,  providing  for  legitimate  deficiencies  in 
current  appropriations  for  the  support  of  the 
government,  is  transformed  into  a  mere  vehicle 
wherein  the  Senate  loads  up  and  carries  through 
every  sort  of  claims  that  should  have  no  consid- 
eration by  either  branch  of  Congress  except  as 
independent  bills  reported  from  competent  commit- 
tees." He  confessed  that  "the  appropriations  are, 
in  my  judgment,  in  excess  of  the  legitimate  de- 
mands of  the  public  service."  But  he  contended 

1  The  Federalist,  No.  58. 


248  THE   ORGANS  OF  GOVERNMENT 

that  this  condition  of  affairs  was  not  the  fault  of 
the  party  in  power.  "  It  is  the  result  of  conditions 
accruing  out  of  the  rules  of  the  House  and  out  of 
the  rules,  practices,  and  so-called  courtesies  of  the 
Senate,  together  with  the  irresponsible  manner 
in  which  the  executive  submits  to  Congress  esti- 
mates to  meet  expenditures  for  the  conduct  of 
the  government."  1  Admissions  almost  as  abject 
as  these  are  frequently  made  in  the  House. 

In  its  final  development  the  committee  system 
has  completely  destroyed  the  control  of  the  House 
over  the  national  finances.  Down  to  the  year  1865 
something  of  the  nature  of  a  budget  existed  from 
the  fact  that  all  revenue  and  appropriation  bills 
were  referred  to  the  Ways  and  Means  Committee. 
All  the  great  revenue  measures  and  all  the  vast 
appropriations  required  by  the  Civil  War  were  re- 
ported by  that  committee.  But,  in  1865,  the  Com- 
mittee on  Appropriations  was  created,  and  that 
branch  of  legislative  business  was  transferred  to  it 
from  the  Ways  and  Means  Committee.  In  1880 
the  Agricultural  appropriation  bill  was  taken  over 
by  a  committee  of  that  name,  and  in  1883  the  prac- 
tice of  having  the  River  and  Harbor  bill  reported 
by  a  distinct  committee  was  begun.  In  1885  a 
wholesale  distribution  of  the  powers  of  the  Com- 
mittee on  Appropriations  among  other  com- 
mittees took  place.  But  six  of  the  great  annual 

1  Speech  of  Mr.  Cannon,  March  9, 1897.  Congressional  Record, 
pp.  2943-2944. 


THE  HOUSE    OF  REPRESENTATIVES        249 

appropriation  bills  remained  in  charge  of  the  Com- 
mittee on  Appropriations,  the  remaining  appropri- 
ation bills,  eight  in  number,  being  turned  over  to 
seven  other  committees.  Mr.  Randall,  who  was 
chairman  of  the  Appropriations  Committee,  when 
its  powers  were  thus  mutilated,  told  the  House  at 
the  time,  "  You  will  enter  upon  a  path  of  extrava- 
gance you  cannot  foresee  the  length  of  or  the  depth 
of,  until  we  find  the  Treasury  of  the  country  bank- 
rupt." In  ten  years  his  prediction  was  fulfilled. 
The  distribution  of  the  appropriations  made  just 
so  many  additional  points  upon  which  local  inter- 
ests could  mass  their  demands.  The  total  appro- 
priations (exclusive  of  pensions)  for  the  decade 
1887-1896,  as  compared  with  the  decade  1877- 
1886,  show  an  increase  of  $688,487,376.  The 
appropriations  increased  46.43  per  cent,  while  the 
population  increased  24.85  per  cent.  All  sense  of 
proportion  between  income  and  expenditure  has 
been  lost.1  The  Fifty-third  Congress  voted  ap- 
propriations greatly  in  excess  of  the  revenues  of 
the  government,  and  at  the  same  time  it  refused 
to  enable  the  government  to  borrow  money  to 
meet  the  obligations  so  profusely  created.  The 
government  had  to  use  authority  conferred  upon 

1  The  effect  of  the  distribution  of  the  appropriation  bills  in  pro- 
moting extravagance  has  been  commented  upon  in  Congress.  For 
a  detailed  statement,  see  speech  of  Mr.  Pitney  of  New  Jersey,  Con- 
gressional Record,  February  17,  1897,  Fifty-fourth  Congress,  second 
session,  p.  2009,  et  seq. 


250  THE    ORGANS   OF  GOVERNMENT 

it  by  an  old  statute,  not  made  for  such  an  emer- 
gency, and  not  suited  to  the  occasion.  Bonds  of 
longer  term  and  higher  interest  rate  than  were 
at  all  necessary  had  to  be  sold  to  enable  the 
Treasury  to  meet  its  engagements.  The  Fifty- 
fourth  Congress,  without  having  done  anything 
to  increase  the  revenues,  increased  the  appropria- 
tions. Never  were  the  exactions  of  local  interests 
so  monstrous  as  during  this  period.  The  largest 
River  and  Harbor  appropriation  bill  ever  reported 
in  the  history  of  the  country  was  passed  by  the 
House  without  debate,  and  it  was  eventually  passed 
by  Congress  over  the  veto  of  the  President  by  a 
confederation  of  interests  embracing  members  of 
all  parties.  To  preserve  the  Treasury  from  the 
bankruptcy  prepared  by  Congress,  government 
bonds  to  the  amount  of  $262,000,000  were  sold. 
The  blame  of  this  shameful  situation  was  bandied 
from  one  party  to  another,  but  there  was  a  com- 
mon agreement  that  it  was  a  matter  beyond  the 
power  of  Congress  to  control. 

The  House  is  not  oblivious  to  the  shame  of  its 
situation,  but  such  is  its  subserviency  to  local  in- 
terests that  it  is  unable  to  practise  any  self-con- 
trol. The  best  it  can  do  is  to  put  it  out  of  its 
power  to  act  at  all  by  surrendering  its  liberty  of 
action,  in  cases  when  party  interests  make  it  neces- 
sary to  impose  restraint.  From  this  condition  of 
affairs  has  emerged  the  strangest  system  of  con- 
trol ever  generated  in  political  procedure  —  an  ab- 


THE  HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATIVES     251 

solute,  discretionary  negative  upon  action,  vested 
in  the  Speaker.  This  authority  has  grown  up  from 
force  of  party  necessity,  and  is  extremely  simple 
and  arbitrary  in  mode  of  exercise.  The  Speaker 
refuses  to  recognize  a  member  who  has  a  proposi- 
tion to  make  that  is  not  acceptable  to  the  chair.1 
This  authority,  which  was  to  a  large  extent  exer- 
cised by  many  preceding  Speakers,  reached  its  full 
development  under  Speaker  Carlisle,  and  he  made 
it  an  effectual  interdict  upon  legislation  calculated 
to  obtain  the  support  of  local  interests  in  a  way 
antagonistic  to  his  party  policy.  Hence  the  Blair 
Educational  bill,  although  it  passed  the  Senate 
three  times,  was  never  voted  on  by  the  House 
because  Mr.  Carlisle  would  never  recognize  a 
member  to  make  a  motion  to  take  it  up  for  con- 
sideration. He  refused  to  allow  the  House  to 
consider  a  bill  for  the  repeal  of  the  internal  taxes 
upon  tobacco,  and  in  a  written  communication  to 
the  advocates  of  the  measure  declared  his  unwill- 
ingness to  recognize  any  member  of  the  House  for 
the  purpose  of  moving  the  consideration  of  that 
bill.  Subsequent  Speakers  have  exercised  the 
same  power  quite  as  absolutely.  It  has  become 
the  practice  for  members  to  petition  a  Speaker  to 
permit  the  House  to  consider  its  own  business, 
and  the  Speaker  does  not  hesitate  to  disregard 
such  petitions,  even  when  signed  by  enough  mem- 

1  See  Chap.  IX.  of  Follett's  The  Speaker  of  the  House  for  a 
discussion  of  this  curious  subject. 


252  THE   ORGANS  OF  GOVERNMENT 

bers  to  remove  him  from  the  chair  and  elect  an- 
other in  his  place.  Such  an  anomaly  can  be 
explained  only  by  the  fact  that  members  value 
the  protection  thus  afforded  against  a  pressure  of 
local  interests  injurious  to  the  general  welfare  of 
national  party  organization.1 

The  characteristics  which  have  been  described 
are  reflected  in  the  behavior  of  the  House.  A 
visitor  sees  a  noisy  body,  whose  least  concern 
seems  to  be  that  of  deliberation.  Members  are 
sitting  at  desks  writing,  or  are  lounging  on  sofas, 
or  are  talking  together  in  little  groups.  There  is 
a  constant  movement  in  and  out  of  the  smoking 
rooms  under  the  galleries.  Hands  are  clapping 
to  summon  pages,  who  are  constantly  going  up 
and  down  the  aisles  on  errands  for  members. 
There  is  a  -continual  noise  and  bustle,  whose 
aggressive  volume  frequently  provokes  the  pound- 
ing of  the  Speaker's  gavel.  A  member  may  be 
addressing  the  chair,  but  few  members  seem  to 
be  paying  any  attention  to  him.  The  manual  of 
parliamentary  law,  prepared  by  Jefferson  from 

1  "  Congressman  Ernest  F.  Acheson  was  in  Pittsburg  yesterday. 
He  said  he  had  been  forced  to  agree  with  Speaker  Reed  in  refus- 
ing to  give  a  place  to  the  Omnibus  bill,  providing  appropriations 
for  seventy  public  buildings,  three  of  which  were  to  be  located  in 
Wilkesbarre,  Altoona,  and  his  own  town  of  Washington.  Speaker 
Reed  showed  that  the  deficit  for  the  month  current  was  already 
$8,107,118,  and  for  the  fiscal  year  $46,009,514.  And  thus  it  was 
he  refused  to  grant  a  petition  signed  by  308  members  of  the  House." 
The  Pittsburg  Dispatch,  January  24,  1897. 


THE  HOUSE   OF  REPRESENTATIVES       253 

the  rules  of  Parliament  when  it  was  supposed 
that  the  House  would  be  likewise  a  deliberative 
body,  remarks  that  "if  a  member  finds  that  it 
is  not  the  inclination  of  the  House  to  hear  him, 
and  that  by  conversation  or  any  other  noise  they 
endeavor  to  drown  his  voice,  it  is  his  most  prudent 
way  to  submit  to  the  pleasure  of  the  House  and 
sit  down."  If  this  advice  were  followed,  there 
would  be  few  speeches .  in  Congress.  But  mem- 
bers are  not  concerning  themselves  about  the 
pleasure  of  the  House ;  they  are  speaking  for 
their  districts  —  "for  Buncombe  County,"  as  one 
of  them  once  explained,  thus  furnishing  a  generic 
phrase  to  describe  congressional  oratory.  It  is 
difficult  to  hear  any  speaker  all  over  the  big  hall, 
and  when  a  really  interesting  speaker  is  on  the 
floor,  members  leave  their  seats  and  crowd  around 
him.  Outside  of  the  impromptu  mass-meeting 
which  he  is  addressing,  members  continue  at 
their  writing  or  other  occupations.  There  is  very 
little  real  debate.  When  a  measure  before  the 
House  is  a  party  issue,  an  equitable  division  of 
time  is  made,  and  speechmakers  follow  one 
another  according  to  a  set  programme.  The 
speeches  are  party  pleas  made,  not  to  the 
House,  but  to  the  districts.  It  is  a  regular 
practice  to  write  out  speeches  in  advance  and 
furnish  copies  to  the  press  agencies.  Before  a 
party  spokesman  takes  the  floor,  his  speech  will 
have  been  put  in  type  in  the  newspaper  offices. 


254  THE   ORGANS   OF  GOVERNMENT 

As  soon  as  he  begins,  the  press  agencies  send 
a  bulletin  to  their  clients,  announcing  that  the 
speech  is  "  released "  —  that  is  to  say,  that  it 
may  be  published.  Afternoon  papers  will  come 
out  with  as  much  as  they  choose  to  give  of  the 
speech,  most  of  which  may  have  been  unspoken 
at  the  time  they  went  to  press.  Now  and  then 
wrangles  take  place  and  spiteful  remarks  pass 
between  members,  communicating  to  the  proceed- 
ings something  of  the  interest  which  attaches  to 
the  cockpit  or  the  prize-ring ;  but  the  rule  is  to 
prearrange  everything  said  and  done.  The  pro- 
ceedings are  quite  formal,  the  object  being  not 
debate,  but  to  accomplish  what  is  called  "  making 
up  the  record." 

In  recent  times  the  powerful  influence  of  party 
has  been  prominently  displayed  by  the  way  it 
keeps  shaping  the  rules  of  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives so  as  to  compel  obedience  to  its  be- 
hests. In  proportion  as  rules  designed  to  secure 
consideration  of  legislation  are  used  by  minorities 
to  obstruct  the  passage  of  party  measures,  parti- 
san ingenuity  has  been  stimulated  to  find  a 
remedy,  until  finally  expedients  have  been  de- 
vised by  means  of  which  the  avenues  of  legis- 
lation, crowded  as  they  always  are,  may  be 
temporarily  cleared  so  as  to  give  an  open  way 
to  the  passage  of  measures  to  which  party  ur- 
gency is  conceded.  A  measure,  which  in  the  reg- 
ular course  of  procedure  it  might  take  weeks  or 


THE  HOUSE   OF  REPRESENTATIVES        255 

months  to  reach,  if  it  could  be  reached  at  all, 
can  be  called  up  and  put  to  vote  at  any  time,  if 
the  Speaker  of  the  House  and  his  two  party  col- 
leagues, constituting  the  majority  of  the  Com- 
mittee on  Rules,  decide  to  have  it  so.  Thus  the 
bill  which  the  Senate  substituted  for  the  Wilson 
Tariff  bill  was  taken  up  in  the  House  and  passed, 
and  then  four  supplemental  tariff  bills  were  re- 
ported and  passed,  all  in  one  day.  The  various 
devices  of  filibustering  have  been  met  by  modifi- 
cations of  the  rules,  until  it  is  impossible  to  pre- 
vent a  majority  in  the  House  from  proceeding 
with  any  business  it  is  determined  to  transact. 
The  Senate  has  not  been  subjected  to  the  same 
control,  for  the  reason  that  it  is  a  body  which 
until  recent  times  possessed  more  self-control 
than  the  House,  and  was  less  impeded  by  its 
rules  in  the  despatch  of  business.  But  since  ex- 
perience has  shown  that  it  is  no  longer  to  be 
trusted  to  act  with  party  honesty,  the  same  press- 
ure of  party  organization  for  control  of  proceed- 
ings to  which  the  House,  has  been  subjected  is 
rising  against  the  Senate. 


CHAPTER   XXI 

THE    SENATE 

THE  Senate  has  had  a  singular  career,  and  its 
character  was  slow  in  taking  definite  form.  Origi- 
nally intended  to  combine  the  functions  of  a  privy 
council  and  a  House  of  Lords,  the  first  part  of  the 
scheme  was  soon  found  to  be  impracticable.  The 
only  instance  of  any  exercise  of  such  a  function 
since  Washington's  unsatisfactory  experience  was 
during  Folk's  administration,  and  his  action  was 
a  political  manoeuvre  rather  than  a  sincere  con- 
sultation. There  had  been  a  good  deal  of  party 
jockeying  over  the  Oregon  boundary  question,  but 
the  President  pulled  the  Senate  up  sharp  by  in- 
viting its  advice  whether  he  should  accept  or  de- 
cline Great  Britain's  proposition  to  settle  upon  the 
forty-ninth  parallel  from  the  Rocky  Mountains  to 
the  Pacific.  The  Senate  shrank  from  advising 
rejection,  and  thus  it  precluded  itself  from  blam- 
ing the  administration  for  the  surrender  of  the 
extreme  claims  which  demagogues  in  Congress  had 
been  making.  In  the  ordinary  procedure  of  the 
Senate,  all  that  remains  of  its  privy  council  func- 
tion is  the  fossil  imprint  preserved  in  the  phrase 

256 


THE  SENATE 

"  the  Senate  advises  and  consents  "  used  in  ratify- 
ing treaties  or  confirming  appointments. 

As  an  adaptation  of  the  House  of  Lords,  the 
Senate  soon  bettered  the  model  in  grasp  of  author- 
ity. It  had  not  been  expected  that  it  would  equal 
the  House  in  political  weight.  "Against  the  force 
of  the  immediate  representatives  of  the  people," 
wrote  Madison,  "  nothing  will  be  able  to  maintain 
even  the  constitutional  authority  of  the  Senate, 
but  such  display  of  enlightened  policy  and  attach- 
ment to  the  public  good  as  will  divide  with  that 
branch  of  the  legislature  the  affections  and  sup- 
port of  the  entire  body  of  the  people  themselves." J 
This  expectation  had  much  to  do  with  reconciling 
the  larger  states  to  the  admission  of  the  smaller 
on  an  equal  footing  with  them  in  the  Senate.  At 
the  outset  the  course  of  legislation  seemed  to  verify 
the  forecast.  The  Senate  was  quite  unable  to  con- 
trol the  situation.  Its  schemes  for  surrounding 
the  presidency  with  monarchical  ceremonial  were 
brushed  aside  by  the  House  in  a  way  that  made  it 
appear  ridiculous.  But  it  soon  regained  its  poise, 
and  before  the  first  session  was  over  it  had  mani- 
fested in  its  relations  with  the  House  those  superi- 
orities of  address  and  management  which  have 
since  become  its  recognized  characteristics,  and  to 
which  the  House  of  Lords  can  offer  no  parallel. 
In  this  respect  the  framers  of  the  constitution  were 
entirely  out  in  their  calculations.  They  had  as- 

1  The  Federalist,  No.  63. 
S 


258  THE    ORGANS   OF  GOVERNMENT 

sumed  that  the  Senate,  as  the  institution  corre- 
sponding with  the  House  of  Lords,  would  encounter 
the  same  resistance  from  the  popular  branch  of 
the  government.  But  the  case  was  quite  different. 
The  House  of  Lords  represented  a  distinct  order 
in  the  state.  Its  natural  disposition  was  to  use 
its  influence  and  opportunities  in  behalf  of  its  own 
class,  and  this  fact  insured  the  jealous  antagonism 
of  the  body  representing  the  mass  of  the  people. 
The  political  position  of  the  Lords  was  unassail- 
able, so  that  their  political  privileges  could  be 
confined  only  by  the  collective  weight  and  dignity 
of  the  House  of  Commons.  On  the  other  hand, 
aristocratic  influence  was  so  strong  in  the  House 
of  Commons  that  it  could  pursue  its  interests 
there  with  the  advantage  of  avoiding  jealousies 
and  resentments  that  would  be  excited  by  the 
same  measures  if  proposed  by  the  House  of  Lords. 
But  the  Senate  and  the  House  of  Representatives 
did  not  represent  different  orders.  At  the  most 
they  represented  only  gradations  in  the  general 
class  of  politicians.  The  official  tenure  of  senators 
was  different  from  that  of  members  of  the  House, 
but  it  was  likewise  based  upon  party  interest. 
State  attachments  established  groups  of  senators 
and  representatives  united  by  bonds  too  powerful 
to  be  seriously  disturbed  by  jealousies  and  antag- 
onisms arising  out  of  the  parliamentary  relations 
of  the  two  Houses.  It  was  an  early  practice  for 
the  members  of  state  delegations  to  meet  together 


THE  SENATE  2 59 

and  act  in  concert,  so  that  a  disposition  was  soon 
created  to  regard  any  special  facilities  which  either 
Senate  or  House  possessed  as  belonging  to  the 
same  general  fund  of  political  opportunity.  What 
members  of  the  House  could  not  accomplish  in 
their  branch,  they  sought  to  obtain  through  their 
allies  in  the  Senate.  The  first  Congress  had  been 
in  session  just  one  month  when  Maclay  noted  in 
his  diary,  "  The  moment  a  party  finds  a  measure 
lost  or  likely  to  be  lost,  all  engines  are  set  to  work 
in  the  upper  House."  This  tendency  gave  the 
Senate  a  free  hand  in  legislation,  and  it  was  soon 
altering  and  amending  bills  at  its  pleasure  without 
exciting  any  serious  contention  as  to  the  extent  of 
its  powers.  Its  privileges  in  this  respect  being 
put  on  an  equality  with  those  of  the  House,  its 
advantages  of  position  soon  made  themselves  felt. 
Having  a  small  membership,  it  could  act  quickly, 
and,  since  its  organization  was  perpetual,  it  had 
time  to  wait  in  order  to  carry  a  point,  so  that  it 
was  apt  to  get  the  best  of  the  House  when  dis- 
putes occurred.  This  superiority,  which  it  has 
always  since  manifested,  was  fully  developed  dur- 
ing the  first  session. 

While  the  Senate  thus  successfully  stretched 
its  legislative  authority  to  lengths  beyond  the 
reckoning  of  the  framers  of  the  constitution,  it 
was  equally  as  prompt  in  seeking  to  extend  the 
powers  which  it  derived  from  its  partial  associa- 
tion with  the  President  in  executive  functions.  An 


260  THE    ORGANS   OF  GOVERNMENT 

abuse  of  the  power  of  confirmation  in  order  to 
coerce  the  President's  exercise  of  his  right  of 
making  appointments  to  office  was  perpetrated 
by  the  Senate  during  Washington's  administra- 
tion. Speaking  of  the  agency  of  the  Senate  in 
regard  to  appointments,  Hamilton  had  remarked 
that  "  there  will  be  no  exertion  of  choice  on  the 
part  of  senators."1  But  while  the  Senate  was 
still  fresh  from  the  hands  of  its  creators,  Wash- 
ington's nomination  of  a  naval  officer  for  the  port 
of  Savannah  was  rejected  because  he  was  unac- 
ceptable to  the  senators  from  Georgia.  This 
action  elicited  a  special  message  from  Washing- 
ton, defending  the  fitness  of  his  first  nomination ; 
but  he  avoided  further  contention  by  making  a 
new  nomination.  The  distrust  with  which  the 
Federalist  party  leaders  regarded  Adams  caused 
an  extraordinary  degree  of  interference  with  his 
freedom  of  choice,  and  Madison  also  had  to  endure 
much  dictation  from  the  Senate.  z 

Nevertheless,  in   political  prestige,  the  Senate 
long  remained  inferior  to  the  House.     The  House 

1  The  Federalist,  No.  66. 

2  These  instances  do  not  seem  to  have  attracted  the  attention  of 
the  early  commentators  on  the  constitution.     Kent,  in  1826,  said  of 
the  Senate  :  "  Having  no  agency  in  the  nominations,  nothing  but 
simply  consent  or  refusal,  the  spirit  of  personal  intrigue  and  per- 
sonal attachment  must  be  pretty  much  extinguished  for  a  want  of 
means  to  gratify  it.     Commentaries,  Vol.  I.,  p.  288.     Story,  writing 
in  1833,  spoke  of  the  Senate  as  having  "but  a  slight  participation 
in  the  appointments  to  office."     Commentaries,  section  752. 


THE  SENATE  26 1 

took  the  lead  in  legislation  of  all  kinds,  the  Senate 
devoting  more  time  to  the  revision  of  House  bills 
than  to  originating  bills  of  its  own.  The  Senate 
originally  sat  with  closed  doors.  It  was  a  private 
conference  of  provincial  notables,  affording  no 
opportunities  to  talent  ambitious  of  political  re- 
nown. Its  members  might  be  really  influential 
in  dispensing  patronage  or  directing  legislation, 
but  they  did  not  appear  upon  the  stage  of  affairs. 
In  this  respect  the  situation  was  somewhat  like 
what  it  was  in  England,  when  the  famous  states- 
men were  those  who,  like  Pitt  or  Fox  or  Burke, 
had  the  ear  of  the  people ;  while  lords  and  privy 
councillors  were  determining  the  personnel  of 
ministries  and  really  controlling  the  management 
of  public  affairs.  This  distinction  was,  however, 
more  important  in  the  United  States,  for  it  meant 
for  the  Senate  the  exclusion  of  its  members  from 
the  highest  office  in  the  state  —  the  great  goal  of 
political  ambition.  Presidential  timber  was  not 
grown  in  the  Senate. 

The  parliamentary  regime  which  grew  up  under 
the  Virginian  dynasty  depreciated  the  Senate  in 
a  peculiar  manner.  The  Congressional  Caucus  de- 
termined the  presidential  succession,  and  senators 
as  Caucus  members  were  in  about  the  same  posi- 
tion as  the  delegates-at-large  to  a  modern  national 
convention  — few  in  number  as  compared  with  the 
district  delegates,  and  undistinguishable  from  them 
in  privilege  and  opportunity.  In  this  field  the 


262  THE   ORGANS  OF  GOVERNMENT 

united  influence  of  the  Senate  could  not  rival 
that  of  a  popular  Speaker  like  Henry  Clay.  The 
House  made  Presidents  and  exercised  a  control- 
ling influence  upon  public  policy.  Madison  could 
not  be  reflected  President  until  he  had  accepted 
the  policy  of  the  leaders  of  the  House,  which 
brought  on  the  War  of  1812. 

The  Jacksonian  revolution  had  a  remarkable 
effect  upon  the  Senate.  It  seemed  actually  to  be 
exalted  by  the  general  overthrow  of  parliamentary 
rule,  even  as  a  tower  shows  its  height  more  im- 
pressively when  the  edifice  which  it  had  buttressed 
lies  in  ruins.  The  permanency  of  its  organization, 
and  the  independent  foundation  of  authority  which 
it  derived  from  the  principle  of  state  authority  on 
which  it  was  "constituted,  protected  it  from  the 
sharp  vicissitudes  to  which  the  House  was  exposed, 
so  that  its  chamber  became  the  refuge  of  the  great 
parliamentary  leaders,  —  Webster,  Clay,  and  Cal- 
houn, — and  public  attention  was  concentrated  upon 
its  proceedings.  The  prestige  of  the  Senate  both 
at  home  and  abroad  was  the  creation  of  this  period. 
The  superior  dignity  and  intellectuality  of  the 
Senate  made  a  deep  impression  upon  foreign  ob- 
servers. De  Tocqueville  contrasted  the  two  Houses 
with  expressions  of  wonder  that  one  body  should 
be  "  remarkable  for  its  vulgarity  and  its  poverty  of 
talent,  while  the  other  seems  to  enjoy  a  monopoly 
of  intelligence  and  sound  judgment."  The  only 
reason  by  which  he  could  account  for  this  was  that 


THE   SENATE  26$ 

"  the  House  of  Representatives  is  elected  by  the 
populace  directly,  while  the  Senate  is  elected  by  an 
indirect  application  of  universal  suffrage."  The 
Senate  still  retains  a  higher  reputation  abroad  than 
it  has  ever  had  in  this  country.  So  late  as  the 
year  1896,  Mr.  Lecky  referred  to  it  as  "this  illus- 
trious body,  which  plays  so  important  a  part  in 
American  history,  and  has  excited  the  envy  and 
admiration  of  many  European  statesmen  and 
writers  on  politics."  1 

It  was  very  natural  to  conclude  that  the  conser- 
vatism and  dignity  of  the  Senate  were  the  nor- 
mal characteristics  of  a  body  so  constituted,  for 
the  course  of  events  long  tended  to  impress  such 
qualities  of  behavior  upon  the  Senate.  The  War 
of  1812  caused  a  strong  reaction  against  the  strict 
and  narrow  views  of  national  authority  to  which 
Jefferson  and  Madison  had  resorted  in  combating 
the  Federalist  administrations  ;  and  a  movement 
towards  a  broad  and  liberal  interpretation  of  consti- 
tutional powers  was  started  under  Southern  leader- 
ship. This  movement  was  checked  by  the  struggle 
over  the  admission  of  Missouri  and  the  passage  of 
the  Missouri  compromise,  which  excluded  slavery 
from  so  large  a  section  of  the  country  as  to  make 
it  certain  that  the  preponderance  of  congres- 
sional influence  would  pass  to  the  free  states. 
It  therefore  became  the  policy  of  the  Southern 
leaders  to  limit  as  strictly  as  possible  the  field  of 

1  Democracy  and  Liberty,  Vol.  I.,  p.  445. 


264  THE    ORGANS   OF  GOVERNMENT 

federal  authority  and  to  exalt  state  rights.  Their 
control,  being  proportionately  much  stronger  in 
the  Senate  than  in  the  House,  had  the  practical 
effect  of  causing  the  Senate  to  exert  a  restrain- 
ing and  moderating  influence  upon  congressional 
action,  thus  exhibiting  it  as  the  more  conservative 
body. 

Influences  which  tended  to  make  the  Senate 
illustrious  were  also  developed  by  the  new  turn 
given  to  political  activities.  Throughout  what 
may  be  called  the  middle  period  of  our  politics, 
extending  from  the  Jacksonian  era  down  to  the 
Civil  War,  the  dominant  issues  turned  upon  ques- 
tions of  principle  that  made  the  most  thrilling  ap- 
peals to  the  moral  sentiments  of  the  people,  while 
their  scope  comprehended  the  very  nature  of  the 
constitution  and  the  respective  rights  of  the  gen- 
eral government  and  of  the  states.  Political 
necessity,  as  well  as  the  demands  of  public  senti- 
ment, tended  to  procure  the  selection  of  men 
strong  enough  to  maintain  themselves  with  credit 
in  such  a  forum  as  the  Senate  had  become,  and 
so  the  line  of  statesmen  came  into  being,  whose 
powers  were  evoked  by  the  slavery  contest,  mak- 
ing the  debates  of  the  Senate  a  school  of  political 
education  for  the  nation. 

During  its  first  period  the  Senate  does  not 
appear  to  have  been  a  very  dignified  body.  The 
ceremonious  politeness  of  the  times  was  a  crust  of 
formality  that  sometimes  gave  way  explosively 


THE  SENATE  26$ 

when  passions  boiled  up,  and  such  records  of  the 
debates  as  have  come  down  to  us  indicate  that 
controversy  was  apt  to  degenerate  into  peevish 
contention.1  The  reputation  of  the  Senate  for 
gravity  and  decorum  was  the  creation  of  its  second 
period,  when  it  had  become  a  parliamentary  forum. 
Those  traits  were  the  result  of  a  reciprocity  of 
consideration  between  men  who  sat  as  state  am- 
bassadors and  whose  character  was  strongly  braced 
by  state  pride,  and  they  were  also  upheld  by  the 
respect  felt  by  statesmen  for  the  means  by  which 
they  obtained  parliamentary  distinction.  By  ex- 
alting the  dignity  of  the  Senate,  they  elevated  the 
stage  upon  which  they  stood  to  address  the  nation. 
Privileges  of  unrestricted  debate  were  not  origi- 
nally possessed  by  the  Senate.  The  rules  adopted 
at  the  first  session  provided  that  "in  case  of  a 
debate  becoming  tedious,  four  senators  may  call 
for  the  question,"  and  this  expedient  for  shutting 
off  debate  was  freely  used.  Writing  under  date 
of  March  2,  1791,  Maclay  says,  "Every  one  that 
attempts  to  speak  is  silenced  with  the  cry  of 
'question.''  But  such  restraints  came  to  be  re- 
garded as  incompatible  with  the  dignity  of  a  body 

1  Maclay  relates  that,  on  his  making  a  motion  which  injured  the 
pride  of  the  Senate,  by  putting  them  on  an  equality  with  the  House 
in  the  matter  of  compensation,  "  such  a  storm  of  abuse  never, 
perhaps,  fell  upon  any  member.  '  It  was  nonsense,'  '  stupidity,'  '  it 
was  a  misfortune  to  have  men  void  of  understanding  in  the  House.' 
Izard,  King,  and  Mr.  Morris  said  every  rude  thing  they  could." 
Journal,  p.  141. 


266  THE   ORGANS   OF  GOVERNMENT 

whose  self-respect  would  keep  it  from  abusing 
its  privileges.  Still  cases  may  be  found  when 
debate  was  protracted  to  a  tedious  extent.  After 
the  Whig  victory  of  1840,  Henry  Clay  complained 
that  the  minority  was  abusing  the  privilege  of  un- 
restricted debate,  and  he  proposed  the  reintroduc- 
tion  of  the  previous  question ;  but  the  proposition 
met  with  so  much  opposition  that  it  was  abandoned. 
It  was  felt,  and  not  unjustly,  that  the  privilege  was 
safely  confined  by  the  dignity  of  the  Senate.  De- 
bate, as  a  filibustering  practice,  carried  on  for  the 
purpose  of  legislative  extortion,  was  a  moral  impos- 
sibility. 

This  reputation  of  the  Senate  for  dignity  and 
conservatism  not  only  helped  to  sustain  the  author- 
ity it  had  seized,  but  at  one  important  juncture 
facilitated  such  an  augmentation  of  it  as  to  raise 
the  Senate  to  an  extraordinary  pitch  of  power. 
During  the  Johnson  administration,  when  by  a 
combination  of  circumstances  unlikely  to  recur,  a 
parliamentary  opposition  to  the  executive  was 
developed  of  such  strength  as  to  overbalance  the 
weight  of  the  presidential  office,  the  victory  of 
Congress  was  in  effect  the  triumph  of  the  Senate. 
Its  advisory  executive  function  was  conveniently 
at  hand  for  asserting  congressional  mastery  of  the 
situation.  The  Tenure  of  Office  act  was  passed, 
virtually  substituting  the  discretion  of  the  Senate 
for  that  of  the  President  in  making  removals  from 
office.  What  was  taken  away  from  the  President's 


THE  SENATE  267 

authority  by  the  united  force  of  Congress  was  thus 
given  to  the  Senate,  while  the  House  as  a  body 
gained  nothing.  In  this  way  there  came  about  a 
development  of  oligarchical  power  under  a  repub- 
lican form  of  government  that  was  the  wonder  of 
the  age.  It  seemed  that  while  everywhere  else 
upper  Houses  were  decaying  and  their  authority 
was  becoming  effete,  the  principle  of  aristocratic 
control  was  renewing  its  vigor  in  the  constitution 
of  the  American  Senate,  making  that  body  the 
envy  and  admiration  of  Tory  statesmen  the  world 
over. 

This  was  the  culmination  of  the  overt  authority 
of  the  Senate.  As  soon  as  the  temporary  exigency, 
which  produced  the  Tenure  of  Office  act,  had  passed 
by,  the  House  sought  to  repeal  it.  In  deference 
to  the  appeal  of  President  Grant  in  his  inaugural 
address,  the  Senate  modified  the  requirements  of 
the  law,  but  insisted  on  the  point  that  its  consent 
should  be  essential  to  removals  from  offices.  In 
his  message  of  December,  1869,  President  Grant 
declared  the  law  "inconsistent  with  a  faithful 
and  efficient  administration  of  the  government," 
and  the  House  soon 'after  voted  for  its  repeal  by 
a  majority  of  more  than  six  to  one.  The  Senate, 
however,  adhered  to  its  oligarchical  power,  and 
under  it  perfected  the  practice  known  as  "  the 
courtesy  of  the  Senate,"  by  which  the  power  to 
make  appointments  to  office  in  a  particular  state 
was  in  practice  vested  in  the  senators  from  that 


state.1  The  attempt  of  President  Garfield  to 
break  down  the  senatorial  usurpation  caused  a 
faction  war  which  incited  an  assassin  to  take  his 
life.  The  Senate,  however,  still  clung  to  its 
powers  and  used  them  to  harass  President  Cleve- 
land's administration,  evoking  his  memorable 
message  of  March  i,  1886.  The  issue  had  now 
become  so  menacing  that  considerations  of  party 
expediency  compelled  the  Senate  to  surrender. 
The  Tenure  of  Office  law  was  repealed  by  the  act 
of  March  3,  1887. 

The  force  of  public  opinion  has  not  only  repelled 
the  extension  of  the  powers  of  the  Senate,  but  it 
has  to  some  extent  curtailed  them.  The  Senate 
would  not  now  as  a  body  dare  to  interfere  with  the 
President's  selection  of  the  members  of  his  Cabinet, 
although  originally  the  appointment  of  Cabinet 
officers  was  just  as  contingent  upon  its  consent 
as  the  appointments  of  any  other  class  of  public 
officers.  Neither  would  it  dare  openly  to  dispute 
the  right  of  the  President  to  select  members  of  his 
own  party  to  fill  the  public  offices  under  his  admin- 
istration, although  quick  to  find  pretexts  for  em- 
barrassing him  in  the  exercise  of  that  right.  With 

1  In  a  speech  April  6,  1893,  Senator  Hoar  said  :  "  When  I  came 
into  public  life  in  1869,  the  Senate  claimed  almost  the  entire  con- 
trol of  the  executive  function  of  appointment  to  office.  .  .  .  What 
was  called  '  the  courtesy  of  the  Senate '  was  depended  upon  to 
enable  a  senator  to  dictate  to  the  executive  all  appointments  and 
removals  in  his  territory."  Congressional  Record,  Fifty-third 
Congress,  p.  137. 


THE  SENATE  269 

these  exceptions,  however,  the  Senate  does  not 
seem  to  have  been  sensibly  abridged  in  its  powers, 
and  in  all  functions  which  it  possesses  in  common 
with  the  House  it  still  enjoys  better  opportunity 
with  superior  ability  for  accomplishing  its  purposes. 
Comparing  its  present  with  its  original  state,  the 
authority  of  the  Senate  has  on  the  whole  greatly 
increased,  while  that  of  the  House  has  diminished. 
The  peculiar  influences  which  created  and  sus- 
tained the  prestige  of  the  Senate  have,  however, 
passed  away.  The  principle  of  state  sovereignty 
is  extinct,  as  a  political  force,  and  no  longer 
interposes  any  check  upon  congressional  action. 
Ability  in  the  public  championship  of  party  prin- 
ciples has  declined  in  importance,  as  compared 
with  assiduity  in  service  to  party  organization.1 
Claims  of  distinction  resting  upon  capacity  in  party 
service,  either  by  craft  of  management  or  by  ability 
to  finance  party  organization,  receive  increasing 
recognition.2  Senators  quite  different  from  the 
provincial  notables  of  the  first  period,  and  still 
more  different  from  the  parliamentary  leaders  and 

1  In  an  article  in  the  Forum  for  August,  1897,  Senator  Hoar 
remarked,  as  denoting  changed  conditions  and  without  intention 
of  disparaging  the  Senate  as  now  constituted  :  "  Were   Webster, 
or  Clay,  or  Calhoun,  alive  to-day,  his  career  as  a  senator  must  be, 
from   necessity,  of  a  different  character  from  what  it  was.      His 
leadership  and  guidance  of  the  public  thought  would  be  exercised 
by  writing  or  speech  elsewhere  than  in  the  Senate  chamber." 

2  These  two  types  are  distinguished  in  popular  parlance  as  "  the 
boss  "  and  "  the  man  with  the  barrel." 


2/0  THE    ORGANS   OF  GOVERNMENT 

constitutional  statesmen  of  the  second  period,  have 
made  their  way  into  the  Senate  in  such  number 
as  to  determine  its  character  as  a  body. 

The  Senate,  by  its  constitution,  is  protected 
against  sudden  change.  Renewal  of  its  member- 
ship is  a  slow  and  gradual  process,  so  that  the 
Senate  at  all  times  contains  representatives  of 
different  periods  of  our  politics.  Then  again,  the 
variety  of  political  conditions  and  party  circum- 
stances in  the  various  states  is  always  reflected 
in  the  Senate  by  marked  diversities  of  tempera- 
ment and  mental  capacity  among  its  members.  A 
general  tendency  towards  a  deep  change  in  the 
character  of  the  Senate  is,  however,  quite  dis- 
cernible. This  tendency  has  been  towards  the 
conversion  of  the  Senate  into  a  Diet  of  party  lords, 
wielding  their  powers  without  scruple  or  restraint 
in  behalf  of  the  particular  interests  which  they 
represent.  The  privileges  of  unrestricted  debate, 
which  were  once  regarded  as  opportunities  of  dis- 
tinction, have  become  the  intrenchments  of  partic- 
ular interests,  the  shelter  of  party  treachery,  and 
the  ready  instrument  of  extortion.1  The  debate 

1  In  a  speech,  August  16,  1894,  Senator  Vest  of  Missouri  re- 
marked :  "  Sir,  after  my  experience  in  the  last  five  months,  I  have 
not  an  enemy  in  the  world  whom  I  would  place  in  the  position 
that  I  have  occupied  as  a  member  of  the  Finance  Committee  under 
the  rules  of  the  Senate.  I  would  put  no  man  where  I  have  been, 
to  be  blackmailed  and  driven  in  order  to  pass  a  bill  that  I  believe 
is  necessary  to  the  welfare  of  the  country,  by  senators  who  desired 
to  force  amendments  upon  me  against  my  better  judgment,  and 


THE  SENATE  2/1 

on  the  Silver  Repeal  bill  of  1893,  during  which  a 
minority  endeavored  to  extort  a  compromise  by 
refusing  to  allow  a  vote  to  be  taken,  was  an  exhi- 
bition of  the  degradation  of  the  Senate,  which  made 
a  profound  impression  upon  public  opinion. 

Notwithstanding  the  great  change  that  has  taken 
place  in  the  character  of  the  Senate,  the  general 
tone  of  its  proceedings  is  superior  to  that  of  the 
House  in  decorum.  It  is  composed  of  older, 
graver,  more  experienced  men,  but  there  have  been 
occasions  when  it  has  been  shown  that  all  these 
moderating  qualities  are  unable  to  stand  the  strain. 
It  is  a  small  body,  so  that  excitement  finds  less 
fuel  than  in  the  House,  and  the  dignified  traditions 
of  the  Senate  have  not  quite  lost  their  hold.  The 
fundamental  distinction,  however,  lies  in  the  cir- 
cumstances which  set  senators  apart  as  a  distinct 
class.  The  greater  permanency  of  their  tenure 
causes  them  to  become  residents  of  the  national 
capital,  while  members  of  the  House  are,  as  a  rule, 
transient  sojourners.  Connections  of  social  interest 
have  time  to  form,  and  these  establish  a  community 
of  feeling  and  a  reciprocity  of  consideration  which 
affect  the  tone  of  debate  and  modify  party  spirit. 
One  of  the  difficulties  which  every  administration 
has  to  encounter  is  the  disposition  of  senators  to 
stand  together  on  issues  affecting  senatorial  con- 
compel  me  to  decide  the  question  whether  I  will  take  any  bill  at 
all  or  a  bill  which  has  been  distorted  by  their  views  and  objects." 
Congressional  Record,  p.  1015. 


2/2  THE   ORGANS  OF  GOVERNMENT 

trol  over  patronage.  A  senatorial  faction  in  revolt 
against  the  administration  is  certain  to  receive  as 
much  comfort  and  assistance  from  their  fellows, 
irrespective  of  party  attachment,  as  can  be  extended 
without  endangering  party  position. 

While  the  manner  differs,  the  method  of  legis- 
lative procedure  is  essentially  the  same  as  in  the 
House ;  but  senators,  being  individually  more 
powerful  to  obstruct,  exhibit  greater  hardihood  in 
making  demands  for  concessions  in  return  for  their 
support  to  measures.  Instead  of  having  to  resort  to 
"log-rolling,"  as  in  the  House,  they  practise  what 
is  known  as  "the  legislative  hold-up."1  Legisla- 
tion is  managed  on  the  principle  of  give  and  take, 
each  interest  exacting  conditions  as  the  price  of 
its  support,  and  blocking  action  until  satisfied. 

1  Senator  Plumb  of  Kansas,  in  a  speech  March  3,  1891,  said: 
"  The  Senate  last  year  passed  an  amendment  giving  a  bounty  of  two 
cents  a  pound  on  maple  sugar,  which  is  not  only  not  a  national  in- 
dustry, but  is  the  production  of  an  article  of  luxury.  After  it  was 
passed  as  a  matter  personal  to  himself  (Mr.  Morrill),  on  statements 
made  by  members  of  the  Finance  Committee,  that  it  would  help  to 
reeled  him  to  the  Senate  from  Vermont,  it  was  kept  on  because 
his  colleague  (Mr.  Edmunds)  threatened  in  writing  that  if  it  was 
not  kept  on  he  would  vote  against  the  tariff  bill."  Congressional 
Record,  p.  3953. 

Senator  MacPherson  of  New  Jersey,  in  a  speech  March  8, 
1894,  said  :  "  I  find  a  very  severe  criticism  is  being  made  upon  the 
Finance  Committee  for  not  reporting  the  tariff  bill  back  to  the 
Senate.  As  to  delaying  its  report,  I  wish  to  state  that  the  delay  is 
mine  and  mine  only.  .  .  .  Whatever  delay  has  happened  has  been 
owing  to  the  fact  that  I  have  been  struggling  for  a  little  higher  rates 
of  duty."  Congressional  Record,  p.  3281. 


THE  SENATE  273 

This  has  been  defended  as  being  the  only  way  of 
obtaining  fair-play  for  all  interests.  In  a  speech 
June  8,  1897,  Senator  Stewart  of  Nevada  said: 
"What  do  we  have  representatives  of  different 
sections  here  for  except  to  represent  the  interests 
of  our  constituents  ?  A  senator  near  me  suggests 
that  we  are  here  to  get  offices  for  our  friends. 
That  is  not  true,  because  only  a  part  of  us  ever 
have  a  chance  to  do  that.  The  offices  are  always 
monopolized  by  one  side  or  the  other.  We  are  all 
here  to  see  to  the  various  interests  in  our  parts  of 
the  country,  to  enact  laws  to  protect  them  equally, 
and  to  live  under  equal  laws.  ...  If  the  tariff 
laws  are  unfair,  it  is  because  senators  in  different 
sections  have  not  looked  after  the  interests  of  their 
constituents." 

With  the  deterioration  of  its  character  that  has 
taken  place,  the  composition  of  the  Senate  makes 
it  inferior  to  the  House  in  balance  and  moderation. 
In  the  House  the  weight  of  particular  interests  is 
proportioned  to  their  popular  strength,  but  in  the 
Senate  there  may  be  a  very  great  disproportion. 
Nevada,  with  a  population  of  45,761,  has  the  same 
representation  in  the  Senate  as  New  York  with 
5,997,853.  Thirty-two  million  people  in  ten  states 
are  represented  by  twenty  senators,  while  29,- 
000,000  people  in  other  states  have  a  senatorial 
representation  of  sixty-eight.  On  February  i,  1896, 
the  Senate  substituted  a  free  silver  bill  for  the 
Treasury  Relief  bond  bill  passed  by  the  House, 


2/4  THE    ORGANS   OF  GOVERNMENT 

by  a  vote  of  forty-two  to  thirty-five,  but  the  minority 
represented  nearly  8,000,000  more  people  than 
the  majority.  Vagaries  of  popular  sentiment  and 
transient  delusions  of  opinion  may  be  magnified 
in  the  Senate  far  beyond  their  real  strength.  Al- 
ready the  consequences  are  such  that  the  reputa- 
tion of  the  Senate  for  conservatism  has  become 
a  faded  tradition,  and  instead  of  regarding  the 
Senate  as  a  check  upon  the  House,  the  people 
have  gotten  into  the  habit  of  looking  to  the  House 
for  restraint  upon  the  extravagance  and  impetu- 
osity of  the  Senate.  The  change  of  public  senti- 
ment in  this  respect  has  been  so  great  as  to  force 
itself  upon  the  recognition  of  the  Senate  itself. 
A  Senate  committee  in  a  formal  report  has  regret- 
fully admitted  that  "the  tendency  of  public  opinion 
is  to  disparage  the  Senate  and  depreciate  its  use- 
fulness, its  integrity,  its  power."1 

1  Senate  Reports,  No.  530,  Fifty-fourth  Congress,  first  session. 


CHAPTER   XXII 

THE    PRESIDENCY 

ACCORDING  to  the  intention  of  the  constitution 
it  is  the  business  of  the  President  to  run  the  gov- 
ernment. It  is  the  business  of  other  branches  of 
the  government  to  condition  the  operation  of  the 
executive  department  in  accordance  with  the  con- 
stitutional principles  on  which  the  government  is 
founded  ;  but  to  take  care  of  the  government,  to 
attend  to  its  needs,  to  shape  its  policy,  and  to  pro- 
vide for  its  responsibilities  is  the  special  business 
of  the  President. 

This  might  seem  to  be  a  better  statement  of  the 
duties  of  the  British  ministry  than  of  the  President 
of  the  United  States  ;  but  the  constitutional  provi- 
sion requiring  the  President  to  "  recommend "  to 
the  consideration  of  Congress  "  such  measures  as 
he  shall  judge  necessary  and  expedient"  contem- 
plated the  discharge  of  just  such  duties  of  fore- 
sight and  provision  as  are  performed  by  the  Brit- 
ish ministry.  Gouverneur  Morris,  who  did  the 
actual  work  of  draughting  the  constitution,  gave 
precisely  this  illustration  of  the  functions  of  the 
presidency  when  the  office  was  under  discussion. 
"Our  President,"  he  said,  "will  be  the  British 

275 


2/6  THE   ORGANS  OF  GOVERNMENT 

minister."  1  There  was  no  dissent  as  to  that;  the 
controversies  of  the  convention  turned  upon  the 
mode  of  constituting  the  office,  and  the  means  by 
which  it  should  be  confined  to  its  appointed  sphere 
and  at  the  same  time  be  protected  in  it.  The 
fathers  knew  very  well  that  the  king  himself  had 
been  superseded  by  the  ministry  as  the  actual 
agency  of  government.  In  the  same  debate  Mor- 
ris referred  to  the  fact  that  "the  real  king"  was 
"  the  minister."  At  that  period  the  interception 
of  royal  duty  by  ministerial  combinations,  based 
upon  parliamentary  interest,  was  regarded  as  an 
aberration  from  the  principles  of  the  English  con- 
stitution and  as  the  chief  source  of  political  cor- 
ruption. The  framers  of  the  constitution  took 
special  pains  to  guard  against  a  parliamentary  con- 
trol. The  President  himself  was  to  carry  on  the 
administration.  In  order  that  he  might  be  able  to 
impress  his  policy  upon  Congress  with  vigor  and 
effect,  the  patronage  of  the  government  was  placed 
in  his  hands.  Appointments  to  office  were  referred 
to  as  "the  principal  source  of  influence."  The 
fathers  did  not  mince  words  in  speaking  of  such 
matters  ;  Morris  bluntly  declared  that  "  the  loaves 
and  fishes  must  bribe  the  demagogues."  2  It  should 
be  borne  in  mind  that  the  very  object  in  view  in 
framing  the  constitution  was  to  enlist  the  passions 
and  selfish  interests  of  men  on  the  side  of  social 
stability  and  public  order. 

1  Madison's  Journal,  July  24.  *  Ibid.,  July  2. 


THE  PRESIDENCY  2/7 

This  duty  of  management  was  fully  conceived 
by  Washington  and  was  habitually  acted  upon  by 
him  in  his  relations  with  Congress  and  in  his  use 
of  the  patronage -of  his  office.  The  President's 
responsibility  for  national  policy  was  the  ground 
on  which  Hamilton  appealed  to  Jefferson  to  exert 
his  personal  influence  to  secure  votes  to  carry  the 
assumption  bill  through  Congress.  Jefferson  re- 
ports him  as  saying  "  that  the  President  was  the 
centre  upon  which  all  administrative  questions 
ultimately  rested,  and  that  all  of  us  should  rally 
around  him,  and  support  with  joint  efforts  meas- 
ures approved  by  him." 1  It  was  from  the  same 
point  of  view  that  Rufus  King,  one  of  the  framers 
of  the  constitution,  criticised  Jefferson's  behavior 
in  the  presidential  office.  Commenting  upon  the 
political  situation  in  1806,  King  remarked:  "It  is 
scarcely  credible  that  the  public  honor  and  safety, 
instead  of  being  well  guarded  by  well-concerted 
and  prudent  arrangements,  should  be  suffered  to 
become  the  sport  of  the  casual,  intemperate,  and 
inefficient  measures  of  inexperienced  individuals  ; 
and  yet  the  several  messages  of  the  President  look 
as  if  every  subject  were  to  be  submitted  to  Con- 
gress, without  the  disclosure  of  the  views  of  the 
executive,  which  by  the  letter  and  spirit  of  our 
government  is  charged  with  our  foreign  affairs."2 

The   growth    of    parliamentary   control    which 

1  Writings  of  Jefferson,  Vol.  I.,  p.  163. 

2  Life  and  Correspondence,  Rufus  King,  Vol.  IV.,  p.  481. 


2/8  THE   ORGANS  OF  GOVERNMENT 

went  on  during  the  Virginia  dynasty  impaired 
the  original  conception  of  presidential  duty,  but 
did  not  extinguish  it.  It  was  still  the  usage  for 
Congress  to  respect  the  President's  initiative  and 
provide  for  it.  When  this  tradition  of  congres- 
sional behavior  was  ruptured  by  the  violence  of 
party  strife  during  the  administration  of  John 
Quincy  Adams,  there  was  a  shock  to  conservative 
sentiment.  Benton,  himself  a  leader  of  the  Jack- 
sonian  party,  whose  work  this  was,  said,  "The 
appointment  of  the  majority  of  members  in  all 
committees,  and  their  chairmen,  in  both  Houses, 
adverse  to  the  administration,  was  a  regular  con- 
sequence of  the  inflamed  state  of  parties,  although 
the  proper  conducting  of  the  public  business 
would  demand  for  the  administration  the  chair- 
men of  several  important  committees  as  enabling 
it  to  place  its  measures  fairly  before  the  House."1 
The  direct  representative  character  imparted  to 
the  presidential  office,  when  the  machinery  of  the 
electoral  college  passed  under  the  control  of  a 
system  of  popular  election,  gave  the  office  a  much 
firmer  foundation  than  it  originally  possessed,  and 
invigorated  all  its  functions,  so  far  as  the  inde- 
pendent powers  of  the  executive  department  suf- 
ficed to  give  them  efficiency.  This  condition  was 
completely  satisfied  in  the  case  of  the  veto  power, 
but  the  correlative  function,  the  legislative  initia- 
tive, still  dependent  as  it  is  upon  congressional 

1  Thirty  Years'  View,  Vol.  I.,  p.  92. 


THE  PRESIDENCY  2/9 

acquiescence,  has  shown  no  access  of  strength.  It 
is  complicated  with  the  ordinary  activities  of  Con- 
gress, and  the  operation  of  the  presidential  office 
in  this  respect  has  been  obscure.  Nevertheless, 
the  fact  is  clear  that  the  basis  of  administrative 
control  is  not  Congress  but  the  President.  Pos- 
session of  that  office  is  the  great  object  of  party 
struggles.  It  is  impossible  for  a  party  to  carry 
out  even  a  purely  legislative  programme  unless  it 
embodies  a  policy  accepted  by  the  President  and 
sustained  by  the  influence  of  his  office. 

The  agency  of  the  presidential  office  has  been 
such  a  master  force  in  shaping  public  policy  that 
to  give  a  detailed  account  of  it  would  be  equiva- 
lent to  writing  the  political  history  of  the  United 
States.  From  Jackson's  time  to  the  present  day 
it  may  be  said  that  political  issues  have  been 
decided  by  executive  policy.  The  independent 
treasury  system  introduced  during  Van  Buren's 
administration  was  a  measure  formulated  by  the 
President  and  forced  upon  Congress.  Tyler,  al- 
though his  congressional  following  was  so  weak 
that  it  was  known  as  "  the  corporal's  guard,"  pros- 
trated Whig  plans  for  the  reestablishment  of  the 
Bank  of  the  United  States  and  controlled  the 
tariff  policy  of  Congress.  The  annexation  of 
Texas,  which  was  the  issue  of  the  election  of 
1844,  originated  as  an  executive  proposal,  and 
was  consummated  by  Tyler  before  he  retired 
from  office.  Polk's  administration  is  associated 


280  THE   ORGANS  OF  GOVERNMENT 

with  tariff  reform  and  the  Mexican  War,  both 
measures  originating  in  executive  policy.  The 
slavery  agitation,  whose  growing  intensity  was 
the  chief  feature  of  the  administrations  of  Fill- 
more,  Pierce,  and  Buchanan,  presented  issues 
which  the  executive  department  was,  above  all 
things,  anxious  to  avoid,  so  that  presidential  in- 
fluence strongly  supported  a  policy  of  adjustment 
and  compromise  by  negotiation  among  the  con- 
gressional factions ;  but  nevertheless  the  issues 
which  arose  were  shaped  by  executive  policy,  as 
the  inevitable  result  of  its  trenchant  nature.  In 
the  presence  of  emergency  it  is  necessary  to  do 
one  thing  or  another,  and  the  decision  stands  out 
for  condemnation  or  approval,  thus  furnishing  a 
dividing  line  for  party  formation.  The  election 
of  1860  turned  on  issues  raised  by  executive  policy 
in  Kansas.  The  administration  of  President  Lin- 
coln saw  the  opening  of  a  new  arsenal  of  presi- 
dential authority  in  the  war  powers,  whose  extent 
is  still  quite  unmeasured.  The  President  levied 
an  army  without  authority  of  Congress,  and  before 
Congress  had  met.  He  assumed  and  exercised  the 
right  of  suspending  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus. 
The  crowning  event  of  his  administration — the 
emancipation  of  the  slaves  —  did  not  take  place  in 
pursuance  of  any  act  of  Congress,  but  was  done 
on  his  own  authority  as  President,  and  was  as 
absolute  an  exercise  of  power  as  the  ukase  of 
the  Czar  which  freed  the  serfs  of  Russia.  Presi- 


THE   PRESIDENCY  28 1 

dent  Lincoln  was  able  to  do  these  things  by  the 
direct  support  of  public  opinion,  irrespective  of 
the  volition  of  Congress.  Although  in  the  case 
of  his  accidental  successor,  Congress  was  strong 
enough  to  enforce  its  own  programme  of  recon- 
struction, it  instinctively  recognized  the  fact  that 
it  was  not  able  to  do  so  from  its  inherent  au- 
thority. Senator  Sherman  put  the  case  exactly 
when  he  said,  "The  recent  acts  of  Congress, 
those  acts  upon  which  the  President  and  Con- 
gress separated,  were  submitted  to  the  people, 
and  after  a  very  full  canvass  and  a  very  able 
one,  in  which  great  numbers  of  speeches  were 
made  on  both  sides,  and  documents  were  circu- 
lated, the  people,  who  are  the  common  masters 
of  President  and  Congress,  decided  in  favor  of 
Congress." 1  That  is  to  say,  Congress  prevailed 
not  by  virtue  of  its  ordinary  representative  capa- 
city, but  by  express  delegation  for  that  special 
purpose. 

While  all  that  a  President  can  certainly  accom- 
plish is  to  force  a  submission  of  an  issue  to  the 
people,  yet  such  is  the  strength  of  the  office  that, 
if  he  makes  a  sincere  and  resolute  use  of  its  re- 
sources, at  the  same  time  cherishing  his  party  con- 
nection, he  can  as  a  rule  carry  his  party  with  him, 
because  of  the  powerful  interests  which  impel  it 
to  occupy  ground  taken  for  it  by  the  administra- 
tion. Many  instances  of  this  tendency  may  be 

1  Congressional  Globe,  January  8,  1867. 


282  THE   ORGANS  OF  GOVERNMENT 

found  in  our  political  history.  A  noted  case  in 
our  own  times  is  the  result  of  General  Grant's 
veto  in  1874  of  the  bill  providing  for  an  additional 
issue  of  legal  tender  notes.  Later  on,  the  same 
Congress  passed  an  act  providing  for  the  redemp- 
tion in  coin  of  the  outstanding  issues. 

On  the  other  hand,  unless  a  measure  is  made  an 
administrative  issue,  Congress  is  unable  to  make 
it  a  party  issue.  Colonel  W.  R.  Morrison,  when 
the  Democratic  leader  of  the  House,  was  unable  to 
accomplish  the  passage  of  a  tariff  bill  although 
there  was  a  party  majority.  His  explanation  of 
his  failure  is  that  "  my  bills  all  lacked  the  in- 
fluence of  administration  and  party  support  and 
patronage."  Colonel  Morrison's  successor,  Mr. 
Mills,  was  more  fortunate  in  his  leadership  of  the 
House,  because  "when  Mr.  Cleveland  took  decided 
ground  in  favor  of  revision  and  reduction  he  rep- 
resented the  patronage  of  the  administration,  in 
consequence  of  which  he  was  enabled  to  enforce 
party  discipline,  so  that  a  man  could  no  longer  be 
a  good  Democrat  and  favor  anything  but  the  re- 
form of  the  tariff."  l 

If,  in  default  of  a  definite  administrative  policy 
vigorously  asserted,  Congress  is  left  to  its  own 
devices,  issues  are  compromised  and  emergencies 
are  dealt  with  by  makeshift  expedients.  The  com- 
plex entanglements  of  the  currency  situation  were 
brought  about  in  this  way.  But  even  then,  the 

1  New  York  Sun  interview,  September  12,  1893. 


THE  PRESIDENCY  283 

presidential  authority,  -however  passive  its  condi- 
tion, continues  to  be  a  factor  of  great  importance. 
The  passage  of  the  silver  bullion  purchase  act  of 
1890,  according  to  its  framer,  Senator  Sherman, 
was  thus  the  result  of  the  President's  attitude, 
although  the  President  had  nothing  directly  to  do 
with  it.  Senator  Sherman  says:  "A  large  major- 
ity of  the  Senate  favored  free  silver ;  and  it  was 
feared  that  the  small  majority  against  it  in  the 
other  House  might  yield  and  agree  to  it.  The 
silence  of  the  President  in  the  matter  gave  rise  to 
an  apprehension  that  if  a  free  coinage  bill  should 
pass  both  Houses,  he  would  not  feel  at  liberty  to 
veto  it.  Some  action  had  to  be  taken  to  prevent 
a  return  to  free  silver  coinage,  and  the  measure 
evolved  was  the  best  obtainable."  l  The  repeal  of 
this  law  in  November,  1893,  after  a  memorable 
struggle  in  the  Senate,  affords  a  conspicuous 
example  of  the  efficiency  of  the  presidential  office 
in  influencing  legislation  when  in  earnest  about 
the  discharge  of  that  duty. 

The  evidence  which  our  history  affords  seems 
conclusive  of  the  fact  that  the  only  power  which 
can  end  party  duplicity  and  define  issues  in  such 
a  way  that  public  opinion  can  pass  upon  them 
decisively,  is  that  which  emanates  from  presiden- 
tial authority.  It  is  the  rule  of  our  politics  that 
no  vexed  question  is  settled  except  by  executive 
policy.  Whatever  may  be  the  feeling  of  Congress 

1  Sherman's  Memoirs,  p.  1070. 


284  THE    ORGANS   OF  GOVERNMENT 

towards  the  President,  it  cannot  avoid  an  issue 
which  he  insists  upon  making.  And  this  holds 
good  of  presidents  who  lose  their  party  leader- 
ship as  with  those  who  retain  it.  Tyler,  Johnson, 
and  Cleveland,  although  repudiated  by  the  parties 
which  elected  them,  furnished  the  issues  upon 
which  party  action  turned. 

The  rise  of  presidential  authority  cannot  be 
accounted  for  by  the  intention  of  presidents :  it  is 
the  product  of  political  conditions  which  dominate 
all  the  departments  of  government,  so  that  Con- 
gress itself  shows  an  unconscious  disposition  to 
aggrandize  the  presidential  office.  The  existence 
of  a  separate  responsible  authority  to  which  ques- 
tions of  public  policy  may  be  resigned  opens  to 
Congress  an  easy  way  out  of  difficulty  when  the 
exercise  of  its  own  jurisdiction  would  be  trouble- 
some. Its  servitude  to  particular  interests  makes 
it  chary  of  issues  which  may  cause  dissension.  It 
goes  only  so  far  as  it  is  compelled  to  go  in  obedi- 
ence to  a  party  mandate,  and  is  apt  to  leave  as  much 
as  possible  to  executive  discretion.  So  it  happens 
that  important  determinations  of  national  policy 
are  reached  in  ways  that  seem  to  ignore  congres- 
sional authority,  although  the  circumstances  imply 
congressional  acquiescence.  A  curious  case  in 
point  is  the  well-known  fact  that  the  gold  reserve 
fund,  which  became  the  base  of  the  monetary  sys- 
tem of  the  nation,  was  the  creation  of  the  execu- 
tive department.  There  is  no  law  on  the  statute 


THE  PRESIDENCY  285 

books  which  directed  or  authorized  the  establish- 
ment of  a  gold  reserve  fund.  The  act  of  1875  for 
the  resumption  of  specie  payments  authorized  the 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury  to  sell  bonds  to  enable 
him  to  redeem  in  coin  the  legal  tender  notes  of 
the  United  States.  Under  the  authority  of  that 
law  Secretary  Sherman  collected  $100,000,000  in 
gold  which  was  designated  as  the  reserve  fund, 
and  its  existence  has  been  only  indirectly  recog- 
nized by  subsequent  legislation. 

When  the  reserve  fund  was  depleted  during  the 
panic  of  1893-1894,  the  administration  was  reluc- 
tant to  take  the  responsibility  of  selling  bonds  to 
replenish  the  fund,  and  submitted  to  the  Senate 
Committee  on  Finance  the  draught  of  a  bill, 
specially  authorizing  the  sale  of  bonds  for  that 
purpose.  The  party  leaders,  however,  advised  the 
executive  department  to  proceed  upon  its  own 
responsibility,  on  the  ground,  as  given  by  Sena- 
tor Voorhees,  chairman  of  the  Finance  Commit- 
tee, that  "  it  will  be  wiser,  safer,  and  better  for 
the  financial  and  business  interests  of  the  country 
to  rely  upon  existing  law  with  which  to  meet  the 
present  emergency  rather  than  to  encounter  the 
delays  and  uncertainties  always  incident  to  pro- 
tracted discussion  in  the  two  Houses  of  Con- 
gress." l  This  confession  of  the  incapacity  of 
Congress  in  the  presence  of  an  emergency,  made 
with  such  exquisite  candor,  gave  no  sting  to  par- 
1  Statement  furnished  to  the  Associated  Press,  January  16,  1894. 


286  THE  ORGANS   OF  GOVERNMENT 

liamentary  pride,  and  excited  no  comment.  The 
opposition  of  course  promptly  denied  the  right  of 
the  administration  to  issue  bonds,  but  it  did  not 
seem  to  occur  to  any  one  that  the  abased  attitude 
assigned  to  Congress  was  at  all  unfitted  to  its  dig- 
nity. The  whole  debate  turned  upon  points  of 
law. 

The  strong  disposition  of  Congress  to  extend 
the  scope  of  federal  duty  powerfully  stimulates 
the  development  of  presidential  authority.  That 
authority  may  emerge  with  startling  vigor  from 
the  implications  of  laws  enacted  without  any  idea 
of  producing  such  results.  A  memorable  instance 
is  the  manner  in  which  the  last  vestige  of  the  old 
state  sovereignty  doctrine  was  obliterated  from 
practical  politics  by  the  agency  of  the  interstate 
commerce  act.  In  assuming  to  regulate  interstate 
commerce,  Congress  put  upon  the  national  adminis- 
tration the  responsibility  of  maintaining  interstate 
railroads  as  national  highways.  The  significance 
of  this  never  dawned  upon  the  country  until  the 
railroad  strikes  of  1894  took  place,  when  the  arm 
of  federal  power  was  suddenly  extended  to  suppress 
riot  and  quell  disorder.  The  popular  belief  had 
always  been  that  the  national  government  could 
riot  act  in  such  cases  until  requested  by  state 
authority,  but  now  state  authority  was  not  only 
ignored,  but  its  protests  were  unheeded.  Time 
was  when  such  action  would  have  convulsed  the 
nation  and  might  have  caused  collision  between 


THE  PRESIDENCY  28? 

state  and  federal  authority,  but  the  act  was  hailed 
with  intense  gratification  both  North  and  South ; 
the  governors  who  took  up  the  old  cry  of  state 
rights  were  loaded  with  derision,  and  a  Congress, 
Democratic  in  both  branches,  passed  resolutions 
by  acclamation  approving  the  action  of  the  execu- 
tive. 

Such  vigor,  in  an  authority  which  the  framers 
of  the  constitution  erected  with  painful  misgivings 
as  to  its  stability,  becomes  the  more  impressive 
when  it  is  contrasted  with  the  lot  of  the  institu- 
tion upon  which  it  was  patterned.  The  Federalist 
makes  a  detailed  comparison  between  the  powers 
of  the  President  and  the  British  crown,  so  as  to 
exhibit  the  more  stringent  limitations  and  the  infe- 
rior authority  of  the  presidency.  Since  then  every 
power  ascribed  to  the  king  has  withered  ;  but  there 
is  no  authority  conceded  to  the  President,  at  the 
time  the  duties  of  the  office  began,  that  is  not 
flourishing  with  unimpaired  vigor.  Moreover, 
authority  which  the  early  Presidents  would  not 
have  ventured  to  assume  is  now  regarded  as  be- 
longing to  the  ordinary  functions  of  the  office. 
This  aggrandizement  of  presidential  authority  has 
gone  on  under  all  parties  since  Jackson's  time,  and 
in  the  hands  of  men  of  widely  varying  capacity. 
The  tendency  is  so  powerful  that  it  sustains  itself 
against  the  great  weakness  of  the  vice-presidency 
in  our  constitutional  system.  That  office,  of  such 
small,  ordinary  importance  that  it  is  disposed  of 


288  THE    ORGANS   OF  GOVERNMENT 

as  an  incident  in  the  struggle  for  the  presidential 
nomination,  serving  as  a  make-weight  on  the  ticket, 
or  as  a  sop  to  faction,  may  at  any  time  produce 
a  President.  Men  have  been  raised  to  the  presi- 
dency who  never  would  have  been  thought  of  as 
a  candidate  for  that  office ;  but  its  powers  have 
sustained  no  permanent  loss  thereby.  Although 
once  executive  power,  in  the  hands  of  an  accidental 
President,  was  bent  and  held  down  by  the  weight 
of  a  huge  congressional  majority,  its  springs  were 
unbroken,  and  it  sprang  up  unhurt  when  the  abnor- 
mal pressure  was  removed.  Incidentally  the  history 
of  Andrew  Johnson's  administration  discloses  the 
fact  that  the  extraordinary  check  provided  by  the 
constitution  —  the  process  of  impeachment  —  is 
practically  worthless.  It  remains  in  the  armory 
of  Congress,  a  rusted  blunderbuss,  that  will  prob- 
ably never  be  taken  in  hand  again. 

Another  check  upon  the  power  of  the  President, 
which  has  been  made  obsolete  by  the  peculiar  turn 
taken  by  our  constitutional  development,  is  the 
power  of  the  House  to  refuse  supplies.  Madison 
said  :  "The  House  of  Representatives  cannot  only 
refuse,  but  they  alone  can  propose  the  supplies 
requisite  for  the  support  of  the  government.  .  .  . 
This  power  over  the  purse  may,  in  fact,  be  regarded 
as  the  most  effectual  weapon  with  which  any  con- 
stitution can  arm  the  immediate  representatives 
of  the  people,  for  obtaining  a  redress  of  every 
grievance,  and  for  carrying  into  effect  every  just 


THE  PRESIDENCY  289 

and  salutary  measure."1  Such  an  opinion  was 
fully  warranted  by  English  constitutional  history, 
but  it  has  been  falsified  by  American  experience. 
As  a  means  of  coercing  the  administration,  con- 
trol of  supply  failed  so  completely  when  the 
test  was  made  that  it  is  not  likely  that  such  an 
use  of  it  will  ever  be  made  again.  Probably  the 
attempt  would  not  have  been  made  at  all  had 
it  not  been  for  the  extraordinary  circumstances 
of  the  presidential  election  of  1876  and  the  moral 
weakness  of  President  Hayes'  position.  The 
House  attempted  to  reduce  federal  control  of 
elections  by  annexing  conditions  to  appropriation 
bills ;  but  the  demands  of  the  House  were  baffled 
by  a  series  of  vetoes,  and  in  the  end  Congress  had 
to  pass  the  appropriation  bills  without  the  extrane- 
ous legislation  to  which  the  President  objected. 
It  is  now  a  fact  recognized  by  all  parties  that  the 
idea  of  stopping  the  government  by  withholding 
supplies  cannot  even  be  considered  seriously.  As 
a  practical  expedient,  such  a  check  upon  executive 
authority  no  longer  exists.  The  federal  election 
laws  that  were  attacked  in  1876  were  repealed  in 
1894,  but  that  was  not  until  the  people  had  put 
a  President  in  office  who  was  favorable  to  the 
repeal. 

Although  the  power  of  making  appointments  to 
office  has  been,  to  a  large  extent,  practically  taken 
over  by  the  Senate,  under  the  exercise  of  the  au- 
1  The  Federalist,  No.  58. 


2QO  THE    ORGANS   OF  GOVERNMENT 

thority  to  confirm  or  reject  nominations,  yet  in 
this  respect  also,  the  executive  department  pos- 
sesses abundant  power  for  the  protection  of  its 
constitutional  rights.  The  President  has  power 
"to  fill  up  all  vacancies  that  may  happen  during 
the  recess  of  the  Senate,  by  granting  commissions 
which  shall  expire  at  the  end  of  their  next  ses- 
sion." As  he  has  absolute  power  of  removal,  he 
can  select  his  own  time  for  making  vacancies,  and 
the  commissions  which  he  shall  issue  will  hold 
good  to  the  last  day  of  the  expiring  session, 
whereupon,  in  case  of  a  rejection,  another  com- 
mission may  be  issued  of  like  duration.  Prece- 
dents for  such  action  go  back  to  the  early  days 
of  the  republic.  Robert  Smith  acted  as  Secretary 
of  the  Navy  during  the  whole  period  of  Jefferson's 
second  administration  without  his  appointment  to 
that  office  being  confirmed  by  the  Senate,  or  any 
known  authority  except  the  verbal  request  or  per- 
mission of  the  President.1  The  appointment  of 
Taney  to  be  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  in 
which  office  he  carried  out  the  financial  policy  of 
the  administration,  was  never  confirmed  by  the 
Senate.  Jackson  did  not  send  in  the  nomination 
until  the  last  week  of  the  session,  when  Taney  had 
finished  all  that  he  entered  the  office  to  do.  There 
are  numerous  precedents  for  the  appointment  and 
retention  of  minor  officials  in  the  face  of  senato- 
rial refusal  to  confirm  the  nominations.  There 

1  Adams'  History  of  the  United  States,  Vol.  III.,  p.  12. 


THE  PRESIDENCY  2QI 

were  a  number  of  such  cases  during  President 
Cleveland's  term  of  office. 

The  strongest  and  most  unqualified  statements 
of  the  powers  of  the  presidential  office  come  from 
experienced  statesmen  who  have  had  the  best  oppor- 
tunity of  scrutinizing  its  operation.  John  Quincy 
Adams,  at  a  time  when  presidential  authority  was 
less  developed  than  now,  said,  "  It  has  perhaps 
never  been  duly  remarked  that,  under  the  consti- 
tution of  the  United  States,  the  powers  of  the 
executive  department,  explicitly  and  emphatically 
concentrated  in  one  person,  are  vastly  more 
extensive  and  complicated  than  those  of  the 
legislature." l  Secretary  Seward  told  a  London 
Times  correspondent,  who  was  interrogating  him 
as  to  the  nature  of  our  government,  "  We  elect 
a  king  for  four  years,  and  give  him  absolute  power 
within  certain  limits,  which  after  all  he  can  inter- 
pret for  himself."  2  Quite  as  strong  were  the  ex- 
pressions used  by  ex-President  Hayes  to  a  publicist 
who  applied  for  information  on  the  subject.  "Prac- 
tically the  President  holds  the  nation  in  his  hand."  3 
Hare,  the  leading  legal  authority  on  this  subject, 
sums  up  the  case  as  follows  :  — 

"  A  chief  magistrate  who  wields  the  whole  mili- 
tary and  no  inconsiderable  share  of  the  civil  power 
of  the  state,  who  can  incline  the  scale  to  war  and 

1  Discourse  on  the  Jubilee  of  the  Constitution. 

2  Jennings'  Republican  Government  in  the  United  States,  p.  36. 

3  Stevens'  Sources  of  the  Constitution,  pp.  167-170. 


THE    ORGANS   OF  GOVERNMENT 

forbid  the  return  of  peace,  whose  veto  will  stay 
the  force  of  legislation,  who  is  the  source  of  the 
enormous  patronage  which  is  the  main  lever  in 
the  politics  of  the  United  States,  exercises  func- 
tions which  are  more  truly  regal  than  those  of  an 
English  monarch."  l 

It  should  be  carefully  noted,  however,  that  this 
power  of  the  presidential  office  does  not  proceed 
from  its  strength  as  an  embodiment  of  royal  pre- 
rogative as  conceived  by  the  framers  of  the  consti- 
tution. Their  expectation  was  that  in  the  ordi- 
nary working  of  the  machinery  of  election  they 
had  devised,  there  would  be  numbers  of  candidates 
in  various  states  —  "favorite  sons,"  to  use  the  mod- 
ern phrase.  Therefore  the  electoral  college  of  each 
state  was  to  vote  for  two  persons,  one  of  whom 
should  not  be  an  inhabitant  of  that  state,  so  that, 
at  least  in  one  instance,  the  vote  of  each  state 
would  be  likely  to  "fall  on  characters  eminent  and 
generally  known."2  The  Federalist  speaks  of  this 
scheme  with  a  complacency  rare  in  that  sombre 
treatise ;  but  it  was  a  complete  failure.  It  never 
worked  according  to  the  design,  except  in  the 
election  of  Washington,  when  the  work  of  the 
electoral  college  was  really  done  for  it  in  advance, 
and  it  had  simply  to  register  an  unanimous  con- 
sent. The  greatness  of  the  presidency  is  the  work 


1  American  Constitutional  Law,  p.  1 73. 

2  Madison's  Journal,  September  5. 


THE  PRESIDENCY  293 

of  the  people,  breaking  through  the  constitutional 
form. 

The  truth  is  that  in  the  presidential  office,  as  it 
has  been  constituted  since  Jackson's  time,  Amer- 
ican democracy  has  revived  the  oldest  political 
institution  of  the  race,  the  elective  kingship.  It 
is  all  there :  the  precognition  of  the  notables  and 
the  tumultuous  choice  of  the  freemen,  only  con- 
formed to  modern  conditions.  That  the  people 
have  been  able  to  accomplish  this  with  such  de- 
fective apparatus,  and  have  been  able  to  make 
good  a  principle  which  no  other  people  have  been 
able  to  reconcile  with  the  safety  of  the  state,  indi- 
cates the  highest  degree  of  constitutional  morality 
yet  attained  by  any  race. 


CHAPTER   XXIII 

PARTY     ORGANIZATION 

PARTY  is  as  old  as  politics,  and  the  opera- 
tion of  party  in  working  the  machinery  of  gov- 
ernment is  seen  in  all  countries  having  free 
institutions  ;  but  of  party  as  an  external  authority, 
expressing  its  determinations  through  its  own 
peculiar  organs,  the  United  States  as  yet  offers 
to  the  world  the  only  distinct  example,  although 
tendencies  in  that  direction  are  showing  them- 
selves in  England.  There  is  still,  however,  noth- 
ing of  which  the  British  Parliament  is  more 
intolerant  than  an  assumption  that  there  exists 
any  constitution  of  authority  exterior  to  its  own, 
which  can  claim  to  give  expression  to  the  will  of 
the  people.  No  less  keen  a  jealousy  might  have 
been  expected  from  the  Congress  of  the  United 
States,  which,  according  to  the  constitution,  di- 
rectly represents  both  the  people  and  their  state 
governments.  Assuredly  nothing  would  have 
been  more  incomprehensible  and  astonishing  to 
the  framers  of  the  constitution  than  to  have  been 
informed  that  a  political  jurisdiction  would  be  es- 
tablished, unknown  to  the  constitution  and  with- 
out warrant  of  law,  whose  determinations  would 

294 


PARTY  ORGANIZATION  2C)$ 

be  recognized  as  entitled  to  delineate  the  policy 
of  the  administration  and  bind  the  proceedings  of 
Congress.  Such  obligation,  though  constantly 
paltered  with  by  faction  interests  and  continually 
evaded  by  tricky  politicians,  is  nevertheless  un- 
reservedly admitted.  To  such  an  extent  is  this 
submission  carried  that  it  is  not  an  uncommon 
thing  for  members  of  Congress  to  admit  that  they 
are  acting  under  the  compulsion  of  such  obliga- 
tion against  their  own  judgment.1 

Although  party  organization  asserts  jurisdiction 
over  the  constitutional  organs  of  government,  its 
own  pretensions  to  a  representative  character  have 
a  very  slight  basis.  The  theory  of  party  organiza- 
tion is  that  its  power  emanates  directly  from  the 
people,  by  means  of  a  system  according  to  which 
the  party  membership,  at  primary  elections,  choose 
delegates  who  meet  to  state  the  party  principles 
and  name  the  party  candidates.  In  practice,  few 
people  besides  the  politicians  have  any  share  in 
the  transaction.  As  a  rule,  the  vote  at  primary 
elections  is  very  small,  and  even  when  exceptional 

1  Mr.  Gorman. — The  senator  from  Wisconsin  says  that  both 
parties  were  somewhat  intimidated  by  the  people  who  were  the 
special  advocates  of  this  law.  For  one,  I  do  not  believe  we  can 
shirk  our  duty  in  this  matter. 

Mr.  Spooner.  —  All  I  said  was  this,  and  I  repeat  it,  that  both  the 
political  parties  were  committed  to  the  principle  of  the  civil  ser- 
vice law  and  its  maintenance. 

Mr.  Gorman.  —  To  that  I  agree. 

—  Congressional  Record,  February  24,  1891,  p.  3395. 


296  THE   ORGANS   OF  GOVERNMENT 

circumstances  bring  out  a  large  vote,  it  is  still 
small  as  compared  with  that  polled  at  a  regular 
election.  In  many  cases  there  is  hardly  the  pre- 
tence of  an  election  by  the  party  membership,  but 
the  politicians  frankly  bargain  among  themselves 
who  shall  attend  the  conventions  and  figure  as 
party  representatives.  The  total  vote  polled  for 
the  members  of  a  national  convention,  which  nom- 
inates the  President  and  declares  the  policy  to  be 
pursued  by  the  government,  is  but  a  small  per- 
centage of  the  vote  polled  at  a  congressional 
election. 

What  is  still  more  significant  is  the  fact  that 
there  appears  to  be  no  connection  between  the 
extent  to  which  a  constituent  quality  has  been  im- 
parted to  a  convention,  and  the  force  with  which 
its  decisions  appeal  to  public  confidence  and  sup- 
port. So  far  as  the  appearance  of  representative 
character  in  party  organization  is  concerned,  it  is 
generally  greatest  when  its  subjection  to  profes- 
sional management  is  most  complete.  In  an  old 
party,  which  has  acquired  a  valuable  stock  of 
traditional  sentiment  and  popular  attachment, 
the  reciprocal  efforts  of  struggling  factions  have 
evolved  a  stringent  code  of  regulations  to  prevent 
unfair  advantages,  and  their  mutual  jealousies  in- 
sure vigilant  attention  to  regularity  of  procedure. 
A  spontaneous  movement,  issuing  from  popular 
enthusiasm,  is  tolerant  of  irregularity  in  method. 
It  welcomes  without  question  those  whose  heart 


PARTY  ORGANIZATION  297 

is  in  the  cause.  The  convention  of  a  new  party 
has  largely  the  character  of  a  mass-meeting.  Es- 
tablished usage  requires  some  observance  of  the 
form  of  delegation,  but  practically  any  one  of  re- 
spectability and  standing,  who  is  in  sympathy  with 
the  movement,  may  take  part  in  the  proceedings. 
A  reform  movement  will  eagerly  cluster  around  a 
self-constituted  leadership,  while  the  regular  politi- 
cal boss  in  selecting  candidates  must  carefully  re- 
spect the  form  of  nomination  by  delegates  from  the 
people.  The  Committee  of  Seventy,  appointed 
by  some  citizens'  associations,  nominated  a  ticket 
which  swept  New  York  City  in  the  election  of 
1894,  while  the  Tammany  ticket,  regularly  nomi- 
nated by  a  body  of  genuine  constituent  character, 
was  defeated. 

Such  considerations  make  it  plain  that  the  true 
office  of  party  organization  is  that  of  a  factor.  It 
carries  on  a  self-assumed  procuration  in  the  name 
of  the  people  and  by  their  acquiescence,  but  not  by 
their  desire.  The  appearance  of  a  representative 
character  is-  the  result  of  arrangements  gradually 
effected  under  pressure  of  a  demand  that  the 
emoluments  and  opportunities  of  this  business  of 
factorship  should  be  open  to  competition.  This 
view  of  the  case  is  fully  confirmed  by  the  history 
of  party  organization  sketched  in  the  preceding 
chapters.  The  occasion  for  it  was  the  need  of 
means  of  concentration  so  as  to  establish  a  control 
over  the  divided  powers  of  government.  Party 


298  THE  ORGANS  OF  GOVERNMENT 

machinery  was  devised  under  the  stimulus  of 
necessity  and  has  been  submitted  to  because  there 
was  no  help  for  it.  A  paradoxical  phrase,  often 
used  in  regard  to  this  very  matter,  puts  the  case 
exactly  as  the  people  regard  it.  It  is  a  necessary 
evil. 

The  development  of  party  organization  has  been 
elaborate  and  extensive  in  keeping  with  the  vast 
expansion  of  the  nation  and  the  multifarious  politi- 
cal activities  of  our  complicated  system  of  govern- 
ment. The  struggles  of  the  people  to  convert  the 
government  to  democratic  uses  have  introduced 
complications  which  have  greatly  enlarged  the 
functions  of  party  organization  and  intensified 
their  energy.  The  movement  towards  the  mul- 
tiplication of  elective  offices  originated  in  popu- 
lar revolt  against  class  rule.  The  constitutional 
framework  of  the  national  government  was  so 
unyielding  that  effort  was  expended  upon  it  in 
vain  ;  but  plastic  material  was  found  in  the  state 
constitutions.  The  democratic  movement  which 
raised  Jackson  to  the  presidency,  although  baffled 
in  all  its  designs  of  amending  the  constitution  of 
the  United  States,  has  left  a  deep  influence  upon 
state  constitutions.  A  sentiment  of  popular  hos- 
tility to  aristocratic  control  was  the  force  that  sus- 
tained the  movement  of  constitutional  reform,  and, 
as  a  means  of  diminishing  the  sphere  of  such  con- 
trol and  admitting  new  interests  to  power,  there 
was  no  expedient  so  effective  as  turning  appoint- 


PARTY  ORGANIZATION  2Q9 

ive  into  elective  offices.  The  powers  of  the  gov- 
ernor were  reduced  by  converting  local  agencies 
of  government  into  elective  offices.  Heads  of 
state  departments,  that  had  been  appointed  by  the 
governor  or  by  the  legislature,  were  also  cut  loose 
to  be  filled  under  the  form  of  popular  election. 
Even  the  judiciary  did  not  escape,  and  in  most  of 
the  states  the  office  of  judge  was  abandoned  to 
party  politics  by  making  it  elective.  The  practi- 
cal effect  of  the  change  was  to  convert  a  system  of 
responsible  appointment  into  a  system  of  irrespon- 
sible appointment.  It  is  obviously  impossible  for 
the  people  to  select  officers  for  innumerable  places 
except  by  some  means  of  agreement  and  coopera- 
tion, which  means  is  ordinarily  supplied  by  the 
activity  of  the  political  class.  It  may  be  laid  down 
as  a  political  maxim,  that  whatever  assigns  to  the 
people  a  power  which  they  are  naturally  incapable 
of  wielding  takes  it  away  from  them.  It  may  be 
argued  that  this  principle  carried  to  its  logical 
conclusion  implies  that  the  people  are  unable  to 
select  their  own  rulers  in  any  case.  This  is  per- 
fectly true.  The  actual  selection  will  be  always 
made  by  the  few,  no  matter  how  many  may  seem 
to  participate.  The  only  value  of  popular  elections 
is  to  establish  accountability  to  the  people,  but  this 
rightly  used  is  quite  enough  to  constitute  a  free 
government. 

The  multiplication  of  elective  offices  and   the 
distribution  of  the  responsibilities  of  government 


300  THE   ORGANS  OF  GOVERNMENT 

among  independent  authorities,  dissipates  account- 
ability so  that  practically  it  ceases  to  exist.  It 
puzzles  foreign  observers  to  understand  how  any 
public  responsibility  can  be  enforced  under  such 
a  system.  Mr.  Bryce  remarks :  "  Will  not  a 
scheme,  in  which  the  executive  officers  are  all 
independent  of  one  another,  yet  not  subject  to 
the  legislature,  want  every  condition  needed  for 
harmonious  and  efficient  action  ?  They  obey  no- 
body. They  are  responsible  to  nobody,  except  a 
people  which  only  exists  in  concrete  activity  for 
one  election  day  every  two  years,  when  it  is  drop- 
ping papers  into  the  ballot-box.  Such  a  system 
seems  the  negation  of  a  system,  and  more  akin 
to  chaos."  1  The  explanation  of  this  mystery  is 
that  the  scattered  powers  of  government  are  re- 
sumed by  party  organization,  and  this  concentra- 
tion of  power 'carries  with  it  a  public  responsibility 
which  may  be  enforced.  The  soundness  of  the 
popular  instinct  on  this  point  is  shown  by  the 
indifference  of  voters  to  the  personal  merits  of 
candidates,  when  moved  by  resentment  against 
party  organization.  One  of  the  peculiarities  of  the 
great  revulsions  of  feeling,  which  have  obtained 
the  name  of  "tidal-waves,"  is  the  way  in  which 
they  toss  into  prominence,  grotesque  nonentities 
and  incapables  who  never  could  have  obtained 
important  office  by  the  ordinary  gradation  of 
political  preferment. 

1  American  Commonwealth,  Vol.  I.,  p.  530. 


PARTY  ORGANIZATION  3OI 

The  interdependence  of  political  interests  is 
such  that  local  transactions  cannot  be  separated 
from  state  and  national  concerns.  If  the  party 
is  hurt  anywhere,  it  feels  it  everywhere.1  Needs 
of  adjustment  between  local  and  general  political 
interests  have  thus  been  created,  which  have 
gradually  evolved  a  hierarchy  of  political  control, 
with  respective  rights  and  privileges  that  are 
tenaciously  insisted  upon.  In  this  respect  party 
organization  curiously  resembles  feudalism.  The 
city  boss  and  the  state  boss  are  the  grand  feuda- 
tories of  the  system.  The  city  boss  is  the  nexus 
of  municipal  administration, —  a  centre  of  control 
outside  of  the  partitions  of  authority  which  public 
prejudice  and  traditional  opinion  insist  upon  in 
the  formal  constitution  of  city  government.  The 
boss  system  is  enormously  expensive,  but  so  great 
is  the  value  of  concentrated  authority  in  business 
management  that  one  may  hear  it  said  among 
practical  men  of  affairs  that  a  city  needs  a  politi- 
cal boss  in  order  to  be  progressive.  The  fact  is 
well  known  that  it  was  due  to  authority  of  this 
kind  that  the  national  capital  was  transformed 
from  an  area  of  swamps  and  mud-banks  into  the 
beautiful  city  it  is  now.  The  state  boss  is  the 

1  At  the  New  York  City  election  of  1897,  the  Low  movement 
confined  itself  to  local  purposes,  and  offered  its  adherents  no 
candidate  for  the  state  office  voted  for  at  the  same  election.  As 
a  result,  67,677  votes  that  were  cast  for  local  candidates  were  not 
cast  at  all  for  judge  of  the  Court  of  Appeals. 


302  THE    ORGANS   OF  GOVERNMENT 

natural  complement  of  the  situation  produced  by 
the  dissolution  of  executive  authority  in  state 
government.  The  office  restores  outside  of  the 
formal  constitution  what  is  lost  inside  of  it  — 
efficient  control.  In  the  national  government  no 
such  dissolution  having  taken  place,  the  ca'se  is 
different.  There  is  no  national  boss  but  the 
President,  and  that  is  what  the  people  put  him 
there  to  be.  If  he  does  not  boss  the  situation,  he 
is  a  political  failure,  no  matter  what  else  he  may 
be. 

Thus  by  a  perfectly  natural  process  of  evolution, 
the  structure  and  functions  of  party  organization 
have  been  elaborated,  so  as  to  comprehend  the 
political  activity  of  American  citizenship  from  the 
minutest  subdivision  of  local  government  up  to 
the  formation  of  a  national  administration.  Party 
organization  selects  candidates  for  innumerable 
offices ;  it  superintends  the  perpetual  succession 
of  elections ;  its  operation  is  continuous.  Since 
politics  in  all  their  gradations  have  their  connec- 
tions with  trade  and  society,  the  activities  of 
politics  permeate  the  whole  sphere  of  civic  life. 

The  community  of  interest  thus  established 
causes  party  organization  to  exercise  a  moderat- 
ing influence  of  immense  importance.  When  the 
convention  system  was  established,  its  direct  ap- 
peal to  the  people,  followed  by  numerous  mass- 
meetings  and  floods  of  oratory,  excited  a  violence 
of  party  feeling  that  horrified  statesmen  of  the 


PARTY  ORGANIZATION  303 

old  school.  "Here  is  a  revolution  in  the  habits 
and  manners  of  the  people,"  wrote  John  Quincy 
Adams  in  his  diary.  "These  meetings  cannot  be 
multiplied  in  number  and  frequency  without  result- 
ing in  deeper  tragedies.  Their  manifest  tendency 
is  to  civil  war." l  Calhoun  had  no  doubt  that 
"the  appeal  to  force  will  be  made  whenever  the 
violence  of  the  struggle  and  the  corruption  of 
parties  will  no  longer  submit  to  the  decision  of 
the  ballot-box."2 

But  history  plainly  shows  that  party  spirit  has 
not  had  any  such  tendency.  On  the  contrary, 
party  organization  long  repressed  the  operation  of 
the  forces  which  did  indeed  eventually  produce 
civil  war.  Before  the  slavery  question  could  be 
brought  to  the  front  as  the  decisive  issue  of 
national  politics,  an  entirely  new  and  purely  sec- 
tional party  had  to  be  formed.  National  party 
organization  held  the  Union  together  long  after 
the  South  had  become  at  heart  a  separate  nation, 
from  the  distinct  interests  and  purposes  developed 
by  slavery.  As  early  as  the  forties,  great  religious 
denominations  split  into  Northern  and  Southern 
divisions.  Calhoun,  in  his  last  speech,  called  at- 
tention to  the  manner  in  which  tie  after  tie  was 
snapping.  But  still  party  organization  continued 
to  bear  the  strain,  and  it  was  the  last  bond  of  union 
to  give  way.  Then  war  or  disunion  became  inevi- 

1  Memoirs,  Vol.  X.,  p.  352. 

2  Calhoun's  Works,  Vol.  I.,  pp.  378,  379. 


304  THE    ORGANS   OF  GOVERNMENT 

table.  After  the  war,  the  powerful  agency  of 
party  organization  was  again  displayed  in  the 
rapidity  with  which  the  revolted  section  was  re- 
incorporated  into  the  life  of  the  nation. 

The  truth  is  that  a  remarkable  nonchalance 
underlies  the  sound  and  fury  of  partisan  politics. 
The  passionate  recrimination  that  goes  on  is  like 
the  disputes  of  counsel  over  the  trial  table.  Back 
of  it  all  is  a  substantial  community  of  interest. 
The  violence  of  politicians  does  not  usually  go 
higher  than  their  lips.  The  antagonists  of  the 
stump  often  have  a  really  friendly  feeling  for  one 
another.  It  is  not  an  uncommon  thing  for  profes- 
sional politicians  of  opposing  parties  to  display  a 
spirit  of  mutual  good  will  and  helpfulness  in  pro- 
moting the  personal  political  interests  of  one  an- 
other. The  .extraordinary  thing  about  American 
party  politics  is  really  their  amenity.  Public  sen- 
timent, while  permitting  great  license  of  speech, 
exacts  a  decorum  of  behavior  that  is  surprising  to 
English  visitors,  accustomed  as  they  are  to  popu- 
lar turbulence  —  the  howling  down  of  speakers, 
storming  of  platforms,  and  scuffling  of  excited 
partisans.1  There  is  in  this  country  an  immense 
business  preparation  for  a  campaign,  an  enormous 

1  A  letter  in  the  New  York  Evening  Post,  November  13,  1897, 
makes  an  interesting  comparison  of  electioneering  in  the  two  coun- 
tries. The  writer  concludes  that  "an  American  public  meeting  is 
one  of  the  quietest  and  most  decorous  forms  of  entertainment  yet 
invented." 


PARTY  ORGANIZATION  305 

investment  in  spectacular  effects  and  stage  prop- 
erties, and  a  prodigious  display  of  enthusiasm,  cul- 
minating in  the  thrilling  scenes  of  election  night ; 
but  as  soon  as  the  result  is  fully  known,  it  is  good- 
humoredly  accepted  and  the  people  eagerly  return 
to  their  ordinary  business  pursuits. 

This  curious  circumspection  that  attends  the 
periodical  national  mood  of  party  frenzy  is  trace- 
able to  the  same  moderating  influence  that  devel- 
oped a  constitutional  system  of  party  government 
in  England  —  the  succession  of  opportunity  in  en- 
joyment of  the  offices  of  government.  Burke's 
expressive  metaphor  fits  the  case  exactly.  "The 
parties  are  the  gamesters ;  but  government  keeps 
the  table."  No  matter  how  passionately  they  con- 
tend, they  will  take  care  that  they  do  not  kick  over 
the  table  and  lose  the  stakes.  The  same  influence 
is  seen  in  the  way  in  which  party  spirit  reacts  against 
mob  spirit.  By  its  habit  of  consulting  and  flatter- 
ing all  interests,  party  spirit  may  encourage  mob 
spirit  up  to  a  certain  point ;  but  when  the  limits  of 
fair  accommodation  are  overpassed,  there  is  a  sud- 
den change  of  attitude  and  a  fierce  energy  is  shown 
in  repressing  disorder. 

The  true  office  of  the  elaborate  apparatus  used 
to  work  up  popular  excitement  over  party  issues  is 
to  energize  the  mass  of  citizenship  into  political 
activity.  Although  so  dissimilar  in  character,  na- 
tional party  organization  fulfils  a  function  similar 
to  that  indirectly  accomplished  in  England  by  royal 


306  THE    ORGANS   OF  GOVERNMENT 

prerogative  during  the  period  when  it  was  really 
massive ;  but  with  the  important  difference  that, 
whereas  then  the  various  classes  of  the  population 
were  fused  into  political  community  by  the  weight 
of  royalty,  party  spirit  now  draws  them  together 
by  ardent  sympathies  which  elicit  a  copious  and 
constant  supply  of  political  force.  Their  opera- 
tion extends  far  beyond  the  sphere  of  the  intelli- 
gence, for  they  thrill  and  penetrate  the  bottom 
strata  of  character,  —  the  inheritance  of  ancestral 
habit  moulded  by  tribal  discipline,  the  deposits  of 
race  experience  throughout  the  ages,  —  bringing 
into  play  those  deep  instincts  of  which  we  are 
unconscious,  but  which  constitute  the  wisest  part 
of  us. 

This  nationalizing  influence  continues  to  pro- 
duce results  of  the  greatest  social  value,  for  in 
coordinating  the  various  elements  of  the  popula- 
tion for  political  purposes,  party  organization  at 
the  same  time  tends  to  fuse  them  into  one  mass 
of  citizenship,  pervaded  by  a  common  order  of  ideas 
and  sentiments,  and  actuated  by  the  same  class  of 
motives.  This  is  probably  the  secret  of  the  power- 
ful solvent  influence  which  American  civilization 
exerts  upon  the  enormous  deposits  of  alien  popu- 
lations thrown  upon  this  country  by  the  torrent  of 
emigration.  Racial  and  religious  antipathies,  which 
present  the  most  threatening  problems  to  countries 
governed  upon  parliamentary  principles,  melt  with 
amazing  rapidity  in  the  warm  flow  of  a  party  spirit 


PARTY  ORGANIZATION  307 

which  is  constantly  demanding,  and  is  able  to  re- 
ward, the  subordination  of  local  and  particular  in- 
terests to  national  purposes.  The  extent  to  which 
accidents  of  foreign  nativity  or  extraction  are  made 
use  of,  to  constitute  what  is  known  in  politics  as  "  a 
vote,"  is  generally  regarded  as  the  great  weakness 
of  American  politics,  but  it  is  really  a  stage  in  the 
process  of  fusion.  In  order  that  "the  Irish  vote," 
"the  German  vote,"  "the  Italian  vote,"  etc.,  shall 
be  recognized  as  such,  they  must  display  a  spirit 
of  mutual  accommodation  and  enter  into  amicable 
relations.  It  is  a  matter  of  common  observation 
in  the  politics  of  our  great  cities  that  a  surprising 
amount  of  intimacy  and  association  between  peo- 
ple of  different  nationalities  is  thereby  brought 
about.  In  the  district  headquarters  of  a  party  or- 
ganization, one  may  perchance  see  an  Irish  ward 
captain  patting  on  the  back  some  Italian  ward 
worker  who  can  hardly  speak  intelligible  English, 
but  whose  pride  and  zeal  in  the  success  of  his  efforts 
to  bring  his  compatriots  "  in  line  with  the  party  " 
are  blazoned  upon  his  face.  American  politics 
seem  able  to  digest  and  assimilate  any  race  of  the 
Aryan  stock,  but  it  fails  with  the  negro  race,  so 
that  where  the  negro  vote  is  large  enough  to  be  a 
controlling  factor,  the  tendency  is  to  suppress  it  by 
the  direct  resistance  of  the  community  or  else  re- 
duce it  to  manageable  dimensions  by  special  con- 
trivance of  law. 

The  extensive  business  of  political  factorship, 


308  THE   ORGANS  OF  GOVERNMENT 

created  by  the  peculiar  circumstances  of  American 
politics,  naturally  attracts  to  its  various  employ- 
ments men  of  congenial  aptitudes.  Energy,  ad- 
dress, and  opportunity  tell  in  this  just  as  in  other 
pursuits.  The  power  exercised  by  the  political 
class  is  certainly  the  most  striking  characteristic 
of  American  public  affairs,  but  there  is  nothing 
mysterious  about  it.  Burke  gave  the  explanation 
long  ago  when  he  remarked  that  "  nations  are  gov- 
erned by  the  same  methods  and  on  the  same  prin- 
ciples by  which  an  individual  without  authority  is 
often  able  to  govern  those  who  are  his  equals  or 
superiors  :  by  a  knowledge  of  their  temper  and  a 
judicious  management  of  it."1 

It  is  the  fashion  to  regard  American  politicians 
as  a  peculiar  class,  who  as  individuals  are  addicted 
to  envy,  hatred,  and  all  uncharitableness,  and  whose 
machinations  as  a  body  are  responsible  for  the 
wide  disagreement  between  the  accepted  theory 
and  the  actual  practice  of  our  politics ;  but  this  is 
a  mistaken  view  of  the  case.  Whenever  people 
come  in  contact  in  the  struggles  of  life,  there  is 
friction.  People  in  the  same  line  of  business,  of 
whatever  sort,  have  their  feuds  as  well  as  their 
friendships,  and  if  the  public  heard  all  that  goes 
on  in  the  business  world,  it  would  be  found  that 
envy,  selfishness,  and  bickering  abound  there 
too.  The  public  business  being  everybody's  busi- 
ness, stuff  which,  if  it  concerned  the  transactions 

lThe  Present  Discontents. 


PARTY  ORGANIZATION  309 

of  ordinary  business,  would  be  considered  as  mere 
scandalous  gossip  and  backbiting,  in  politics  as- 
sumes the  rank  of  public  discussion  and  criticism, 
and  the  vast  reverberation  of  the  press  swells  the 
murmur  into  clamor.  Intimate  knowledge  and 
good  understanding,  however,  reveal  an  extent  of 
toleration,  charity,  and  downright  generosity  in 
politics  that  raises  one's  esteem  for  human  nature. 
The  consideration  shown  by  professional  politi- 
cians for  the  poor  and  unfortunate  is  a  beautiful 
trait  in  their  character.  The  relations  between 
them  and  their  constituents  in  many  cases  embrace 
sympathies  far  deeper  and  stronger  than  any  con- 
nection, founded  merely  upon  community  of  politi- 
cal ideas,  could  excite. 

There  is  really  nothing  peculiar  in  the  character 
of  American  politicians ;  but  the  circumstances 
which  condition  their  activity  are  very  peculiar. 
Their  demerits  are  those  which  pertain  to  their 
period,  and  find  abundant  parallels  in  the  history 
of  English  politics.  On  the  other  hand  they  have 
displayed,  in  meeting  the  peculiar  exigencies  of 
their  situation,  a  readiness  of  invention  and  an 
adaptability  of  method  which  are  characteristically 
American.  Not  even  the  great  industrial  develop- 
ment of  the  nation  affords  so  striking  an  exhibi- 
tion of  American  inventive  genius  and  faculty  for 
organization  as  that  huge,  complicated  mechanism 
which,  in  default  of  any  provision  for  direct  party 
control  of  legislative  procedure,  has  been  extended 


310  THE   ORGANS   OF  GOVERNMENT 

to  every  part  of  the  government  —  national,  state, 
and  municipal  —  so  as  to  reach  and  subject  to  some 
degree  of  public  responsibility  the  political  activi- 
ties finding  expression  in  the  various  state  legislat- 
ures and  in  Congress.  Nowhere  else  in  the  world, 
at  any  period,  has  party  organization  had  to  cope 
with  such  enormous  tasks  as  in  this  country,  and 
its  efficiency  in  dealing  with  them  is  the  true 
glory  of  our  political  system.  As  to  this,  the 
testimony  of  so  competent  and  unbiassed  a  critic 
as  Mr.  Bagehot  may  be  cited.  He  says  :  "  The 
Americans  now  extol  their  institutions,  and  so 
defraud  themselves  of  their  due  praise ;  but  if 
they  had  not  a  genius  for  politics,  if  they  had  not 
a  moderation  in  action  singularly  curious  where 
superficial  speech  is  so  violent,  if  they  had  not  a 
regard  for  laws  such  as  no  great  people  have  yet 
evinced,  and  infinitely  surpassing  ours  —  the  mul- 
tiplicity of  authorities  in  the  American  constitu- 
tion would  long  ago  have  brought  it  to  a  bad  end.1 
All  these  characteristics  are  phases  of  that 
genius  for  politics  of  which  party  organization  is 
the  expression  and  the  organ.  The  conclusion 
may  be  distasteful,  since  it  is  the  habit  of  the 
times  to  pursue  public  men  with  calumny  and 
detraction  ;  but  it  follows  that  when  history  comes 
to  reckon  the  achievements  of  our  age,  great  party 
managers  will  receive  an  appreciation  very  different 
from  what  is  now  accorded  to  them. 

1  Bagehut's  English  Constitution,  Chap.  VII. 


CHAPTER   XXIV 

PARTY    SUBSISTENCE 

HAVING  so  much  to  do,  party  organization  pro- 
vides employment  for  an  enormous  staff  of  mana- 
gers, agents,  and  servants.  Their  number  exceeds 
immensely  the  number  of  those  connected  with 
politics  in  any  country  in  which  unity  of  adminis- 
trative control  is  provided  by  the  constitution.  In 
England  the  class  of  professional  politicians  is  com- 
paratively small.  Mr.  Bryce  makes  an  interesting 
comparison  on  this  point.  He  says  that  by  the 
most  liberal  computation — one  that  includes  the 
members  of  Parliament  and  expectant  candidates ; 
editors,  managers,  and  chief  writers  on  leading 
newspapers ;  and  party  agents  in  the  various  con- 
stituencies—  he  reached  a  total  of  3500  in  all  Eng- 
land. Of  their  number  in  this  country  he  says,  "  I 
can  form  no  estimate,  save  that  it  must  be  counted 
by  hundreds  of  thousands,  inasmuch  as  it  practi- 
cally includes  nearly  all  office-holders  and  most 
expectants  of  public  office."  l  This  estimate,  al- 
though large,  is  very  moderate,  since  it  includes 
besides  federal  office-holders  the  numerous  officials 
holding  office  under  state  and  local  authority.  To 

1  American  Commonwealth,  Chap.  LVII. 
3" 


312  THE    ORGANS   OF  GOVERNMENT 

these  should  be  added  the  large  class  of  men  who 
find  the  gains  of  their  political  activity,  not  in 
office-holding,  but  in  the  exercise  of  political  in- 
fluence. The  probability  is  that  the  machinery 
of  control  in  American  government  requires  more 
people  to  tend  and  work  it  than  all  other  political 
machinery  in  the  rest  of  the  civilized  world. 

So  huge  an  organism  necessarily  requires  pro- 
vision of  corresponding  magnitude  for  its  sub- 
sistence. It  is  notorious  that  party  demands 
possession  of  all  the  offices  of  government  for  its 
support,  but  only  a  part  of  its  maintenance  can  be 
provided  in  this  way.  The  public  service  furnishes 
pay  and  quarters  for  what  may  be  called  the  office 
staff  of  the  business  of  party  management,  and  the 
compensation  attached  to  official  employment  may 
be  squeezed  for  party  purposes,  but  the  direct 
emoluments' of  office-holding  certainly  do  not  sus- 
tain the  management  nor  can  they  supply  funds  in 
amounts  large  enough  to  finance  the  large  transac- 
tions of  the  business.  It  is  a  matter  of  observation 
that  as  politicians  get  into  the  first  r?rik  in  influ- 
ence and  control  their  inclination  is  to  seek  office 
for  their  followers  rather  than  for  themselves. 
Often  when  they  do  hold  office  the  expenses  they 
have  to  assume  are  notoriously  in  excess  of  the 
compensation  provided  by  law,  and  the  real  value 
of  the  office  must  lie  in  some  advantages  of  po- 
sition facilitating  their  management  of  politics. 
Many  of  the  men  who  are  recognized  chiefs  of 


PARTY  SUBSISTENCE  313 

party  management,  "the  bosses,"  do  not  hold 
office  at  all.  Indeed,  this  avoidance  of  direct  of- 
ficial responsibility  may  almost  be  said  to  be  the 
distinguishing  characteristic  of  the  boss  in  a  large 
city.  Such  men  must  find  their  account  in  politics 
in  other  ways  than  in  the  emoluments  of  office- 
holding. 

It  is  also  to  be  observed  that  the  revenues 
required  by  party  management  are  much  too  large 
to  be  raised  by  assessments  upon  office-holders  or 
candidates.  Although  large  sums  are  raised  in 
this  way,  they  form  only  what  may  be  called  the 
ordinary  revenues  of  party  organization,  and  are 
quite  inadequate  for  the  extraordinary  expenditures 
of  an  important  campaign.  Vast  sums  are  then 
expended  in  party  agitation  —  public  addresses,  cir- 
culation of  documents,  mass-meetings,  barbecues, 
picnics,  and  parades.  Then,  too,  large  expendi- 
tures are  made  in  qualifying  voters  by  getting  out 
naturalization  papers,  or  paying  their  taxes  when 
the  exercise  of  the  franchise  is  so  conditioned. 
Moreover,  on  election  day  the  captain  of  every 
election  district  expects  to  be  supplied  with  funds 
so  as  to  be  able  to  meet  the  expense  of  getting 
voters  to  the  polls  or  to  offer  inducements  to  the 
wavering  or  indifferent.  While  it  is  impossible  to 
get  exact  figures,  yet  the  way  in  which  money  is 
poured  out  to  carry  elections  shows  that  copious 
sources  of  supply  are  open  to  party  managers. 

It  has  been  the  experience  of  other  countries, 


3 14  THE   ORGANS   OF  GOVERNMENT 

having  representative  institutions,  that  the  gratifi- 
cations which  political  distinction  offer  to  people 
of  means  are  such  as  to  make  them  willing  to  bear 
the  burden  and  expense  of  party  management. 
But  in  such  countries  political  activity  is  a  depart- 
ment of  the  general  activities  of  good  society,  and 
hence  may  confer  a  social  distinction  which  affords 
a  powerful  incentive  to  effort,  while  the  work  re- 
quired makes  only  occasional  demands  upon  the 
time  and  attention  of  those  taking  it  up,  and  can 
be  done  under  simple  forms  of  organization.  If 
American  party  organization  meant  only  the  exist- 
ence of  such  regular  machinery  as  the  congres- 
sional committee,  supplemented  by  the  organiza- 
tion in  each  district  of  a  committee  of  citizens  to 
bring  out  a  candidate  in  the  party  interest  and  to 
canvass  votes  in  his  behalf,  party  management  in 
America  would  then  mean  something  like  what  it 
does  in  England.  The  far  more  extensive  duties 
assumed  by  party  organization  in  this  country 
make  it  so  intricate  in  its  nature  and  so  absorbing 
in  its  demands  that  it  can  be  managed  only  by 
those  who  are  trained  to  it  as  a  business,  and  in 
becoming  a  trade  politics  cease  to  offer  the  induce- 
ments which  in  other  countries  commend  them  as  a 
social  duty.  There  may  be  political  prominence 
so  great  as  to  compel  a  certain  amount  of  social 
recognition  ;  but  it  is  given  with  reserve,  and  no 
one  would  think  of  taking  to  party  management  as 
a  road  to  social  distinction. 


PARTY  SUBSISTENCE  315 

There  is  no  lack  of  public  spirit  in  the  American 
character.  The  spontaneous  vigor  and  multi- 
tudinous variety  of  ecclesiastical  organization,  for 
which  the  United  States  is  a  wonder  among 
nations,  alone  afford  sufficient  proof  that  the 
American  people  possess  extraordinary  powers  of 
gratuitous  voluntary  effort  in  behalf  of  public  in- 
terests. In  this  country,  more  perhaps  than  else- 
where, public  service  exerts  an  attraction  upon  the 
mass  of  society  which  elicits  a  vast  amount  of 
activity ;  but  in  order  to  obtain  a  field  in  which  to 
operate,  it  must  as  a  rule  avoid  an  occupation  which 
established  conditions  reserve  so  exclusively  to 
professional  control  as  party  management.  The 
public  spirit,  which  under  simpler  forms  of  govern- 
ment includes  in  its  operation  the  direction  and 
maintenance  of  party  activity,  in  the  United  States 
confines  itself  to  the  administration  of  charities,  to 
unpaid  service  upon  the  directories  of  public  insti- 
tutions, or  to  service  upon  public  commissions 
whose  duties  and  objects  put  them  out  of  the 
sphere  of  partisanship,  or  else  are  shielded  by  a 
consensus  of  public  opinion  which  the  politicians 
feel  compelled  to  respect.  To  service  of  such 
character  public  esteem  attaches,  and  to  mark  this 
it  is  the  practice  of  common  speech  to  designate 
such  employment  as  "outside  of  politics."  Dis- 
tinctions of  this  sort  have  impressed  a  narrow 
meaning  on  the  word  "politics."  .  In  Europe  the 
politicians  are  those  who  in  one  capacity  or  another 


316  THE   ORGANS  OF  GOVERNMENT 

are  engaged  in  directing  the  administration  of  pub- 
lic affairs.  In  the  United  States  the  politicians 
are  the  class  of  men  who  attend  to  the  working  of 
party  machinery.  If  it  is  desired  to  indicate  that 
the  reputation  of  a  public  man  has  been  gained  in 
service  to  administration  rather  than  in  party  man- 
agement, the  word  "politician  "  is  avoided,  and  he  is 
spoken  of  as  a  statesman.  The  late  Mr.  Tilden 
was  spoken  of  as  both  a  great  politician  and  a  great 
statesman,  because  of  his  eminence  in  both  respects. 

Motives  of  public  spirit  and  honorable  ambition 
doubtless  enter  into  the  direct  work  of  party 
management  to  a  far  greater  extent  than  is  gen- 
erally supposed,  and  their  influence  retains  in 
party  service  capacities  which  would  command  far 
larger  remuneration  if  exercised  in  other  employ- 
ments ;  but  nevertheless  politics  are  regarded  as  a 
business,  and  as  a  rule  those  who  follow  it  expect 
to  live  by  it.  The  political  class  must  in  one  way 
or  another  extract  from  their  occupation  the  re- 
muneration of  their  labor  as  well  as  obtain  funds 
for  party  undertakings,  and  in  so  doing  they  have 
to  encounter  a  state  of  popular  feeling  disposed  to 
grudge  reward  and  envy  acquisition.  This  being 
so,  it  is  the  more  inconceivable  that  the  attach- 
ment of  the  people  to  their  party  principles  should 
prompt  the  contribution  of  such  enormous  sums  of 
money  as  are  handled  by  the  politicians  without 
account  or  audit. 

The   matter  does  not   become  comprehensible 


PARTY  SUBSISTENCE  317 

until  the  nature  of  the  opportunities  which  accom- 
pany the  power  of  party  organization  over  the  con- 
duct of  government  is  considered.  It  is  then  easy 
to  see  that  a  potentate  whose  sway  extends  over 
the  administration  of  state  governments  and  in- 
numerable subordinate  governments,  controlling 
franchises  of  immense  value  and  extent,  and  able 
to  affect  the  welfare  of  a  myriad  of  wealthy  inter- 
ests, will  not  be  without  an  ample  retinue  of  cour- 
tiers, nor  lack  obliging  friends  willing  to  relieve  his 
necessities  by  princely  gifts,  and  thus  enjoy  his 
favor.  Party  organization  is  able  to  command 
more  generous  benevolences  from  rich  subjects 
than  were  ever  the  Tudor  kings.  Thus  in  indirect 
ways  party  organization  is  able  to  give  its  chiefs 
rich  opportunities  of  money-making,  and  is  able 
to  levy  enormous  sums  from  wealthy  interests  for 
political  purposes. 

Public  spirit,  party  attachment,  and  personal  good 
will  towards  party  managers  in  numerous  cases  con- 
spire to  elicit  contributions  which  are  very  large 
in  the  aggregate,  but  it  is  unlikely  that  the  supply 
would  be  so  copious  were  it  not  that  extensive 
interests  find  it  to  their  advantage  to  lay  party 
organization  under  obligations.  The  business  cal- 
culation of  the  system  is  shown  by  the  non-partisan 
spirit  of  its  beneficence.  In  testifying  before  a 
committee  of  the  United  States  Senate,  the  pres- 
ident of  the  American  Sugar  Refining  Company 
said,  "  It  is  my  impression  that  wherever  there  is 


318  THE    ORGANS   OF  GOVERNMENT 

a  dominant  party,  wherever  the  majority  is  large, 
that  is  the  party  that  gets  the  contribution,  be- 
cause that  is  the  party  which  controls  the  local 
matters."  He  explained  that  this  system  of  con- 
tribution was  carried  on  because  the  company  had 
large  interests  which  needed  protection,  and  he 
added,  "  Every  individual  and  corporation  and 
firm,  trust,  or  whatever  you  call  it,  does  these 
things,  and  we  do  them."  1 

But  even  this  source  of  revenue  must  be  inade- 
quate to  the  needs  of  party  organization.  It  is  a 
tribute  to  an  established  control,  but  it  neither 
creates  nor  maintains  that  control.  The  main  re- 
source of  party  management  —  the  working  capital 
of  the  business — is  the  negotiation  of  the  value  of 
its  good  will  that  in  one  way  or  another  is  being 
constantly  carried  on.  Franchises  to  the  use  of 
streets  and  highways,  the  grant  of  rights  of  way, 
concessions  of  charter  privileges,  legislative  sanc- 
tions to  corporate  undertakings,  lucrative  usufructs 
of  various  species  of  public  wealth,  real  estate  de- 
velopment in  connection  with  municipal  improve- 
ments, etc.,  are  fields  of  investment  for  many 
millions  of  private  capital,  an  obvious  policy  with 
whose  representatives  is  to  confederate  their  in- 
terests with  political  influence. 2  Probably  more 

1  Senate  Report,  No.  606,  Fifty-third  Congress,  second  session, 

PP- 351.  352- 

2  The  financial  statement  of  Berlin  for   1893-1894  showed  that 
the  profits  from  the  city  gas  and  water-works  and  revenues  from 


PARTY  SUBSISTENCE  319 

money  is  lost  than  is  made  in  politics,  but  when, 
as  is  sometimes  the  case,  a  high  degree  of  business 
capacity  is  united  with  great  political  influence,  a 
splendid  fortune  may  be  accumulated  by  cultivat- 
ing the  opportunities  of  a  political  career. 

This  connection  of  business  opportunity  with 
political  position  is  at  the  bottom  of  many  of  the 
fierce  faction  fights  that  go  on  inside  of  party 
organization.  They  usually  originate  in  conflicts 
over  the  apportionment  of  respective  privileges  in 
the  adjustment  of  party  interests,  and  are  in  their 
nature  essentially  like  the  hostilities  that  some- 
times break  out  among  competitive  interests  in  the 
business  world,  lasting  until  the  strength  and  re- 
sources of  rival  interests  are  thoroughly  tested, 
when  the  stage  of  business  combination  is  reached. 
In  the  same  way  political  interests  measure 
strength  in  the  primary  elections,  and  then  reach 
an  adjustment  in  accordance  with  the  develop- 
ments. Thus  it  so  often  comes  about  that  fac- 
tions, which  at  one  time  seem  bent  on  tearing 
each  other  to  pieces,  may  at  another  time  be 
seen  snuggled  together  cheek  by  jowl.  These 
adjustments  of  interest  are  sometimes  entered 

franchises  amounted  to  more  than  $5,000,000  a  year.  With  com- 
paratively small  exception,  such  sources  of  revenue  are  in  this 
country  exploited  on  private  account.  The  enormous  increase  in 
the  value  of  street  railway  franchises,  attending  the  introduction  of 
electric  power,  went  nearly  all  to  the  enrichment  of  private  interests 
able  to  enlist  the  needful  amount  of  political  influence,  which  of 
course  was  duly  rewarded, 


320  THE    ORGANS   OF  GOVERNMENT 

into  under  written  covenants  as  formal  as  in  regu- 
lar business  negotiation.  Of  course  such  instru- 
ments rarely  see  the  light  of  day,  for  even  faction 
fury  is  slow  to  commit  such  an  imprudence,  yet 
such  a  thing  has  happened.  A  quarrel  of  Penn- 
sylvania factions  made  public  a  remarkable  draught 
of  a  treaty  between  state  and  local  political  inter- 
ests, the  preamble  of  which  set  forth  that  it  was 
for  "mutual  political,  and  business  advantage."  1 

The  process  will  be  misunderstood  if  it  is  re- 
garded as  altogether  mere  venality.  Bargain  and 
sale  of  legislation  and  downright  blackmail  go  on 
to  a  large  extent,  but  such  abuse  of  trust  always 
bears  the  distinct  brand  of  corruption.  The  politi- 
cal class,  like  every  class  of  business  men,  includes 
great  variety  of  talent  and  character.  Vulgar 
cheats  and  ordinary  rogues  get  into  politics  and 
use  their  opportunities  for  their  own  pelf  with  as 
little  regard  for  the  interests  of  their  party  as  they 
dare  reveal.  This  class  of  politicians  sometimes 
invade  city  councils  and  state  legislatures  to  such 
an  extent  as  to  stamp  those  bodies  with  their  char- 
acter. Indeed,  it  may  be  said  to  be  the  rule  that 
lobby  influence,  which  within  its  legitimate  field  of 
advocacy  is  a  valuable  and  a  really  necessary  ad- 
junct of  legislation,  is  compelled  to  assume  a  cor- 
rupt character,  and  it  must  select  for  its  principal 
service  agents  skilled  in  systematic  bribery.  It 
is  also  true  that  blackmail  purposes  inspire  many 
1The  Pittsburgh  newspapers  of  March  16,  1896. 


PARTY  SUBSISTENCE 


legislative  proposals,  and  operate  to  a  vast  extent 
under  cover  of  the  police  power  and  the  punishment 
of  misdemeanors.  The  maximum  of  the  latter 
species  of  corruption  was  probably  reached  under 
the  bi-partisan  police  administration  of  New  York 
City,  when  the  responsibility  was  divided  between 
the  two  parties,  and  was  the  full  risk  of  neither. 
But  such  practices  are  regarded  as  antagonistic  to 
party  interests,  and  the  tendency  pf  party  manage- 
ment is  to  go  as  far  as  its  strength  permits  in 
stopping  them.  They  excite  resentments  and 
accumulate  odium,  which  injure  the  party  and 
at  times  provoke  popular  revolts.  The  political 
consequences  of  the  disclosures  made  by  the 
Lexow  committee  are  still  fresh  in  public  recol- 
lection. Moreover,  the  revenues  of  downright 
venality  and  blackmail  are  personal  plunder  and 
probably  yield  little  to  party  resources.  In  re- 
straining such  abuses,  party  managers  are  hindered 
by  the  fact  that  they  can  retain  command  only  on 
condition  of  service  to  the  interests  in  possession 
of  the  field.  For  every  boss  in  power,  there  are 
plenty  of  would-be  bosses,  and  his  success  in  main- 
taining his  position  is  contingent  upon  his  ability 
to  satisfy  inexorable  conditions  of  efficiency.  The 
baser  sort  of  politicians  are  generally  dexterous  in 
securing  to  themselves  a  certain  amount  of  influ- 
ence, so  that  they  are  in  a  position  to  compel  rec- 
ognition and  secure  toleration  of  their  practices 
unless  carried  to  excesses  which  plainly  jeopard 


322  THE   ORGANS   OF  GOVERNMENT 

party  interests.  Even  then  the  task  of  curbing 
them  is  difficult  and  dangerous,  owing  to  a  state 
of  public  sentiment  which  fosters  a  spirit  of  insub- 
ordination. The  traditional  spirit  of  hostility  to 
all  regular  party  organization  is  so  strong  that  the 
appearance  of  a  breach  invites  a  raid  of  forces  col- 
lected from  all  quarters  for  the  special  attack. 
There  is  always  a  great  risk  that  the  enforcement 
of  too  strict  a  discipline  may  provoke  a  mutiny  in 
the  camp  which  will  furnish  to  some  casual  aggre- 
gate of  opposition  the  services  of  a  band  of  experts 
to  give  force  and  direction  to  the  assault.  The  pro- 
fessional gambler,  John  Morrissey,  once  effected 
a  political  revolution  in  New  York  City  by  going 
over  to  the  opposition  in  his  rage  at  pretensions  on 
the  part  of  the  municipal  administration  which  he 
regarded  as  being  rather  too  high  and  supercilious 
to  be  endured. 

The  close  association  of  partisanship  with  cor- 
ruption in  our  political  system  is  the  result  of 
circumstances,  not  of  affinity.  They  are  really 
antagonistic  principles.  Partisanship  tends  to  es- 
tablish a  connection  based  upon  an  avowed  public 
obligation,  while  corruption  consults  private  and 
individual  interests  which  secrete  themselves  from 
view  and  avoid  accountability  of  any  kind.  The 
weakness  of  party  organization  is  the  opportunity 
of  corruption.  Party  organization  undertakes  to 
supervise  the  conduct  of  legislative  bodies  only 
so  far  as  party  interests  distinctly  require,  and  it 


PARTY  SUBSISTENCE  323 

has  no  warrant  to  go  further.  This  permits  a 
latitude  of  action  in  regard  to  general  legislation 
which  abounds  in  pernicious  reactions  throughout 
the  business  world.  In  proportion  as  party  control 
is  strengthened,  a  counteracting  force  is  brought 
to  bear.  The  way  in  which,  in  some  of  the  large 
states,  the  development  of  the  state  boss  has  syste- 
matized the  relations  between  corporations  and 
politics,  has  therefore  caused  a  marked  improve- 
ment in  legislative  behavior.  The  boss,  being 
supplied  with  resources  which  enable  him  to 
finance  the  details  of  party  management,  —  the 
running  of  primaries,  the  setting-up  of  delegates, 
the  selection  of  candidates,  etc.,  —  is  in  a  position 
to  interpose  a  party  obligation  between  legislative 
marauders  and  their  prey. 

The  cost  of  party  subsistence  cannot  be  com- 
puted. Exact  data  are  unattainable.  Although 
various  estimates  have  been  made,  they  are  all 
worthless  and  are  all  probably  below  the  mark, 
although  some  of  them  mount  into  many  mill- 
ions of  dollars.  It  is  quite  probable  that  party 
organization  costs  more  than  any  one  of  the 
regular  departments  of  government.  It  is  a 
fond  delusion  of  the  people  that  our  republican 
form  of  government  is  less  expensive  than  the 
monarchical  forms  which  obtain  in  Europe.  The 
truth  is  that  ours  is  the  costliest  government  in 
the  world,  and  none  save  a  nation  so  industrious 
and  energetic,  and  which  possesses  such  great  nat- 


324  THE    ORGANS   OF  GOVERNMENT 

ural  resources  as  our  own,  could  possibly  sustain 
it.  No  other  nation  in  the  world  is  rich  enough 
for  the  political  experimentation  which  the  United 
States  is  carrying  on ;  but  when  the  end  crowns 
the  work,  its  cost  may  be  found  to  have  been 
small  in  comparison  with  the  value  of  the  recom- 
pense. 


CHAPTER    XXV 

PARTY    EFFICIENCY 

SINCE  it  lacks  a  true  representative  character, 
and  its  concern  in  public  affairs  is  at  bottom  a 
business  pursuit  carried  on  for  personal  gain  and 
emolument,  the  service  which  party  performs  in 
executing  the  behests  of  public  opinion  and  in 
carrying  on  political  development  must  be  an 
incident  of  its  ordinary  activity.  That  this  is  the 
case  all  observation  confirms.  It  is  a  common 
remark,  that  all  political  parties  seem  to  care  for 
is  the  possession  of  the  offices,  and  that  they  are 
willing  to  shift  and  change  their  principles  as  much 
as  need  be  in  order  to  win.  Talleyrand's  cynical 
remark,  that  a  man  who  is  always  true  to  his  party 
must  be  prepared  to  change  his  principles  fre- 
quently, is  peculiarly  applicable  to  American  poli- 
tics. Party  effrontery  is  carried  to  such  a  pitch 
that  in  one  state  a  party  may  take  up  and  energeti- 
cally advocate  doctrines,  which  the  same  party  in 
another  state  will  be  just  as  actively  engaged  in 
denouncing  and  opposing.  So  accommodating  is 
party  policy  in  this  respect,  that  state  political 
campaigns  have  become  tests  of  the  public  dispo- 
sition, and  the  results  of  such  experimentation  are 

325 


326  THE   ORGANS   OF  GOVERNMENT 

studied  for  data  upon  which  to  base  plans  for  the 
grand  quadrennial  adventure  of  the  presidential 
election. 

It  therefore  appears  that  wherein  party  serves 
public  interests  is  in  the  catering  to  public  wants 
and  desires  which  every  party  organization  must 
carry  on  to  get  and  hold  business  in  competition 
with  opposing  party  organization.  Hence  party 
is  obliged  to  consult  public  opinion  and  assume 
engagements  to  be  carried  out  in  the  administra- 
tion of  public  affairs.  American  politics  are  not 
peculiar  in  this  respect,  for  that  is  the  way  in 
which  party  discharges  its  function  wherever  it 
carries  on  the  government.  What  is  peculiar 
to  American  politics  is  that  party  organization  is 
so  situated  that  it  cannot  negotiate  as  a  principal, 
but  as  a  go-between.  Unlike  an  English  party, 
it  cannot  itself  formulate  measures,  direct  the 
course  of  legislation,  and  assume  the  direct  re- 
sponsibility of  administration.  All  that  it  can  do 
is  to  certify  the  political  complexion  of  candidates, 
leaving  it  to  be  inferred  that  their  common  purpose 
will  effect  such  unity  of  action  as  will  control  leg- 
islation and  direct  administration  in  accordance 
with  party  professions.  The  peculiarities  of  Amer- 
ican party  government  are  all  due  to  this  separation 
of  party  management  from  direct  and  immediate 
responsibility  for  the  administration  of  govern- 
ment. Party  organization  is  compelled  to  act 
through  executive  and  legislative  deputies,  who, 


PARTY  EFFICIENCY  327 

while  always  far  from  disavowing  their  party 
obligations,  are  quite  free  to  use  their  own  dis- 
cretion as  to  the  way  in  which  they  shall  interpret 
and  fulfil  the  party  pledges.  Meanwhile  they 
are  shielded,  by  the  constitutional  partitions  of 
privilege  and  distributions  of  authority,  from  any 
direct  and  specific  responsibility  for  delay  or  fail- 
ure in  coming  to  an  agreement  for  the  accomplish- 
ment of  party  purposes.  Authority  being  divided, 
responsibility  is  uncertain  and  confused,  and  the 
accountability  of  the  government  to  the  people  is 
not  at  all  definite  or  precise.  When  a  party  meets 
with  disaster  at  the  polls,  every  one  may  form  his 
own  opinion  as  to  the  cause.  It  is  purely  a  matter 
of  speculation.  The  situation  of  affairs  is  one 
which  was  accurately  foretold  in  The  Federalist. 
"  It  is  often  impossible,"  said  Hamilton,  "amidst 
mutual  accusations,  to  determine  on  whom  the 
blame  or  the  punishment  of  a  pernicious  measure, 
or  series  of  pernicious  measures,  ought  really  to 
fall.  It  is  shifted  from  one  to  another  with  so 
much  dexterity,  and  under  such  plausible  appear- 
ances, that  the  public  opinion  is  left  in  suspense 
about  the  real  author.  The  circumstances  which 
may  have  led  to  any  national  miscarriage  or  mis- 
fortune are  sometimes  so  complicated  that  where 
there  are  a  number  of  actors  who  may  have  had 
different  degrees  and  kinds  of  agency,  though  we 
may  clearly  see  upon  the  whole  that  there  has  been 
mismanagement,  yet  it  may  be  impracticable  to 


328  THE   ORGANS   OF  GOVERNMENT 

pronounce  to  whose  account  the  evil  which  may 
have  been  incurred  is  truly  chargeable."  1 

As  a  natural  consequence  of  the  detached  and 
subordinate  position  of  party  organization  in  the 
conduct  of  the  government,  public  opinion  is  not 
concentrated  upon  its  acts  with  steady  scrutiny 
and  vigilant  supervision.  The  activity  of  party  is 
largely  concerned  with  details  of  its  own  business 
management,  not  possessing  much  interest  for  the 
mass  of  the  people  who  have  their  own  affairs  to 
attend  to.  Its  contentions  are  largely  personal 
squabbles,  whose  political  results  may  be  very  im- 
portant, but  which  do  not  themselves  present 
political  issues.  They  are  like  the  intrigues  which 
used  to  go  on  among  the  English  gentry,  over  court 
honors  and  official  emoluments,  in  the  Georgian  era 
of  English  politics,  the  mass  of  the  electorate  but 
dimly  comprehending  what  was  going  on  and  regard- 
ing the  strife  with  disgust  and  aversion,  although 
quickly  roused  to  activity  by  issues  appealing  to 
their  political  instincts.  The  true  public  opinion 
of  the  nation  is  ordinarily  in  a  state  of  suspense. 
The  minds  of  people  are  preoccupied  by  too  many 
interests  to  attend  closely  to  the  transactions  of 
the  politicians,  and  not  until  the  issue  is  thrust 
upon  the  public  in  a  definite  form  by  some  press- 
ing emergency  is  the  genuine  expression  of  public 
opinion  evoked.  Meanwhile  the  political  opinion 
with  which  party  organization  is  concerned,  and  to 
1  The  Federalist,  No.  70. 


PARTY  EFFICIENCY  329 

which  it  defers,  is  that  with  which  it  comes  in 
contact  in  soliciting  business.  The  acrid  and  fret- 
ting humors  of  the  body  politic  exert  a  more  direct 
and  active  influence  upon  party  behavior  than  the 
judgment  and  intelligence  of  the  nation,  because 
elements  of  unrest  and  dissatisfaction  are  im- 
portunate in  their  demands  and  therefore  receive 
attention,  while  social  interests  of  incomparably 
greater  magnitude  are  ignored. 

The  readiness  with  which  party  organization 
lends  itself  to  the  service  of  temporary  manias 
and  recognized  delusions  proceeds  from  an  in- 
stinct of  self-preservation.  Everywhere  the  ins 
are  menaced  by  the  activity  of  the  outs,  prompt 
to  seize  upon  any  whim,  passion,  or  prejudice,  no 
matter  how  foolish  or  noxious,  if  it  can  be  turned 
to  present  account.  Party  organization,  therefore, 
exploits  outbreaks  of  popular  folly  and  knavery, 
and  caters  to  the  prejudices  of  ignorance  and 
fanaticism  in  a  way  that  invests  them  with  facti- 
tious importance,  and  confers  upon  them  inordinate 
legislative  influence.  This  feature  of  American 
politics,  more  than  any  other,  causes  the  national 
character  to  be  misunderstood,  and  the  worth  of 
democratic  institutions  to  be  undervalued.  It  is 
inferred  that  public  opinion  in  this  country  is  sub- 
ject to  periodical  hallucinations,  that  there  is  a 
popular  contempt  of  authority,  and  a  frequent  re- 
currence of  reckless  desires  to  try  over  again  the 
old  failures,  heedless  of  the  abundant  instructions 


330  THE    ORGANS   OF  GOVERNMENT 

of  history  and  the  warnings  of  our  own  national 
experience.  This  is  a  mistake.  Folly  does  not 
more  abound,  but  it  is  magnified  in  force  and 
effect  by  the  peculiar  conditions  of  American  poli- 
tics. American  citizenship  is  probably  superior  in 
average  intelligence  to  that  of  any  other  country. 
The  public  press,  although  considerate  of  the  value 
of  party  good  will  to  an  extent  that  unfits  it  for 
fairly  representing  public  opinion,  must  neverthe- 
less keep  that  in  view,  since  it  caters  to  the  public 
at  large,  and  not  merely  to  the  fraction  which  busies 
itself  with  politics ;  and  it  is  well  known  that  the 
voice  of  the  press  is  different  from  the  voice  of 
party  on  questions  of  public  policy.  Sanity  and 
conservatism  prevail  in  the  tone  of  the  press, 
even  when  party  organization  is  most  supple  and 
accommodating  to  the  folly  of  the  hour. 

Party  organization  not  being  directly  burdened 
by  the  difficulties  and  necessities  of  government 
feels  at  liberty  to  court  public  opinion  in  all  its 
vagaries.  Great  art  is  employed  in  framing  plat- 
forms so  as  to  be  susceptible  to  various  interpreta- 
tions. Concerning  issues  which  are  settled,  party 
speaks  in  a  clear,  sonorous  voice.  But  on  new 
issues  it  mumbles  and  quibbles.  Subdivisions  of 
the  party  organization  make  such  professions  as 
will  pay  the  best  in  their  respective  fields  of  ac- 
tivity. If  the  issue  cannot  be  dodged,  straddling 
may  be  resorted  to.  Declarations  really  incongru- 
ous in  their  nature  are  coupled,  and  their  inconsist- 


PARTY  EFFICIENCY  331 

ency  is  cloaked  by  rhetorical  artifice.  Sometimes 
such  expedients  are  employed  as  making  the  plat- 
form lean  one  way  and  putting  on  it  a  candidate 
who  leans  the  other  way,  or  candidates  represent- 
ing opposing  ideas  and  tendencies  are  put  upon 
the  same  ticket.  Such  practices  are  results  of 
the  ordinary  instincts  of  party  in  all  countries,  and 
obtain  such  monstrous  growth  in  America  because 
of  extraordinarily  favorable  conditions.  Party  never 
commits  itself  to  any  new  undertaking  until  it  has 
to.  In  England  there  must  be  a  long  period  of 
agitation  and  education  of  public  sentiment  before 
a  new  issue  is  raised  to  the  rank  of  what  is  known 
as  a  cabinet  question,  but  when  that  time  arrives, 
party  is  in  a  position  to  enter  into  exact  and  specific 
engagements  as  to  the  disposition  which  will  be  made 
of  it.  In  this  country  the  only  way  in  which  party 
can  be  forced  into  such  a  position  is  through  the 
exigencies  of  the  national  administration.  What- 
ever may  be  the  policy  then  adopted,  it  puts  upon 
party  the  necessity  of  acquiescence  or  dissent  in  a 
way  that  requires  a  categorical  response  to  the 
demands  of  public  opinion. 

In  the  discharge  of  this  function  national  party 
organization  claims  and  exercises  supreme  jurisdic- 
tion. When  it  reaches  its  decision,  all  indulgence 
of  local  heterodoxy  disappears  and  is  succeeded  by 
a  ferocious  intolerance.  State  and  local  party  lead- 
ers must  submit  on  penalty  of  excommunication. 
The  coercive  force  which  party  organization  then 


332  THE   ORGANS  OF  GOVERNMENT 

develops  was  strikingly  manifested  by  the  way  in 
which  the  Democratic  platform  of  1896  was  forced 
upon  dissenting  state  party  organizations.  Some, 
which  had  adopted  platforms  antagonistic  to  the 
platform  of  the  national  party,  were  compelled  to 
meet  and  eat  their  words.  It  is  the  established 
principle  of  American  politics  that  fidelity  to  the 
national  platform  is  the  crucial  test  of  party  ortho- 
doxy. Hence  national  issues  are  the  controlling 
force  in  politics.  Attempting  to  reform  state  or 
local  politics,  while  ignoring  national  politics,  is 
like  expecting  to  accomplish  a  local  purification  of 
the  atmosphere  by  palisading  a  patch  of  ground 
in  a  swamp.  A  little  may  be  done,  but  not  much. 
It  follows  that,  in  this  country,  —  as  was  the  case 
in  England,  — the  effectual  purification  of  our  poli- 
tics will  begin  with  national  politics  and  will  spread 
from  them  to  local  politics. 

The  pliable  and  time-serving  disposition  of  party, 
which  is  the  natural  consequence  of  its  own  anx- 
ious calculation  of  its  business  interests,  prepares 
for  it  tremendous  reverses.  It  becomes  committed 
to  methods  of  administration  and  courses  of  policy 
inimical  to  the  public  interest,  so  that  there  comes 
a  time  when  genuine  public  opinion  is  roused  to 
action  with  a  vigor  which  nothing  can  withstand. 
The  shelters  of  falsehood  and  the  refuges  of  deceit 
are  swept  away,  as  by  the  blast  of  a  hurricane,  and 
the  discomfited  party  managers  lie  choking  and 
dumfounded  in  the  dust  and  the  wreckage.  The 


PARTY  EFFICIENCY  333 

readiness  of  the  people  to  treat  their  great  national 
parties  in  this  way  must  eventually  beat  those  par- 
ties into  serviceable  tools  of  government  or  break 
them  up  to  make  room  for  better  material.  The 
situation  confronts  political  leaders  with  problems 
of  party  control  and  discipline,  whose  solution  tends 
to  improve  the  apparatus  of  government.  The 
results  of  this  tendency  are  already  very  plainly 
marked  in  the  improvement  of  the  House  of  Rep- 
resentatives ;  but  far  more  extensive  changes  must 
take  place  in  all  the  organs  of  government  before 
the  rule  of  public  opinion  is  definitely  established. 
The  present  inadequacy  of  party  organization  for 
a  true  representation  of  public  opinion  is  so  exas- 
perating to  impatient  reformers  that  they  would 
like  to  shatter  it  to  bits ;  but  that  is  not  the  way  to 
better  the  state  of  affairs.  Party  rises  to  new 
occasions  by  consulting  its  own  interests.  This 
consultative  faculty  in  party  organization,  mis- 
chievous as  seems  to  be  its  irregular  and  irre- 
sponsible operation,  is  that  which  sustains  political 
development,  and  eventually  it  will  perfect  the 
democratic  type  of  government. 


PART    IV 

TENDENCIES  AND  PROSPECTS   OF  AMER- 
ICAN POLITICS 


CHAPTER   XXVI 

POLITICAL    IDEAS    OF    OUR    TIMES 

IN  attempting  to  forecast  the  future  of  our  poli- 
tics, the  ideas  of  our  times  must  first  be  consid- 
ered, since  ideas  are  the  sap  from  which  institu- 
tions obtain  their  growth.  Examination  discloses 
the  remarkable  fact  that  there  is  as  yet  little  change 
in  political  ideas.  The  doctrine  of  a  distribution  of 
authority,  so  that  the  various  branches  of  the  gov- 
ernment shall  check  and  balance  one  another  to 
protect  the  public  welfare,  still  possesses  the  public 
mind.  Although  the  working  of  the  constitution 
has  undergone  profound  change,  the  theory  has  re- 
mained almost  intact.  That  the  constitution  does 
not  work  well  in  practice  is  freely  admitted ;  but 
of  course  that  is  not  its  fault.  The  constitutional 
ideal  is  noble ;  but  the  politicians  are  vile.  If  only 
the  checks  could  be  made  more  effective,  if  only  a 
just  balance  of  power  could  be  established  beyond 

334 


POLITICAL  IDEAS   OF  OUR    TIMES  335 

the  strength  of  the  politicians  to  disarrange, — or, 
above  all,  if  some  barriers  could  be  erected,  so 
tight  and  strong  as  to  shut  the  politicians  out 
altogether,  —  the  constitution  would  work  per- 
fectly. Therefore,  more  checks  upon  the  abuse 
of  power;  more  contrivances  to  baffle  the  politi- 
cians, whose  machinations  pervert  the  constitution 
and  corrupt  the  government ! 

These  ideas  are  products  of  the  Whig  theory  of 
government.  They  abound  in  the  voluminous  re- 
form literature  of  the  eighteenth  century,  when 
England,  too,  was  under  a  system  of  government 
in  which  authority  was  distributed  and  responsibil- 
ity confused,  and  the  resultant  corruption  tormented 
the  conscience  of  the  nation.  In  Macaulay's  brill- 
iant essays,1  Trevelyan's  fine  work  on  the  "Early 
History  of  Charles  James  Fox,"  and  in  Lecky's 
great  "History  of  England  in  the  Eighteenth  Cen- 
tury "  we  have  vivid  pictures  and  abundant  details 
of  the  state  of  politics  in  that  age.  As  Burke  re- 
marked, "  Every  age  has  its  own  manners,  and  its 
politics  dependent  upon  them."  There  are  many 
differences  between  the  politics  of  England  in  the 
eighteenth  century  and  the  politics  of  the  United 
States  in  the  nineteenth  century;  but  such  is  the 
fundamental  identity  in  the  cause  of  the  disease 
that  it  is  impossible  to  read  any  description  of 
English  politics  in  that  age  without  recognizing 

1  In  particular,  those  on  Horace  Walpole  and  The  Earl  of 
Chatham. 


336      TENDENCIES  AND  PROSPECTS  OF  POLITICS 

traits  of  American  politics  of  the  present  day.  On 
the  other  hand,  so  great  a  change  has  taken  place  in 
English  politics  that  men  of  this  generation  in  that 
country  can  hardly  imagine  such  a  state  of  affairs 
as  existed  in  the  past.  Mr.  Trevelyan,  himself 
an  English  statesman  of  high  rank,  says,  "  We, 
who  look  upon  politics  as  a  barren  career  by 
which  few  people  hope  to  make  money  and  none 
to  save  it,  and  who  would  expect  a  poet  to  found 
a  family  as  soon  as  a  prime  minister,  can  with 
difficulty  form  a  just  conception  of  a  period  when 
people  entered  Parliament,  not  because  they  were 
rich,  but  because  they  wanted  to  be  rich,  and  when 
it  was  more  profitable  to  be  a  member  of  a  Cabinet 
than  a  partner  in  a  brewery."  His  American  read- 
ers have  no  difficulty  in  forming  such  a  conception  : 
the  difficulty  with  them  is  to  conceive  of  a  state 
of  politics  in-which  private  gain  is  not  the  main- 
spring of  activity.  The  political  characteristics 
which  Mr.  Trevelyan  locates  in  the  past  are  famil- 
iar features  of  the  present  in  this  country.  What 
observations  could  be  more  commonplace  than  such 
as  these  ?  The  legislative  party  hack  "cared  noth- 
ing whatever  for  the  disapproval  of  any  one  outside 
the  House  .  .  .  who  did  not  happen  to  be  a  free- 
man (voter)  in  his  own  borough  ;  and  among  those 
with  whom  he  lived,  and  whose  esteem  he  valued, 
public  employment  was  looked  upon  as  a  sort  of 
personalty  of  which  everybody  had  a  clear  right 
to  scrape  together  as  much  as  he  could  without 


POLITICAL  IDEAS   OF  OUR    TIMES  337 

inquiring  whether  the  particular  post  he  coveted 
ought  to  exist  at  all,  or  whether  he  himself  was 
the  proper  man  to  hold  it."  In  deciding  contested 
elections  "  even  exceptionally  high-minded  men 
were  not  ashamed  of  allowing  that  they  had  voted 
on  party  grounds  ;  and  an  appeal  to  any  other 
motive  would  have  been  scouted  by  the  lower  class 
of  parliamentary  tacticians  as  clap-trap."  Talk 
about  disinterestedness  inspired  disgust.  Lord 
Shelburne,  when  a  young  man,  once  made  a  re- 
mark to  Henry  Fox  to  the  effect  that  gentlemen 
of  independent  position,  in  their  political  conduct, 
should  act  as  the  trustees  of  public  interests.  The 
veteran  bade  him  get  "rid  of  such  puerile  notions" 
and  push  for  the  offices  if  he  wanted  to  get  on  in 
politics.  Aptitude  for  cabal  and  intrigue  rather 
than  capacity  for  the  administration  of  public  af- 
fairs was  the  source  of  political  influence.  "Power 
went  to  such  as  had  the  strength  to  seize  and  hold 
it."  There  was  "a  profound  distrust  of  public 
men."  1 

During  this  stage  of  English  politics,  as  now  in 
this  country,  the  attitude  respectively  of  literature 
and  politics,  which  should  be  as  reciprocal  as 
thought  and  action,  was  characterized  on  the  one 
side  by  disgust  and  aversion  ;  on  the  other  by 
contempt.  The  tone  of  newspaper  comment  was 
one  of  calumny  and  abuse.  Serious  criticism  must 

1  Trevelyan's  Early  History  of  Charles  James  Fox,  Chap.  III. 
z 


338      TENDENCIES  AND  PROSPECTS   OF  POLITICS 

have  definite  grounds ;  when  discussion  of  responsi- 
bility must  proceed  by  guess-work  and  inference,  it 
inevitably  degenerates  into  slander,  and  journalism 
so  circumstanced  is  prone  to  develop  levity,  reck- 
lessness, and  sensationalism  as  its  prevailing  char- 
acteristics. 

In  respectable  literature,  the  tone  of  thought  was 
pessimistic.  Browne's  "  Estimate  of  the  Manners 
and  Principles  of  the  Times,"  which  appeared  in 
1757  and  had  a  wide  popularity,  argued  that  virtue 
was  rotting  out  of  the  English  stock  from  the 
development  of  a  commercial  spirit,  which  was 
corroding  patriotism  and  all  the  moral  elements 
that  are  the  true  sources  of  national  greatness. 
He  eloquently  insisted  that  no  increase  of  material 
resources  could  compensate  for  the  moral  deterio- 
ration which  had  come  upon  the  English  people. 
This  once  famous  treatise  is  now  preserved  from 
oblivion  only  by  casual  references  to  it  made  by 
Burke  and  Macaulay ;  but  the  melancholy  which 
clouded  the  thought  of  the  age  produced  a  durable 
literary  monument  in  Samuel  Johnson's  noble  poem 
on  "  The  Vanity  of  Human  Wishes."  All  its  politi- 
cal allusions  are  scornful. 

"Through  freedom's  sons  no  more  remonstrance  rings, 
Degrading  nobles  and  controlling  kings  ; 
Our  supple  tribes  repress  their  patriot  throats 
And  ask  no  questions  but  the  price  of  votes ; 
With  weekly  libels  and  septennial  ale, 
Their  wish  is  full  to  riot  and  to  rail." 


POLITICAL  IDEAS   OF  OUR    TIMES  339 

The  deceits  of  the  world  and  the  general  de- 
pravity of  mankind  present  a  scene  of  gloom  which 
no  ray  of  hope  illumines.  The  only  peace  for  the 
soul  is  in  resignation. 

"  Must  helpless  man,  in  ignorance  sedate, 
Roll  darkling  down  the  torrent  of  his  fate? 
Must  no  dislike  alarm,  no  wishes  rise, 
No  cries  evoke  the  mercies  of  the  skies  ? 
Inquirer  cease  ;  petitions  yet  remain 
Which  heaven  may  hear,  nor  deem  religion  vain. 
Still  raise  for  good  the  supplicating  voice, 
But  leave  to  heaven  the  measure  and  the  choice." 

Then  as  now  the  existence  of  corruption  was  the 
theme  of  an  insincere  party  recrimination.  Says 
Macaulay  :  "  The  outs  were  constantly  talking  in 
magnificent  language  about  tyranny,  corruption, 
wicked  ministers,  servile  courtiers,  the  liberty  of 
Englishmen,  the  great  charter,  the  rights  for  which 
the  fathers  bled.  .  .  .  They  excited  a  vague  crav- 
ing for  change  by  which  they  profited  for  a  single 
moment,  and  of  which,  as  they  well  deserved,  they 
were  soon  the  victims."  Even  in  particular  details 
there  are  striking  resemblances  of  practical  politics 
between  that  age  and  our  own.  "  The  undertakers  " 
who  figured  prominently  in  the  government  of  Ire- 
land had  political  functions  like  those  of  our 
bosses.  Mr.  Lecky  describes  them  as  great  Irish 
borough  owners  "who,  in  consideration  of  a  large 
share  of  the  patronage  of  the  crown,  '  undertook ' 
to  carry  the  king's  business  through  (the  Irish) 


340      TENDENCIES  AND  PROSPECTS  OF  POLITICS 

Parliament."  In  other  words,  the  method  was  that 
of  boss  rule  founded  on  the  spoils  system.  Mr. 
Lecky  remarks  that  "  more  corruption  was  em- 
ployed to  overturn  their  ascendency  than  had  ever 
been  required  to  maintain  it,"  and  he  thinks  that 
"  the  formation  of  a  connected  influence  .  .  .  bind- 
ing many  isolated  and  individual  interests  into  a 
coherent  and  powerful  organization,  was  a  real  step 
towards  parliamentary  government."1 

Disgust  and  irritation  at  the  degradation  and 
corruption  of  politics  produced  phases  of  public 
sentiment  like  those  with  which  we  are  familiar. 
Non-partisanship  was  continually  preached.  Hon- 
est men  should  "  enter  into  an  association  for  the 
support  of  one  another  against  the  endeavors  of 
those  whom  they  ought  to  look  upon  as  their  com- 
mon enemies,  whatsoever  side  they  may  belong  to. 
Were  there  such  an  honest  body  of  neutral  forces, 
we  should  never  see  the  worst  of  men  in  the  great 
figures  of  life,  because  they  are  useful  to  a  party ; 
nor  the  best  unregarded  because  they  are  above 
practising  those  methods  which  would  be  grateful 
to  their  factions.  We  should  then  single  every 
criminal  out  of  the  herd  and  hunt  him  down,  how- 
ever formidable  and  overgrown  he  might  appear." 
This  is  not  an  extract  from  a  recent  appeal  to 
the  public  in  behalf  of  the  formation  of  good  gov- 


1  Lecky's  History  of  England,  Vol.  II.,  p.  443  ;  Vol.  IV.,  pp. 
383-384. 


POLITICAL  IDEAS   OF  OUR    TIMES          341 

ernment  clubs,  but  is  an  extract  from  Addison,  in 
the  Spectator,  No.  125,  Tuesday,  July  24,  1711. 

A  memorable  experiment  of  this  sort  was  made. 
The  revolt  against  Walpole  was  a  magnificent  inde- 
pendent movement.  Whigs  and  Tories  coalesced 
to  overthrow  corruption.  All  the  leading  men  of 
letters  supported  the  movement.  Macaulay  said, 
"  The  downfall  of  Walpole  was  to  be  the  beginning 
of  a  political  millennium ;  and  every  enthusiast 
had  figured  to  himself  that  millennium  according 
to  his  own  wishes."  Akenside's  best  poem  was 
called  forth  by  this  movement,  and,  expatiating 
upon  what  was  to  be  expected  from  the  overthrow 
of  the  great  master  of  corruption,  he  exclaimed  :  — 

"  See  private  life  by  wisest  arts  reclaimed, 
See  ardent  youth  to  noblest  manners  framed." 

The  victory  of  the  Patriots,  as  they  were  called, 
was  not  only  complete,  but  the  man  who  was 
raised  to  power  in  Walpole's  place  realized  in  his 
conduct  their  professions  of  contempt  for  Wal- 
pole's methods.  Carteret  despised  office-monger- 
ing  and  would  have  nothing  to  do  with  it.  He 
neglected,  says  Macaulay,  "all  those  means  by 
which  the  power  of  Walpole  had  been  created 
and  maintained."  Chief-Justice  Willes  once  went 
to  him  to  beg  some  office  for  a  friend.  Carteret 
replied  that  he  was  too  much  occupied  with  Con- 
tinental politics  to  think  about  the  disposal  of 
places  and  benefices.  "  You  may  rely  on  it,  then," 


342      TENDENCIES  AND  PROSPECTS  OF  POLITICS 

said  the  justice,  "that  people  who  want  places  and 
benefices  will  go  to  those  who  have  more  leisure."  1 
The  prediction  was  fulfilled.  Carteret's  parliamen- 
tary support  fell  away,  and  before  long  he  had  to 
retire  from  an  office  in  which  he  could  not  sustain 
himself.  With  Walpole's  downfall  had  disappeared 
the  sole  point  of  policy  on  which  the  Patriots  were 
united.  To  form  an  efficient  administration,  party 
connection  had  to  be  established,  and  for  this  pur- 
pose the  usual  arts  of  political  management  were 
found  necessary.  The  nation  soon  found  that  a 
change  of  men  had  made  no  change  of  method. 
The  popular  disgust  was  intense.  The  very  name 
of  Patriot  became  a  by-word.  Samuel  Johnson 
was  so  completely  cured  of  enthusiasm  that  he 
declared  that  patriotism  was  the  last  refuge  of  a 
scoundrel. 

Still  another  phase  of  popular  sentiment  in  our 
own  times  that  has  its  prototype  in  English  poli- 
tics of  the  eighteenth  century  is  that  which  may 
be  described  as  the  Messianic  hope  of  politics  — 
expectation  of  the  advent  of  some  strong  deliverer. 
The  ideal  president  or  governor  who  rises  superior 
to  party,  and  calls  all  good  citizens  to  his  support,  is 
Bolingbroke's  "  Patriot  King  "  in  republican  dress. 
Although  the  political  philosophy  of  Bolingbroke 
is  long  since  obsolete,  it  powerfully  impressed  the 
thought  of  his  age  and  was  in  high  repute  with  the 
fathers  of  the  republic.  There  was  nothing  servile 

1  Macaulay's  Essay  on  Horace  Walpole. 


POLITICAL  IDEAS   OF  OUR    TIMES  343 

in  Bolingbroke's  attitude  towards  kingship.  He 
ridiculed  the  idea  that  a  king  ruled  by  divine  right, 
and,  laying  down  the  principle  that  "  the  ultimate 
end  of  all  governments  is  the  good  of  the  people," 
he  upheld  monarchy  as  the  most  feasible  system 
by  which  social  order  might  be  preserved  and 
civil  liberty  protected.  The  great  advantage  which 
monarchical  government  possessed  over  every  other 
kind  of  government  was  its  power  of  r-eform  by  the 
accession  of  a  patriot  king.  "A  corrupt  common- 
wealth remains  without  remedy,  though  all  the 
orders  and  forms  of  it  subsist ;  a  free  monarchical 
government  cannot  remain  absolutely  so,  so  long 
as  the  orders  and  forms  of  the  constitution  sub- 
sist." He  based  this  opinion  on  the  ground  that 
no  matter  how  bad  public  men  may  have  become, 
the  king  in  the  normal  exercise  of  his  sovereignty 
can  elevate  the  standard  of  public  service  so  that 
every  part  of  the  constitution  will  experience  a 
purgation  which  will  restore  it  to  its  proper  func- 
tions. "  By  rendering  public  virtue  and  real  capa- 
city the  sole  means  of  acquiring  any  degree  of 
power  or  profit  in  the  state,  he  will  set  the  pas- 
sions of  their  hearts  on  the  side  of  liberty  and 
good  government."  The  essential  thing  was  to 
uproot  partisanship.  "To  espouse  no  party,  but 
to  govern  like  the  common  father  of  his  people,  is 
so  essential  to  the  character  of  a  patriot  king  that 
he  who  does  otherwise  forfeits  the  title.  ...  In- 
stead of  abetting  the  divisions  of  his  people,  he 


344      TENDENCIES  AND  PROSPECTS  OF  POLITICS 

will  endeavor  to  unite  them  and  to  be  himself  the 
centre  of  their  union  ;  instead  of  putting  himself 
at  the  head  of  one  party  in  order  to  govern  his 
people,  he  will  put  himself  at  the  head  of  his  peo- 
ple in  order  to  govern,  or  more  properly  to  sub- 
due, all  parties." 

This  was  the  theory  which  produced  George  III. 
In  his  private  life  he  exactly  fulfilled  the  popular 
ideal  of  the  good  ruler.  In  an  age  when  fashion- 
able society  was  recklessly  dissolute,  he  was  chaste 
in  his  conduct,  temperate  in  his  diet,  and  simple  in 
his  manners.  While  irreligion  abounded,  he  kept 
a  virtuous  home  whose  days,  beginning  at  dawn 
with  family  prayer,  were  passed  in  laborious 
performance  of  duty.  He  modelled  his  political 
conduct  precisely  in  accord  with  Bolingbroke's 
instructions.  Writing  of  the  beginning  of  his 
reign,  Mac'aulay  says  :  "  The  watchwords  of  the 
new  government  were  prerogative  and  purity. 
The  sovereign  was  no  longer  to  be  a  puppet  in 
the  hands  of  any  subject  or  combinations  of  sub- 
jects. .  .  .  The  system  of  bribery  which  had 
grown  up  during  the  late  reigns  was  to  cease." 
Britain  was  to  be  freed  from  corruption  and  oli- 
garchical cabals.  But  in  separating  himself  from 
existing  parties,  he  still  had  to  secure  to  himself 
legislative  support,  and  this  practically  meant  the 
organization  of  a  personal  faction.  "  Thus  sprang 
into  existence  and  into  note,"  Macaulay  says,  "a 
reptile  species  of  politicians  never  before  and 


POLITICAL  IDEAS   OF  OUR    TIMES  345 

never  since  known  in  our  country."  l  They  were 
known  as  "  The  King's  Friends."  By  their  aid  the 
king  was  temporarily  able  to  overthrow  party  gov- 
ernment. As  a  result,  corruption  soon  abounded 
more  than  ever  before,  and  every  evil  in  the  state 
was  aggravated.  In  wrecking  party  discipline  and 
control,  he  dissolved  restraint  upon  faction  vio- 
lence and  brought  on  an  anarchic  condition  of 
politics  which  menaced  all  social  interests. 

Burke's  famous  "  Thoughts  on  the  Cause  of  the 
Present  Discontents,"  written  in  1770,  made  a 
diagnosis  of  the  malady  from  which  politics  were 
then  suffering  ;  and  since  our  government  has  pre- 
served the  essential  characteristics  of  the  English 
constitution  of  that  period,  that  diagnosis,  in  all  its 
general  observations,  is  still  pertinent  to  the  con- 
dition of  American  politics.  Then  as  now  it  was 
the  popular  disposition  to  account  for  evils  by  the 
predominance  in  administration  of  some  obnoxious 
person.  Lord  Bute  was  then  the  target  of  ob- 
loquy. Burke  disdained  to  join  in  the  clamor,  re- 
marking that,  "  where  there  is  a  regular  scheme  of 
operations  carried  on,  it  is  the  system,  and  not  any 
individual  person  who  acts  in  it,  that  is  truly 
dangerous."  He  went  directly  to  the  source  of 
the  disease  by  pointing  out  that  it  arose  from  the 
separation  between  administration  and  responsi- 
bility. There  was  a  double  ministry :  the  one  a 
sham  set  up  before  the  public ;  while  the  real 

1  Essay  on  The  Earl  of  Chatham. 


346      TENDENCIES  AND  PROSPECTS  OF  POLITICS 

power  of  administration  was  controlled  by  a  cabal 
working  behind  the  scenes.  The  interests  in  con- 
trol behind  the  scenes  "  contrived  to  form  in  the 
outward  administration  two  parties  at  least,  which, 
whilst  they  are  tearing  one  another  to  pieces,  are 
both  competitors  for  the  favor  and  protection  of 
the  cabal ;  and  by  their  emulation  contribute  to 
throw  everything  more  and  more  into  the  hands 
of  the  interior  managers."  The  principle  of  the 
double  ministry  is  still  in  full  force  in  American 
politics.  Back  of  the  apparent  administration 
stands  the  political  ring,  and  the  powers  of  gov- 
ernment are  wielded  by  irresponsible  managers 
behind  the  scenes.  Burke  made  an  observation, 
whose  justness  is  strikingly  illustrated  by  the  way 
in  which  every  now  and  then  in  our  politics  the 
people  in  a  frenzy  of  rage  crush  the  boss's  candi- 
date while  -the  boss  remains,  when  he  said  that 
"  they  have  so  contrived  matters  that  the  people 
have  a  greater  hatred  to  the  subordinate  instru- 
ment than  to  the  principal  movers." 

Speaking  of  the  evils  caused  by  the  lack  of 
direct  responsibility  for  the  management  of  public 
affairs,  Burke  said  that  it  "  not  only  strikes  a  palsy 
into  every  nerve  of  our  free  constitution,  but  in 
the  same  degree  benumbs  and  stupefies  the  whole 
executive  power ;  rendering  government  in  all  its 
grand  operations  languid,  uncertain,  ineffective ; 
making  ministers  fearful  of  attempting,  and  inca- 
pable of  executing,  any  useful  plan  of  domestic  ar- 


POLITICAL  IDEAS   OF  OUR    TIMES  347 

rangement  or  of  foreign  politics."  As  regards  the 
effects  upon  the  temper  of  the  people  he  said,  with 
striking  appositeness  to  the  present  condition  of 
American  politics  :  "  When  the  people  conceive 
that  laws  and  tribunals,  and  even  popular  assem- 
blies, are  perverted  from  the  ends  of  their  institu- 
tion, they  find  in  those  names  of  degenerated 
establishments  only  new  motives  to  discontent. 
...  A  sullen  gloom  and  furious  disorder  prevail 
by  fits.  ...  A  species  of  men,  to  whom  a  state  of 
order  would  become  a  sentence  of  obscurity,  are 
nourished  into  a  dangerous  magnitude  by  the  heat 
of  intestine  disturbances  ;  and  it  is  no  wonder  that, 
by  a  sort  of  sinister  piety,  they  cherish  in  their 
turn  the  disorders  which  are  the  parents  of  all 
their  consequence.  Superficial  observers  consider 
such  persons  as  the  cause  of  the  public  uneasiness, 
when  in  fact  they  are  nothing  more  than  the  effect 
of  it." 

Burke  dismissed  somewhat  contemptuously  the 
various  projects  in  the  way  of  new  checks  and  pro- 
hibitions. A  favorite  reform  proposal  then  was 
a  bill  to  exclude  office-holders  from  Parliament. 
He  remarked,  "  It  were  better,  perhaps,  that  they 
should  have  a  corrupt  interest  in  the  forms  of  the 
constitution  than  that  they  should  have  none  at 
all."  He  did  not  share  in  belief  "of  the  infalli- 
bility of  laws  and  regulations,  in  the  cure  of  public 
distempers."  Whatever  they  might  be,  the  poli- 
ticians would  get  around  them.  "  The  science  of 


348      TENDENCIES  AND  PROSPECTS  OF  POLITICS 

evasion,  already  tolerably  understood,  would  then 
be  brought  to  the  greatest  perfection."  The  doc- 
trine "  that  all  political  connections  are  in  their 
nature  factitious,  and  as  such  ought  to  be  dissi- 
pated and  destroyed,"  and  that  "the  rule  for  form- 
ing administration  is  mere  personal  ability,"  he 
energetically  denounced  as  pernicious  counsel. 
"  Every  honorable  connection  will  avow  it  is  their 
first  purpose  to  pursue  every  just  method  to  put 
the  men  who  hold  their  opinions  into  such  a  con- 
dition as  may  enable  them  to  carry  their  common 
plans  into  execution,  with  all  the  power  and  au- 
thority of  the  state.  As  this  power  is  attached  to 
certain  situations,  it  is  their  duty  to  contend  for 
these  situations.  Without  a  proscription  of  others, 
they  are  bound  to  give  to  their  own  party  the 
preference  in  all  things."  In  fine,  Burke's  remedy 
for  factious  -strife  and  abounding  corruption  was 
frankly  to  adopt  party  rule  by  conferring  upon 
party  full  power  to  act,  coupled  with  complete  re- 
sponsibility for  what  was  done.  It  was  from 
partisanship,  thus  strengthened  and  steadied,  that 
the  nation  might  hope  "  to  see  public  and  private 
virtues,  not  dissonant  and  jarring  and  mutually 
destructive,  but  harmoniously  combined,  growing 
out  of  one  another  in  a  noble  and  orderly  grada- 
tion, reciprocally  supporting  and  supported." 

The  event  has  shown  that  just  by  such  partisan- 
ship the  regeneration  of  English  politics  was  ac- 
complished. The  corruption  of  English  politics 


POLITICAL  IDEAS   OF  OUR    TIMES  349 

seems  to  have  been  accompanied  by  a  more  general 
infection  of  society  than  has  taken  place  in  this 
country,  and  the  conditions  of  public  life  were 
more  degraded  than  at  any  period  of  our  history. 
We  read  with  amazement  of  the  torrent  of  bribery 
flowing  through  English  constituencies,  of  candi- 
dates going  to  the  polls  surrounded  by  gangs  of 
hired  pugilists,  and  of  the  savage  rioting  or  sod- 
den drunkenness  that  invested  the  polling  booths. 
And  yet  it  was  from  material  furnished  by  such 
an  electorate  that  the  workings  of  public  opinion 
wrought  great  party  leaders  and  statesmen  of  shin- 
ing integrity. 

"  Responsibility  is  a  tremendous  engine  in  a  free 
government,"  said  Jefferson. 1  "  Responsibility,  in 
order  to  be  reasonable,"  said  Madison,  "must  be 
limited  to  objects  within  the  power  of  the  responsi- 
ble party ;  and  in  order  to  be  effectual  must  relate 
to  the  operations  of  that  power,  of  which  a  ready 
and  proper  judgment  can  be  formed  by  the  con- 
stituents."2 These  conditions  were  established 
in  England  when  the  cabinet  system  became  defi- 
nitely converted  into  a  party  agency,  uniting  ad- 
ministration with  the  initiative  of  legislation.  All 
that  was  then  needed  to  establish  accountability 
was  the  overthrow  of  the  privacy  of  debate  and 
voting,  anciently  regarded  as  a  most  sacred  privi- 
lege for  the  protection  of  Parliament.  This  barrier 

1  Writings  of  Jefferson,  Vol.  V.,  p.  410. 
•  The  Federalist,  No.  63. 


350      TENDENCIES  AND  PROSPECTS  OF  POLITICS 

was  broken  down  after  violent  struggles,  and  then 
the  reign  of  public  opinion  began.  The  new  con- 
ditions developed  a  new  type  of  statesmanship. 
The  ability  preferred  by  the  situation  was  no  longer 
that  which  excelled  in  the  manipulation  of  the 
individual  interests  of  members  so  as  to  obtain 
their  cooperation  in  the  transaction  of  public  busi- 
ness. That  was  attended  to  by  the  constituencies 
themselves  in  fixing  the  party  obligations  of  their 
representatives.  The  ability  now  ascendant  was 
that  which  appealed  to  the  support  and  confidence 
of  the  nation,  and  which  was  able  to  sustain  the 
high  responsibilities  of  public  office. 

In  meeting  these  responsibilities,  English  states- 
men have  devised  various  instruments  for  correct- 
ing abuses  and  arresting  corruption,  the  adoption 
of  which,  in  this  country,  is  now  the  great  object 
of  reformers.  The  idea  seems  to  be  that  if  similar 
machinery  is  forced  upon  our  politicians,  a  proper 
and  effective  use  of  it  must  necessarily  follow  ;  but 
so  far  such  expectations  have  been  disappointed. 
What  has  been  introduced  in  this  country  as  civil 
service  reform,  was  established  in  England  by  the 
Aberdeen  ministry  in  1853  as  a  barrier  against 
the  selfish  importunity  of  aristocratic  influence. 
The  reports  of  reform  associations  and  the  dis- 
closures of  congressional  investigations  afford 
ample  testimony  of  the  fact  that  a  device  adopted 
by  English  party  leaders  to  relieve  them  of  press- 
ure to  do  what  they  did  not  want  to  do,  does  not 


POLITICAL  IDEAS   OF  OUR    TIMES  351 

serve  so  well  to  prevent  American  party  leaders 
from  doing  what  circumstances  incline  them  to  do, 
whether  they  like  it  or  not.  The  Corrupt  Practices 
Prevention  law,  which  also  is  being  introduced  in 
this  country,  with  high  hopes  of  its  utility  as  a 
reform  measure,  is  the  product  of  a  series  of  English 
statutes,  the  first  of  which  was  passed  in  1854.  It 
is  not  very  difficult  for  our  clever  politicians  to 
evade  such  laws,  but  they  have  been  effective 
in  England  because  they  are  regarded  as  a  pro- 
tection for  candidates  against  blackmail  and  cor- 
ruption, and  because  they  are  useful  as  a  handy 
club  to  knock  out  of  public  life  men  mean  enough 
to  resort  to  cheating.  Far  from  desiring  to  evade 
such  legislation,  the  tendency  among  English  party 
leaders  is  to  tighten  its  restraint  so  as  to  keep 
down  election  expenses.  Before  the  creation  of  a 
regenerative  force  to  give  life  and  vigor  to  statutes, 
such  legislation  was  as  great  a  failure  in  England 
as  in  this  country.  In  1705,  De  Foe,  after  advert- 
ing to  some  acts  passed  against  bribery,  remarked, 
"  Never  was  treating,  buying  of  voices,  freedoms 
and  freeholds,  and  all  the  corrupt  practices  in  the 
world,  so  open  and  barefaced  as  since  these  severe 
laws  were  enacted."  Lecky  states  that  "by  an 
act  of  1/29,  any  elector  might  be  compelled  on 
demand  to  take  an  oath  swearing  that  he  had 
received  no  bribe  to  influence  his  vote,  and  any 
person  who  was  convicted  of  either  giving  or  re- 
ceiving a  bribe  at  election  was  deprived  forever 


352      TENDENCIES  AND  PROSPECTS  OF  POLITICS 

of  either  giving  or  receiving  the  franchise  and 
fined  ^500,  unless  he  purchased  indemnity  by 
discovering  another  offender  of  the  same  kind  "  ; 
but  the  historian  remarks  that  so  long  as  it  was 
to  the  interest  of  politicians  to  shelter  corruption, 
laws  against  it  were  a  dead  letter.  On  the  other 
hand,  even  without  specific  legislation  against  cor- 
ruption, the  operation  of  public  opinion,  addressing 
a  responsible  control,  exerted  a  purifying  influence. 
Writing  in  1833,  Macaulay  remarked  that  whereas, 
formerly,  nobody  thought  worse  of  a  man  because 
he  had  bought  votes,  the  practice  had  become  dis- 
honorable. The  remedial  process  was  a  gradual 
one,  effecting  not  a  sudden  cure,  but  a  steady  im- 
provement. Mr.  Bagehot,  in  his  famous  work 
which  finally  disposed  of  the  old  Whig  theory  of 
the  English  constitution,  pointed  out  that  the 
really  valuable  reforms  were  instituted  and  made 
effectual  by  the  politicians  themselves.  "  The 
statesmen  who  worked  the  system  that  was  put 
up  had  themselves  been  educated  under  the  system 
that  was  pulled  down." 

There  is  no  reason  for  thinking  that  American 
politicians  will  be  any  less  amenable  to  public 
opinion  or  less  capable  in  obeying  its  requirements. 
But  so  long  as  our  constitutional  system  provides 
that  an  administration  chosen  to  carry  out  a  party 
policy  shall  be  debarred  from  initiating  and  direct- 
ing that  policy  in  legislation,  just  so  long  is  the 
party  machine  a  necessary  intermediary  between 


POLITICAL   IDEAS   OF  OUR    TIMES          353 

the  people  and  their  government,  and  just  so  long 
will  party  management  constitute  a  trade  which 
those  which  have  a  vocation  for  politics  cannot 
neglect,  and  those  who  make  a  business  of  politics 
will  make  as  profitable  as  they  can.  As  Burke 
wisely  said,  "Whatever  be  the  road  to  power, 
that  is  the  road  which  will  be  trod." 

2A 


CHAPTER   XXVII 

THE    POLITICAL    PROSPECT 

ALTHOUGH  "  the  Cause  of  the  Present  Discon- 
tents "  has  taken  rank  as  a  classic,  it  does  not 
appear  to  have  had  any  marked  effect  upon  con- 
temporaneous thought.  The  general  current  of 
political  speculation  continued  to  be  deeply  tinct- 
ured by  the  fallacies  of  the  old  Whig  theory. 
John  Adams  probably  expressed  the  prevailing 
opinion  when  he  wrote  that  Burke  was  far  inferior 
to  Bolingbroke  as  a  thinker.  Burke's  essay  gave 
great  umbrage  to  reformers  and  called  forth 
counter  manifestoes.  What  the  age  admired  was 
Churchill's  satire,  the  invectives  of  Junius,  and 
Mrs.  Catherine  Macaulay's1  dissertations  proving 
to  the  satisfaction  of  every  one  not  a  dolt  or  a 
knave  that  the  corruptions  of  politics  were  due  to 

1  Mrs.  Macaulay  was  in  high  repute  as  the  "  celebrated  female 
historian."  She  is  referred  to  by  John  Adams  as  a  recognized 
authority.  A  poet  of  the  age  declared :  — 

"  Macaulay  shall  in  nervous  prose  relate 
Whence  flows  the  venom  that  distracts  the  state." 

The  prophecy  was  exactly  fulfilled  by  a  Macaulay  whose  fame  has 
obliterated  that  of  his  predecessor,  whose  name  is  now  preserved 
from  oblivion  mainly  by  some  ungallant  remarks  at  her  expense  by 
old  Dr.  Johnson,  duly  recorded  by  Boswell. 
354 


THE  POLITICAL  PROSPECT  355 

the  disturbance  of  the  constitution  caused  by  the 
growth  of  partisanship. 

The  belief  that  the  constitution  could  be  tink- 
ered into  some  sort  of  mechanical  excellence  pos- 
sessed reformers  too  strongly  to  be  disturbed.  An 
elaborate  presentation  of  their  ideas  was  made 
in  Burgh's  "  Political  Disquisitions,  an  Inquiry 
into  Public  Errors,  Defects,  and  Abuses,"  published 
in  17/4.  John  Adams  mentions  that  it  was 
favorite  reading  in  the  colonies,  and  Jefferson  rec- 
ommended it  to  a  friend  as  a  good  work  on  politics. 
It  is  cited  in  The  Federalist  as  a  standard  au- 
thority. In  its  three  stout  volumes  one  finds  all 
the  familiar  nostrums  for  remedying  the  ills  of  the 
body  politic  —  such  as  annual  elections,  rotation 
in  office,  the  ballot,  the  extension  of  the  suffrage, 
the  requirement  of  residence  in  the  constituency 
as  a  qualification  for  election,  and  above  all  things 
the  suppression  of  partisanship.  In  England  the 
course  of  practical  politics  would  not  budge  for 
such  reforms,  but  they  have  had  a  grand  field  in 
this  country.  New  nostrums  are  now  in  favor,  but 
the  spirit  of  reform  is  unchanged.  The  great 
object  is  still,  as  in  Burgh's  time,  "  not  to  set 
up  one  party  against  another,  the  one  to  battle 
against  the  other ;  but  to  take  away  the  fuel  of 
parties,  the  emolumentary  invitations  to  the  fatal 
and  mischievous  strife,  in  which  every  victory  is 
a  loss  to  the  country."  1 

1  Burgh's  Disquisitions,  Vol.  III.,  p.  332. 


356      TENDENCIES  AND  PROSPECTS   OF  POLITICS 

Legislation  conceived  in  this  spirit  has  had  grave 
consequences ;  but  for  the  present  purpose  it  is 
sufficient  to  remark  that  there  is  nothing  in  the 
present  condition  of  our  politics  to  indicate  that 
constitutional  development  is  taking  any  different 
course  than  it  has  followed  hitherto,  as  described 
in  the  second  part  of  this  work.  On  the  contrary, 
there  is  abundant  evidence  to  confirm  the  opinion 
that  party  organization  continues  to  be  the  sole 
efficient  means  of  administrative  union  between 
the  executive  and  legislative  branches  of  the 
government,  and  that  whatever  tends  to  maintain 
and  perfect  that  union  makes  for  orderly  politics 
and  constitutional  progress ;  while  whatever  tends 
to  impair  that  union,  disturbs  the  constitutional 
poise  of  the  government,  obstructs  its  functions,  and 
introduces  an  anarchic  condition  of  affairs  full  of 
danger  to  all  social  interests.  This  is  the  cardinal 
principle  of  American  politics. 

The  situation  is  such  that  the  extension  of  exec- 
utive authority  is  still  the  only  practical  method 
of  advancing  popular  rule.  This  disposition  of 
American  politics  to  exalt  executive  authority 
causes  some  critics  of  our  institutions  to  infer 
that  democracy  tends  towards  personal  rule.  Ap- 
pearances seem  to  corroborate  this  theory ;  but  all 
that  it  really  amounts  to  is  that  at  the  present 
stage  of  our  political  development  American  de- 
mocracy, confronted  by  the  old  embarrassments  of 
feudalism,  compounded  from  new  ingredients,  in- 


THE  POLITICAL  PROSPECT  357 

stinctively  resorts  to  the  historic  agency  for  the 
extrication  of  public  authority  from  the  control 
of  particular  interests  —  the  plenitude  of  executive 
power.  The  circumstances  are  such  as  are  likely 
to  put  increasing  emphasis  upon  this  tendency. 

The  actual  situation  as  regards  the  practical 
work  of  government  assigns  real  control  to  two 
systems  of  authority :  one  the  power  of  the 
Speaker  of  the  House  over  the  opportunities 
of  legislation ;  the  other  the  power  of  senators 
over  the  details  of  legislation.  The  latter  is  by 
far  the  more  important,  as  it  is  the  positive  force ; 
the  former  operating  simply  as  a  check  or  inhibi- 
tion at  large,  and,  from  its  gross  and  massive  nat- 
ure, incapable  of  discrimination.  The  senatorial 
control  is  supple,  insinuating,  and  under  existing 
conditions  it  is  ordinarily  incontestable.  By  so 
much  as  particular  interests  are  brought  under  a 
general  control  in  the  House,  the  more  they  value 
the  opportunities  afforded  by  senatorial  preroga- 
tive ;  and  thus  there  is  created  in  the  membership 
of  the  House  a  sense  of  dependence  upon  the  offi- 
ces of  senators,  which  greatly  weakens  the  House 
as  a  body  in  any  controversies  with  the  Senate. 
There  are  always  a  large  number  of  members  who 
are  fearful  of  injuring  some  special  interests  which 
they  are  pursuing  by  the  aid  of  senators,  so  that 
they  have  no  stomach  for  a  conflict,  and  are  quite 
willing  to  sacrifice  the  dignity  of  the  House  for 
their  individual  advantage. 


358      TENDENCIES  AND  PROSPECTS   OF  POLITICS 

The  possibility  that  the  constitutional  privileges 
of  the  Senate  might  be  abused,  so  as  to  erect  oli- 
garchical power,  was  foreseen  by  the  framers  of 
the  constitution,  and  the  representatives  of  the 
larger  states  would  never  have  agreed  to  equality 
of  senatorial  representation  with  the  smaller  states 
had  it  not  been  supposed  that  the  House  of  Rep- 
resentatives would  dominate  the  legislative  branch 
of  the  government.  Speaking  of  that  equality, 
Madison  remarked  :  — 

"  The  peculiar  defence  which  it  involves  in  favor 
of  the  smaller  states  would  be  more  rational  if 
any  interests  common  to  them,  and  distinct  from 
those  of  the  other  states,  would  otherwise  be  ex- 
posed to  peculiar  dangers.  But  as  the  larger 
states  would  always  be  able,  by  their  power  over 
the  supplies,  to  defeat  unreasonable  exertions  of 
this  prerogative  of  the  lesser  states ;  and  as  the 
facility  and  excess  of  law-making  seem  to  be  the 
diseases  to  which  our  governments  are  most  liable, 
it  is  not  impossible  that  this  part  of  the  constitution 
may  be  more  convenient  in  practice  than  it  ap- 
pears to  many  in  contemplation."  1 

In  this,  as  in  all  their  estimates  of  the  practi- 
cal working  of  the  constitution,  the  fathers  were 
misled  by  deceptive  analogies  drawn  from  the 
English  constitution.  All  the  checks  upon  which 
they  relied  for  the  control  of  the  Senate,  by  means 
of  the  superior  weight  and  influence  of  the  House, 

1  The  Federalist,  No.  62. 


THE  POLITICAL  PROSPECT  359 

have  failed  in  practice.  Events  have  shown  that 
the  House  is  so  little  jealous  of  its  power  and  con- 
sequence that  members  quietly  permit  the  will  of 
the  nation,  as  declared  in  the  election  of  the  Presi- 
dent and  an  overwhelming  majority  of  the  House 
of  Representatives,  to  be  thwarted  by  an  acci- 
dental preponderance  of  minority  representation 
in  the  Senate,  rather  than  risk  the  trouble  and  an- 
noyance of  combating  senatorial  usurpation.  Nay, 
it  has  been  shown  that  members  of  the  House  are 
so  absorbed  in  the  service  of  their  local  interests 
that  they  eagerly  seize  the  fact  of  an  adverse  ma- 
jority in  the  Senate  as  an  excuse  for  abandoning 
any  effort  to  fulfil  national  party  pledges,  prefer- 
ring to  await  the  chances  of  political  adjustments 
which  may  establish  an  accidental  coincidence 
between  the  purposes  of  the  Senate  and  the  will 
of  the  nation. 

It  was  very  natural  to  suppose  that  the  superior 
weight  and  controlling  authority  of  the  House  of 
Commons  in  the  British  legislature  was  due  to  the 
fact  that  it  was  the  body  immediately  representing 
the  people,  but  such  was  not  the  case.  The  as- 
cendency of  the  House  of  Commons  dates  no 
farther  back  than  to  the  period  when  the  seven 
years'  term  of  membership  was  fixed.  Mr.  Lecky 
points  out  that  "during  the  triennial  period  the 
frequency  of  elections  made  the  members  to  a 
great  extent  subservient  to  the  people  who  elected 
or  to  the  noblemen  who  nominated  them,  and  gave 


360      TENDENCIES  AND  PROSPECTS  OF  POLITICS 

each  Parliament  scarcely  time  to  acquire  much 
self-confidence,  fixity  of  purpose,  or  consistency  of 
organization.  The  Septennial  Act,  and  the  pres- 
ence of  Walpole  in  the  House  of  Commons  dur- 
ing the  whole  of  his  long  ministry,  gradually  made 
that  body  the  undoubted  centre  of  authority." 1 
The  parallel  between  the  present  condition  of  our 
House  of  Representatives,  and  the  House  of  Com- 
mons before  it  obtained  stability  of  position  and 
became  the  seat  of  executive  authority,  is  obvious. 
Although  fresh  from  the  people,  and  just  at  the 
beginning  of  their  term,  it  was  with  great  difficulty 
that  Speaker  Reed  was  able  to  hold  the  majority 
of  the  House  to  their  shrewd  and  effective  policy, 
at  the  extra  session  of  1897,  of  refusing  to  take 
up  general  legislation  until  the  Senate  had  passed 
the  tariff  bill  to  enact  which  Congress  had  been 
specially  convoked. 

At  present,  however,  the  government  is  subject 
to  the  rule  of  an  oligarchy  intrenched  in  the  Sen- 
ate. Senator  Hoar,  a  zealous  defender  of  the  dig- 
nity and  privileges  of  the  body  of  which  he  is  a 
member,  in  a  review  article  stated  :  — 

"  We  choose  our  chief  magistrate  every  four  years, 
and  the  members  of  one  House  of  Congress  every 
two  years.  One-third  of  the  senators  go  out  of 
office  every  two  years.  The  term  of  office  of  an 
individual  senator  is  six  years.  The  Senate  is  con- 
trolled by  a  majority  of  the  states.  A  majority  of 

1  History  of  England,  Vol.  I.,  p.  472. 


THE  POLITICAL  PROSPECT  361 

the  people  cannot  change  the  policy  of  the  country 
unless  a  majority  of  the  states  also  consent.  A 
senator  must  be  a  citizen  of  the  state  from  which 
he  is  chosen.  Thus  no  change  in  the  popular 
opinion  can  compel  a  change  of  policy  during  the 
four  years  of  the  President's  term,  nor  can  it  com- 
pel a  change  of  policy  in  a  body  where  great  and 
small  states  meet  as  equals,  unless  a  majority  of 
the  states  agree  to  the  change.  But  the  purpose 
and  desire  of  the  numerical  majority  of  the  Ameri- 
can people  may  be  baffled  for  twenty  years  by  the 
local  interests  and  feeling  of  a  majority  of  the 
states,  and  those,  perhaps,  the  smallest  in  popu- 
lation." i 

This  is  a  revival  of  the  state  sovereignty  doc- 
trine without  any  historical  basis.  It  is  bottomed 
wholly  upon  usurpation.  But  there  is  no  likelihood 
that  the  House  of  Representatives,  out  of  its  own 
resources,  will  be  able  to  make  the  effective  resist- 
ance upon  which  the  framers  of  the  constitution 
relied  as  a  means  of  preventing  the  Senate  from 
turning  the  government  into  an  oligarchy.  The 
remedy  must  come,  as  in  England,  by  the  coopera- 
tion of  executive  power  with  representative  author- 
ity. How  potent  is  such  a  union  of  force  is  shown 
by  the  fact  that  in  England  it  was  able  to  reduce 
even  a  body  of  hereditary  legislators  into  subordi- 
nation to  the  will  of  the  people,  as  expressed 
through  their  direct  representatives  by  majority 
1  The  Forum,  August,  1897. 


362      TENDENCIES  AND  PROSPECTS   OF  POLITICS 

rule.  Legally,  the  position  of  the  British  House 
of  Lords  seems  impregnable.  There  is  no  way  of 
getting  any  one  of  them  out  of  office,  and  theoreti- 
cally nothing  can  be  done  without  their  consent. 
But,  practically,  they  must  agree  to  anything  on 
which  the  House  of  Commons  is  resolutely  de- 
termined. Of  late  years,  since  the  functions  of  the 
Commons,  as  a  college  of  electors,  are  somewhat 
impaired  by  the  degeneracy  of  party  government, 
the  Lords  have  plucked  up  more  spirit  in  opposing 
the  Commons ;  but  in  defeating  a  bill,  they  do  it 
on  the  ground  that  their  action  is  a  method  of  in- 
voking a  referendum.  If  the  appeal  to  the  people 
goes  against  the  Lords,  they  have  nothing  to  do 
but  to  submit. 

It  is  no  longer  possible  for  any  institution  of 
government,  no  matter  what  paper  safeguards  it 
may  possess,  to  have  any  genuine  strength,  unless 
it  is  invigorated  by  democratic  influence.  One 
need  only  consider  the  real  extent  of  the  presi- 
dential authority  in  appointments  to  office,  and 
the  control  over  details  of  legislation  inherent  in 
the  veto  power  when  fully  brought  into  play,  to  be 
convinced  that  the  presidential  office  still  retains 
its  efficiency  as  an  agency  of  popular  control  over 
the  government,  and  that  the  power  and  influence 
of  the  office  afford  ample  resources  for  the  redress 
of  grievances  as  soon  as  the  determination  to  use 
them  for  that  purpose  shall  have  been  developed. 
It  is  hardly  too  much  to  say  that  the  President  and 


THE  POLITICAL  PROSPECT  363 

the  House  of  Representatives,  acting  in  accord, 
are  constitutionally  omnipotent ;  but  the  vast  re- 
serves of  power  which  they  together  possess  would 
not  have  to  be  drawn  upon  to  any  great  extent. 
The  influence  of  party  connection  would  make  its 
influence  felt  in  the  Senate,  just  as  it  has  done 
in  its  prototype,  the  House  of  Lords,  long  before 
any  controversy  could  reach  an  acute  stage ;  but 
it  is  altogether  probable  that  some  very  forcible 
interposition  of  the  authority  of  the  two  repre- 
sentative branches  of  the  government  will  have 
to  be  made  before  the  oligarchical  power  of  the 
Senate  is  curbed,  and  its  authority  reduced  to 
constitutional  dimensions.  The  only  way  in  which 
the  Senate  will  ever  be  reformed  is  by  divesting 
it  of  all  power  to  domineer.  When  it  is  out  of 
the  question  for  the  Senate  to  oppose  its  will  to 
the  will  of  the  nation,  and  its  influence  becomes 
wholly  dependent  upon  the  worth  and  dignity  of 
its  membership,  then  it  will  assume  the  character- 
istics which  the  fathers  hoped  to  secure  by  its 
constitution.  Party  interest  will  then  inspire  the 
selection  of  the  ablest  men  that  can  be  found  for 
service  in  the  Senate,  so  that  in  the  discharge  of 
the  purely  advisory  functions,  which  are  all  that 
senators  should  be  permitted  to  exercise,  their 
action  will  have  the  weight  and  influence  which 
belong  to  wisdom  and  experience. 

Although  the  main  instrument  for  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  feudal  characteristics  which  deface  our 


364      TENDENCIES  AND  PROSPECTS  OF  POLITICS 

form  of  government  will  be  executive  authority, 
yet  in  performing  that  service  the  presidential 
office  will  be  surrounded  by  influences  which  will 
tend  to  preclude  the  subversion  of  its  representa- 
tive character  by  the  caprice  or  presumption  of 
the  individual  who  may  chance  to  hold  the  office. 
The  situation  is  such  that  only  by  entire  accord 
and  close  association  with  a  majority  in  the  House 
of  Representatives  can  such  an  exaltation  of  presi- 
dential authority  be  sustained,  so  that  the  aggran- 
dizement of  the  office  can  be  accomplished  only 
under  conditions  insuring  democratic  control. 


CHAPTER   XXVIII 

THE    ULTIMATE    TYPE 

THE  principle  of  elective  kingship,  —  as  repre- 
sented by  the  masterful  Mayor,  Governor,  or  Presi- 
dent, —  in  which  democracy  puts  its  trust,  does  not 
tend  to  a  suppression  of  parliamentary  agencies 
of  government,  such  as  took  place  in  Europe  dur- 
ing its  period  of  emergence  from  feudalism  ;  but  it 
tends  rather  to  subordinate  their  action  to  general 
requirements,  as  in  England,  so  that  all  that  there 
is  in  them  of  public  utility  will  be  preserved  for 
the  use  of  the  new  type  of  government  which 
American  democracy  is  perfecting.  The  greatest 
curtailments  of  the  authority  of  legislative  bodies 
are  those  which  have  taken  place  in  municipal 
charters  and  in  various  state  constitutions  ;  but 
even  at  their  lowest  point  of  authority  such  bodies 
are  retained  as  an  indispensable  part  of  the  appa- 
ratus of  government,  open  to  an  invigoration  of 
their  functions  when  political  conditions  correspond 
to  such  development.  In  national  politics,  the 
form  of  the  legislative  agencies  of  government  has 
remained  intact,  and  changes  that  have  taken  place 
in  their  functions  have  been  sustained  by  their 
own  activities.  The  House  of  Representatives 

365 


366      TENDENCIES  AND  PROSPECTS   OF  POLITICS 

has  practically  subjugated  its  elaborate  organiza- 
tion for  the  representation  of  local  interests,  by 
developing  a  collective  authority,  which  needs  only 
direct  association  with  executive  policy  to  become 
an  effective  organ  of  responsible  national  control. 
The  monstrous  list  of  committees  may  very  well 
continue,  as  now,  to  serve  as  convenient  cemeteries 
for  undesired  legislation ;  the  complicated  system 
of  rules  may  still  serve  a  useful  purpose  in  con- 
trolling the  moblike  characteristics  naturally  ap- 
pertaining to  so  large  a  body ;  and  it  will  quite 
suffice  for  all  the  purposes  of  a  responsible  admin- 
istration of  public  affairs  under  representative  in- 
stitutions if  that  resistless  engine  of  control,  forged 
by  the  development  of  the  Speaker's  authority  and 
by  the  creation  of  the  mandatory  powers  of  the 
Committee  on  Rules,  is  made  part  of  the  apparatus 
of  executive  authority.  So  far  as  the  constitution 
of  the  House  of  Representatives  is  concerned, 
party  organization  has  very  little  left  to  do  in 
completing  the  means  of  administrative  union 
between  the  executive  department  and  the  legis- 
lative branch. 

The  uniform  experience  of  other  countries  has 
shown  that  when  the  executive  power  has  been 
directly  connected  with  the  legislative  branch,  the 
tendency  is  not  towards  an  increasing  subordina- 
tion of  the  legislative  branch,  but  is  just  the  other 
way  —  the  legislature  is  apt  to  annex  the  func- 
tions of  the  executive  department.  The  invigora- 


THE    ULTIMATE    TYPE  367 

tion  of  legislative  control  by  direct  association 
with  executive  authority  is  the  ground  upon 
which  some  of  our  wisest  statesmen  have  urged 
the  deliberate  adoption  of  measures  to  bring  the 
administration  face  to  face  with  Congress.  The 
subject  has  been  considered  by  a  Senate  commit- 
tee of  exceptional  ability,  whose  report  is  so  im- 
portant a  document  that  the  main  portion  is  given 
as  an  appendix  to  this  work.  The  measure  recom- 
mended has  never  developed  any  practical  strength, 
as  it  was  not  appreciated  by  public  sentiment,  nor 
did  it  meet  with  any  favor  in  Congress,  where  it 
encountered  the  latent  opposition  of  particular  in- 
terests naturally  conservative  of  the  opportunities 
which  they  now  derive  from  representative  institu- 
tions unaccompanied  by  responsible  government. 

The  development  of  executive  authority,  as  an 
agency  of  popular  control  over  the  government, 
may,  however,  transform  political  conditions  in  a 
way  that  will  promote  a  direct  administrative  union 
between  the  executive  and  legislative  branches. 
[.Such  an  association  between  the  presidential  office 
and  the  House  of  Representatives,  as  must  sooner 
or  later  ensue  from  their  cooperation  in  suppress- 
ing the  oligarchical  power  of  the  Senate,  will  have 
the  result  of  making  the  House  the  real  base  of 
administration! — not,  as  in  the  early  days  of  the 
republic,  by  a  transient  location  of  support,  but  by 
firm  establishment,  fortified  by  party  interests,  and 
garrisoned  by  the  activities  of  practical  politics. 


368      TENDENCIES  AND  PROSPECTS   OF  POLITICS 

The  relations  of  particular  interests  to  the  general 
control,  which  then  will  have  been  established,  will 
be  such  that  the  same  inclinations  which  now  con- 
spire to  make  the  House  membership  deferential 
to  the  senatorial  oligarchy,  will  then  tend  to  favor 
the  most  extensive  contact  possible  between  the 
House  and  the  administration.  Members  now 
run  after  senators  because  senators  have  arbitrary 
powers  of  control  over  offices,  imposts,  and  appro- 
priations ;  when  the  administration  obtains  control 
of  the  situation,  particular  demands  will  be  no  less 
avid,  but  they  must  then  operate  under  new  condi- 
tions. It  is  not  likely  that  the  mass  of  the  mem- 
bers will  be  satisfied  to  allow  privileges  of  effective 
access  to  the  government  to  be  monopolized  by 
committee  chairmen,  and  they  will  find  that  their 
best  opportunity,  under  the  circumstances,  will  be 
obtained  by  embodying  the  administration  directly 
in  the  House,  where  it  will  be  open  to  direct  nego- 
tiation and  engagements.  The  ultimate  type  of 
democratic  government  will  be  reached  by  a  natu- 
ral development,  promoted  by  the  political  oppor- 
tunism which  affords  the  only  safe  process,  as  it 
always  keeps  in  touch  with  practical  expediency. 
Much  more  extensive  in  character  and  radical  in 
nature  are  the  changes  which  are  likely  to  take 
place  in  the  executive  department  under  such 
conditions.  The  presidency  now  combines  two 
distinct  functions — -one  ceremonial;  the  other 
practical  —  which  advancing  civilization  makes 


THE    ULTIMATE    TYPE       •  369 

incongruous,  so  that,  as  history  shows,  they  tend 
to  severance.  The  President  is  the  head  of  the 
nation,  the  chief  magistrate,  the  common  father 
of  the  people,  to  whom  they  write  when  in  trouble 
or  deeply  moved,  to  whom  they  feel  they  have 
a  right  of  personal  access  as  primitive  in  its 
simplicity  as  if  the  office  were  still  a  tribal 
chieftainship ;  but  he  is  also  the  premier  of  the 
administration,  a  busy  man  of  affairs,  with  so 
many  things  to  attend  to  that  there  do  not  seem 
to  be  hours  enough  in  the  day  for  them  all.  The 
attempt  to  compass  these  two  functions  is  a  killing 
task,  fraught  with  great  perils  to  the  individual 
incumbent  and  to  the  public  welfare.  With  the 
establishment  of  a  direct  parliamentary  basis  for 
the  government,  the  actual  management  of  affairs 
will  naturally  tend  to  pass  into  the  hands  of  groups 
of  statesmen  trained  to  their  work  by  gradations 
of  public  service,  their  fitness  attested  by  suc- 
cess in  coping  with  their  responsibilities  under 
the  direct  and  continuous  scrutiny  and  criticism  of 
Congress.  The  presidency  will  tend  to  assume 
an  honorary  and  a  ceremonial  character,  and  will 
find  therein  its  most  satisfactory  conditions  of 
dignity  and  usefulness. 

This  ultimate  type  of  government,  while  it  will 
have  a  parliamentary  forum  and  will  follow  parlia- 
mentary usages  in  its  ordinary  mode  of  expression, 
will  not  be  parliamentary  in  its  nature.  The  limita- 
tions of  the  constitution,  and  the  direction  taken 

2B 


3/O      TENDENCIES  AND  PROSPECTS   OF  POLITICS 

by  constitutional  development,  provide  an  exclu- 
sively executive  structure  for  the  administration, 
and  it  will  be  independent  of  parliamentary  vicis- 
situdes. The  government  will  represent  the  will 
of  the  nation,  as  expressed  at  the  presidential  elec- 
tion. Congress  will  have  no  power  to  suppress 
national  volition,  but  it  will  possess  the  indepen- 
dent, but  no  less  important,  function  of  serving  as 
the  agency  of  the  moral  inhibitions  which  should 
attend  the  exercise  of  the  will,  insuring  due  con- 
sideration of  all  interests,  and  circumspection  of 
procedure.  Congress  will  retain  the  power  to 
inhibit  altogether  any  determination  of  the  gov- 
ernment requiring  legislative  assent,  but  will  have 
no  power  to  prevent  the  government  from  shaping 
its  proposals,  defining  exactly  its  position,  and  con- 
fronting the  opposition  with  an  explicit  respon- 
sibility for  which  it  must  answer  to  the  people. 
Having  reached  such  a  position,  the  administration 
of  the  government  will  have  nothing  to  ask  of  party 
but  the  cultivation  of  public  sentiment  and  the 
propagation  of  opinion.  Party  organization  will 
therefore  tend  to  revert  to  more  simple  structure 
and  to  become  dependent  upon  spontaneous  effort, 
while  its  present  violence  will  disappear.  Some- 
thing like  the  ease  and  placidity  in  such  matters, 
which  now  obtain  under  democratic  government  in 
Switzerland,  may  ensue.  The  same  influences  will 
cause  claims  of  public  employment,  based  on  par- 
tisan service,  to  decline  in  importance,  and  the 


THE    ULTIMATE    TYPE  3/1 

ordinary  tests  of  competency,  such  as  exist  in  the 
business  world,  will  prevail  in  the  public  service 
also.  The  empirical  influences  which  now  per- 
vade the  sphere  of  government  will  also  decline, 
and  the  management  of  public  affairs  will  take  on 
a  more  scientific  character.  At  present,  intellect- 
ual authority  has  no  means  of  proper  contact  with 
legislation.  Expert  advice  is  regarded  by  the  peo- 
ple with  a  distrust  not  unreasonable  in  view  of  the 
way  in  which  authorities  differ,  and  of  the  extent 
to  which  charlatanry  assumes  the  air  of  wisdom. 
But  trusted  leadership  may  resort  to  any  consulta- 
tion that  it  finds  advantageous,  and  thus  the  re- 
sources of  special  ability  and  information  may  be 
brought  directly  to  bear  upon  the  elucidation  of 
any  question  of  public  policy. 

Such  a  system  of  government  would  preserve 
everything  of  value  in  the  parliamentary  system  of 
government,  while  avoiding  its  defects.  There  is 
an  inherent  weakness  in  the  parliamentary  type  of 
government,  suggesting  the  possibility  that  in  the 
end  it  may  turn  out  to  have  been  after  all  a  tran- 
sitory phase  of  political  development.  Already 
signs  multiply  that  parliamentary  institutions  are 
a  melancholy  failure  on  the  continent  of  Europe ; 
and  in  England,  where  the  type  was  formed,  they 
seem  to  be  sustained  by  the  force  of  traditions  of  be- 
havior which  are  gradually  weakening.  Perhaps  the 
most  remarkable  of  the  passages  in  "  The  Present 
Discontents,"  which  surprise  one  by  their  miracu- 


3/2      TENDENCIES  AND  PROSPECTS   OF  POLITICS 

lous  prescience,  is  that  in  which  Burke  called 
attention  to  the  fundamental  requirement  for  the 
successful  operation  of  the  parliamentary  system. 
He  said  :  "  The  popular  election  of  magistrates, 
and  popular  disposition  of  rewards  and  honors,  is 
one  of  the  first  advantages  of  a  free  state.  With- 
out it,  or  something  equivalent  to  it,  perhaps  the 
people  cannot  long  enjoy  the  substance  of  freedom  ; 
certainly  none  of  the  vivifying  energy  of  good  gov- 
ernment. The  frame  of  our  commonwealth  did 
not  admit  of  such  an  actual  election ;  but  it  pro- 
vided as  well  and  (while  the  spirit  of  the  constitu- 
tion is  preserved)  better  for  all  the  effects  of  it 
than  by  the  method  of  suffrage  in  any  democratic 
state  whatever." 

What  Burke  prophesied  was  indeed  accom- 
plished to  the  letter,  as  Bagehot  has  shown  in  his 
commentary  'on  the  English  constitution.  The 
development  of  the  cabinet  system  enabled  the 
English  people  to  elect  their  government,  through 
the  agency  of  Parliament  as  an  electoral  college, 
with  the  peculiar  excellence  that  the  college  con- 
tinued to  preside  over  its  work,  and  to  test  its 
worth,  with  power  to  undo  it  and  refer  the  mat- 
ter to  the  constituencies  for  a  fresh  declaration 
of  public  opinion.  But  the  parliamentary  type  of 
government  was  the  product  of  aristocratic  control, 
and,  with  the  increase  of  democratic  forces,  its 
adjustments  are  being  disturbed,  and  processes  of 
change  are  perceptible  that  may  impair  its  effi- 


THE    ULTIMATE    TYPE  373 

ciency.  The  conditions,  which  make  parliamentary 
government  a  system  of  national  choice,  will  have 
been  destroyed  if  the  constitution  of  the  gov- 
ernment becomes  a  composition  of  the  forces  of 
parliamentary  factions,  in  which  case  the  possi- 
bility is  conceivable  of  ministries  as  poorly  em- 
bodying the  national  will,  and  as  unstable  in  their 
power,  as  those  which  flit  across  the  stage  of  public 
affairs  in  France.  It  is  to  be  hoped  that  the  noble 
traditions  of  duty  and  responsibility  which  have 
been  created  in  English  public  life  will  be  a  suffi- 
cient protection  against  degradation,  and  will  safe- 
guard every  change  ;  but  England  has  yet  to  make 
terms  with  democracy,  while  every  advance  which 
America  achieves  in  the  art  of  government  is 
firmly  based  upon  democratic  foundations.  Cer- 
tainly, when  the  President  shall  have  been  con- 
verted into  a  Grand  Elector,  whose  function  is  to 
constitute  the  government,  every  excellence  which 
Bagehot  claimed  for  the  parliamentary  system 
will  have  been  gained  for  the  presidential  type  of 
government,  and  both  as  the  archetype  of  national 
unity,  and  as  a  practical  institution  of  government, 
it  will  comprehend  every  element  of  majesty  and 
strength.1  Such  a  circumstance  as  that  the  actual 

1  This  forecast  of  the  ultimate  type  of  American  government, 
based  upon  direct  inference  from  the  actual  tendencies  of  our 
politics,  agrees  with  the  conclusions  reached  by  Mr.  Herbert  Spen- 
cer, upon  philosophic  grounds,  as  to  the  final  outcome  of  political 
evolution.  Mr.  Spencer  says,  "  Concerning  the  ultimate  executive 


374      TENDENCIES  AND  PROSPECTS  OF  POLITICS 

constitution  of  the  government  will  by  no  means 
be  confined  to  parliamentary  circles,  may  eventu- 
ally be  counted  as  a  special  advantage.  There 
is  no  natural  conjunction  between  parliamentary 
talent  and  administrative  ability,  and  it  enlarges 
the  resources  of  government  to  have  the  ability  of 
the  nation  to  choose  from  in  forming  an  adminis- 
tration, free  from  any  conditions  of  merely  parlia- 
mentary distinction. 

[But  this  implies  that  democratic  progress  will 
omit  a  stage  of  political  development,  the  most 
brilliant  that  has  yet  illumined  the  history  of  the 
human  race.  The  course  of  political  evolution  is 
marked  by  lustrous  periods,  when  the  expanding 
energies  of  nations  for  a  time  achieve  a  type  of 
government  exactly  suited  to  the  national  life 
and  character^  Such  a  period  is  that  of  the  era 
of  parliamentary  government  in  England,  the 
splendid  traditions  of  which  cast  a  reflected  light 
upon  our  own  national  legislature,  although  the 
only  time  when  it  shone  by  any  light  of  its  own, 
or  gave  any  souvenirs  to  popular  tradition,  was 
during  the  age  of  Clay,  Webster,  and  Calhoun. 
That  period  is  as  near  an  approach  to  a  brilliant 
parliamentary  era  as  the  course  of  our  political 
development  is  ever  likely  to  permit  to  us.  All 

agency,  it  appears  to  be  an  unavoidable  inference  that  it  must  be- 
come in  some  way  or  other  elective;  .  .  .  and  that  the  functions 
to  be  discharged  by  its  occupant  will  become  more  and  more  auto- 
matic." Political  Institutions,  section  578. 


THE    ULTIMATE    TYPE  3/5 

grand  expressions  of  national  character,  whether 
in  literature,  art,  or  politics,  are  orchestral  in  their 
quality,  every  note  of  the  national  genius  contrib- 
uting to  the  result.  To  produce  the  Elizabethan 
drama  required  an  epoch  when  a  people,  intelligent 
but  unlearned,  brave  and  free,  yet  reverential  of 
authority,  possessing  a  national  consciousness 
vividly  awake  and  throbbing  from  extraordinary 
excitements  of  world-wide  battle  and  thrilling  ad- 
venture, demanded  satisfaction  for  their  intellectual 
cravings  in  a  noble  form  that  they  could  see  and 
hear.  The  fame  which  has  attended  the  working 
of  parliamentary  institutions  in  England  requires  a 
theatre  venerable  in  structure,  august  in  renown, 
unique  in  political  eminence,  and  surrounded  by 
social  esteem,  so  that  the  actors  command  both 
celebrity  and  appreciation.  No  such  concurrence 
of  favoring  circumstances  is  possible  under  the 
conditions  which,  in  this  country,  distribute  pub- 
lic attention  and  detach  political  interests  from 
the  general  interests  of  society.  But  it  does  not 
follow  that  we  shall  be  losers  thereby  ;  for  the  aim 
of  democracy  is  not  to  develop  a  social  order  with 
which  the  duties  and  responsibilities  of  govern- 
ment may  be  safely  deposited :  its  ideal  is  the 
creation  of  a  perfect  medium  for  all  the  activities 
of  the  social  organism.  All  leadership  is  naturally 
aristocratic,  and  to  aristocracy,  and  not  to  the 
mass,  are  due  the  gains  of  humanity  ;fbut  the  demo- 
cratic type  of  government  will  develop  a  natural 


376      TENDENCIES  AND  PROSPECTS  OF  POLITICS 

aristocracy,  authenticated  solely  by  merit,  and  free 
from  all  the  losses  and  offsets  which  are  entailed 
by  special  provision  for  the  maintenance  of  an 
aristocratic  class.  There  will  be  great  public  ad- 
ministrators, just  as  there  are  now  great  engineers, 
great  inventors,  great  manufacturers,  great  mer- 
chants, great  captains  of  industry.  The  political 
career  will  select  appropriate  talent,  but  it  will  be 
more  unobtrusive,  less  engaging  of  public  notice, 
more  subordinate  and  accessory  in  its  functions. 
By  so  much  as  the  activities  of  politics  are  per- 
fected in  their  adaptation  to  the  general  needs  of 
the  Asocial  organism)  the  less  they  will  intrude  upon 
the  public  consciousness.  Nothing  is  more  unsci- 
entific than  the  current  notion  that  to  have  a  good 
government  it  will  be  necessary  to  educate  every 
citizen  into  being  a  good  politician.  To  expect 
that  political  development  should  contravene  the 
universal  law  of  the  specialization  of  functions  as 
the  concomitant  of  progressive  development,  is  a 
singular  idea.  The  perfection  of  the  type  implies 
that  the  spontaneous  operation  of  social  instincts 
will  adequately  sustain  political  activities,  as  it  does 
all  other  activities  of  the  social_organism,  by  the 
unforced  play  of  individual  tastes  and  inclinations. 
People  who  do  not  have  a  taste  for  politics  need 
not  reproach  themselves  for  their  aversion  :  they 
may  have  a  higher  vocation ;  which,  as  for  women, 
is  certainly  the  case. 

The  resultant  economies  of  social  force  may  be 


THE    ULTIMATE    TYPE  3/7 

grandly  utilized,  for  this  perfection  of  the  type  may 
be  attended  by  an  outburst  of  national  genius 
of  surpassing  brilliancy.  The  reproach  is  made 
to  America  that  it  has  a  borrowed  civilization,  and 
that  with  all  its  material  gains  it  has  made  no  real 
contributions  to  culture.  This  varies  the  old  com- 
plaint against  democracy,  which  was  that,  although 
it  produced  an  expansion  of  the  intellectual  ener- 
gies of  the  people,  with  splendid  results  in  art  and 
literature,  it  was  incompatible  with  social  order, 
and  was  sure  to  end  in  moral  exhaustion  and 
political  degradation.  In  concentrating  the  na- 
tional energies  upon  material  improvement, — an 
object  naturally  attended  by  extreme  solicitude  for 
the  maintenance  of  order, — the  republic  provides 
for  the  stability  of  its  political  institutions,  and 
thus  escapes  the  traditional  peril  of  democracy. 
That  the  character  of  its  civilization  is  acquisitive 
rather  than  creative  is  a  distinct  advantage  during 
the  period  in  which  it  is  engaged  in  laying,  deep 
and  strong,  the  foundations  of  social  order,  and 
at  the  same  time  it  may  be  establishing  a  culture 
whose  worth  will  be  proportionate  to  the  thorough- 
ness of  the  preparation.  The  greatest  advances 
in  human  destiny  have  been  the  work  of  nations 
which  borrowed  a  civilization  as  a  starting-point 
for  the  creation  of  a  new  type  under  the  stimulus 
of  free  institutions.  Time  may  have  been  when 
the  artists  and  savants  of  Egypt  regarded  with 
patronizing  disdain  the  crude,  adaptive  civilization 


378      TENDENCIES  AND  PROSPECTS   OF  POLITICS 

of  Greece  ;  but  there  came  an  outpouring  of  demo- 
cratic genius  which  supplied  all  the  materials  of 
culture  with  which  the  world  has  worked  ever 
since.  The  Renaissance,  which  set  in  motion  the 
processes  of  modern  civilization,  was  also  the  prod- 
uct of  democratic  forces.  From  such  eras  human- 
ity derives  the  principle  of  progress,  without  which 
civic  organization  would  be  only  a  large  exhibition 
of  instincts  of  social  agglomeration,  such  as  com- 
munities of  ants,  bees,  or  wasps  display  on  a  smaller 
scale,  but  in  greater  perfection,  pf  mankind  is  ever 
going  to  ascend  to  a  still  higher  plane  of  psychical 
activity,  it  is  at  least  most  likely  to  be  the  result 
of  such  an  expansion  of  social  energies  as  only  a 
democratic  order  can  evoke ;  and  if  it  is  the  mis- 
sion of  America  to  adjust  to  democratic  conditions 
all  that  civilization  has  now  to  offer,  the  accom- 
plishment of  that  task  will  provide  such  opportu- 
nities for  the  free  expression  of  the  noblest  capa- 
cities of  humanity  as  may  produce  an  epoch  of 
incomparable  grandeur.j 

Such  speculations  may  appear  fantastic,  but 
they  are  no  more  so  than  would  have  been  a  fore- 
cast of  the  Victorian  age  just  before  its  dawn, 
when  the  state  of  English  politics  was  darkest. 
It  may  be  admitted  that  there  is  no  warrant  for 
confidence  in  any  abstract  law  of  human  develop- 
ment. The  process  of  evolution  is  a  statement  of 
order,  not  an  index  of  direction,  and  decay  and 
dissolution  are  just  as  conformable  to  it  as  growth 


THE    ULTIMATE    TYPE  379 

and  development.  Mr.  Charles  Francis  Adams, 
remarking  upon  some  of  the  perils  through  which 
our  government  has  passed,  observed  :  "  Much  of 
the  favorable  working  of  a  form  of  government, 
or  the  opposite,  may  be  traced  to  circumstances 
having  no  necessary  connection  with  its  intrinsic 
excellence.  The  Polish  constitution  of  1791  was 
immediately  overthrown  by  the  interference  of 
neighboring  powers  interested  to  destroy  it.  The 
constitution  of  the  United  States  has  survived  till 
now,  and  bids  fair  to  last  much  longer.  But  if 
we  could  for  a  moment  suppose  the  geographical 
position  of  the  two  countries  to  have  been  exactly 
changed,  looking  back  at  the  nature  of  the  politi- 
cal controversies  which  agitated  America  for  many 
years,  it  is  at  least  open  to  question  whether  as 
marked  disorders  would  not  have  been  developed 
under  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  as 
were  ever  found  in  the  worst  of  times  in  Poland."1 
All  this  is  very  true ;  and  it  is  equally  true  that 
the  insular  position  of  England  provided  favorable 
circumstances,  without  which  the  peculiar  excel- 
lences of  her  political  development  would  have 
been  impossible  of  attainment.  Local  circum- 
stances are,  after  all,  the  most  influential  factor 
in  determining  governmental  arrangements  ;  but 
the  conditions  were  peculiarly  fortunate  for  the 
development  of  a  new  and  superior  type  of  gov- 

1  Note  on  p.  374,  Vol.  IV.,  of  his  edition  of  John  Adams'  Works. 


TENDENCIES  AND  PROSPECTS   OF  POLITICS 


ernment,  when  English  institutions  were  planted 
in  the  New  World  and  began  an  independent  ca- 
reer. From  a  humanistic  point  of  view,  it  was  the 
transmission  of  the  intellectual  estate  of  the  Ro- 
manized world,  relieved  from  entail  to  privileged 
classes,  and  intrusted  to  a  people  whose  capacity 
for  government  had  been  developed  by  the  direct 
succession  of  their  institutions  from  their  own 
race  origins,  and  whose  political  habits  had  been 
made  instinctive  by  the  continuous  discipline  of 
their  own  race  experience.  In  this  aspect,  Ameri- 
can politics  may  be  regarded  as  at  work  upon  the 
denouement  of  a  drama  of  liberty  whose  acts  have 
included  the  destinies  of  nations.  Materials  for 
it  were  provided  by  obliterated  empires,  the  re- 
mains of  which  science  is  disinterring.  It  was 
begun  by  Greece  and  systematized  by  Rome  ;  re- 
vived by  Italy  and  enlarged  by  Europe.  Its  latest 
episodes  have  been  the  Renaissance,  the  Reforma- 
tion, and  the  Revolution,  in  their  various  national 
phases,  with  widely  different  results.  The  world 
now  waits  to_  see  how  it  will  come  out  in  the  hands 
of  America.  J  Mr.  Lecky  has  recorded  the  opinion 
that  "the  future  destinies  and  greatness  of  the 
English  race  must  necessarily  rest  mainly  with 
the  mighty  nation  which  has  arisen  beyond  the 
Atlantic."  l  De  Tocqueville  long  ago  foretold  that 
all  the  European  states  would  follow  the  same  law 
of  development  as  ourselves,  and  would  end  in  the 

1  History  of  England,  Vol.  IV.,  p.  113. 


THE    ULTIMATE    TYPE  381 

democratic  system  which  shall  have  been  estab- 
lished here.1 

When  existing  conditions  are  viewed  with  dis- 
cernment, grounds  of  confidence  as  to  the  future 
are  afforded  by  evidences  of  political  virtue  which, 
after  the  dust  of  present  turmoil  subsides,  may  cause 
these  times  of  struggle  and  anxiety  to  be  regarded 
as  the  heroic  age  of  America. 

The  generation  which  endured  the  Civil  War 
has  witnessed  the  rehabilitation  of  the  prostrated 
section,  and  has  seen  the  ascendency  of  the  race 
reestablished  in  the  face  of  tremendous  odds.  Ex- 
tinction of  the  bitterness  of  conflict  is  so  complete 
that  late  combatants  hold  fraternal  reunions  on 
fields  over  which  once  they  fought,  and  both  they 
and  their  children  rally  around  the  flag  at  their 
country's  call ;  while  distinctions  between  victors 
and  vanquished  in  eligibility  to  public  service  are 
effaced.  This  period  of  our  national  existence 
has  also  seen  the  development  of  our  material 
resources  carried  to  a  point  which  confers  indus- 
trial primacy,  with  corresponding  extensions  of 
enterprise  and  business  organization,'  implying  re- 
sources of  probity  no  less  ample  than  of  intelli- 
gence and  skill.  !  And,  finally,  the  nation  has 
shown  the  world  that  democratic  institutions  and 
an  industrial  type  of  society  are  compatible  with 
the  possession,  in  their  highest  degree,  of  all  the 
heroic  qualities  which  are  the  peculiar  claim  of 

1  Democracy  in  America,  Vol.  II.,  Chap.  IX.,  p.  190. 


382      TENDENCIES  AND  PROSPECTS   OF  POLITICS 

militancy,  while  combining  with  them  a  deadly 
precision  of  attack  which  is  the  expression  of  an 
abounding  mechanical  skill,  such  as  only  indus- 
trialism can  produce.  Such  manifestations  show 
that  the  sources  of  national  greatness  are  uncor- 
rupted,  so  that  amid  the  baleful  confusion  of  our 
politics  patriotism  may  cherish  the  hope  that  a 
purified  and  ennobled  republic  will  emerge  — 

(  "  Product  of  deathly  fire  and  turbulent  chaos, 
J    Forth  from  its  spasms  of  fury  and  its  poisons, 
\   Issuing  at  last  in  perfect  power  and  beauty." 


APPENDIX 

DIRECT  PARTICIPATION  OF  THE  HEADS  OF  EXECU- 
TIVE DEPARTMENTS  IN  THE  PROCEEDINGS  OF 
CONGRESS 

Extract  from  Senate  Report,  No.  837,  ^6iA  Congress,  T,d  Session, 
February  4,  1881 

THE  power  of  both  houses  of  Congress,  either  sepa- 
rately or  jointly,  to  admit  persons  not  members  to  their 
floors,  with  the  privilege  of  addressing  them,  cannot  be 
questioned.  "  Each  House  may  determine  the  Rules  of 
its  Proceedings,"  is  the  provision  of  the  Constitution. 
Under  this  power  each  house  admits  a  chaplain  to  open 
the  proceedings  with .  prayer.  Under  this  power  the 
House  of  Representatives  constantly  admits  contestants 
to  argue  their  title  to  membership,  and  sometimes  admits 
counsel  to  argue  in  the  same  behalf.  No  one  would  doubt 
the  power  of  the  Senate  to  extend  the  same  privilege  to 
a  claimant,  or  his  advisers. 

By  the  act  of  1817,  it  is  prescribed  that  "  every  Terri- 
tory shall  have  the  right  to  send  a  Delegate  to  the  House 
of  Representatives  of  the  United  States,  to  serve  during 
each  Congress,  who  shall  be  elected  by  the  voters  in  the 
Territory  qualified  to  elect  members  of  the  legislative 
assembly  thereof.  .  .  .  Every  such  Delegate  shall  have 
a  seat  in  the  House  of  Representatives,  with  the  right  of 

383 


384  APPENDIX 

debating,  but  not  of  voting."  And  under  this  authority 
the  Delegates  of  the  eight  Territories  sit  to-day  in  the 
House  of  Representatives,  and  participate  in  its  debates. 
A  precedent  directly  in  point  has  stood  unchallenged  since 
the  first  year  of  the  organization  of  the  government.  The 
act  of  1 789,  organizing  the  Treasury  Department,  provided 
that  "  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  shall,  from  time  to 
time,  digest  and  prepare  plans  for  the  improvement  and 
management  of  the  revenue  and  for  the  support  of  the 
public  credit  .  .  .  shall  make  report  and  give  informa- 
tion to  either  branch  of  the  legislature,  in  person  or  in 
writing,  as  may  be  required,  respecting  all  matters  re- 
ferred to  him  by  the  Senate  or  House  of  Representatives, 
or  which  shall  appertain  to  his  office." 

When  Hamilton  made  his  great  report  on  the  public 
credit  in  1790  he  was,  on  motion,  after  discussion,  re- 
quired to  make  it  in  writing,  because  the  details  were  so 
numerous  that,  delivered  orally,  they  would  not  remain 
in  the  memory  of  his  hearers ;  but  the  power  and  the 
propriety  of  requiring  the  personal  presence  of  the  Sec- 
retary were  not  then  called  in  question,  nor  have  they 
been  questioned  at  any  time  since.  This  bill  only  per- 
mits and  enjoins  that  to  be  done  by  all  the  Secretaries 
at  convenient  times  which  the  law  of  1 789  required  and 
permitted  to  be  done  at  any  time  by  the  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury. 

Your  committee  thinks  it  too  plain  for  argument  that 
Congress  may  enjoin  upon  the  heads  of  departments  the 
duty  of  giving  information  in  the  manner  required  by 
this  bill.  The  constitutional  provisions  in  relation  to  the 
executive  departments  are  very  simple.  The  President 
"  may  require  the  Opinion  in  writing  of  the  Principal 


APPENDIX  385 

Officer  in  each  of  the  executive  Departments  upon  any 
Subject  relating  to  the  Duties  of  their  respective  Offices ;  " 
and  "  Congress  may  by  Law  vest  the  Appointment  of  such 
inferior  Officers  as  they  think  proper  in  the  President  alone, 
in  the  Courts  of  Law,  or  in  the  Heads  of  Departments." 
These  are  all  the  provisions  of  the  Constitution  on  this 
subject.  Congress  may,  by  inevitable  implication,  pre- 
scribe other  duties  and  define  other  powers.  Every  act 
organizing  every  department  has  prescribed  the  duties  of 
the  principal  officers,  and  has  required  the  head  of  every 
department  to  report  directly  to  Congress  in  reference  to 
the  discharge  of  the  duties  thus  imposed  upon  his  office. 

If  by  a  line  of  precedents  since  the  organization  of  the 
government  Congress  has  established  its  power  to  require 
the  heads  of  departments  to  report  to  it  directly,  and  also 
its  power  to  admit  persons  to  the  floor  of  either  house  to 
address  it,  the  argument  would  seem  to  be  perfect  that 
Congress  may  require  the  report  to  be  made  or  the  in- 
formation to  be  given  by  the  heads  of  departments  on 
the  floor  of  the  houses,  publicly  and  orally.  The  pro- 
vision of  the  Constitution,  that  "  no  Person  holding  any 
Office  under  the  United  States  shall  be  a  Member  of  either 
House  during  his  Continuance  in  Office,"  is  in  no  wise 
violated.  The  head  of  a  department,  reporting  in  person 
and  orally,  or  participating  in  debate,  becomes  no  more 
a  member  of  either  House  than  does  the  chaplain,  or  the 
contestant  or  his  counsel,  or  the  Delegate.  He  has  no 
official  term ;  he  is  neither  elected  nor  appointed  to 
either  house ;  he  has  no  participation  in  the  power  of 
impeachment,  either  in  the  institution  or  trial ;  he  has 
no  privilege  from  arrest ;  he  has  no  power  to  vote. 

We  are  dealing  with  no  new  question.     In  the  early 

2C 


386  APPENDIX 

history  of  the  government  the  communications  were  made 
by  the  President  to  Congress  orally,  and  in  the  presence 
of  both  or  either  of  the  houses.  Instances  are  not  want- 
ing —  nay,  they  are  numerous  —  where  the  President  of 
the  United  States,  accompanied  by  one  or  more  of  his 
cabinet,  attended  the  sessions  of  the  Senate  and  House 
of  Representatives  in  their  separate  sessions  and  laid 
before  them  papers  which  had  been  required  and  infor- 
mation which  had  been  asked  for. 

"  Wednesday,  July  22, 1 789. — The  Secretary  of  Foreign 
Affairs  (Mr.  Jefferson)  attended,  agreeably  to  order,  and 
made  the  necessary  explanations."  —  Annals  of  Congress, 
First  Congress,  volume  i,  page  51. 

"  Saturday,  August  22,  1789. —  The  Senate  again  en- 
tered on  executive  business.  The  President  of  the  United 
States  came  into  the  Senate  Chamber,  attended  by  Gen- 
eral Knox,  Secretary  of  War,  and  laid  before  the  Senate 
the  following  statement  of  facts,  with  the  questions  thereto 
annexed,  for  their  advice  and  consent."  —  Annals  of  Con- 
gress, First  Congress,  volume  i,  page  66. 

And  again  on  the  Monday  following  the  President  and 
General  Knox  were  before  the  Senate. 

"  Friday,  August  7, 1 789.  —  The  following  message  was 
received  from  the  President  of  the  United  States,  by  Gen- 
eral Knox,  the  Secretary  of  War,  who  delivered  therewith 
sundry  statements  and  papers  relating  to  the  same."  — 
Proceedings  of  House  of  Representatives,  Annals  of  Con- 
gress, volume  i,  page  684. 

"Monday,  August  10,  1789.  —  The  following  message 
was  received  from  the  President,  by  General  Knox  [Sec- 
retary of  War],  who  delivered  in  the  same,  together  with 
statement  of  the  troops  in  the  service  of  the  United 


APPENDIX  387 

States." — Proceedings  of  House  of  Representatives ,  Annals 
of  Congress,  volume  i,  page  689. 

Instances  of  this  kind  might  be  almost  indefinitely 
multiplied,  but  these  serve  sufficiently  to  exhibit  the 
practice  established  at  an  early  day  by  those  who  framed 
the  Constitution.  The  committee  refers  to  the  Annals  of 
Congress,  at  the  pages  cited,  for  very  interesting  details 
of  the  proceedings  of  those  respective  days.  They  are 
too  long  to  be  copied  here  in  full. 

This  bill  thus  being  clearly  within  the  letter  of  the  Con- 
stitution is,  in  the  opinion  of  your  committee,  as  clearly 
within  its  spirit. 

Your  committee  is  not  unmindful  of  the  maxim  that 
in  a  constitutional  government  the  great  powers  are 
divided  into  legislative,  executive,  and  judicial,  and  that 
they  should  be  conferred  upon  distinct  departments. 
These  departments  should  be  defined  and  maintained, 
and  it  is  a  sufficiently  accurate  expression  to  say  that 
they  should  be  independent  of  each  other.  But  this 
independence  in  no  just  or  practical  sense  means  an 
entire  separation,  either  in  their  organization  or  their 
functions  —  isolation,  either  in  the  scope  or  the  exercise 
of  their  powers.  Such  independence  or  isolation  would 
produce  either  conflict  or  paralysis,  either  inevitable  col- 
lision or  inaction,  and  either  the  one  or  the  other  would 
be  in  derogation  of  the  efficiency  of  the  government. 
Such  independence  of  coequal  and  coordinate  depart- 
ments has  never  existed  in  any  civilized  government,  and 
never  can  exist. 

If  there  is  anything  perfectly  plain  in  the  Constitution 
and  organization  of  the  Government  of  the  United 


388  APPENDIX 

States,  it  is  that  the  great  departments  were  not  intended 
to  be  independent  and  isolated  in  the  strict  meaning  of 
these  terms ;  but  that,  although  having  a  separate  exist- 
ence, they  were  to  cooperate  each  with  the  other,  as  the 
different  members  of  the  human  body  must  cooperate 
with  each  other  in  order  to  form  the  figure  and  perform 
the  duties  of  a  perfect  man. 

The  connection  of  the  executive  and  the  legislative 
departments  of  the  government  illustrates  this  position 
most  strongly.  Congress  can  pass  no  law  without  the 
assent  of  the  President.  The  President  can  establish  no 
office  without  the  consent  of  Congress.  Congress  must 
provide  him  with  the  means  of  executing  the  great  trusts 
confided  to  him.  He  must  communicate  to  Congress 
the  information  and  make  the  suggestions  of  legislation 
which  his  experience  in  administration  teaches  to  be  de- 
sirable. And  so  uniformly  has  Congress  acted  upon  this 
interdependence  of  the  executive  and  the  legislative  de- 
partments, that,  as  has  been  before  said,  Congress  re- 
quires the  chief  officers  of  every  executive  department  to 
report  to  it  directly  as  to  the  performance  of  the  duties 
and  the  execution  of  the  powers  confided  to  it. 

The  result  has  been  that  the  executive  department, 
comprising  in  this  term  the  President  and  the  chief 
officers,  has  exercised  necessarily  and  properly  great  in- 
fluence on  the  legislation  of  Congress. 

The  principles  enacted  into  laws  are  comparatively  few 
and  simple.  The  machinery  by  which  these  few  and 
simple  principles  can  be  carried  into  actual  administra- 
tion is  complex,  and  can  be  perfected  by  experience 
only.  The  duties  of  administration  necessarily  compel 
the  heads  of  departments  to  become  familiar,  not  only 


APPENDIX  389 

with  the  best  policy,  but  with  the  best  methods  of  carry- 
ing policies  into  actual  execution,  and  the  consequence 
is  that  members  of  Congress,  much  less  familiar,  do  in 
fact  seek,  either  individually  or  through  committees,  the 
counsel  and  advice  of  these  officers,  and  are,  to  a  very 
great  extent,  influenced  by  them. 

The  influence  is  exerted  by  means  of  the  annual  re- 
ports, of  private  consultations,  and  of  special  reports 
made  in  answer  to  special  resolutions  of  inquiry  by  either 
house,  and  the  question  really  submitted  to  the  consider- 
ation of  Congress  by  this  bill  is,  whether  these  means  of 
communication  will  not  be  greatly  improved  by  consulta- 
tion between  the  members  of  Congress  and  these  officers, 
face  to  face,  on  the  floor  of  the  houses.  Your  committee 
cannot  doubt  that  the  result  would  be  most  beneficial, 
and  that  no  elaboration  of  reasons  is  necessary  to  bring 
Senators  to  the  same  conclusion. 

It  has  been  objected  that  the  effect  of  this  introduc- 
tion of  the  heads  of  departments  upon  the  floor  would 
be  largely  to  increase  the  influence  of  the  executive  on 
legislation.  Your  committee  does  not  share  this  appre- 
hension. The  information  given  to  Congress  would 
doubtless  be  more  pertinent  and  exact ;  the  recommen- 
dations would,  perhaps,  be  presented  with  greater  effect, 
but  on  the  other  hand,  the  members  of  Congress  would 
also  be  put  on  the  alert  to  see  that  the  influence  is  in 
proportion  only  to  the  value  of  the  information  and  the 
suggestions ;  and  the  public  would  be  enabled  to  de- 
termine whether  the  influence  is  exerted  by  persuasion 
or  by  argument.  No  one  who  has  occupied  a  seat  on 
the  floor  of  either  house,  no  one  of  those  who,  year  after 
year,  so  industriously  and  faithfully  and  correctly  report 


390  APPENDIX 

the  proceedings  of  the  houses,  no  frequenter  of  the  lobby 
or  the  gallery,  can  have  failed  to  discern  the  influence 
exerted  upon  legislation  by  the  visits  of  the  heads  of  de- 
partments to  the  floors  of  Congress,  and  the  visits  of  the 
members  of  Congress  to  the  offices  in  the  departments. 
It  is  not  necessary  to  say  that  the  influence  is  dishonest 
or  corrupt,  but  it  is  illegitimate ;  it  is  exercised  in  secret 
by  means  that  are  not  public  —  by  means  which  an  hon- 
est public  opinion  cannot  accurately  discover,  and  over 
which  it  can  therefore  exercise  no  just  control.  The 
open  information  and  argument  provided  by  the  bill  may 
not  supplant  these  secret  methods,  but  they  will  enable 
a  discriminating  public  judgment  to  determine  whether 
they  are  sufficient  to  exercise  the  influence  which  is 
actually  exerted,  and  thus  disarm  them. 

It  has  been  objected  that  the  introduction  of  the  heads 
of  departments  on  the  floor  would  impair  the  influence 
of  the  executive  power;  that  it  would  bring  them  and 
Congress  in  closer  relations  and  thus  lessen  their  depend- 
ence on  the  President,  and,  to  that  extent,  deprive  him  of 
his  constitutional  power  and  relieve  him  of  his  constitu- 
tional responsibility.  It  would  be  enough  to  say,  in  an- 
swer to  this  objection,  that  no  power  exists  anywhere  to 
diminish  the  duties  or  powers  or  responsibilities  imposed 
by  the  Constitution  upon  the  President.  The  committee 
ventures  again  to  repeat  that  the  effect  of  the  bill  does 
not  seek  to  —  and  will  not  —  aggrandize  or  impair  the 
executive  power  as  defined  in  the  Constitution  and  vested 
in  the  President. 

The  President,  and  the  President  alone,  is  the  constitu- 
tional executive;  he  and  he  alone  is  the  coordinate  ex- 
ecutive branch  of  the  government;  he  and  he  alone  is 


APPENDIX  391 

the  "Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Army  and  Navy  of  the 
United  States,  and  of  the  militia  of  the  several  States  when 
called  into  the  actual  service  of  the  United  States."  He 
and  he  alone  "  shall  have  power  to  grant  reprieves  and  par- 
dons for  offences  against  the  United  States ; "  to  make 
treaties  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate,  pro- 
vided two-thirds  of  the  Senators  present  concur  ;  to  nomi- 
nate and  by  and  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate 
to  appoint  embassadors  and  other  public  ministers  and  con- 
suls, judges  of  the  Supreme  Court,  and  all  other  officers  of 
the  United  States  whose  appointments  are  not  otherwise 
provided  for ;  "  to  give  to  Congress  information  as  to  the 
state  of  the  Union ;  "  on  extraordinary  occasions  to  con- 
vene and  adjourn  Congress  ;  "  "  to  receive  embassadors 
and  other  public  ministers ;  to  take  care  that  the  laws  be 
faithfully  executed  ;  to  commission  all  the  officers  of  the 
United  States ;  "  and  to  exercise  the  veto  power.  These 
are  the  functions  of  the  executive  power  which  is  vested 
in  the  President  by  the  Constitution.  They  can  be  per- 
formed neither  in  whole  nor  in  part  by  another ;  neither 
the  President  nor  the  Congress  nor  both  can  delegate  them 
or  abridge  them.  Both  the  President  and  the  Congress 
are  bound  to  maintain  and  protect  them.  The  depart- 
ments and  their  principal  officers  are  in  no  sense  sharers 
of  this  power.  They  are  the  creatures  of  the  laws  of 
Congress,  exercising  only  such  powers  and  performing 
only  such  duties  as  those  laws  prescribe. 

The  First  Congress,  after  long  debate,  decided  that 
the  President  should  have  the  power  of  appointment  and 
removal,  unimpaired,  except,  as  in  all  other  cases,  by 
impeachment ;  and  that  the  Secretaries  should  perform 
all  the  duties  imposed  upon  them  by  law  and  by  the  con- 


3Q2  APPENDIX 

stitutional  power  of  the  President  to  call  for  written 
opinions.  The  Secretaries  were  made  heads  of  depart- 
ments ;  they  were  charged  by  law  with  certain  duties, 
and  invested  by  law  with  certain  powers  to  be  used 
by  them  in  the  administration  confided  to  them  by 
the  laws.  They  were  in  no  sense  ministers  of  the 
President,  his  hand,  his  arm,  his  irresponsible  agent,  in 
the  execution  of  his  will.  There  was  no  relation  analo- 
gous to  that  of  master  and  servant  or  principal  and  agent. 
The  President  cannot  give  them  dispensation  in  the  per- 
formance of  duty,  or  relieve  them  from  the  penalty  of 
non-performance.  He  cannot  be  impeached  for  their 
delinquency ;  he  cannot  be  made  to  answer  before  any 
tribunal  for  their  inefficiency  or  malversation  in  office ; 
public  opinion  does  not  hold  him  to  stricter  responsi- 
bility for  their  official  conduct  than  that  of  any  officer. 
They  are  the  creatures  of  law  and  bound  to  do  the  bid- 
ding of  the  law. 

This  bill  will  not  change  their  legal  relations,  either  to 
the  President  or  to  the  Congress.  It  will  not  make  their 
tenure  of  office  in  any  wise  dependent  on  the  favor  of 
Congressional  majorities  or  on  adverse  votes  of  either  or 
both  of  the  houses.  They  cannot  assume  undue  leader- 
ship in  Congress,  because  success  will  not  prolong,  as 
defeat  will  not  terminate,  their  tenure  of  office.  They 
may  be  removed  by  the  President  at  any  moment,  not- 
withstanding their  success.  They  may  be  maintained  in 
office  by  him  during  his  whole  term,  notwithstanding  their 
defeat.  At  the  end  of  his  term  they  will  almost  certainly 
leave  office  and  probably  soon  have  place  in  Congress. 
Their  independence  of  Congress  will  prevent  their  suc- 
cumbing to  its  will,  and  will  rouse  the  natural  jealousy  of 


APPENDIX  393 

Congress  to  resist  their  power  becoming  too  great.  The 
concurrence  of  opinion  between  the  President  and  Con- 
gress is  not  essential,  perhaps  is  not  possible.  Neither 
will  be  broken  down  by  the  assertion  of  the  will  of  the 
other  in  its  own  department,  because  both  will  soon  be 
called  to  judgment  by  the  people,  and  the  people  will 
correct  any  antagonism  which  threatens  the  effective 
working  of  the  government. 

This  system  will  require  the  selection  of  the  strongest 
men  to  be  heads  of  departments,  and  will  require  them 
to  be  well  equipped  with  the  knowledge  of  their  offices. 
It  will  also  require  the  strongest  men  to  be  the  leaders  of 
Congress  and  participate  in  debate.  It  will  bring  these 
strong  men  in  contact,  perhaps  into  conflict,  to  advance 
the  public  weal,  and  thus  stimulate  their  abilities  and  their 
efforts,  and  will  thus  assuredly  result  to  the  good  of  the 
country. 

If  it  should  appear  by  actual  experience  that  the  heads 
of  departments  in  fact  have  not  time  to  perform  the  addi- 
tional duty  imposed  on  them  by  this  bill,  the  force  in  their 
offices  should  be  increased,  or  the  duties  devolving  on 
them  personally  should  be  diminished.  An  under-secre- 
tary  should  be  appointed  to  whom  could  be  confided  that 
routine  of  administration  which  requires  only  order  and 
accuracy.  The  principal  officers  could  then  confine  their 
attention  to  those  duties  which  require  wise  discretion  and 
intellectual  activity.  Thus  they  would  have  abundance 
of  time  for  their  duties  under  this  bill.  Indeed,  your 
committee  believes  that  the  public  interest  would  be  sub- 
served if  the  Secretaries  were  relieved  of  the  harassing 
cares  of  distributing  clerkships  and  closely  supervising 
the  mere  machinery  of  the  departments.  Your  com- 


394  APPENDIX 

mittee  believes  that  the  adoption  of  this  bill  and  the 
effective  execution  of  its  provisions  will  be  the  first  step 
towards  a  sound  civil-service  reform,  which  will  secure  a 
larger  wisdom  in  the  adoption  of  policies,  and  a  better 
system  in  their  execution. 

GEO.  H.  PENDLETON. 

W.  B.  ALLISON. 

D.  W.  VOORHEES. 

J.  G.  ELAINE. 

M.  C.  BUTLER. 

JOHN  J.  INGALLS. 

O.  H.  PLATT. 

J.  T.  FARLEY. 


Story  on  the  Constitution,  section  869  et  seq. :  — 
The  heads  of  the  departments  are,  in  fact,  thus  pre- 
cluded from  proposing  or  vindicating  their  own  measures 
in  the  face  of  the  nation  in  the  course  of  debate,  and  are 
compelled  to  submit  them  to  other  men  who  are  either 
imperfectly  acquainted  with  the  measures  or  are  indiffer- 
ent to  their  success  or  failure.  Thus  that  open  and  pub- 
lic responsibility  for  measures  which  properly  belongs  to 
the  executive  in  all  governments,  and  especially  in  a  re- 
publican government,  as  its  greatest  security  and  strength, 
is  completely  done  away.  The  Executive  is  compelled  to 
resort  to  secret  and  unseen  influences,  to  private  inter- 
views, and  private  arrangements  to  accomplish  its  own 
appropriate  purposes,  instead  of  proposing  and  sustain- 
ing its  own  duties  and  measures  by  a  bold  and  manly 
appeal  to  the  nation  in  the  face  of  its  representatives. 
One  consequence  of  this  state  of  things  is,  that  there 


APPENDIX  395 

never  can  be  traced  home  to  the  Executive  any  responsi- 
bility for  the  measures  which  are  planned  and  carried  at 
its  suggestion.  Another  consequence  will  be  (if  it  has 
not  yet  been)  that  measures  will  be  adopted  or  defeated 
by  private  intrigues,  political  combinations,  irresponsible 
recommendations,  and  all  the  blandishments  of  office,  and 
all  the  deadening  weight  of  silent  patronage.  The  Ex- 
ecutive will  never  be  compelled  to  avow  or  support  any 
opinions.  His  ministers  may  conceal  or  evade  any  ex- 
pression of  their  opinions.  He  will  seem  to  follow,  when, 
in  fact,  he  directs  the  opinions  of  Congress.  He  will  as- 
sume the  air  of  a  dependent,  when,  in  fact,  his  spirit  and 
his  wishes  pervade  the  whole  system  of  legislation.  If 
corruption  ever  eats  its  way  silently  into  the  vitals  of  this 
republic  it  will  be  because  the  people  are  unable  to  bring 
responsibility  home  to  the  Executive  through  his  chosen 
ministers.  They  will  be  betrayed  when  their  suspicions 
are  most  lulled  by  the  Executive  under  the  disguise  of  an 
obedience  to  the  will  of  Congress.  If  it  would  not  have 
been  safe  to  trust  the  heads  of  departments,  as  represent- 
atives, to  the  choice  of  the  people  as  their  constituents, 
it  would  have  been  at  least  some  gain  to  have  allowed 
them  seats,  like  territorial  delegates  in  the  House  of 
Representatives,  where  they  might  freely  debate  without 
a  title  to  vote. 

In  such  an  event  their  influence,  whatever  it  would 
be,  would  be  seen  and  felt  and  understood,  and  on  that 
account  would  have  involved  little  danger  and  more 
searching  jealousy  and  opposition;  whereas  it  is  now 
secret  and  silent,  and  from  that  very  cause  may  become 
overwhelming.  One  other  reason  in  favor  of  such  a  right 
is  that  it  would  compel  the  Executive  to  make  appoint- 


396  APPENDIX 

ments  for  the  high  departments  of  government,  not  from 
personal  or  party  favorites,  but  from  statesmen  of  high 
public  character,  talent,  experience,  and  elevated  ser- 
vices ;  from  statesmen  who  had  earned  public  favor  and 
could  command  public  confidence.  At  present  gross  in- 
capacity may  be  concealed  under  official  forms,  and  igno- 
rance silently  escape  by  shifting  the  labors  upon  more 
intelligent  subordinates  in  office.  The  nation  would  be, 
on  the  other  plan,  better  served,  and  the  Executive  sus- 
tained by  more  masculine  eloquence  as  well  as  more 
liberal  learning.  .  .  .  There  can  be  no  danger  that  a 
free  people  will  not  be  sufficiently  wakeful  over  their 
rulers  and  their  acts  and  opinions  when  they  are  known 
and  avowed,  or  that  they  will  not  find  representatives  in 
Congress  ready  to  oppose  improper  measures  or  sound  the 
alarm  upon  arbitrary  encroachments.  The  real  danger  is 
when  the  influence  of  the  rulers  is  at  work  in  secret  and 
assumes  no  definite  shape  ;  when  it  guides  with  silent  and 
irresistible  sway,  and  yet  covers  itself  under  the  forms  of 
popular  opinion  or  independent  legislation ;  when  it  does 
nothing,  yet  accomplishes  everything. 


INDEX 


ACHESON,  Representative,  cited, 
n.  252. 

Adams,  Charles  Francis,  cited,  379. 

Adams,  John,  on  party  divisions  in 
colonies,  2;  on  sectional  bitter- 
ness, 2 ;  on  printed  votes,  7 ;  on 
the  caucus  club,  8 ;  on  balanced 
powers  of  government,  35 ;  favors 
titles  of  dignity  for  President,  55  ; 
philosophy  of  government,  60; 
describes  United  States  as  a 
monarchical  republic,  61 ;  on 
Washington's  fears  for  his  coun- 
try, n.  66 ;  on  Washington's  joy 
on  quitting  office,  n.  74 ;  Maclay's 
opinion  of,  76;  favors  election  of 
army  officers  by  Congress,  99; 
on  alien  journalists,  in  ;  Wash- 
ington's relations  with,  118;  de- 
nounced by  Hamilton,  118; 
closing  scenes  of  his  adminis- 
tration, 119;  on  popular  revolt 
against  Washington's  foreign 
policy,  125 ;  on  quarrels  over 
patronage,  135,  137;  defends 
property  qualifications  of  suf- 
frage, 168 ;  favors  rotation  in 
office,  169;  interfered  with  by 
the  Senate,  260. 

Adams,  John  Quincy,  elected  Pres- 
ident, 158;  on  presidential  au- 
thority, 291 ;  on  electioneering 
excitements,  303. 

Adams,  Samuel,  organizes  com- 
mittees of  correspondence,  8. 

Addison,  Joseph,  108. 

Addison,  Judge,  113. 

Akenside,  Mark,  341. 


Alabama,  116. 

Allen,  Senator,  cited,  n.  233. 

Ames,  Fisher,  on  the  basis  of 
government,  67 ;  a  formidable 
neighbor  needed,  69;  on  con- 
gressional committee  system,  88 ; 
on  the  public  press,  in  ;  on  the 
perils  of  democracy,  120. 

Anti-Federalism,  a  party  of  nega- 
tion, 101. 

Anti-Masonic  party,  201. 

Bagehot,  Walter,  on  the  English 
constitution,  93;  on  American 
genius  for  politics,  310 ;  cited, 
352;  mentioned,  372,  373. 

Ballot,  the,  early  introduction  in 
America,  5. 

Benton,  Thomas  H.,  on  removals 
from  office,  171 ;  on  original  po- 
sition of  the  House  of  Represent- 
atives, 193  ;  on  transformation  of 
the  system  of  presidential  elec- 
tion, 208 ;  on  administrative  con- 
nection between  Congress  and 
President,  278. 

Blackstone's  Commentaries,  29. 

Bolingbroke,  90,  342. 

Bonaparte,  Napoleon,  his  imperial 
ideas,  19. 

Boston,  a  revolutionary  centre,  10. 

Brackenridge,  Hugh  H.,  127,  198. 

Bryce,  James,  cited,  19,  300,  311. 

Buchanan,  James,  280. 

Burgh,  J.,  author  of  Political  Dis- 
quisitions, 169 ;  his  reform  pro- 
posals, 355. 

Burke,  Edmund,  on  political  torpor 


397 


INDEX 


in  England,  14;  on  balanced 
powers  of  government,  29;  on 
aristocracy,  71 ;  defends  party 
government,  91 ;  a  Whig  pam- 
phleteer, 109;  on  conditions  of 
parliamentary  dignity,  193 ;  on 
political  management,  308  ;  men- 
tioned, 338  ;  diagnosis  of  political 
disease,  345-348  ;  popular  elec- 
tion the  essential  principle  of 
free  government,  372. 
Burr,  Aaron,  rivalry  with  Hamilton, 
144 ;  his  local  power  undermined, 
146 ;  tries  conspiracy,  147. 

Cabinet,  development  of,  79 ;  ap- 
proximates a  bureaucracy,  165 ; 
will  ultimately  manage  the  actual 
administration,  369. 

Calhoun,  on  Jefferson's  shortcom- 
ings, 132;  on  South  Carolina's 
immunity  from  the  spoils  sys- 
tem, 142 ;  on  necessity  of  strength 
in  government,  162;  on  President 
Jackson,  180;  on  original  as- 
cendency of  House  of  Represent- 
atives, 193 ;  on  transformation  of 
the  system  of  presidential  elec- 
tion, 209 ;  on  the  genesis  of  the 
spoils  system,  210 ;  constitutional 
basis  of  his  nullification  theory, 
211 ;  dangers  of  civil  war  from 
party  violence,  303. 

Cal  lender,  107. 

Calvin,  John,  ideal  of  a  Christian 
commonwealth,  26. 

Cameron,  J.  Donald,  mentioned, 
n.  223. 

Cannon,  Representative,  cited,  248. 

Carlisle,  John  G.,  Secretary  of 
the  Treasury,  86 ;  as  Speaker, 

251- 

Carteret,  341,  342. 

Caucus,  early  origin  of,  8;  Con- 
gressional, 155 ;  effects  upon 
character  of  the  administration, 


165 ;  tended  towards  the  conven- 
tion system,  199. 

Central  American  republics,  69. 

Charles  I.,  123. 

Chase,  Samuel,  becomes  Federal- 
ist, 102;  attempt  to  impeach, 
127. 

Chastellux,  Marquis  de,  n. 

Civil  Service  Reform,  350. 

Clay,  Henry,  on  the  overthrow  of 
congressional  control,  173 ;  on 
the  veto  power,  180 ;  his  influence 
as  Speaker,  262;  advocates  re- 
striction of  Senate  debate,  266. 

Cleveland,  Grover,  obtains  repeal 
of  Tenure  of  Office  Law,  268. 

Clinton,  De  Witt,  undermines 
Burr's  leadership,  146 ;  his  scru- 
ples about  removals  from  office, 
148 ;  presidential  candidate  in 
opposition  to  Madison,  157; 
mentioned,  199,  201,  205. 

Colonial  politics,  their  aristocratic 
complexion,  4;  early  adoption 
of  English  reform  ideas,  5 ;  vot- 
ing methods,  6,  7 ;  beginnings  of 
party  organization,  7  ;  aristocratic 
ascendency,  10;  social  condi- 
tions, ii ;  two  streams  of  ideas, 
30;  cause  of  the  revolutionary 
struggle.  31. 

Colonial  society,  3. 

Confederation,  not  a  regular  gov- 
ernment, 34;  a  makeshift,  37; 
anarchical  influences,  38-40. 

Congress  of  the  Confederation,  a 
diplomatic  body,  36;  never  ob- 
tained public  confidence,  36; 
moral  deterioration  of,  96;  de- 
fective organization  of,  97 ;  issues 
paper  money,  98 ;  retains  control 
of  army  affairs,  99;  creates  in- 
dependent executive  depart- 
ments, 100;  distracted  by  dis- 
putes over  offices,  135. 

Congress  of  United  States,  public 


INDEX 


399 


sittings  not  required,  63 ;  immu- 
nity of  members,  63 ;  not  meant 
to  be  controlled  by  public  opin- 
ion, 64;  follows  English  prece- 
dents, 73 ;  attends  the  President's 
audience  chamber,  74;  suspi- 
cious of  executive  designs,  76; 
original  relations  to  the  admin- 
istration, 81 ;  squabble  over  site 
of  national  capital,  86 ;  connec- 
tion with  administration  dislo- 
cated by  party  spirit,  88 ;  origin 
of  system  of  standing  commit- 
tees, 88  ;  President  consulted  on 
committee  chairmanships,  155 ; 
diversities  in  election  of  mem- 
bers, 156 ;  national  regulation  of 
elections,  160;  extends  its  juris- 
diction, 164;  establishment  of  a 
parliamentary  regime,  165 ;  de- 
termines national  policy,  166; 
administrative  relations  affected 
by  Jackson's  election,  168 ;  end 
of  the  parliamentary  regime,  173 ; 
reduced  importance  of,  192 ;  a 
diplomatic  body,  221 ;  character- 
istics of  its  procedure,  222;  sub- 
ordinate to  party  organization, 
223,  294 ;  development  of  its 
committee  system,  225;  explana- 
tion of  its  peculiarities,  228 ;  op- 
pressed by  its  own  mechanism, 
229 ;  unable  to  legislate  carefully, 
231;  no  direct  representation  of 
general  interests,  232:  subservi- 
ent to  special  interests,  233 ;  apt 
to  misconceive  public  opinion, 
234;  subject  to  irresponsible 
control,  235 ;  its  character  exem- 
plified by  the  Record,  237 ;  origi- 
nal respect  for  President's  initia- 
tive, 278 ;  congressional  policy 
shaped  by  executive  influence, 
279-283 ;  disposition  to  shift  re- 
sponsibility to  the  President,  284- 
286;  final  place  in  our  constitu- 


tional system,  370;  can  admit 
heads  of  administration  to  direct 
participation  in  legislative  pro- 
ceedings, 383-394 ;  results  of  the 
present  separation  of  executive 
and  legislative  branches,  394- 
396. 

Connecticut,  10,  167,  191. 

Constitution  of  the  United  States, 
starting-point,  40;  inside  politics 
of  movement,  41-44;  formation 
of,  45-57;  modelled  on  English 
constitution,  47 ;  an  embodiment 
of  Whig  doctrine,  51 ;  English 
reform  ideas  incorporated,  52; 
anti-democratic  nature,  53,  54; 
a  deposit  from  the  stream  of 
English  constitutional  ideas,  56; 
originated  a  new  type  of  govern- 
ment, 57 ;  theory  of  its  checks 
and  balances,  60 ;  fallacious  ex- 
pectations of,  67;  energized  by 
the  gentry,  68 ;  failure  of,  as  a 
general  model  of  government, 
68  ;  effect  upon  course  of  politi- 
cal development,  71 ;  leaves  great 
latitude  to  state  action,  150; 
scheme  of  presidential  election 
miscarries,  153;  diversities  in 
appointment  of  presidential  elec- 
tors, 154;  attempts  at  amend- 
ment, 159;  broad  construction 
tendency  developed  in  Congress, 
164;  nature  of  the  veto  power, 
177 ;  its  development,  183 ;  ex- 
tends to  items,  185 ;  effacement 
of  the  constitutional  design  for 
the  election  of  President,  208 ; 
the  genesis  of  the  nullification 
doctrine,  211;  of  the  secession 
movement,  212 ;  lack  of  proper 
organs  for  democratic  func- 
tions, 215;  its  character  as  a 
working  machine  of  government, 
217 ;  function  of  the  convention 
system,  220;  constitutional  func- 


400 


INDEX 


tions  of  the  President,  275-277, 
291 ;  failure  of  constitutional 
checks  upon  President's  power, 
288 ;  public  attachment  to  obso- 
lete ideas,  334;  practical  conse- 
quences of,  346 ;  the  future  course 
of  constitutional  development, 
356,  363;  the  ultimate  type,  369- 
374;  power  of  Congress  to  admit 
executive  officials  to  participate 
in  legislative  debate,  383-394. 

Constitutional  Union  Party,  206. 

Convention  system,  see  Party  or- 
ganization. 

Corruption  of  State  legislatures, 
46,  320,  323. 

Crawford,  W.  H.,  158. 

Dallas,  Alexander,  127. 

De  Foe,  351. 

Delaware,  methods  of  voting  in, 
7,  116,  159. 

Democracy,  fear  of,  45,  46;  fav- 
ored by  territorial  conditions, 
69 ;  Fisher  Ames  on,  125 ;  ten- 
dencies towards,  134;  political 
upheaval  of,  158;  effects  upon 
mode  of  presidential  election, 
159 ;  its  constitutional  expression 
in  America  and  England  com- 
pared, 213  ;  mode  of  its  consti- 
tutional development,  219;  con- 
verts the  presidency  into  an 
elective  kingship,  293  ;  multiplies 
elective  offices,  299;  its  ideal  a 
perfect  medium  for  social  activi- 
ties, 375  ;  the  democratic  type  of 
government,  376 ;  its  grand  pos- 
sibilities, 377,  378,  380;  human 
progress  a  democratic  principle, 
378. 

Democratic  party  founded  by  Jack- 
son, 172 ;  obtained  possession  of 
the  Jeffersonian  tradition,  173 ; 
support  of  the  veto  power  a 
party  principle,  181. 


De  Tocqueville,  cited,  262,  380. 

Dickinson,  John,  state  rights  a 
social  security,  46 ;  on  the  fed- 
eral system,  50;  on  the  Senate, 
53;  favors  restriction  of  the  suf- 
frage, n.  70;  becomes  a  Repub- 
lican leader,  102;  author  of  the 
Farmer's  Letters,  no. 

Drinking  customs,  2. 

Elective  franchise,  conditioned  by 
property  qualifications,  4 ;  mode 
of,  6;  an  inducement  to  settlers, 
70;  movement  toward  manhood 
suffrage,  133 ;  applied  to  presi- 
dential elections,  158 ;  great  ex- 
tension of,  167 ;  transforms  the 
government,  167 ;  extension  an- 
tagonized by  old-school  states- 
men, 168. 

Electoral  college,  devised  as  a  dis- 
cretionary body,  50;  controlled 
by  the  Congressional  Caucus,  155 ; 
diversity  in  modes  of  state  ap- 
pointment, 154;  district  system 
of  election  abandoned,  159 ;  be- 
comes subservient  to  popular 
control,  161 ;  becomes  a  demo- 
cratic agency,  214;  divested  of 
its  original  discretion,  219. 

Ellsworth,  Oliver,  denounces  Jef- 
ferson in  charging  a  jury,  113; 
on  President's  revisionary  power 
over  legislation,  177. 

England,  political  instability,  23; 
prevalence  of  corruption,  24; 
vigor  of  representative  institu- 
tions, 26;  antipathy  to  repub- 
lics, 28  ;  attachment  to  balanced 
powers  of  government,  29;  atti- 
tude to  United  States  during 
Confederation  period,  38;  pes- 
simistic sentiment,  66;  modern 
constitutional  theory  of,  93;  de- 
velopment of  its  political  charac- 
teristics, 122 ;  politics  during  the 


INDEX 


4OI 


eighteenth  century,  335-349;  re- 
generated by  party  government, 
349 ;  reform  measures,  350-352 ; 
inherent  weakness  of  parliament- 
ary government,  371 ;  conditions 
for  satisfactory  working  of  the 
constitutional  system,  372-375. 
English  Constitutional  Society,  8. 

Federalist  party,  supports  the  adop- 
tion of  constitution,  101 ;  sup- 
ports the  administration,  105; 
behavior  of  judges,  112;  enacts 
the  alien  and  sedition  laws,  113; 
wrecked  by  them,  117;  causes 
of  its  weakness,  117;  its  rise  in 
New  York,  143;  election  trick- 
ery, 151. 

Fillmore,  Millard,  280. 

Fox,  Henry,  138,  337. 

France,  opposed  large  concessions 
to  America,  16;  indifferent  to 
American  welfare,  37;  constitu- 
tion of  1791,  68 ;  sustains  Frank- 
lin, 97 ;  mentioned,  373. 

Franco-mania,  its  prevalence  in 
England,  25. 

Franklin,  Benjamin,  colonial  agent 
at  Westminster,  2;  thought 
America  would  lapse  into  king- 
ship, n.  51 ;  attempt  to  dismiss 
him,  97. 

Frederick  the  Great,  97. 

Freneau,  107. 

Garfield,  James   A.,  assassination 

of,  268. 
George  III.,  14,  24,  32,  67,  90,  138, 

213.  344- 

Georgia,  methods  of  voting  in,  7, 
116,  158,  160. 

Gerry,  Elbridge,  democracy  prone 
to  injustice,  46. 

Gibbon,  preference  for  French  so- 
ciety, 25 ;  political  speculations 
of,  65. 

2  D 


Giddings,  Joshua,  240. 

Goldsmith,  Oliver,  celebrates  royal 
prerogative,  25. 

Gordon,  William,  on  origin  of 
caucus,  4. 

Grant,  U.  S.,  holds  that  appropri- 
ations are  not  mandatory,  185 ; 
interested  in  Mexican  recipro- 
city treaty,  n.  245 ;  condemns 
Tenure  of  Office  Act,  267. 

Griffin,  Cyrus,  president  of  Con- 
gress, 4 ;  on  America's  contempt- 
ible situation,  38. 

Guizot  on  federal  government,  57. 

Gustavus  III.  of  Sweden,  22. 

Hamilton,  Alexander,  on  the  Con- 
federation, 37;  how  to  govern 
men,  47 ;  favors  strong  executive, 
54;  on  administration,  59;  de- 
spondent of  public  affairs,  n.  66; 
his  scheme  of  presidential  eti- 
quette, 72;  Maclay's  opinion  of, 
76;  attitude  to  Adams'  adminis- 
tration, n.  80;  his  maxim  of 
practical  politics,  81 ;  assumes 
functions  of  a  crown  minister, 
81;  organizes  Treasury  depart- 
ment, n.  81 ;  adheres  to  English 
precedents,  82;  premier  of  the 
ministry,  n,  82;  his  financial 
measures,  83 ;  his  self-sacrificing 
public  spirit,  85 ;  bargains  with 
Jefferson  to  carry  the  Assump- 
tion bill,  87 ;  one  of  the  authors 
of  The  Federalist,  no;  regards 
alien  and  sedition  laws  as  im- 
politic, 114;  political  methods  in 
New  York,  143 ;  plans  the  Chris- 
tian Constitutional  Society,  145 ; 
political  sharp  practice  proposed 
to  Jay,  151 ;  on  the  presidential 
veto,  176;  compares  it  with  the 
royal  negative,  178  ;  on  supreme 
importance  of  presidential  elec- 
tion, 196;  senators  to  have  no 


402 


INDEX 


choice  as  to  appointments,  260; 
President  the  centre  of  adminis- 
tration, 277;  on  evasion  of  re- 
sponsibility, 327. 

Hare,  legal  opinion  of  President's 
authority,  291. 

Harrington,  James,  author  of 
"  Oceana,"  169. 

Harrison,  Gov.  Benj.,  on  popular 
ignorance  of  causes  of  Revolu- 
tion, ii. 

Harrison,  William  Henry,  theory 
of  presidential  responsibility, 
189. 

Hastings,  Daniel  H.,  his  vetoes, 
184. 

Hawley,  Senator,  n.  240. 

Hayes,  Rutherford  B.,  mentioned, 
289;  on  President's  power,  291. 

Henry,  Patrick,  opposition  of,  to 
constitution,  n.  63;  condemns 
Virginia  and  Kentucky  resolu- 
tions, 102. 

Hepburn,  of  Iowa,  n.  242. 

Hill,  David  B.,  his  vetoes,  184. 

Hoar,  Senator,  on  the  courtesy  of 
the  Senate,  n.  268;  on  changed 
conditions  in  the  Senate,  n.  269 ; 
on  the  Senate  as  an  instrument 
of  minority  rule,  360. 

Holy  Roman  Empire,  19. 

House  of  Representatives,  see 
Representatives. 

Hume,  on  turbulence  of  English 
politics,  24;  on  superiority  of 
French  society,  25. 

Ingersoll,  Jared,  127. 

Internal  improvements,  beginnings 

of,  164. 
Italian  republics,  22. 

Jackson,  Andrew,  natural  leader 
of  the  democratic  movement, 
157;  his  presidential  candidacy 
in  1824,  158 ;  elected  President, 


159;  causes  of  his  triumph,  168  ; 
reforms  public  office,  170;  shapes 
party  issues,  171 ;  founder  of  the 
Democratic  party,  172;  asserts 
presidential  authority,  173 ;  vigor- 
ous use  of  veto  power,  180;  sus- 
tained by  the  people,  181 ;  his 
administration  a  constitutional 
landmark,  212 ;  evades  Senate's 
power  of  rejecting  nominations, 
290. 

Jay,  John,  one  of  the  authors  of 
The  Federalist,  no;  declines 
chief-justiceship,  119;  rejects 
Hamilton's  sharp  practice,  152. 

Jefferson,  Thomas,  on  balanced 
powers  of  government,  34 ;  Ma- 
clay's  opinion  of,  76;  attitude  to 
Washington's  administration,  n. 
79;  bargains  for  the  Potomac 
site,  87 ;  on  legal  tender  acts,  98 ; 
a  national  politician,  101;  op- 
posed to  growth  of  city  popula- 
tion, 104 ;  hostility  to  Hamilton's 
policy,  105;  friendly  towards 
John  Adams,  117;  style  of  his 
administration,  130;  its  authori- 
tative character,  131 ;  letter  to 
William  Wirt,  133 ;  letter  on  re- 
movals from  office,  139 ;  favored 
rotation  in  office,  168 ;  approved 
an  exercise  of  President's  veto 
power,  179;  did  not  himself  use 
the  veto  power,  179;  his  manual 
of  parliamentary  law,  224,  252 ; 
his  Secretary  of  the  Navy  never 
confirmed,  290. 

Johnson,  Andrew,  288. 

Johnson,  Dr.  Samuel,  338,  342. 

Junius,  15,  138,  354. 

King,  Rufus,  on  President's  respon- 
sibility, 277. 

Kentucky  resolutions,  framed  by 
Jefferson,  116. 

Knox,  General,  Maclay's  opinion 


INDEX 


403 


of,  76 ;  accompanies  Washington 
to  Senate  chamber,  77. 

Laurens,  Henry,  on  corruption  of 
Continental  Congress,  96. 

Lecky,  W.  E.  H.,  cited,  263,  335, 
339-  340,  3SL  38o. 

Lee,  Arthur,  8. 

Lee,  Richard  Henry,  102. 

Lincoln,  Abraham,  280. 

Lincoln,  James,  n.  79. 

Louisiana,  methods  of  voting  in, 
158,  160. 

Louis  XIV,  122. 

Lyon,  Matthew,  punished  for  sedi- 
tion, 114. 

Macaulay,  Mrs.  Catherine,  354. 

Macaulay,  Thomas  Babington,  129, 
214,  335.  338,  339,  34i,  344. 
352. 

Maclay,  William,  describes  Wash- 
ington's manner,  74;  criticises 
the  federal  leaders,  76 ;  and 
Washington  too,  77 ;  describes 
attempt  to  use  Senate  as  a  privy 
council,  77 ;  describes  visit  of 
Jefferson  to  Senate  chamber,  n. 
81;  puffs  John  Adams  for  Vice- 
President,  86;  on  Washington's 
attention  to  Representatives,  135 ; 
on  appeals  to  the  aid  of  the 
Senate,  259;  on  senatorial  de- 
portment, 265. 

Madison,  James,  inside  politics  of 
national  movement,  42 ;  democ- 
racy prone  to  dishonesty,  45 ; 
favored  national  negative  on 
state  legislation,  49 ;  on  the 
Senate,  53 ;  need  of  legislative 
restraint,  54 ;  public  safety  the 
supreme  law,  55 ;  on  principles 
of  government,  60;  definition  of 
a  republic,  62;  declines  to  confer 
with  the  Senate,  78 ;  moves  to 
reduce  General  St.  Clair's  salary, 


86;  defends  grant  of  power  to 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  87 ;  a 
national  politician,  101 ;  Re- 
publican leader,  102;  attacks 
foreign  policy  of  Washington's 
administration,  107 ;  one  of  the 
authors  of  The  Federalist,  no; 
carried  executive  authority  to 
extreme  lengths,  132;  excuses 
party  change  of  policy,  163 ;  de- 
fends property  qualifications  of 
suffrage,  168 ;  use  of  the  veto 
power,  179;  on  control  of  legisla- 
tive assemblies,  237;  on  powers 
of  House  of  Representatives, 
247 ;  on  the  authority  of  the 
Senate,  257;  subjected  to  dicta- 
tion by  the  Senate,  260;  on  se- 
curity against  senatorial  ascen- 
dency, 358. 

Maine,  7. 

Marshall,  John,  120,  155,  168. 

Martin,  Luther,  102. 

Maryland,  7,  40,  159,  160,  167. 

Mason,  George,  on  popular  inca- 
pacity, 45;  on  legislative  delin- 
quency, 47  ;  opposed  to  the  con- 
stitution, n.  79. 

Massachusetts,  116,  152,  167,  191. 

McKean,  Governor,  127. 

McKinley,  William,  241. 

MacPherson,  Senator,  holds  back 
the  tariff  bill,  n.  272. 

Mercer,  John  Francis,  46. 

Michigan  temporarily  adopts  dis- 
trict system  of  choosing  presiden- 
tial electors,  160. 

Milton,  John,  on  English  political 
instability,  23;  on  a  free  com- 
monwealth, 27  ;  on  origin  of  Par- 
liament, 122. 

Mississippi,  116,  160. 

Missouri,  160,  166,  167,  190,  263. 

Monroe,  James,  President's  patron- 
age used  against  De  Witt  Clinton, 
149 ;  devises  constitutional  loop- 


404 


INDEX 


hole  for  internal  improvements, 
164;  letter  to  Wirt  on  Cabinet 
office,  166;  establishes  four-year 
term  of  appointments  to  office, 
170;  use  of  the  veto  power,  179. 

Montesquieu,  29. 

Morris,  Gouverneur,  how  to  govern 
mankind,  47 ;  on  the  Senate,  53 ; 
on  presidential  duty,  275. 

Morris,  Robert,  100. 

Morrissey,  John,  n.  240,  322. 

Morrison,  W.  R.,  presidential  pat- 
ronage the  support  of  party  dis- 
cipline, 282. 

National  Republican  party,  n.  160 ; 
and  see  Whig  party. 

Nevada,  disproportionate  repre- 
sentation of,  273. 

New  England,  7,  38,  55,  116. 

New  Hampshire,  191. 

New  Jersey,  6,  40,  152,  160. 

Newspapers  in  colonial  period,  12; 
during  Federalist  period,  107; 
historical  antecedents  of,  109; 
intrude  into  politics,  109;  colo- 
nial censorship  of,  no;  a  vehi- 
cle of  revolutionary  thought, 
no;  attacks  on  Washington, 
in. 

New  York,  family  control  of  poli- 
tics, 10;  commercial  relations, 
40;  national  political  issues  in- 
troduced, 143;  democratic  ten- 
dencies, 144 ;  revolt  against  Con- 
gressional Caucus,  157;  adopts 
general  ticket  system,  158 ;  veto 
power  in,  183,  184;  inadequate 
representation  in  United  States 
Senate,  273;  Lexow  committee 
disclosures,  321. 

North  Carolina,  6,  116. 

North,  Lord,  14. 

Ohio,  116,  191. 
Otis,  James,  13. 


Otto,  describes  plans  for  a  restora- 
tion of  government,  42-44. 

Page,  of  Virginia,  attacks  proposed 
powers  of  Secretary  of  the  Treas- 
ury, 87. 

Paine,  Thomas,  on  maltreatment 
of  loyalists,  9;  advocates  inde- 
pendence, 30. 

Pan-American  conference,  224. 

Party  organization,  beginnings  of, 
7 ;  first  effects  of  in  Congress,  88 ; 
the  bane  of  the  Whig  ideal,  90 ; 
Washington's  condemnation  of, 
93 ;  repugnant  to  traditional  sen- 
timent, 95 ;  development  of,  95 ; 
motives  of,  101 ;  shaped  by  cir- 
cumstances, 103 ;  distinction 
between  Federalists  and  Repub- 
licans, 104;  as  an  English  char- 
acteristic, 121 ;  distinction  be- 
tween party  and  faction,  127; 
conservative  function  of,  128, 
305;  aristocratic  ascendency  in, 
134;  promoted  by  patronage, 
134;  effect  of  national  politics 
upon  state  politics,  141 ;  laying 
hold  upon  state  offices,  143 ; 
establishment  of  the  machine, 
149;  nationalizing  influences  of, 
150,  303;  consolidated  by  pat- 
ronage, 171 ;  rise  of  the  conven- 
tion system,  197 ;  development 
of  the  platform,  205 ;  the  agency 
of  administrative  control,  215, 
356;  an  organ  of  government. 
220;  peculiarity  of  the  American 
type,  294 ;  has  jurisdiction  over 
congressional  policy,  295;  slight 
basis  of  its  representative  char- 
acter, 296;  in  reality  a  self-con- 
stituted factorship,  297;  causes 
of  its  elaboration  and  complexity, 
298,  299;  to  some  extent  estab- 
lishes the  public  responsibility  of 
the  government,  300;  the  genesis 


INDEX 


of  boss  rule,  301 ;  the  great  factor 
of  national  unity,  306;  assimi- 
lates immigrant  peoples  with  the 
general  mass  of  citizenship,  307; 
characteristics  of  the  political 
class,  309,  310;  more  numerous 
than  in  England,  311;  party 
expenditure,  313;  party  revenue, 
317-320;  tribute  from  corpora- 
tions, 317;  exploits  public  re- 
sources, 318;  animus  of  faction 
conflicts,  319;  partisanship  and 
corruption  antagonistic  prin- 
ciples, 322 ;  cost  of  party  subsist- 
ence, 323 ;  public  service  an 
incident  of  party  activity,  325 ; 
not  usually  subject  to  specific 
responsibility,  327;  apt  to  mis- 
conceive public  opinion,  329; 
deference  to  popular  folly,  329; 
platform  characteristics,  330; 
cannot  avoid  presidential  issues, 
331 ;  the  national  convention  the 
arbiter  of  party  orthodoxy,  331 ; 
the  consultative  faculty  of  party 
the  agency  of  political  progress, 
333;  English  prototypes  of  Amer- 
ican political  methods,  339-344, 
355 ;  an  administrative  connec- 
tion between  executive  and  legis- 
lative branches,  306;  the  ulti- 
mate type,  370. 

Patronage,  use  of,  in  English  poli- 
tics, 134 ;  during  colonial  period, 
135;  by  Washington,  136;  under 
Adams'  administration,  136;  the 
spring  of  congressional  activity, 
137 ;  feeling  against  removals 
from  office,  137 ;  growing  use  of, 
in  state  politics,  147 ;  corner-stone 
of  national  party  organization, 
207 ;  a  constitutional  source  of 
executive  influence,  276;  an  ele- 
ment of  social  stability,  305. 

Peel,  Sir  Robert,  on  public  opinion, 
64. 


Penn,  William,  political  induce- 
ments to  immigrants,  n.  70. 

Pennsylvania,  commercial  rela- 
tions, 40;  revolts  against  Adams, 
137 ;  political  conditions  in,  157 ; 
veto  power  in,  184. 

Philadelphia,  the  largest  colonial 
city,  10. 

Pickering,  Timothy,  136. 

Pierce,  Franklin,  280. 

Pinckney,  Charles,  draught  of  the 
constitution,  176. 

Pitney,  representative,  cited,  n. 
249. 

Pitt  (Lord  Chatham),  14,  91. 

Pitt,  William,  138. 

Platform,  the,  see  Party  organiza- 
tion. 

Plumb,  Senator,  n.  272. 

Polk,  James  K.,  on  the  veto  power, 
189;  but-mano2uvres  the  Senate, 
256;  mentioned,  279. 

Political  Ideas,  in  the  middle  ages, 
18  ;  attachment  to  kingship,  20  ; 
influences  unfavorable  to  parlia- 
mentary institutions,  21;  effect 
of  theocratic  principles,  26;  in- 
fluence of  Cromwellian  Com- 
monwealth, 27;  genesis  of  Whig 
doctrine,  29 ;  repugnant  to  party 
spirit,  90;  as  set  forth  by  Boling- 
broke,  90 ;  as  set  forth  by  Burke, 
91 ;  effects  of  party  system  upon, 
92;  found  expression  in  party 
organization,  103 ;  divide  the 
gentry,  106;  as  to  the  place  of 
the  public  press,  HI;  mythic 
tendency  in,  129;  averse  to  dis- 
turbance of  official  tenure,  137; 
diversity  of,  between  North  and 
South,  142;  rotation  in  office, 
169;  genesis  of  nullification  doc- 
trine, 211 ;  influence  upon  presi- 
dential functions,  214 ;  operation 
in  producing  constitutional  de- 
velopment, 219 ;  reaction  against 


406 


INDEX 


narrow  views  of  national  author- 
ity, 263 ;  checked  by  the  Missouri 
compromise,  264;  American  tol- 
erance and  good  humor,  304; 
impress  a  narrow  meaning  on 
the  word  "politics,"  315;  repug- 
nant to  party  organization,  322; 
the  old  Whig  ideal  still  dominant, 
334;  past  English  parallels  of 
modern  American  ideas,  335- 
345  ;  Burke's  diagnosis,  345-349 ; 
the  means  of  reform,  350 ;  Ameri- 
can reform  ideas  the  echo  of  ob- 
solete English  ideas,  355. 
President  of  the  United  States,  an 
embodiment  of  monarchical  pre- 
rogative, 54,  55 ;  royal  style  af- 
fected, 72 ;  but  proves  ineffectual, 
75;  changes  in  official  style  in- 
troduced by  Jefferson,  130;  tends 
to  become  the  headship  of  a 
bureaucracy,  165 ;  extent  of  veto 
power,  185 ;  acquires  a  repre- 
sentative character,  190;  small 
vote  for  previously,  190;  trans- 
formation of  the  system  of  elec- 
tion, 208;  the  instrument  of 
democratic  forces,  214 ;  defective 
accommodation  to  its  new  func- 
tions, 215 ;  the  organ  of  the  na- 
tional will,  219;  charged  with 
the  direction  of  national  policy, 
275,  277;  his  duty  like  that  of 
the  British  Premier,  275,  276; 
his  patronage  a  constitutional 
means  of  influence,  276;  Con- 
gress originally  provided  for 
presidential  initiative.  278 ;  po- 
litical issues  always  decided  by 
executive  policy,  279-283 ;  ex- 
ecutive support  essential  to  the 
accomplishment  of  party  pur- 
poses, 282;  "presidential  author- 
ity an  inextinguishable  factor, 
283;  political  conditions  tend  to 
aggrandize  presidential  author- 


ity, 284-286,  356;  presidential 
authority  compared  with  royal 
authority,  287 ;  the  vice-presi- 
dency a  source  of  weakness, 
287;  failure  of  constitutional 
checks  upon  presidential  au- 
thority, 288,  289;  constitutional 
defences  against  senatorial  usur- 
pation, 289,  290;  testimony  of 
statesmen  on  President's  powers, 
291 ;  an  elective  kingship,  293 ; 
the  national  boss,  302 ;  affords 
the  only  practical  means  of  ex- 
tending popular  rule,  356;  ex- 
ecutive cooperation  essential  to 
successful  attack  upon  the  sen- 
atorial oligarchy,  361 ;  constitu- 
tionally omnipotent  in  conjunc- 
tion with  House  of  Representa- 
tives, 363 ;  office  comprehends 
incongruous  functions,  368  ;  will 
tend  to  assume  an  honorary  and 
a  ceremonial  character,  369;  po- 
litical functions  eventually  auto- 
matic, 373. 

Puritanism,  contains  a  political 
virus,  38. 

Randall,  Samuel  J.,  obstructs  tariff 
reform,  n.  234  ;  predicts  national 
bankruptcy  from  committee 
methods,  249. 

Randolph,  Edmund,  on  the  Con- 
tinental Congress,  n.36;  prepares 
plan  of  national  government,  49. 

Randolph,  John,  147. 

Reed,  Speaker,  on  inability  of  Con- 
gress to  act  without  specific  in- 
struction, 233 ;  as  a  Capitol  guide, 
n.  246. 

Removals  from  office,  excused  by 
Jefferson,  139;  in  state  politics, 
142,  148,  149;  rotation  in  office, 
169;  systematized  by  Jackson, 
170;  effect  upon  public  service, 
171. 


INDEX 


407 


Representatives,  House  of,  defeats 
efforts  to  confer  titles  on  presi- 
dential office,  55 ;  members  not 
entitled  to  access  to  President, 
72;  diversity  in  election  of  mem- 
bers, 156;  district  system  made 
general,  160;  originally  the  organ 
of  public  opinion,  190 ;  its  decline 
begins,  191 ;  formerly  the  leading 
branch  of  government,  192;  re- 
flects passing  moods  of  the  peo- 
ple, 194;  development  of  its 
committee  system,  226;  its  sys- 
tem of  rules,  230 ;  represents  the 
districts,  239;  continual  change 
of  membership,  241;  "log-roll- 
ing," 242;  not  sensitive  in  regard 
to  corporate  privilege,  243 ;  hum- 
ble attitude  towards  the  Senate, 
254.357.  359:  power  as  regards 
treaties,  245 ;  decline  of  its  au- 
thority, 246;  decay  of  its 'consti- 
tutional prerogatives,  247 ;  its 
confessions  of  impotence,  248; 
loses  control  over  the  national 
budget,  249;  arbitrary  power  of 
the  Speaker,  251 ;  legislative 
demeanor,  252;  character  of 
oratory,  253;  party  control  of 
legislative  procedure,  254;  im- 
peachment process  worthless  as 
a  constitutional  check,  288 ; 
cannot  refuse  supplies,  289 :  ex- 
ecutive cooperation  necessary 
for  the  restoration  of  its  privi- 
leges, 361 ;  omnipotent  in  con- 
junction with  the  President,  363 ; 
will  then  become  the  seat  of 
administration,  367. 

Republican  party  I  Jeffersonian), 
origin  of,  105 ;  Jefferson's  ac- 
count of,  106 ,  invokes  state  rights, 
114,  provides  a  constitutional 
outlet  for  disaffection,  126;  con- 
trolled by  the  Congressional 
Caucus,  155  ;  disruption  of,  157  ; 


experiences  a  change  of  heart, 

162. 
Republican    party    (of    our    own 

times),  160. 

Richmond,  Duke  of,  15. 
Rockingham,  Lord,  91. 
Rousseau,  17. 
Rush,  Dr.  Benjamin,  86. 

Senate,  United  States,  constituted 
as  an  aristocracy,  53;  attempts 
to  attach  titles  to  the  presidency, 
55 ;  failure  of,  as  a  privy  council, 
78,  256;  elections  regulated  by 
law,  160;  censures  Jackson  and 
forced  to  expunge  it,  173 ;  begins 
public  sessions,  193;  no  restric- 
tion upon  debate,  222.  265;  its 
committee  system,  227;  arbitrary 
control  over  legislation,  236; 
superior  address  in  providing 
for  itself,  245 ;  not  faithful  to 
party  obligation,  255;  prompt 
development  of  its  powers,  257 ; 
as  compared  with  House  of 
Lords,  258;  legislative  ascend- 
ency over  the  House,  259 ;  usur- 
pation of  presidential  prerogative, 
260;  originally  inferior  to  House 
in  political  prestige,  261 ;  be- 
comes a  parliamentary  forum, 
262;  foundations  of  its  dignity, 
263;  a  school  of  political  educa- 
tion for  the  nation,  264;  aug- 
mentation of  authority,  266; 
usurps  the  appointing  power, 
267 ;  forced  to  surrender  control 
over  removals,  268 ;  change  of 
character,  269 ;  uses  its  privileges 
for  legislative  extortion,  270 ;  tone 
of  proceedings,  271 ;  methods  of 
legislation,  272;  misrepresenta- 
tive  composition,  273;  declining 
in  public  respect.  274 ;  its  confir- 
mation of  appointments  may  be 
dispensed  with,  290;  the  rule  of 


408 


INDEX 


an  oligarchy,  357 ;  a  state  sover- 
eignty revival,  361 ;  how  to  reform 
the  Senate,  363. 

Seward,  Secretary  of  State,  calls  the 
President  an  elective  king,  291. 

Shays'  Rebellion  causes  public 
alarm,  55. 

Shelburne,  Lord,  92,  337. 

Sherman,  John,  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury,  86 ;  on  President's  dis- 
cretionary authority  over  appro- 
priations, 185 ;  on  the  issue 
between  President  Johnson  and 
Congress,  281 ;  cause  of  enact- 
ment of  silver  bullion  purchase 
bill,  283;  establishes  gold  re- 
serve fund,  285. 

Sherman,  Roger,  anti-democratic 
principles,  45. 

Smith,  Robert,  Secretary  of  the 
Navy,  290. 

South  American  republics,  69. 

South  Carolina,  assembly  votes 
money  to  an  English  political 
society,  7;  legislature  appoints 
presidential  electors,  116,  159. 

Speaker,  the,  original  conception 
of,  135 ;  appoints  House  com- 
mittees, n.  227 ;  determines  char- 
acter of  legislation  by  committee 
appointments,  234 ;  his  negative 
upon  legislation,  251 ;  control  of 
legislative  procedure,  255;  his 
power  over  opportunities  of  leg- 
islation, 357 ;  will  eventually  be 
taken  over  by  the  administration, 
366. 

Spencer,  Herbert,  on  ultimate  type 
of  government,  n.  373. 

Stamp  Act,  passage  of,  13. 

State  sovereignty  invoked  as  a  re- 
source of  opposition,  116. 

Stewart,  Senator,  on  national  legis- 
lation, 273. 

Story,  Justice,  on  dangers  from 
lack  of  direct  association  of  the 


executive  department  with  legis- 
lative proceedings,  394-396. 

Suffrage,  see  Elective  franchise. 

Sweden,  revolution  in,  22. 

Swift,  Jonathan,  109. 

Taine  on  source  of  absolutism  in 
France,  21. 

Talleyrand,  113,  325. 

Tammany  Hall,  145,  201,  297. 

Taney,  Roger  B.,  acted  as  Secre- 
tary of  the  Treasury  without  con- 
firmation, 290. 

Tilden,  Samuel  J.,  316. 

Trevelyan,  George  Otto,  335,  336. 

Turgot,  criticism  upon  American 
constitutions,  35. 

Tyler,  John,  his  vetoes,  182, 189, 279. 

United  States,  beginnings  of  na- 
tionality, 13 ;  true  cause  of  the 
Revolution,  31 ;  Confederation 
period,  36-44;  federal  structure 
of  nation,  57 ;  government  begins 
as  a  class  rule,  59 ;  a  monarchi- 
cal republic,  61 ;  first  occasion 
of  official  reference  to  it  as  a  re- 
public, n.  62;  political  induce- 
ments to  immigration,  69 ;  breach 
between  society  and  politics,  70; 
government  patterned  after  Eng- 
land, 72;  foundations  laid  by 
"  log-rolling,"  87 ;  variety  of  po- 
litical conditions,  150;  gradually 
brought  into  national  conformity, 
159,  160;  political  results  of 
growth  of  population,  168;  its 
political  history  shaped  by  exec- 
utive policy,  279;  its  humanistic 
r61e,  380. 

Van  Buren,  Martin,  203,  205,  279. 

Vermont  adopts  general  ticket 
system,  158. 

Vest,  Senator,  on  legislative  black- 
mail, n.  270. 


INDEX 


409 


Veto,  by  Madison,  164;  by  Mon- 
roe, 164 ;  history  of,  in  the  con- 
stitution, 175;  by  Jackson,  180; 
public  agitation  against,  181 ;  by 
Tyler,  182;  a  democratic  prin- 
ciple, 182 ;  in  the  state  constitu- 
tions, 183;  applies  to  items  of 
bills,  185 ;  as  compared  with 
royal  negative  in  England,  186, 
214;  Folk's  view  of,  189;  inef- 
fectual against  "  log-rolling  " 
combinations,  250. 

Virginia,  House  of  Burgesses,  8 ; 
commercial  negotiations  with 
Maryland,  40;  plan  of  national 
government,  48;  slow  to  make 
partisan  removals  from  office, 
142;  presidential  dynasty,  146; 
limitations  on  elective  franchise, 
168. 

Virginia  resolutions  framed  by 
Madison,  115. 

Voltaire  on  royal  authority,  22. 

Voorhees,  Senator,  confesses  in- 
capability of  Congress,  285. 

Voting  methods  in  the  colonies,  6, 7. 

Walpole,  Sir  Robert,  13,  341,  342. 

War  of  Independence,  its  political 
side,  95  et  seq. 

Warville,  Brissot  de,  cited,  4. 

Washington,  George,  election 
liquor  bill,  5 ;  promotes  move- 
ment for  a  more  perfect  union, 
40;  presided  over  constitutional 
convention,  n.  51 ;  criticises  use  of 


word  "  republic,"  n.  62 ;  his  pres- 
idential deportment,  72;  his  dis- 
gust with  official  annoyances, 
74.  75 !  visits  Senate  to  advise 
with  it,  77 ;  Maclay's  opinion  of, 
77;  his  farewell  address,  93;  on 
behavior  of  Continental  Con- 
gress, 96;  cabal  against  him, 
97 ;  hindered  by  congressional 
mismanagement,  98;  on  party 
spirit,  112;  pleased  by  Judge 
Addison's  charges,  113;  ap- 
proves the  alien  and  sedition 
laws,  114;  relations  with  John 
Adams,  118;  use  of  patronage, 
136,  277;  a  nomination  rejected 
by  the  Senate,  260. 

Webster,  Daniel,  on  removals  from 
office,  142;  on  executive  en- 
croachments, 180. 

Whigs,  English,  relation  to  Ameri- 
can Whigs,  14-16;  methods  of 
agitation,  107,  115. 

Whig  party,  a  coalition  of  anti- 
|ackson  factions,  172;  attitude 
towards  the  veto  power,  183; 
averse  to  formal  declarations  of 
principles,  205. 

Wilkes,  John,  8,  107,  115. 

William  the  Conqueror,  122. 

Wirt,  William,  Jefferson's  letter  to, 
133;  consults  Monroe  on  tenure 
of  Cabinet  office,  166;  men- 
tioned, 203. 

Woodbury,  Levi,  on  President's 
veto  power,  187. 


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